Emotional valence, sense of agency and responsibility: A study using intentional binding

Arousal, interindividual differences and temporal binding a psychophysiological study

The sense of agency varies as a function of arousal in negative emotional contexts. As yet, it is unknown whether the same is true for positive affect, and how inter-individual characteristics might predict these effects. Temporal binding, an implicit measure of the sense of agency, was measured in 59 participants before and after watching either an emotionally neutral film clip or a positive film clip with high or low arousal. Analyses included participants' individual differences in subjective affective ratings, physiological arousal (pupillometry, skin conductance, heart rate), striatal dopamine levels via eye blink rates, and psychopathy. Linear mixed models showed that sexual arousal decreased temporal binding whereas calm pleasure had no facilitation effect on binding. Striatal dopamine levels were positively linked whereas subjective and physiological arousal may be negatively associated with binding towards actions. Psychopathic traits reduced the effect of high arousal on binding towards actions. These results provide evidence that individual differences influence the extent to which the temporal binding is affected by high arousing states with positive valence.

You do you: susceptibility of temporal binding to self-relevance

The self-prioritization effect suggests that self-relevant information has a processing advantage over information that is not directly associated with the self. In consequence, reaction times are faster and accuracy rates higher when reacting to self-associated stimuli rather than to other-related stimuli (Sui et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 38:1105-1117, 2012). This spurs the assumption that self-associated action-effects should also be perceived earlier than other-related outcomes. One way to measure this is temporal binding. Previous research indeed showed that the perceived temporal interval between actions and self-associated outcomes was reduced compared to friend- and other-associated outcomes. However, the employed method (interval estimations) and several experimental design choices make it impossible to discern whether the perceived shortening of the interval between a keypress and a self-relevant outcome is due to a perceptual shift of the action or of the action-effect or both. Thus, we conducted four experiments to assess whether temporal binding can indeed be modulated by self-relevance and if so where this perceptual bias is located. The results did not support stronger temporal binding for self- vs other-related action-effects. We discuss these results against the backdrop of the attentional basis of self-prioritization and propose directions for future research.

The enhancement of temporal binding effect after negative social feedback

The present study investigated the effect of social feedback on the experiences of our actions and the outcomes (e.g. temporal binding between an action and its outcome, reflecting individuals' causal beliefs modulated by their agency judgments). In Experiment 1a, participants freely decided (voluntary action) their action timing to cause an outcome, which was followed by social feedback. A larger temporal binding (TB) following negative vs. positive events was found. This effect appeared neither in the random context where the causal belief between the action and outcome was absent (Experiment 1b) nor in the involuntary action context where participants' action timing was instructed (Experiment 1c). Experiments 2a and 2b examined the effect when the action-outcome was occluded, including reversing the order of outcome and feedback in Experiment 2b. Experiments 3a and 3b investigated the effect with only social feedback or only action-outcome presented. Results revealed that the effect found in Experiment 1 was driven by social feedback and independent of the availability of the action-outcome and the position of social feedback. Our findings demonstrate a stronger temporal integration of the action and its outcome following negative social feedback, reflecting fluctuations in sense of agency when faced with social feedback.

When Good Intention Goes Away: Social Feedback Modulates the Influence of Outcome Valence on Temporal Binding

The retrospective view of temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between one's actions and their effects, proposes that TB is influenced by what happens after the action. However, the role of the interaction between multiple sources of information following the action in the formation of TB has received limited attention. The current study aims to address this gap by investigating the combined influence of social feedback and outcome valence (i.e., positive or negative outcomes) on TB. In Experiment 1, the valenced outcome was followed by either positive or negative social feedback. The results showed that negative social feedback enlarged the difference between TB over negative and positive outcomes relative to positive social feedback. The modulatory effect of social feedback on TB was not observed in the absence of causal beliefs between actions and outcomes (Experiment 2). These results highlight the importance of considering the complex interplay between cognitive, emotional, and social factors in shaping our subjective temporal experience.

Effect of left temporoparietal transcranial direct current stimulation on self-bias effect and retrospective intentional binding paradigm: A randomised, double-blind, controlled study

BACKGROUND

Self-bias effect is expressed as a preferential selection and accelerated perception of self-related sensory information. Intentional binding (IB) is a related phenomenon where the sensory outcome from a voluntary action and the voluntary action itself are perceived to be closer to each other in time in both predictive (voluntary action predicting sensory consequence) and retrospective (sensory consequence features triggering self-related inference) contexts. Recent evidence indicates that self-related visual stimuli can affect retrospective intentional binding (rIB). We aimed to 1) replicate rIB in the auditory context, and 2) investigate the potential role of left temporoparietal junction (l-TPJ), a crucial node for the self-monitoring process, in self-bias effect and intentional binding effect by manipulating l-TPJ activity with neuromodulation [using High-Definition Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (HD-tDCS)]. We anticipated self-bias and rIB effects to increase with anodal stimulation of l-TPJ in comparison to cathodal-stimulation of l-TPJ.

METHODS

Fourteen, right-handed, healthy participants performed sound-label matching (matching tones to self-and-other labels) and rIB (estimating time interval between a button press and a self/other labelled tone) tasks. Each participant underwent both anodal and cathodal stimulation of l-TPJ in separate sessions (at least 72 h apart). Assignment of HD-tDCS type was random and counter-balanced across participants. Behavioural data was collected at three time points: once at baseline (no-stimulation), and twice after stimulation with HD-tDCS.

RESULTS

Strong self-bias effect was observed across all experimental conditions. Neuromodulation of l-TPJ affected processing of other-labelled tone in the sound-label matching task. rIB was noted in baseline and anodal-HD-tDCS conditions where participants exhibited stronger binding for self-associated stimuli compared to other-associated stimuli.

CONCLUSION

l-TPJ may potentially play a critical role in self-other distinction. This may have possible implications for disorders of self-disturbances like psychosis.

Influence of voluntary action and outcome valence on the sense of agency

Recent studies have revealed that people might experience a lessened sense of agency for negative consequences by claiming that they were obeying orders. However, little is known about the cognitive neural mechanism behind the reduced sense of agency when individuals are forced to inflict physical harm on others. This study adopted temporal estimation tasks to investigate the internal mechanism of voluntary action on the sense of agency and the moderating effect of outcome valence as measured by event-related potentials (ERPs). In the temporal estimation task, participants were asked to make trade-offs of monetary gains for themselves against painful electric stimuli experienced by strangers, subjectively estimated the perceptual temporal interval between keypress actions (i.e., free or coercive actions) and consequent outcomes (i.e., positive or negative tones) and rated the feeling of control. The results showed that perceived temporal interval was shorter for positive tones compared with negative tones in the coercive condition, and induced more negative N1 and N300 amplitudes, which indicated that the implicit sense of agency was higher. However, the explicit sense of agency was stronger in the free condition than in the coercive condition, which was not influenced by outcome valence. We discuss the implications of utilizing positive feedback and free choice as significant strategies for those experiencing the abnormal sense of agency.

The impact of facial expression and communicative gaze of a humanoid robot on individual Sense of Agency

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one's actions and their outcomes. A well-established implicit measure of SoA is the temporal interval estimation paradigm, in which participants estimate the time interval between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence. In the present study, we aimed to investigate whether the valence of action outcome modulated implicit SoA. The valence was manipulated through interaction partner's (i) positive/negative facial expression, or (ii) type of gaze (gaze contact or averted gaze). The interaction partner was the humanoid robot iCub. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the time interval between the onset of their action (head movement towards the robot), and the robot's facial expression (happy vs. sad face). Experiment 2 was identical, but the outcome of participants' action was the type of robot's gaze (gaze contact vs. averted). In Experiment 3, we assessed-in a within-subject design-the combined effect of robot's type of facial expression and type of gaze. Results showed that, while the robot's facial expression did not affect participants' SoA (Experiment 1), the type of gaze affected SoA in both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Overall, our findings showed that the robot's gaze is a more potent factor than facial expression in modulating participants' implicit SoA.

The pursuit of the end: The effects of action-goal choices on temporal binding

The effect of action choice (whether one can choose their actions freely) on temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between a voluntary action and its effect, is controversial. The present study tried to distinguish action-goal choice (whether one could pursue the action-effect freely) from action choice. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the effect of action-goal choice on TB while the congruency between actions and outcomes was manipulated (i.e., 50% in Experiment 1 and 80% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the effect of action choice on TB when the outcome congruency was 80%. Results showed that free and instructed action-goals led to comparable magnitudes of TB while free actions led to a larger TB than instructed actions. Furthermore, the effect of outcome congruency on TB varied by action-goal choices (Experiment 2) but not action choices (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the potential differences between action choice and action-goal choice.

Jealousy: self-inflicted agony and ruin

This chapter analyses the concept of jealousy (as different from envy) in romantic and sexual relationships. It demonstrates that jealousy is both logically and empirically untenable, as it is: (1) a self-contradictory emotion; (2) a self-destructive activity. As to (1) feelings of jealousy are incompatible with true care for the well-being and satisfaction of the loved partner. Logically, the notion of jealousy is self-defeating: it professes to be an expression of love while at the same time forbidding the loved one the freedom to act autonomously, thus killing the very notion of love. As to (2) nearly all empirical data point to the destructive effects to relationships of the feeling of jealousy, Shakespeare's Othello being its archetypal expression and its scathing analysis. The astounding fact, however, is that in many (most?) cultures jealousy is seen as an expression of love, while in reality it is an emanation of possessive feeling void of affection for the person 'loved'. A thorough cultural analysis, coupled to recently available DNA analyses, however, reveal a wholly different picture of extra-pair offspring, fully undermining the foundations upon which the notion of jealousy if based. Recent developments like 'open relationships' and 'polyamory' may be signs of overthrowing the contradictory and destructive aspects of jealousy. They presuppose, however, to undo deeply ingrained social attitudes accompanying love relationships.

Depressive traits are associated with a reduced effect of choice on intentional binding

A sense of agency (SoA) over wilful actions is thought to be dependent on the level of choice and the nature of the outcome. In a preregistered study, we manipulated choice and valence of outcome to assess the relationship between SoA across the depression and psychosis continuum. Participants (N = 151) completed a Libet Clock task, in which they had either a free or forced choice to press one of two buttons and received either a rewarding or punishing outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires on depressive and psychosis-like traits. Rewarding outcomes increased intentional binding. The evidence favoured no effect of choice on average, but this was influenced by inter-individual differences. Individuals reporting more depressive traits had less of a difference in intentional binding between free and forced choice conditions. We show that implicit SoA is sensitive to outcome valence and the effect of choice differs across the depression continuum.

The sense of agency for brain disorders: A comprehensive review and proposed framework

Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of control over voluntary actions and the outcomes of those actions. Several brain disorders are characterized by an abnormal SoA. To date, there is no robust treatment for aberrant agency across disorders; this is, in large part, due to gaps in our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and neural correlates of the SoA. This apparent gap stems from a lack of synthesis in established findings. As such, the current review reconciles previously established findings into a novel neurocognitive framework for future investigations of the SoA in brain disorders, which we term the Agency in Brain Disorders Framework (ABDF). In doing so, we highlight key top-down and bottom-up cues that contribute to agency prospectively (i.e., prior to action execution) and retrospectively (i.e., after action execution). We then examine brain disorders, including schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorders (ASD), obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD), and cortico-basal syndrome (CBS), within the ABDF, to demonstrate its potential utility in investigating neurocognitive mechanisms underlying phenotypically variable presentations of the SoA in brain disorders.

The Interplay Between Affective Processing and Sense of Agency During Action Regulation: A Review

Sense of agency is the feeling of being in control of one's actions and their perceivable effects. Most previous research identified cognitive or sensory determinants of agency experience. However, it has been proposed that sense of agency is also bound to the processing of affective information. For example, during goal-directed actions or instrumental learning we often rely on positive feedback (e.g., rewards) or negative feedback (e.g., error messages) to determine our level of control over the current task. Nevertheless, we still lack a scientific model which adequately explains the relation between affective processing and sense of agency. In this article, we review current empirical findings on how affective information modulates agency experience, and, conversely, how sense of agency changes the processing of affective action outcomes. Furthermore, we discuss in how far agency-related changes in affective processing might influence the ability to enact cognitive control and action regulation during goal-directed behavior. A preliminary model is presented for describing the interplay between sense of agency, affective processing, and action regulation. We propose that affective processing could play a role in mediating the influence between subjective sense of agency and the objective ability to regulate one's behavior. Thus, determining the interrelation between affective processing and sense of agency will help us to understand the potential mechanistic basis of agency experience, as well as its functional significance for goal-directed behavior.

Exploring the relationship between perceived Action-Outcome distance and Agency: Evidence from temporal binding

Intentional actions are usually accompanied by a sense of agency (SoA), along with a perceived shortening of action-outcome intervals known as the intentional binding (IB) effect. This is at least partly associated with the perceived strength of action-outcome relationships, which have been described in terms of distance (e.g., a 'distancing effect'). Given that actions in the modern world are increasingly distant from their outcomes, the current study aimed to explore the effect of perceived spatial distance on the strength of IB. Participants voluntarily triggered, or passively observed, a circle on a background that was either flat or appeared three-dimensional, and estimated action-outcome delays. Depth cues modified the circle's perceived distance while the circle itself did not change. When viewed on a forced-perspective background, interval estimates increased with apparent distance, but only when outcomes were caused by intentional actions. This suggests that agency is reduced for outcomes that appear further away.

Intended emotions influence intentional binding with emotional faces: Larger binding for intended negative emotions

The effect of emotions on Intentional binding (IB) is equivocal. In addition, most studies on IB have not manipulated emotional content of intentions. This study investigates the effect of intended and outcome emotions using emotional faces (happy or disgust face in experiment 1 and a happy or angry face in experiment 3). To see whether the effects are due to priming, we used instructions with a happy-disgust pair in experiment 2 and happy-angry pair in experiment 4. Outcome emotional faces were not predictable. Results showed that intending a negative emotional face resulted in shorter action-outcome interval judgments compared to a happy face irrespective of the emotional content of the outcome face. This effect was absent in experiments 2 and 4 with instructed emotions. In addition to showing the importance of having explicit intentions, the results show that emotional content of our intentions does influence IB possibly due to prospective mechanisms.

Influence of arousal on intentional binding: Impaired action binding, intact outcome binding

Emotional states have been indicated to affect intentional binding, resulting in an increase or decrease as a function of valence and arousal. Sexual arousal is a complex emotional state proven to impair attentional and perceptual processes, and is therefore highly relevant to feeling in control over one’s actions. We suggest that sexual arousal affects intentional binding in the same way as highly negative arousing states such as fear and anger. Ninety participants performed the intentional binding task before and after watching an either sexually arousing or emotionally neutral film clip. Analyses were conducted for the subcomponents action and outcome binding separately including the change in arousal before and after the emotion induction as a continuous measure. Results showed an interactive effect for time of measurement (before and after emotion induction) and arousal change on action binding: a decrease in action binding was noted in participants who reported to be more aroused and an increase in action binding was observed for participants who reported to be less aroused. Results emphasize that alterations in action binding are likely to reflect the deficits in the dopaminergic system involved in action execution. An impaired feeling of control in aroused states may play a crucial role for the underlying psychological mechanisms of impulsive violent behavior.

Learning from informative losses boosts the sense of agency

Sense of agency, the feeling of having control over one's actions, is modulated by whether one's choices lead to desired or undesired outcomes. Learning similarly depends on outcome values from previous experience. In the current study, we evaluate a possible link between the sense of agency and learning, by investigating how intentional binding, an implicit measure of agency, changes during a probabilistic learning task. In two experiments, we show increased intentional binding in trials that follow losses, compared with trials that follow wins. Experiment 1 demonstrated that this post-error agency boost (PEAB) effect is rule-specific, as it did not occur if the trial following an error involved different action-outcome contingencies. Furthermore, PEAB was not modulated by the type of outcome presentation (monetary vs. affective). Experiment 2 showed that the PEAB effect can also occur when the current action involves a forced (as opposed to free) choice, but only when the previous, loss-provoking action was chosen freely. Thus, PEAB occurs when current actions are informed by outcomes of one's own previous action choices. Electroencephalography (EEG) data linked these effects to two event-related potential components, namely, the Feedback Related Negativity and the P300. Taken together, these results support the notion that PEAB reflects an adaptive property of human sense of agency, facilitating effective learning about the action-outcome structure of a specific task, to optimise future performance. By clarifying the conditions for enhancing the sense of agency through learning, this work adds to our understanding of human learning and agency.

Effect of alcohol on the sense of agency in healthy humans

Even at low to moderate doses, ingestion of the widely used recreational drug alcohol (ethanol) can impact cognitive and emotional processing. Recent studies show that the sense of agency (SoA; ie, the subjective experience of voluntary control over actions) can be modulated by specific pharmacological manipulations. The SoA, as quantified by the intentional binding (IB) paradigm, is enhanced by direct or indirect dopaminergic agonists in patients with Parkinson's disease and by ketamine (an N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonist) in healthy individuals. These findings implicate dopaminergic and glutamatergic neurotransmission in mechanisms underlying SoA. Alcohol has a complex set of actions, including disinhibition of dopaminergic neurotransmission and allosteric antagonism at NMDA receptors. Here, we tested the hypothesis that low to moderate doses of alcohol would enhance SoA, and impact impulsivity and subjective emotional state. We conducted two experiments in 59 healthy male and female social drinkers, who ingested either a placebo "vehicle," or one of two doses of ethanol: 0.4 and 0.6 g/kg. In both experiments, we observed increased SoA/IB at both doses of alcohol exposure, relative to the placebo condition. We found no correlation between the effects of alcohol on IB and on impulsivity or subjective emotional state. Our findings might have implications for social and legal responsibility related to alcohol use, particularly in states prior to overt intoxication. Further studies are necessary to investigate the effects of alcohol and other addictive substances on the SoA.

I just lost it! Fear and anger reduce the sense of agency: a study using intentional binding

Two recent studies have demonstrated that increases in arousal states lead to an increase people's sense of agency, i.e., the subjective experience of controlling one's own voluntary actions (Minohara et al. in Front Psychol 7:1165, 2016; Wen et al. in Conscious Cogn 36:87-95, 2015). We here extend these findings by showing that arousal states with negative emotional valence, such as fear and anger, decrease sense of agency. Anger and fear are negative emotional states. Anecdotally, they are often invoked as reasons for losing control, and neuroscientific evidence confirms important effects on the brain's action control systems. Surprisingly, the subjective experience of acting in anger or fear has scarcely been investigated experimentally. Thus, the legal notion that these intense emotions may undermine normal voluntary control over actions and outcomes (the 'Loss of Control', a partial defence for murder) lacks any clear evidence base. In three laboratory experiments, we measured sense of agency using an implicit measure based on time perception (the "intentional binding" paradigm). These actions occurred in either an emotionally neutral condition, or in a fearful (experiments 1 and 2) or angry state (experiment 3). In line with our hypotheses, fear or anger reduced the subjective sense of control over an action outcome, even though the objective causal link between action and outcome remained the same. This gap between the objective facts of agency, and a reduced subjective experience of agency under emotional conditions, has important implications for society and law.

It Was Me: The Use of Sense of Agency Cues Differs Between Cultures

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sense of having control over one’s own actions and through them events in the outside world. SoA may be estimated by integrating different agency cues. In the present study, we examined whether the use of different agency cues – action-effect congruency, temporal relation between action and effect, and affective valence of effects – differs between Eastern (Mongolian) and Western (Austrian) cultures. In a learning phase, participants learned to associate different actions (keypresses) with positive and negative action effects (smileys). In a test phase, participants performed the same keypresses. After different intervals positive and negative action effects, which were either congruent or incongruent with the previously acquired action-effect associations, were presented. In each trial participants were asked to rate how likely the action effect was caused by themselves or by the computer (authorship ratings). In both groups authorship ratings were higher for congruent compared to incongruent action effects and for positive compared to negative action effects. This indicates that action-effect congruency and affective valence of action effects modulate SoA. Further, in both groups the difference between positive and negative effects was higher with congruent effects than incongruent effects. This overadditive effect of action-effect congruency and affective valence might indicate that an integration of different agency cues takes place. Decreasing authorship ratings with increasing interval were observed in Austrians but not in Mongolians. For Mongolians, the temporal chronology of events might be less important when inferring causality. Therefore, information regarding the temporal occurrence of the effect might not be used as an agency cue in Mongolians. In conclusion, some agency cues might be similarly used in different cultures, but the use of others might be culture-dependent.

The effects of freedom of choice in action selection on perceived mental effort and the sense of agency

Previous research showed that increasing the number of action alternatives enhances the sense of agency (SoA). Here, we investigated whether choice space could affect subjective judgments of mental effort experienced during action selection and examined the link between subjective effort and the SoA. Participants performed freely selected (among two, three, or four options) and instructed actions that produced pleasant or unpleasant tones. We obtained action-effect interval estimates to quantify intentional binding - the perceived interval compression between actions and outcomes and feeling of control (FoC) ratings. Additionally, participants reported the degree of mental effort they experienced during action selection. We found that both binding and FoC were systematically enhanced with increasing choice-level. Outcome valence did not influence binding, while FoC was stronger for pleasant than unpleasant outcomes. Finally, freely chosen actions were associated with low subjective effort and slow responses (i.e., higher reaction times), and instructed actions were associated with high effort and fast responses. Although the conditions that yielded the greatest and least subjective effort also yielded the greatest and least binding and FoC, there was no significant correlation between subjective effort and SoA measures. Overall, our results raise interesting questions about how agency may be influenced by response selection demands (i.e., indexed by speed of responding) and subjective mental effort. Our work also highlights the importance of understanding how subjective mental effort and response speed are related to popular notions of fluency in response selection.

How disentangled sense of agency and sense of ownership can interact with different emotional events on stress feelings

We used the virtual hand illusion paradigm to study how sense of agency and sense of (body) ownership can interact with different emotional events on stress feelings. Converging evidence for at least the partial independence of agency and ownership was found. For instance, sense of agency was a better predictor of individual anxiety levels than sense of ownership and males showed stronger effects related to agency-presumably due to gender-specific attribution styles and empathy skills. Moreover, agency and ownership also interacted with emotional events and led to different anxiety levels. Taken together, our findings suggest that the disentangled sense of agency and sense of ownership can interact with different emotional events and influenced stress feelings more in threatening situations than awarding ones.

Effects of emotional valence on sense of agency require a predictive model

Sense of agency (SoA), a feeling that one’s voluntary actions produce events in the external world, is a key factor behind every goal-directed human behaviour. Recent studies have demonstrated that SoA is reduced when one’s voluntary action causes negative outcomes, compared to when it causes positive outcomes. It is yet unclear whether this emotional modulation of SoA is caused by predicting the outcome valence (prediction hypothesis) or by retrospectively interpreting the outcome (postdiction hypothesis). To address this, we emulated a social situation where one’s voluntary action was followed by either another’s negative emotional vocalisation or positive emotional vocalisation. Crucially, the relation between an action and the emotional valence of its outcome was predictable in some blocks of trials, but unpredictable in other blocks. Quantitative, implicit measures of SoA based on the intentional binding effect supported the prediction hypothesis. Our findings imply that the social-emotional modulation of SoA is based on predicting the emotional valence of action outcomes.

Having control over the external world increases the implicit sense of agency

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over one's actions, and, through them, over external events. One proposed marker of implicit sense of agency is 'intentional binding'-the tendency to perceive voluntary actions and their outcomes as close in time. Another is attenuation of the sensory consequences of a voluntary action. Here we show that the ability to choose an outcome through action selection contributes to implicit sense of agency. We measured intentional binding and stimulus intensity ratings using painful and non-painful somatosensory outcomes. In one condition, participants chose between two actions with different probabilities of producing high or low intensity outcomes, so action choices were meaningful. In another condition, action selection was meaningless with respect to the outcome. Having control over the outcome increased binding, especially when outcomes were painful. Greater sensory attenuation also tended to be associated with stronger binding of the outcome towards the action that produced it. Previous studies have emphasised the link between sense of agency and initiation of voluntary motor actions. Our study shows that the ability to control outcomes by discriminative action selection is another key element of implicit sense of agency. It also investigates, for the first time, the relation between binding and sensory attenuation for the same events.

Temporal distortion in the perception of actions and events

In everyday life, actions and sensory events occur in complex sequences, with events triggering actions that in turn give rise to additional events and so on. Earlier work has shown that a sensory event that is triggered by a voluntary action is perceived to have occurred earlier in time than an identical event that is not triggered by an action. In other words, events that are believed to be caused by our actions are drawn forward in time towards our actions. Similarly, when a sensory event triggers an action, that event is again drawn in time towards the action and is thus perceived to have occurred later than it really did. This alteration in time perception serves to bind together events and actions that are causally linked. It is not clear, however, whether or not the perceived timing of a sensory event embedded within a longer series of actions and sensory events is also temporally bound to the actions in that sequence. In the current study, we measured the temporal binding in sequences consisting of two simple dyads of event-action and action-event in a series of manual action tasks: an event-action-event triad (Experiment 1) and an action-event-action triad (Experiment 2). Auditory tones either triggered an action or were presented 250ms after an action was performed. To reduce the influence of sensory events other than the tone, such as a noise associated with pressing a key on a keyboard, we used an optical sensor to detect hand movements where no contact was made with a surface. In Experiment 1, there appeared to be no change in the perceived onset of an auditory tone when the onset of that tone followed a hand movement and then the tone triggered a second hand movement. It was as if the temporal binding between the action and the tone and then the tone and the subsequent action summed algebraically and cancelled each other out. In Experiment 2, both the perceived onset of an initial tone which triggered an action and the perceived onset of a second tone which was presented 250ms after the action were temporally bound to the action. Taken together, the present study suggests that the temporal binding between our actions and sensory events occur separately in each dyad within a longer sequence of actions and events.

Agency and Anxiety: Delusions of Control and Loss of Control in Schizophrenia and Agoraphobia

We review the distinction between sense of agency and sense of ownership, and then explore these concepts, and their reflective attributions, in schizophrenic symptoms and agoraphobia. We show how the underlying dynamics of these experiences are different across these disorders. We argue that these concepts are complex and cannot be reduced to neural mechanisms, but involve embodied and situated processes that include the physical and social environments. We conclude by arguing that the subjective and intersubjective dimensions of agency and ownership cannot be considered in isolation from one another, but instead form an interdependent pairing.