Lying relies on the truth

The role of response conflict in concealed information detection with reaction times

The concealed information test (CIT) presents various probe (familiar) items amidst irrelevant (unfamiliar) items. When the probe items appear, reaction time (RT) slows down. This RT-CIT effect has been accounted for by a conflict resulting from the need to deny familiarity of the familiar probes. The present pre-registered study (n = 292) examined whether response conflict is sufficient to account for the RT-CIT effect, using city and name items. Specifically, we compared the common conflict condition, where the response buttons emphasized familiarity of CIT items ("unfamiliar" versus "familiar"), to a novel no conflict condition, where the buttons emphasized categorical membership ("city" versus "name"). In line with our expectations, the RT-CIT effect was substantially stronger in the conflict condition; yet, it remained significant even in the no conflict condition. This implies a critical role for response conflict, but also suggests that other mechanisms (e.g. orientation to significant stimuli) may contribute to the RT-CIT effect.

Cognitive load promotes honesty

In three experiments, we examined the cognitive underpinnings of self-serving dishonesty by manipulating cognitive load under different incentive structures. Participants could increase a financial bonus by misreporting outcomes of private die rolls without any risk of detection. At the same time, they had to remember letter strings of varying length. If honesty is the automatic response tendency and dishonesty is cognitively demanding, lying behavior should be less evident under high cognitive load. This hypothesis was supported by the outcome of two out of three experiments. We further manipulated whether all trials or only one random trial determined payoff to modulate reward adaptation over time (Experiment 2) and whether payoff was framed as a financial gain or loss (Experiment 3). The payoff scheme of one random or all trials did not affect lying behavior and, discordant to earlier research, facing losses instead of gains did not increase lying behavior. Finally, cognitive load and incentive frame interacted significantly, but contrary to our assumption gains increased lying under low cognitive load. While the impact of cognitive load on dishonesty appears to be comparably robust, motivational influences seem to be more elusive than commonly assumed in current theorizing.

Post-execution monitoring in dishonesty

When telling a lie, humans might engage in stronger monitoring of their behavior than when telling the truth. Initial evidence has indeed pointed towards a stronger recruitment of capacity-limited monitoring processes in dishonest than honest responding, conceivably resulting from the necessity to overcome automatic tendencies to respond honestly. Previous results suggested monitoring to be confined to response execution, however, whereas the current study goes beyond these findings by specifically probing for post-execution monitoring. Participants responded (dis)honestly to simple yes/no questions in a first task and switched to an unrelated second task after a response-stimulus interval of 0 ms or 1000 ms. Dishonest responses did not only prolong response times in Task 1, but also in Task 2 with a short response-stimulus interval. These findings support the assumption that increased monitoring for dishonest responses extends beyond mere response execution, a mechanism that is possibly tuned to assess the successful completion of a dishonest act.

Online dating through lies: the effects of lie fabrication for personal semantic information on predicted and actual memory performance

Research shows that people lie on online dating sites often but might fail to remember this information subsequently. This study investigated participants' predicted and actual memory performance for personal semantic information after telling the truth versus a lie in two experiments in a setup similar to online dating sites. In Experiment 1, participants responded to open-ended questions either truthfully or fabricated lies in a within-subjects design, followed by predictions for remembering their responses. Subsequently, they recalled their responses through free-recall. Using the same design, Experiment 2 also manipulated the type of retrieval task by using a free- or cued-recall test. The results showed that participants consistently had higher memory predictions for truthful than deceptive responses. However, the actual memory performance did not always produce similar results to their predictions. The results suggest that the difficulties during lie fabrication, measured through response latencies, partially mediated the relationship between lying and memory predictions. The study has important applied implications for lying about personal semantic information in online dating contexts.

The path of dishonesty: identification of mental processes with electrical neuroimaging

Much research finds that lying takes longer than truth-telling. Yet, the source of this response time difference remains elusive. Here, we assessed the spatiotemporal evolution of electrical brain activity during honesty and dishonesty in 150 participants using a sophisticated electrical neuroimaging approach-the microstate approach. This uniquely positioned us to identify and contrast the entire chain of mental processes involved during honesty and dishonesty. Specifically, we find that the response time difference is the result of an additional late-occurring mental process, unique to dishonest decisions, interrupting the antecedent mental processing. We suggest that this process inhibits the activation of the truth, thus permitting the execution of the lie. These results advance our understanding of dishonesty and clarify existing theories about the role of increased cognitive load. More broadly, we demonstrate the vast potential of our approach to illuminate the temporal organization of mental processes involved in decision-making.

Deceptive behaviour in autism: A scoping review

LAY ABSTRACT

The ability to deceive others is an important skill that usually develops in early childhood. In this review, we give an overview of studies that have examined deceptive behaviour in autistic children, adolescents and adults. We separated the study findings into three main categories and seven sub-categories: (1) Deception ability and prevalence (1a) gameplay deception; (1b) naturalistic deception; (2) Psychological processes in deception (2a) verbal, intellectual and social ability; (2b) ability to understand others' thoughts and beliefs; (2c) cognitive ability; and (3) Social learning (3a) training; (3b) social contexts. Contrary to some stereotypes, we found that autistic people can and do deceive but often find this more difficult than non-autistic people. We also found that autistic people may use different psychological processes than non-autistic people when deceiving and may get better at deception in adulthood.

A Review of Functions of Speculative Thinking

Speculative thinking refers to thinking about past or future possibilities; it includes counterfactual thinking, prefactual thinking, and other types. In this narrative review, we discuss the traditional function of speculative thinking in improving future performance (i.e., the preparatory function). We also explore several non-preparatory functions of speculative thinking that have not been widely covered, namely the functions of conveying information and of supporting lying. In addition, we address temporal asymmetry; one perspective focuses on psychological distance in speculative thinking about the past and future, while another focuses on temporal asymmetry and reality/hypothetical differences in the preparatory function of speculative thinking. Overall, this review suggests that a broader functional theory is needed to address non-preparatory functions and the traditional preparatory function. Such a theory should cover all speculative thinking about the past and future rather than simply counterfactual thinking.

Concealing Untrustworthiness: The Role of Conflict Monitoring in a Social Deception Task

Deception studies emphasize the important role of event-related potentials (ERPs) to uncover deceptive behavior based on underlying neuro-cognitive processes. The role of conflict monitoring as indicated by the frontal N2 component during truthful and deceptive responses was investigated in an adapted Concealed Information Test (CIT). Previously memorized pictures of faces should either be indicated as truthfully trustworthy, truthfully untrustworthy or trustworthy while concealing the actual untrustworthiness (untrustworthy-probe). Mean, baseline-to-peak and peak-to-peak amplitudes were calculated to examine the robustness of ERP findings across varying quantification techniques. Data of 30 participants (15 female; age: M = 23.73 years, SD = 4.09) revealed longer response times and lower correct rates for deceptive compared to truthful trustworthy responses. The frontal N2 amplitude was more negative for untrustworthy-probe and truthful untrustworthy compared to truthful trustworthy stimuli when measured as mean or baseline-to-peak amplitude. Results suggest that deception evokes conflict monitoring and ERP quantifications are differentially sensitive to a-priori hypotheses.

Cognitive strategies for managing cheating: The roles of cognitive abilities in managing moral shortcuts

Cheating and immorality are highly researched phenomena, likely due to their great impact. However, little research has examined the real-time cognitive mechanisms that are involved in cheating and conflict management. Much of the cheating research to date concentrates on binary cheating; however, in more prevalent real-world scenarios, people often engage in more ambiguous self-serving mistakes. To execute such self-serving decisions, one may make use of conflict-management strategies to help balance an internal struggle between gain and self-concept. We propose that to enact such strategies one must employ sufficient cognitive resources. To test this, we employed a simple effortful control task that allows for comparisons of gain and no-gain errors, isolating self-serving mistakes while recording gaze and response-time measures. Findings revealed that individuals can make use of conflict management strategies that mimicked errors made inadvertently. Two strategies included gaze avert and quick response times during gain blocks, whereby participants simulated out-of-control-like behaviors while engaging in self-serving mistakes, plausibly as a method of self-justification. Strategy use was dependent upon individuals' cognitive abilities. Participants reporting high inhibitory control abilities were able to use gaze aversion to engage in self-serving mistakes, while those reporting high attention resources were able to employ faster response times when making more profitable errors. Taken together, this paper contributes to (1) the debate on whether honesty/dishonesty is the dominant response, (2) the debate on self-control and inhibition on cheating, and (3) the understudied area of cognitive justifications to maintain a positive self-concept.

Assessing the impact of previous experience on lie effects through a transfer paradigm

Influential lines of research propose dual processes-based explanations to account for both the cognitive cost implied in lying and for that entailed in the resolution of the conflict posited by Simon tasks. The emergence and consistency of the Simon effect has been proved to be modulated by both practice effects and transfer effects. Although several studies provided evidence that the lying cognitive demand may vary as a function of practice, whether and how transfer effects could also play a role remains an open question. We addressed this question with one experiment in which participants completed a Differentiation of Deception Paradigm twice (baseline and test sessions). Crucially, between the baseline and the test sessions, participants performed a training session consisting in a spatial compatibility task with incompatible (condition 1) or compatible (condition 2) mapping, a non-spatial task (condition 3) and a no task one (condition 4). Results speak in favour of a modulation of individual performances by means of an immediate prior experience, and specifically with an incompatible spatial training.

On the ball: Short-term consequences of movement fakes

In competitive situations, humans sometimes use fake actions. Fake actions are carried out to pretend a certain action goal, which however is not actually pursued, such as pump fakes in basketball, or drop shots in tennis. Here, we studied the short-term consequences of producing or observing fakes on the planning and detection of subsequent fake actions. Two players participated in a game, an attacker and a defender. Attackers had to either throw a ball into a target basket of the defender, or to mimic such a throw without actually throwing. Defenders had to discriminate between real throws and faked throws. Participants changed the roles of attacker and defender, and switched between real and faked throws randomly, on a trial-by-trial basis. We found that the (self-)observation of a fake action facilitated the detection of subsequent fake actions of opponents, but did not facilitate the subsequent planning of own fake actions. We conjecture that previous encounters of fake actions help to focus on the movement aspects that are most diagnostic for such fake actions. As a potential practical consequence, we recommend to not generate multiple fake actions in sports within a short time, to prevent potential short-term perceptual adaptation effects of defenders.

How Not to Fall for the White Bear: Combined Frequency and Recency Manipulations Diminish Negation Effects on Overt Behavior

Processing negated mental representations comes with a price: Not only are negations harder to resolve than affirmative statements, but they may even invoke ironic effects, producing the exact opposite of the intended outcome. Negation effects also behave ironically when subjected to high-frequency training; when they are confronted often, the difficulty to process negations strangely increases. Here we show that negation effects can be mitigated under certain circumstances. Based on models of cognitive control and conflict adaptation, we hypothesized that negation effects diminish when two criteria are met: negations have to be resolved not only frequently, but also just recently. We confirmed this prediction in two experiments by using an innovative, two-dimensional finger tracking design, in which we measured the influence of the original semantic content during negation processing via temporal and spatial measures. Negation effects were present throughout the experiment, but were reduced after recent negations, particularly during or after a high-frequency negation context. The combined influence of frequency and recency thus seems to be the most successful and promising attempt to mitigate ironic negation effects on overt behavior.

Testing the applied potential of the Sheffield Lie Test

The Sheffield Lie Test (SLT) has been frequently used in laboratory research investigating basic mechanisms of deception. Its applied potential as a lie detection tool has been contested. The current two experiments used a reaction time SLT and investigated whether it can discriminate between participants who committed a mock crime and participants who performed an everyday activity. Results of the first experiment revealed that guilty participants (n = 32) took longer and committed more errors when having to deceptively deny the mock crime and deceptively confirm having performed the everyday activity in contrast to truthfully admitting the mock crime and denying the everyday activity. Innocent participants (n = 29) showed the reversed pattern. Individual Cohen's d's and the area under the ROC curve revealed a high above chance discrimination between both groups. In a second experiment, we repeated this procedure, yet participants were now given a more elaborate explanation of the alibi activity that all should pretend to have done. Although results still revealed the expected pattern in innocent participants (n = 48), the effect was not significant any more for the guilty participants (n = 46). Accordingly, classification accuracies also dropped. These two experiments demonstrate the applied potential of the SLT, yet at the same time its severe limitations. Potential solutions and suggestions for future research will be discussed.

False Identity Detection Using Complex Sentences

The use of faked identities is a current issue for both physical and online security. In this paper, we test the differences between subjects who report their true identity and the ones who give fake identity responding to control, simple, and complex questions. Asking complex questions is a new procedure for increasing liars' cognitive load, which is presented in this paper for the first time. The experiment consisted in an identity verification task, during which response time and errors were collected. Twenty participants were instructed to lie about their identity, whereas the other 20 were asked to respond truthfully. Different machine learning (ML) models were trained, reaching an accuracy level around 90–95% in distinguishing liars from truth tellers based on error rate and response time. Then, to evaluate the generalization and replicability of these models, a new sample of 10 participants were tested and classified, obtaining an accuracy between 80 and 90%. In short, results indicate that liars may be efficiently distinguished from truth tellers on the basis of their response times and errors to complex questions, with an adequate generalization accuracy of the classification models.

Deceptive but Not Honest Manipulative Actions Are Associated with Increased Interaction between Middle and Inferior Frontal gyri

The prefrontal cortex is believed to be responsible for execution of deceptive behavior and its involvement is associated with greater cognitive efforts. It is also generally assumed that deception is associated with the inhibition of default honest actions. However, the precise neurophysiological mechanisms underlying this process remain largely unknown. The present study was aimed to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal the underlying functional integration within the prefrontal cortex during the task which requires that subjects to deliberately mislead an opponent through the sequential execution of deceptive and honest claims. To address this issue, we performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis, which allows for statistical assessment of changes in functional relationships between active brain areas in changing psychological contexts. As a result the whole brain PPI-analysis established that both manipulative honest and deceptive claiming were associated with an increase in connectivity between the left middle frontal gyrus and right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Taking into account the role played by rTPJ in processes associated with the theory of mind the revealed data can reflect possible influence of socio-cognitive context on the process of selecting manipulative claiming regardless their honest or deceptive nature. Direct comparison between deceptive and honest claims revealed pattern enhancement of coupling between the left middle frontal gyrus and the left inferior frontal gyrus. This finding provided evidence that the execution of deception relies to a greater extent on higher-order hierarchically-organized brain mechanisms of executive control required to select between two competing deceptive or honest task sets.

Lie construction affects information storage under high memory load condition

Previous studies indicate that lying consumes cognitive resources, especially working memory (WM) resources. Considering the dual functions that WM might play in lying: holding the truth-related information and turning the truth into lies, the present study examined the relationship between the information storage and processing in the lie construction. To achieve that goal, a deception task based on the old/new recognition paradigm was designed, which could manipulate two levels of WM load (low-load task using 4 items and high-load task using 6 items) during the deception process. The analyses based on the amplitude of the contralateral delay activity (CDA), a proved index of the number of representations being held in WM, showed that the CDA amplitude was lower in the deception process than that in the truth telling process under the high-load condition. In contrast, under the low-load condition, no CDA difference was found between the deception and truth telling processes. Therefore, we deduced that the lie construction and information storage compete for WM resources; when the available WM resources cannot meet this cognitive demand, the WM resources occupied by the information storage would be consumed by the lie construction.

Smooth criminal: convicted rule-breakers show reduced cognitive conflict during deliberate rule violations

Classic findings on conformity and obedience document a strong and automatic drive of human agents to follow any type of rule or social norm. At the same time, most individuals tend to violate rules on occasion, and such deliberate rule violations have recently been shown to yield cognitive conflict for the rule-breaker. These findings indicate persistent difficulty to suppress the rule representation, even though rule violations were studied in a controlled experimental setting with neither gains nor possible sanctions for violators. In the current study, we validate these findings by showing that convicted criminals, i.e., individuals with a history of habitual and severe forms of rule violations, can free themselves from such cognitive conflict in a similarly controlled laboratory task. These findings support an emerging view that aims at understanding rule violations from the perspective of the violating agent rather than from the perspective of outside observer.

From junior to senior Pinocchio: A cross-sectional lifespan investigation of deception

We present the first study to map deception across the entire lifespan. Specifically, we investigated age-related difference in lying proficiency and lying frequency. A large community sample (n = 1005) aged between 6 and 77 were surveyed on their lying frequency, and performed a reaction-time (RT) based deception task to assess their lying proficiency. Consistent with the inverted U-shaped pattern of age-related changes in inhibitory control that we observed in a stop signal task, we found that lying proficiency improved during childhood (in accuracy, not RTs), excelled in young adulthood (in accuracy and RTs), and worsened throughout adulthood (in accuracy and RTs). Likewise, lying frequency increased in childhood, peaked in adolescence, and decreased during adulthood. In sum, we observed important age-related difference in deception that generally fit with the U-shaped pattern of age-related changes observed in inhibitory control. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed from a cognitive view of deception.