Naming influences 9-month-olds' identification of discrete categories along a perceptual continuum

Infants' individuation of human faces across race and identity

Young infants' face perception capabilities quickly tune to the features of their primary caregiver. The current study examines whether infants distinguish faces in a more conceptual manner using a manual-search, violation of expectation task that has previously been used to test kind-based individuation. We tested how well infants between 11 and 27 months of age individuated faces that varied by superordinate category (human vs. non-human in Experiment 1) subordinate category (individual identity in Experiment 2) or by race (White vs. Black, Experiments 1 & 2). We assessed individuation by quantifying the difference in infants' duration of reaching within an empty box between trials when the box was unexpectedly empty and expectedly empty. We found evidence of individuation across all ages and conditions, but with within-infant variation. On average, infants individuated face from non-face stimuli (Experiment 1), individual face identities (Experiment 2), and White versus Black faces (Experiments 1 & 2). These findings suggest that 1- to 2-year-old infants use distinct human face features to represent individuals across time and space. We discuss this evidence for race-based individuation and related complexities of face identity in terms of implications for conceptual development for faces in the first years of life.

A principled link between object naming and representation is available to infants by seven months of age

By their first birthdays, infants represent objects flexibly as a function of not only whether but how the objects are named. Applying the same name to a set of different objects from the same category supports object categorization, with infants encoding commonalities among objects at the expense of individuating details. In contrast, applying a distinct name to each object supports individuation, with infants encoding distinct features at the expense of categorical information. Here, we consider the development of this nuanced link between naming and representation in infants' first year. Infants at 12 months (Study 1; N = 55) and 7 months (Study 2; N = 96) participated in an online recognition memory task. All infants saw the same objects, but their recognition of these objects at test varied as a function of how they had been named. At both ages, infants successfully recognized objects that had been named with distinct labels but failed to recognize these objects when they had all been named with the same, consistent label. This new evidence demonstrates that a principled link between object naming and representation is available by 7 months, early enough to support infants as they begin mapping words to meaning.

Human Perception as a Phenomenon of Quantization

For two decades, the formalism of quantum mechanics has been successfully used to describe human decision processes, situations of heuristic reasoning, and the contextuality of concepts and their combinations. The phenomenon of 'categorical perception' has put us on track to find a possible deeper cause of the presence of this quantum structure in human cognition. Thus, we show that in an archetype of human perception consisting of the reconciliation of a bottom up stimulus with a top down cognitive expectation pattern, there arises the typical warping of categorical perception, where groups of stimuli clump together to form quanta, which move away from each other and lead to a discretization of a dimension. The individual concepts, which are these quanta, can be modeled by a quantum prototype theory with the square of the absolute value of a corresponding Schrödinger wave function as the fuzzy prototype structure, and the superposition of two such wave functions accounts for the interference pattern that occurs when these concepts are combined. Using a simple quantum measurement model, we analyze this archetype of human perception, provide an overview of the experimental evidence base for categorical perception with the phenomenon of warping leading to quantization, and illustrate our analyses with two examples worked out in detail.

Language level predicts perceptual categorization of complex reversible events in children

Language plays a well-documented role in perceptual object categorization, but little is known about its role in the categorization of complex events. We explored this here with a perspective from age or developmentally appropriate language capacities in neurotypical children between the ages of two and four years (N = 21), and from delayed language development in a clinical group of children (N = 20), whose verbal mental ages (VMA) often fell far below their chronological ages (CAs). All participants watched two demonstrations of a series of transitive events (e.g. tiger jumps over a girl). The toy agents were then moved out of sight, and participants had to act out the same event type, based on a different tiger and girl that were selected among two distractors. We aimed to determine how mastery of this task relates to CA in the neurotypical group, and whether task performance in the clinical group was predicted by VMA and a standardized measure of grammatical comprehension. Results from a series of logistic mixed-effect regression models showed that neurotypical children start to perform correctly on this task with a chance of around 50% during their third year of CA but reach ceiling performance only during their fourth. A similar pattern emerged for VMA in the clinical group, despite a wide range of CAs and diagnoses. In addition, grammatical comprehension predicted performance. These patterns suggest that language competence plays a role in the perceptual categorization and encoding of complex reversible events.

Relationships Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Action–Reaction Relationships (R) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

Diverse phenomena such as feedback, interconnectedness, causality, network dynamics, and complexity are all born from Relationships. They are fundamentally important, as they are transdisciplinary and synonymous with connections, links, edges, and interconnections. The foundation of systems thinking and systems themselves consists of four universals, one of which is action–reaction Relationships. They are also foundational to the consilience of knowledge. This publication gives a formal description of and predictions of action–reaction Relationships (R) or “R-rule”. There are seven original empirical studies presented in this paper. For these seven studies, experiments for the subjects were created on software (unless otherwise noted). The experiments had the subjects complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples are generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population and they vary for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398). With high statistical significance the studies support the predictions made by DSRP Theory regarding action–reaction Relationships including its universality as an observable phenomenon in both nature (ontological complexity) and mind (cognitive complexity); mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., Distinctions, Systems, and Perspectives); role in structural predictions; internal structures and dynamics; efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity), universality, and efficacy of action–reaction Relationships (R).

Perspectives Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Point-View Perspective (P) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

The importance of perspective-taking crosses disciplines and is foundational to diverse phenomena such as point-of-view, scale, mindset, theory of mind, opinion, belief, empathy, compassion, analysis, and problem solving, etc. This publication gives predictions for and a formal description of point-view Perspectives (P) or the “P-rule”. This makes the P-rule foundational to systems, systems thinking and the consilience of knowledge. It is one of four universals of the organization of information as a whole. This paper presents nine empirical studies in which subjects were asked to complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples vary for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398) and are generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population. As was evident in Cabrera, “These studies support—with high statistical significance—the predictions made by DSRP Theory (Distinctions, Systems Relationships, Perspectives) point-view Perspectives including its: universality as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (material complexity) (i.e., parallelism); internal structures and dynamics; mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., Distinctions, Systems, and Relationships); role in structural predictions; and, efficacy as a metacognitive skill”. These data suggest that point-view Perspectives (P) observably and empirically exist, and that universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and material complexity) exist as well. The impact of this paper is that it provides empirical evidence for the phenomena of point-view perspective taking (“P-rule”) as a universal pattern/structure of systems thinking, a field in which scholarly debate is often based on invalidated opinioned frameworks; this sets the stage for theory building in the field.

Systems Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Part-Whole Systems (S) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

Part-whole Systems (S) structure is foundational to a diverse array of phenomena such as belonging and containment, networks, statistics, reductionism, holism, etc. and is extremely similar if not synonymous with sets, sorts, groups, combinations and combinatorics, clusters, etc. In Cabrera (1998), part-whole Systems (S) or “S-rule” is established as one of four universals for the organization of information and thus is foundational to systems and systems thinking as well as the consilience of knowledge. In this paper, seven empirical studies are presented in which (unless otherwise noted) subjects completed a task. Ranging from n = 407 to n = 34,398, the sample sizes vary for each study but are generalizeable to a normal distribution of the US population. With high statistical significance, the results of these studies support the predictions made by DSRP Theory regarding part-whole Systems (a.k.a., “S-rule”) including: the universality of S-rule as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (ontological complexity) (i.e., parallelism); the internal structures and dynamics of S-rule; S-rule’s mutual dependencies on other universals of DSRP (Distinctions, Systems, Relationships, and Perspectives (i.e., Distinctions, Relationships, and Perspectives); the role S-rule plays in making structural predictions; and, S-rule’s efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity) of part-whole Systems (S).

Distinctions Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Identity–Other Distinctions (D) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

The transdisciplinary importance of distinctions is well-established as foundational to such diverse phenomena as recognition, identification, individual and social identity, marginalization, externalities, boundaries, concept formation, etc., and synonymous general ideas, such as thingness, concepts, nodes, objects, etc. Cabrera provides a formal description of and predictions for identity–other distinctions (D) or “D-rule” as one of four universals for the organization of information that is foundational to systems and systems thinking, as well as the consilience of knowledge. This paper presents seven empirical studies in which (unless otherwise noted) software was used to create an experiment for subjects to complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples varied for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398) and were generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population. These studies support—with high statistical significance—the predictions made by DSRP theory regarding identity–other distinctions including its: universality as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (ontological complexity) (i.e., parallelism); internal structures and dynamics; mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., relationships, systems, and perspectives); role in structural predictions; and efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity) of identity–other distinctions (D).

The “Fish Tank” Experiments: Metacognitive Awareness of Distinctions, Systems, Relationships, and Perspectives (DSRP) Significantly Increases Cognitive Complexity

In the field of systems thinking, there are far too many opinioned frameworks and far too few empirical studies. This could be described as a “gap” in the research but it is more like a dearth in the research. More theory and empirical validation of theory are needed if the field and the phenomenon of systems thinking holds promise and not just popularity. This validation comes in the form of both basic (existential) and applied (efficacy) research studies. This article presents efficacy data for a set of empirical studies of DSRP Theory. According to Cabrera, Cabrera, and Midgley, DSRP Theory has equal or more empirical evidence supporting it than any existing systems theories (including frameworks, which are not theories). Four separate studies show highly statistically relevant findings for the effect of a short (less than one minute) treatment of D, S, R, and P. Subjects’ cognitive complexity and the systemic nature of their thinking increased in all four studies. These findings indicate that even a short treatment in DSRP is effective in increasing systems thinking skills. Based on these results, a longer, more in-depth treatment—such as a one hour or semester long training, such is the norm—would therefore likely garner transformative results and efficacy.

DSRP Theory: A Primer

DSRP Theory is now over 25 years old with more empirical evidence supporting it than any other systems thinking framework. Yet, it is often misunderstood and described in ways that are inaccurate. DSRP Theory describes four patterns and their underlying elements—identity (i) and other (o) for Distinctions (D), part (p) and whole (w) for Systems (S), action (a) and reaction (r) for Relationships (R), and point (ρ) and view (v) for Perspectives (P)—that are universal in both cognitive complexity (mind) and material complexity (nature). DSRP Theory provides a basis for systems thinking or cognitive complexity as well as material complexity (systems science). This paper, as a relatively short primer on the theory, provides clarity to those wanting to understand DSRP and its implications.

Sparse labels, no problems: Infant categorization under challenging conditions

Labeling promotes infants' object categorization even when labels are rare. By 2 years, infants engage in "semi-supervised learning" (SSL), integrating labeled and unlabeled exemplars to learn categories. However, everyday learning contexts pose substantial challenges for infants' SSL. Here, two studies (n = 74, 51% female, 62% non-Hispanic White, 18% multiracial, 8% Asian, 6% Black, M_age  = 27.3 months, collected 2018-2020) implemented a familiarization-novelty preference paradigm assessing 2-year-olds' SSL when (i) exemplars from the target category are interspersed with other objects (Study 1, d = .67) and (ii) multiple categories are learned simultaneously (Study 2, d = .74). The findings indicate 2-year-olds' SSL is robust enough to support object categorization despite substantial challenges posed by everyday learning contexts.

Labels and object categorization in six- and nine-month-olds: tracking labels across varying carrier phrases

Language shapes object categorization in infants. This starts as a general enhanced attentional effect of language, which narrows to a specific link between labels and categories by twelve months. The current experiments examined this narrowing effect by investigating when infants track a consistent label across varied input. Six-month-old infants (N = 48) were familiarized to category exemplars, each presented with the exact same labeling phrase or the same label in different phrases. Evidence of object categorization at test was only found with the same phrase, suggesting that infants were not tracking the label's consistency, but rather that of the entire input. Nine-month-olds (N = 24) did show evidence of categorization across the varied phrases, suggesting that they were tracking the consistent label across the varied input.

How do the object-file and physical-reasoning systems interact? Evidence from priming effects with object arrays or novel labels

How do infants reason about simple physical events such as containment, tube, and support events? According to the two-system model, two cognitive systems, the object-file (OF) and physical-reasoning (PR) systems, work together to guide infants' responses to these events. When an event begins, the OF system sends categorical information about the objects and their arrangements to the PR system. This system then categorizes the event, assigns event roles to the objects, and taps the OF system for information about features previously identified as causally relevant for the event category selected. All of the categorical and featural information included in the event's representation is interpreted by the PR system's domain knowledge, which includes core principles such as persistence and gravity. The present research tested a novel prediction of the model: If the OF system could be primed to also send, at the beginning of an event, information about an as-yet-unidentified feature, the PR system would then interpret this information using its core principles, allowing infants to detect core violations involving the feature earlier than they normally would. We examined this prediction using two types of priming manipulations directed at the OF system, object arrays and novel labels. In six experiments, infants aged 7-13 months (N = 304) were tested using different event categories and as-yet-unidentified features (color in containment events, height in tube events, and proportional distribution in support events) as well as different tasks (violation-of-expectation and action tasks). In each case, infants who were effectively primed reasoned successfully about the as-yet-unidentified feature, sometimes as early as six months before they would typically do so. These converging results provide strong support for the two-system model and for the claim that uncovering how the OF and PR systems represent and exchange information is essential for understanding how infants respond to physical events.

Infant categorization as a dynamic process linked to memory

Recency effects are well documented in the adult and infant literature: recognition and recall memory are better for recently occurring events. We explore recency effects in infant categorization, which does not merely involve memory for individual items, but the formation of abstract category representations. We present a computational model of infant categorization that simulates category learning in 10-month-olds. The model predicts that recency effects outweigh previously reported order effects for the same stimuli. According to the model, infant behaviour at test should depend mainly on the identity of the most recent training item. We evaluate these predictions in a series of experiments with 10-month-old infants. Our results show that infant behaviour confirms the model's prediction. In particular, at test infants exhibited a preference for a category outlier over the category average only if the final training item had been close to the average, rather than distant from it. Our results are consistent with a view of categorization as a highly dynamic process where the end result of category learning is not the overall average of all stimuli encountered, but rather a fluid representation that moves depending on moment-to-moment novelty. We argue that this is a desirable property of a flexible cognitive system that adapts rapidly to different contexts.

How optimal is word recognition under multimodal uncertainty?

Identifying a spoken word in a referential context requires both the ability to integrate multimodal input and the ability to reason under uncertainty. How do these tasks interact with one another? We study how adults identify novel words under joint uncertainty in the auditory and visual modalities, and we propose an ideal observer model of how cues in these modalities are combined optimally. Model predictions are tested in four experiments where recognition is made under various sources of uncertainty. We found that participants use both auditory and visual cues to recognize novel words. When the signal is not distorted with environmental noise, participants weight the auditory and visual cues optimally, that is, according to the relative reliability of each modality. In contrast, when one modality has noise added to it, human perceivers systematically prefer the unperturbed modality to a greater extent than the optimal model does. This work extends the literature on perceptual cue combination to the case of word recognition in a referential context. In addition, this context offers a link to the study of multimodal information in word meaning learning.

Emotion words, emotion concepts, and emotional development in children: A constructionist hypothesis

In this article, we integrate two constructionist approaches-the theory of constructed emotion and rational constructivism-to introduce several novel hypotheses for understanding emotional development. We first discuss the hypothesis that emotion categories are abstract and conceptual, whose instances share a goal-based function in a particular context but are highly variable in their affective, physical, and perceptual features. Next, we discuss the possibility that emotional development is the process of developing emotion concepts, and that emotion words may be a critical part of this process. We hypothesize that infants and children learn emotion categories the way they learn other abstract conceptual categories-by observing others use the same emotion word to label highly variable events. Finally, we hypothesize that emotional development can be understood as a concept construction problem: a child becomes capable of experiencing and perceiving emotion only when her brain develops the capacity to assemble ad hoc, situated emotion concepts for the purposes of guiding behavior and giving meaning to sensory inputs. Specifically, we offer a predictive processing account of emotional development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Defining the Role Of Language in Infants' Object Categorization with Eye-tracking Paradigms

Assessing infant category learning is a challenging but vital aspect of studying infant cognition. By employing a familiarization-test paradigm, we straightforwardly measure infants' success in learning a novel category while relying only on their looking behavior. Moreover, the paradigm can directly measure the impact of different auditory signals on the infant categorization across a range of ages. For instance, we assessed how 2-year-olds learn categories in a variety of labeling environments: in our task, 2-year-olds successfully learned categories when all exemplars were labeled or the first two exemplars were labeled, but they failed to categorize when no exemplars were labeled or only the final two exemplars were labeled. To determine infants' success in such tasks, researchers can examine both the overall preference displayed by infants in each condition and infants' pattern of looking over the course of the test phase, using an eye-tracker to provide fine-grained time-course data. Thus, we present a powerful paradigm for identifying the role of language, or any auditory signal, in infants' object category learning.

A little labeling goes a long way: Semi-supervised learning in infancy

There is considerable evidence that labeling supports infants' object categorization. Yet in daily life, most of the category exemplars that infants encounter will remain unlabeled. Inspired by recent evidence from machine learning, we propose that infants successfully exploit this sparsely labeled input through "semi-supervised learning." Providing only a few labeled exemplars leads infants to initiate the process of categorization, after which they can integrate all subsequent exemplars, labeled or unlabeled, into their evolving category representations. Using a classic novelty preference task, we introduced 2-year-old infants (n = 96) to a novel object category, varying whether and when its exemplars were labeled. Infants were equally successful whether all exemplars were labeled (fully supervised condition) or only the first two exemplars were labeled (semi-supervised condition), but they failed when no exemplars were labeled (unsupervised condition). Furthermore, the timing of the labeling mattered: when the labeled exemplars were provided at the end, rather than the beginning, of familiarization (reversed semi-supervised condition), infants failed to learn the category. This provides the first evidence of semi-supervised learning in infancy, revealing that infants excel at learning from exactly the kind of input that they typically receive in acquiring real-world categories and their names.

Effects of Linguistic Labels on Visual Attention in Children and Young Adults

Effects of linguistic labels on learning outcomes are well-established; however, developmental research examining possible mechanisms underlying these effects have provided mixed results. We used a novel paradigm where 8-year-olds and adults were simultaneously trained on three sparse categories (categories with many irrelevant or unique features and a single rule defining feature). Category members were either associated with the same label, different labels, or no labels (silent baseline). Similar to infant paradigms, participants passively viewed individual exemplars and we examined fixations to category relevant features across training. While it is well established that adults can optimize their attention in forced-choice categorization tasks without linguistic input, the present findings provide support for label induced attention optimization: simply hearing the same label associated with different exemplars was associated with increased attention to category relevant features over time, and participants continued to focus on these features on a subsequent recognition task. Participants also viewed images longer and made more fixations when images were paired with unique labels. These findings provide support for the claim that labels may facilitate categorization by directing attention to category relevant features.

Linking Language and Cognition in Infancy

Human language, a signature of our species, derives its power from its links to human cognition. For centuries, scholars have been captivated by this link between language and cognition. In this article, we shift this focus. Adopting a developmental lens, we review recent evidence that sheds light on the origin and developmental unfolding of the link between language and cognition in the first year of life. This evidence, which reveals the joint contributions of infants' innate capacities and their sensitivity to experience, highlights how a precocious link between language and cognition advances infants beyond their initial perceptual and conceptual capacities. The evidence also identifies the conceptual advantages this link brings to human infants. By tracing the emergence of a language-cognition link in infancy, this article reveals a dynamic developmental cascade in infants' first year, with each developmental advance providing a foundation for subsequent advances.

The Origins of Social Categorization

Forming conceptually-rich social categories helps people to navigate the complex social world by allowing them to reason about the likely thoughts, beliefs, actions, and interactions of others, as guided by group membership. Nevertheless, social categorization often has nefarious consequences. We suggest that the foundation of the human ability to form useful social categories is in place in infancy: social categories guide the inferences infants make about the shared characteristics and social relationships of other people. We also suggest that the ability to form abstract social categories may be separable from the eventual negative downstream consequences of social categorization, including prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping. Although a tendency to form inductively-rich social categories appears early in ontogeny, prejudice based on each particular category dimension may not be inevitable.

14- to 16-Month-Olds Attend to Distinct Labels in an Inductive Reasoning Task

We examined how naming objects with unique labels influenced infants' reasoning about the non-obvious properties of novel objects. Seventy 14- to 16-month-olds participated in an imitation-based inductive inference task during which they were presented with target objects possessing a non-obvious sound property, followed by test objects that varied in shape similarity in comparison to the target. Infants were assigned to one of two groups: a No Label group in which objects were introduced with a general attentional phrase (i.e., "Look at this one") and a Distinct Label group in which target and test objects were labeled with two distinct count nouns (i.e., fep vs. wug). Infants in the Distinct Label group performed significantly fewer target actions on the high-similarity objects than infants in the No Label group but did not differ in performance of actions on the low-similarity object. Within the Distinct Label group, performance on the inductive inference task was related to age, but not to working memory, inhibitory control, or vocabulary. Within the No Label condition, performance on the inductive inference task was related to a measure of inhibitory control. Our findings suggest that between 14- and 16-months, infants begin to use labels to carve out distinct categories, even when objects are highly perceptually similar.