The role of self-related information in the sense of agency

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of controlling one's actions and their subsequent consequences. The present study endeavors to investigate the impact of how different degrees of self-related stimuli as action outcomes on the sense of agency by observing the temporal binding effect. Results showed that self-related sound significantly altered temporal binding, notably influencing outcome binding. A post-hoc explanation model effectively elucidated the role of self-related information in the formation of the sense of agency.

Eye did this! Sense of agency in eye movements

This study investigates the sense of agency (SoA) for saccades with implicit and explicit agency measures. In two eye tracking experiments, participants moved their eyes towards on-screen stimuli that subsequently changed color. Participants then either reproduced the temporal interval between saccade and color-change (Experiment 1) or reported the time points of these events with an auditory Libet clock (Experiment 2) to measure temporal binding effects as implicit indices of SoA. Participants were either made to believe to exert control over the color change or not (agency manipulation). Explicit ratings indicated that the manipulation of causal beliefs and hence agency was successful. However, temporal binding was only evident for caused effects, and only when a sufficiently sensitive procedure was used (auditory Libet clock). This suggests a feebler connection between temporal binding and SoA than previously proposed. The results also provide evidence for a relatively fast acquisition of sense of agency for previously never experienced types of action-effect associations. This indicates that the underlying processes of action control may be rooted in more intricate and adaptable cognitive models than previously thought. Oculomotor SoA as addressed in the present study presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social sense of agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: In this study, sense of agency for eye movements in the non-social domain is investigated in detail, using both explicit and implicit measures. Therefore, it offers novel and specific insights into comprehending sense of agency concerning effects induced by eye movements, as well as broader insights into agency pertaining to entirely newly acquired types of action-effect associations. Oculomotor sense of agency presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. Due to peculiarities of the oculomotor domain such as the varying degree of volitional control, eye movements could provide new information regarding more general theories of sense of agency in future research.

The enhancement of temporal binding effect after negative social feedback

The present study investigated the effect of social feedback on the experiences of our actions and the outcomes (e.g. temporal binding between an action and its outcome, reflecting individuals' causal beliefs modulated by their agency judgments). In Experiment 1a, participants freely decided (voluntary action) their action timing to cause an outcome, which was followed by social feedback. A larger temporal binding (TB) following negative vs. positive events was found. This effect appeared neither in the random context where the causal belief between the action and outcome was absent (Experiment 1b) nor in the involuntary action context where participants' action timing was instructed (Experiment 1c). Experiments 2a and 2b examined the effect when the action-outcome was occluded, including reversing the order of outcome and feedback in Experiment 2b. Experiments 3a and 3b investigated the effect with only social feedback or only action-outcome presented. Results revealed that the effect found in Experiment 1 was driven by social feedback and independent of the availability of the action-outcome and the position of social feedback. Our findings demonstrate a stronger temporal integration of the action and its outcome following negative social feedback, reflecting fluctuations in sense of agency when faced with social feedback.

Feelings of responsibility and temporal binding: A comparison of two measures of the sense of agency

Temporal binding refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between an action and its perceptual consequences. Temporal binding has often been used by researchers to indirectly measure participants' sense of agency (SoA), or the subjective sense of causing something to happen. Other studies have proposed links between temporal binding and feelings of moral responsibility. The present study compared subjective interval estimates to feelings of responsibility in a between-subjects design (Exp 1) and a within-subjects design (Exp 2). Participants either estimated the interval between two events (two tones in the passive condition, or a keypress followed by a tone in active conditions) or rated their feeling of responsibility for the tone(s). Manipulations of participant involvement and choice impacted feelings of responsibility more than temporal estimates. Overall, the two dependent variables followed different patterns, suggesting subjective interval estimates may not be a reliable proxy for feelings of responsibility.

When Good Intention Goes Away: Social Feedback Modulates the Influence of Outcome Valence on Temporal Binding

The retrospective view of temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between one's actions and their effects, proposes that TB is influenced by what happens after the action. However, the role of the interaction between multiple sources of information following the action in the formation of TB has received limited attention. The current study aims to address this gap by investigating the combined influence of social feedback and outcome valence (i.e., positive or negative outcomes) on TB. In Experiment 1, the valenced outcome was followed by either positive or negative social feedback. The results showed that negative social feedback enlarged the difference between TB over negative and positive outcomes relative to positive social feedback. The modulatory effect of social feedback on TB was not observed in the absence of causal beliefs between actions and outcomes (Experiment 2). These results highlight the importance of considering the complex interplay between cognitive, emotional, and social factors in shaping our subjective temporal experience.

Attention and expectation likely underlie temporal binding measured using the Libet Clock

An interesting finding that has emerged in studies of the sense of agency is that of a perceived compression of the temporal interval between actions and the outcomes they produce. This is generally referred to as temporal binding. Although temporal binding has been studied using various paradigms, possibly the most popular of these is the Libet Clock task. The Libet task is also interesting because it suggests that temporal binding can be decomposed into two components, one purportedly relating to actions and the other relating to outcomes. These are termed action binding and outcome binding, respectively. In this article, I focus specifically on temporal binding revealed using the Libet Clock task and propose the idea that attention underpins the action binding effect, while outcome binding, on the other hand, is driven by the effects of expectation.

Age-related changes to the attentional modulation of temporal binding

During multisensory integration, the time range within which visual and auditory information can be perceived as synchronous and bound together is known as the temporal binding window (TBW). With increasing age, the TBW becomes wider, such that older adults erroneously, and often dangerously, integrate sensory inputs that are asynchronous. Recent research suggests that attentional cues can narrow the width of the TBW in younger adults, sharpening temporal perception and increasing the accuracy of integration. However, due to their age-related declines in attentional control, it is not yet known whether older adults can deploy attentional resources to narrow the TBW in the same way as younger adults. This study investigated the age-related changes to the attentional modulation of the TBW. Thirty younger and 30 older adults completed a cued-spatial-attention version of the stream-bounce illusion, assessing the extent to which the visual and auditory stimuli were integrated when presented at three different stimulus-onset asynchronies, and when attending to a validly cued or invalidly cued location. A 2 × 2 × 3 mixed ANOVA revealed that when participants attended to the validly cued location (i.e., when attention was present), susceptibility to the stream-bounce illusion decreased. However, crucially, this attentional manipulation significantly affected audiovisual integration in younger adults, but not in older adults. These findings suggest that older adults have multisensory integration-related attentional deficits. Directions for future research and practical applications surrounding treatments to improve the safety of older adults' perception and navigation through the environment are discussed.

When did it happen? Verbal information about causal relations affects time estimation

Usually, the closer two events occur, the more likely people infer a causal relationship between them. Recent studies have shown that this relationship between time and causality is bidirectional. Participants also tend to judge events closer in time if they assume that they are causally related. We present six experiments showing causal binding, but unlike other experiments, participants do not emit any motor action, and no physical feedback is given. Rather, all stimuli and causal information are provided verbally. After reading a list of events, participants were asked to estimate the time elapsed between two of them. Those participants who were informed that there was a causal relationship between the two events estimated them as occurring closer to each other. These results support causality- and heuristic-based explanations of temporal binding, as opposed to other explanations such as sensory integration or intentionality of action.

The pursuit of the end: The effects of action-goal choices on temporal binding

The effect of action choice (whether one can choose their actions freely) on temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between a voluntary action and its effect, is controversial. The present study tried to distinguish action-goal choice (whether one could pursue the action-effect freely) from action choice. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the effect of action-goal choice on TB while the congruency between actions and outcomes was manipulated (i.e., 50% in Experiment 1 and 80% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the effect of action choice on TB when the outcome congruency was 80%. Results showed that free and instructed action-goals led to comparable magnitudes of TB while free actions led to a larger TB than instructed actions. Furthermore, the effect of outcome congruency on TB varied by action-goal choices (Experiment 2) but not action choices (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the potential differences between action choice and action-goal choice.

Inhibition of intentional binding by an additional sound presentation

When a voluntary action is followed by an effect after a short delay, the time distance between the action and its effect is perceived to be shorter than the actual time distance. This phenomenon is known as intentional binding (IB). We investigated the influence of presentation of an additional effect on IB between the action and the target effect, and investigated the influence of the presentation timing of the additional effect. One sound (target sound) was constantly presented 250 ms after the button was pressed, and the other sound (additional sound) was presented simultaneously when the button was pressed (Experiment 1) or at one of various timings that included moments both before and after the target sound (Experiment 2). The results showed that IB between the action and target sound was significantly inhibited only when the additional sound was presented prior to the target sound. This suggests that the prior effect has a greater advantage in connecting to the action compared to the posterior sound.

Distracted to a fault: Attention, actions, and time perception

In the last years, it has become general consensus that actions change our time perception. Performing an action to elicit a specific event seems to lead to a systematic underestimation of the interval between action and effect, a phenomenon termed temporal (or previously intentional) binding. Temporal binding has been closely associated with sense of agency, our perceived control over our actions and our environment, and because of its robust behavioral effects has indeed been widely utilized as an implicit correlate of sense of agency. The most robust and clear temporal binding effects are typically found via Libet clock paradigms. In the present study, we investigate a crucial methodological confound in these paradigms that provides an alternative explanation for temporal binding effects: a redirection of attentional resources in two-event sequences (as in classical operant conditions) versus singular events (as in classical baseline conditions). Our results indicate that binding effects in Libet clock paradigms may be based to a large degree on such attentional processes, irrespective of intention or action-effect sequences. Thus, these findings challenge many of the previously drawn conclusions and interpretations with regard to actions and time perception.

Differentiating the reported time of intent and action on the basis of temporal binding behaviors and confidence ratings

The reported time of intent (W) and the reported time of action (M) have been used as indices of consciousness during simple voluntary actions. However, it is unclear whether W is exclusively inferred from M. Past studies have suggested that W is inferred from M by demonstrating that W varies when judged in conjunction with M. The current study offers counterevidence by showing that W is independent of M under some circumstances related to temporal binding. Participants performed a voluntary keypress that elicited a tone (briefly delayed at 5 and 60 ms). Subsequently, they reported W or M and indicated the confidence of their report. Binding strength was measured as the extent to which the W and M reports gravitated toward the time of the tone. Moreover, the binding strength was evaluated in conjunction with time course and knowledge to assess whether the strength increases due to repeated exposure or weakens if informed of the tone delay manipulation, respectively. We observed that the binding strength associated with W increased over time, and being informed of the tone manipulation did not affect W's binding behaviors. In contrast, M's binding behaviors did not change over time but being informed of the tone manipulation may release M from binding. The corresponding confidence ratings associated with W were uniform whereas those associated with M fluctuated over time. Collectively, the results suggest that binding behaviors associated with W and M differ, and that W is not simply derived from M.

Two faces of temporal binding: Action- and effect-binding are not correlated

Research on the sense of agency has proliferated a range of explicit and implicit measures. However, the relation of different measures is poorly understood with especially mixed findings on the correlation between explicit judgments of agency and the implicit perceptual bias of temporal binding. Here, we add to the conundrum by showing that the two sub-components of temporal binding - action-binding and effect-binding, respectively - are not correlated across participants either, suggesting independent processes for both components. Research on inter-individual differences regarding the sense of agency is thus well-advised to rely on other implicit measures until the phenomenon of temporal binding is better understood.

Temporal Binding, Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective "sense of agency." However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause-effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.

Disappearing and appearing: Temporal binding effects are consistent across situations

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over actions and action outcomes. Previous studies were mostly confined to the situation of performing actions to make objects appear, while it remains unexplored whether we experience sense of agency when making objects disappear. Here, we examined the temporal binding effect, an implicit index of sense of agency, in performing actions to make objects disappear and compared the magnitude of this effect in the appearing and disappearing situations. Results showed that the temporal binding effect emerged when object's disappearances served as action outcomes. Moreover, the temporal binding effects in the appearing and disappearing situations did not differ significantly. Our findings extend the temporal binding effect to the situation of voluntarily making objects disappear, suggesting a comparable level of implicit sense of agency when voluntarily making objects disappear and appear.

Temporal binding past the Libet clock: testing design factors for an auditory timer

Voluntary actions and causally linked sensory stimuli are perceived to be shifted towards each other in time. This so-called temporal binding is commonly assessed in paradigms using the Libet Clock. In such experiments, participants have to estimate the timing of actions performed or ensuing sensory stimuli (usually tones) by means of a rotating clock hand presented on a screen. The aforementioned task setup is however ill-suited for many conceivable setups, especially when they involve visual effects. To address this shortcoming, the line of research presented here establishes an alternative measure for temporal binding by using a sequence of timed sounds. This method uses an auditory timer, a sequence of letters presented during task execution, which serve as anchors for temporal judgments. In four experiments, we manipulated four design factors of this auditory timer, namely interval length, interval filling, sequence predictability, and sequence length, to determine the most effective and economic method for measuring temporal binding with an auditory timer.

Temporal binding is enhanced in social contexts

Temporal binding (TB) refers to an underestimation of time intervals between two events, most commonly for actions and their effects. This temporal contraction is measurable for both perceived changes in social stimuli such as faces, as well as for interactions with a partner. We investigated TB in two separate experiments to uncover the individual influences of (i) participants’ belief in an interaction with a human partner (as compared to a computer), and (ii) a face-like stimulus versus an abstract stimulus mediating the interaction. The results show that TB is more pronounced when self-initiated actions result in a personal event as opposed to a mere physical effect, being suggestive of a “social hyperbinding.” The social hyperbinding effect appeared to be driven both by the belief in interacting with another person and by a face-like stimulus. However, there seemed to be no further enhancing effect when combining the top-down processes (“beliefs”) with the bottom-up processes (“perceptions”). These findings suggest a prioritization of social information for TB regardless of whether this information is introduced by top-down (beliefs) or bottom-up information (stimuli). Our results add to existing literature demonstrating an increase in action-event monitoring for social cues.

Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects

People form coherent representations of goal-directed actions. Such agency experiences of intentional action are reflected by a shift in temporal perception: self-generated motor movements and subsequent sensory effects are perceived to occur closer together in time—a phenomenon termed intentional binding. Building on recent research suggesting that temporal binding occurs without intentionally performing actions, we further examined whether such perceptual compression occurs when motor action is fully absent. In three experiments, we used a novel sensory-based adaptation of the Libet clock paradigm to assess how a brief tactile sensation on the index finger and a resulting auditory stimulus perceptually bind together in time. Findings revealed robust temporal repulsion (instead of binding) between tactile sensation and auditory effect. Temporal repulsion was attenuated when participants could anticipate the identity and temporal onset (two crucial components of intentional action) of the tactile sensation. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of differences between intentional movement and anticipated bodily sensations in shaping action coherence and agentic experiences.

Olfactory encoding within the insect antennal lobe: The emergence and role of higher order temporal correlations in the dynamics of antennal lobe spiking activity

In this review, we focus on the antennal lobe (AL) of three insect species - the fruit fly, sphinx moth, and locust. We first review the experimentally elucidated anatomy and physiology of the early olfactory system of each species; empirical studies of AL activity, however, often focus on assessing firing rates (averaged over time scales of about 100 ms), and hence the AL odor code is often analyzed in terms of a temporally evolving vector of firing rates. However, such a perspective necessarily misses the possibility of higher order temporal correlations in spiking activity within a single cell and across multiple cells over shorter time scales (of about 10 ms). Hence, we then review our prior theoretical work, where we constructed biophysically detailed, species-specific AL models within the fly, moth, and locust, finding that in each case higher order temporal correlations in spiking naturally emerge from model dynamics (i.e., without a prioriincorporation of elements designed to produce correlated activity). We therefore use our theoretical work to argue the perspective that temporal correlations in spiking over short time scales, which have received little experimental attention to-date, may provide valuable coding dimensions (complementing the coding dimensions provided by the vector of firing rates) that nature has exploited in the encoding of odors within the AL. We further argue that, if the AL does indeed utilize temporally correlated activity to represent odor information, such an odor code could be naturally and easily deciphered within the Mushroom Body.

Network mechanism for insect olfaction

Early olfactory pathway responses to the presentation of an odor exhibit remarkably similar dynamical behavior across phyla from insects to mammals, and frequently involve transitions among quiescence, collective network oscillations, and asynchronous firing. We hypothesize that the time scales of fast excitation and fast and slow inhibition present in these networks may be the essential element underlying this similar behavior, and design an idealized, conductance-based integrate-and-fire model to verify this hypothesis via numerical simulations. To better understand the mathematical structure underlying the common dynamical behavior across species, we derive a firing-rate model and use it to extract a slow passage through a saddle-node-on-an-invariant-circle bifurcation structure. We expect this bifurcation structure to provide new insights into the understanding of the dynamical behavior of neuronal assemblies and that a similar structure can be found in other sensory systems.

To prevent means to know: Explicit but no implicit agency for prevention behavior

Human agents draw on a variety of explicit and implicit cues to construct a sense of agency for their actions and the effects of these actions on the outside world. Associative mechanisms binding actions to their immediate effects support the evolution of agency for operant actions. However, human agents often also act to prevent a certain event from occurring. Such prevention behavior poses a critical challenge for the sense of agency, as successful prevention inherently revolves around the absence of a perceivable effect. By assessing the psychological microstructure of singular operant and prevention actions we show that this comes with profound consequences: agency for prevention actions is only evident in explicit measures but not in corresponding implicit proxies. These findings attest to an altered action representation in prevention behavior and they support recent proposals to model related processes such as avoidance learning in terms of propositional rather than associative terms.

Temporal binding and agency under startle

Forward models are a component of the motor system that predicts the sensory consequences of our actions. These models play several key roles in motor control and are hypothesized to underlie (among other things) the two phenomena under investigation in this experiment: The feeling of agency that we have over self-initiated actions (as opposed to reflexes), and "temporal binding", in which self-caused sensations are judged to have occurred earlier in time than they actually did. This experiment probes the connection between forward models and both of these phenomena using the "Startle" paradigm. In the Startle paradigm, a startlingly loud sound causes people to initiate a prepared action at a very short latency. It is hypothesized that the latency of a startle-initiated action is so short that normal cortical operations (including forward models) are circumvented. This experiment replicates the temporal-binding effect and simultaneously measures participants' sense of agency over their actions. The results show that both the temporal-binding effect and the sense of agency we have over our own actions is disrupted under the startle paradigm in line with the theory that these phenomena both rely on forward models. Furthermore, this experiment provides evidence in support of the claim that a startle-induced action is qualitatively different from other actions.

The developmental profile of temporal binding: From childhood to adulthood

Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6–7, 7–8, and 9–10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter’s button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.

Intentionality and temporal binding: Do causality beliefs increase the perceived temporal attraction between events?

Intentional motor actions and their effects are bound together in temporal perception, resulting in the so-called intentional binding effect. In the current study, we address an alternative explanatory mechanism for the emergence of temporal binding by excluding the role of motor action. Employing a sensory-based Libet clock paradigm, we examined temporal perception of two different auditory stimuli, and tested the influence of beliefs about the causal relationship between the two auditory stimuli, thus simulating a crucial feature of intentional action. In two experiments, we found a robust temporal repulsion effect, indicating that instead of being attracted to each other, the auditory stimuli were shifted away from each other in temporal perception. Interestingly, repulsion was attenuated by causal beliefs, but this effect was fragile. Furthermore, temporal repulsion was unaffected by the intensity of prior learning. Findings are discussed in the context of intentional action awareness research and multisensory integration.

Consistent inter-individual differences in susceptibility to bodily illusions

Illusory senses of ownership and agency (that the hand or effector that we see belongs to us and moves at our will, respectively) support the embodiment of prosthetic limbs, tele-operated surgical devices, and human-machine interfaces. We exposed forty-eight individuals to four different procedures known to elicit illusory ownership or agency over a fake visible rubber hand or finger. The illusory ownership or agency arising from the hand correlated with that of the finger. For both body parts, sensory stimulation across different modalities (visual with tactile or visual with kinesthetic) produced illusions of similar strength. However, the strengths of the illusions of ownership and agency were unrelated within individuals, supporting the proposal that distinct neuropsychological processes underlie these two senses. Developing training programs to enhance susceptibility to illusions of agency or ownership for people with lower natural susceptibility could broaden the usefulness of the above technologies.

Connecting action control and agency: Does action-effect binding affect temporal binding?

The sense of agency, i.e., the notion that we, as agents, are in control of our own actions and can affect our environment by acting, is an integral part of human volition. Recent work has attempted to ground agency in basic mechanisms of human action control. Along these lines, action-effect binding has been shown to affect explicit judgments of agency. Here, we investigate if such action-effect bindings are also related to temporal binding which is often used as an implicit measure of agency. In two experiments, we found evidence for the establishment of short-term action-effect bindings as well as temporal binding effects. However, the two phenomena were not associated with each other. This finding suggests that the relation of action control and agency is not a simple one, and it adds to the evidence in favor of a dissociation between subjective agency and perceptual biases such as temporal binding.

The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal sequences

Causality affects our perception of time; events that appear as causally related are perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is known as temporal binding. One potential explanation of this effect is that causality slows an "internal clock" that is used in interval estimation. To explore this hypothesis, we first examined participants' perceived duration of a range of intervals between a causal action and an effect, or between two unrelated events. If (apparent) causality slows the internal clock, then plotting perceived duration against actual duration should reveal a shallower slope in the causality condition (a relative compression of perceived time). This pattern was found. We then examined an interesting corollary: that a slower rate during causal sequences would result in reduced temporal acuity. This is what we found: Duration discrimination thresholds were higher for causal compared to non-causal sequences. These results are compatible with a clock-slowing account of temporal binding. Implications for sensory recalibration accounts of binding are discussed.

Investigating the perceived timing of sensory events triggering actions in patients with Parkinson's disease and the effects of dopaminergic therapy

Few studies have investigated if Parkinson's disease (PD), advancing age, or exogenous dopamine therapy affect the perceived timing of past events. Here we show a phenomenon of 'temporal repulsion' of a sensory event relative to an action decision in patients with PD. In these patients, the timing of a sensory event triggering an action was perceived to have occurred earlier in time than it really did. In other words, the event appeared to be pushed away in time from the performance of the action. This finding stands in sharp contrast to the 'temporal binding' we have observed here and elsewhere (Yabe et al., 2017; Yabe & Goodale, 2015) in young healthy participants for whom the perceived onset of a sensory event triggering an action is typically delayed, as if it were pulled towards the action in time. In elderly patients, sensory events were neither repulsed nor pulled toward the action decision event. Exogenous dopamine alleviated the temporal repulsion in PD patients and normalized the temporal binding in healthy elderly controls. In contrast, dopaminergic therapy worsened temporal binding in healthy young participants. We discuss this pattern of findings, relating temporal binding processes to dopaminergic and striatal mechanisms.

Brief Report: Differences in Multisensory Integration Covary with Sensory Responsiveness in Children with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder

Research shows that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) differ in their behavioral patterns of responding to sensory stimuli (i.e., sensory responsiveness) and in various other aspects of sensory functioning relative to typical peers. This study explored relations between measures of sensory responsiveness and multisensory speech perception and integration in children with and without ASD. Participants were 8-17 year old children, 18 with ASD and 18 matched typically developing controls. Participants completed a psychophysical speech perception task, and parents reported on children's sensory responsiveness. Psychophysical measures (e.g., audiovisual accuracy, temporal binding window) were associated with patterns of sensory responsiveness (e.g., hyporesponsiveness, sensory seeking). Results indicate that differences in multisensory speech perception and integration covary with atypical patterns of sensory responsiveness.

Unexpected action outcomes produce enhanced temporal binding but diminished judgement of agency

Sense of agency (SoA) is the feeling of being the author of given actions and their effects. Recent works have investigated the cue integration approach to agency, according to which different predictive and inferential cues form SoA. In the current research we focus on how two such cues, i.e. accuracy of sensorimotor prediction and prior causal belief, influence SoA measured by temporal binding (TB) and questionnaires. Our results show that whereas learnt action effects produce normal TB and explicit agency, unexpected oddball effects produce enhanced TB but diminished explicit agency. Increased binding was modulated by temporal prediction, but not by identity prediction. A few interpretations of the results are given, including cue integration and pre-activation mechanisms. The research casts new light on the mechanisms and dynamics of TB and adds to the evidence for discrepancies between SoA measures.

Temporal binding effect in the action observation domain: Evidence from an action-based somatosensory paradigm

Temporal binding is understood as an effect in which a temporal interval between a voluntary action and its consequent effect is perceived as compressed. It denotes an implicit measure of a sense of agency. When people observe someone else performing an action that generates an effect, temporal binding also takes place. We aimed to test whether the interaction between observed actions and tactile sensation influences temporal binding. Participants observed finger tapping movements (of a human or wooden hand), in parallel to receiving tactile stimulations on their fingertip. These stimulations were either congruent or incongruent with the tactile consequences of the observed movement. The finger tapping movement was followed by a tone. Participants estimated the intervals between the observed action and the tone. We found that temporal binding for observed actions depends on the congruency between the perceived touch and tactile consequences of observed actions restricted to intentional actors.

Eyes that bind us: Gaze leading induces an implicit sense of agency

Humans feel a sense of agency over the effects their motor system causes. This is the case for manual actions such as pushing buttons, kicking footballs, and all acts that affect the physical environment. We ask whether initiating joint attention - causing another person to follow our eye movement - can elicit an implicit sense of agency over this congruent gaze response. Eye movements themselves cannot directly affect the physical environment, but joint attention is an example of how eye movements can indirectly cause social outcomes. Here we show that leading the gaze of an on-screen face induces an underestimation of the temporal gap between action and consequence (Experiments 1 and 2). This underestimation effect, named 'temporal binding,' is thought to be a measure of an implicit sense of agency. Experiment 3 asked whether merely making an eye movement in a non-agentic, non-social context might also affect temporal estimation, and no reliable effects were detected, implying that inconsequential oculomotor acts do not reliably affect temporal estimations under these conditions. Together, these findings suggest that an implicit sense of agency is generated when initiating joint attention interactions. This is important for understanding how humans can efficiently detect and understand the social consequences of their actions.

Developmental changes in feature detection across time: Evidence from the attentional blink

The ability to select targets from an ongoing stream of visual information is critical to the successful management of visual attention. The attentional blink (AB), a phenomenon elicited using rapid serial visual presentation, allows for the assessment of the limits of the temporal visual system, and is reflected in a decrease in accuracy in the detection of the second of two targets when it occurs within 200-500ms of a first target. Evidence regarding the development of the AB is mixed and appears to be dependent on the task demands. Here we present data examining the AB across middle childhood, early adolescence, and adulthood using a feature binding task. Participants were asked to detect and report the identity of two purple letters presented in a stream of black letters at a rate of 135ms/item. On this feature binding task, the depth of the AB was invariant across development but AB recovery occurred earlier with increasing age. Furthermore, the error data suggested important developments in temporal binding that were reflected both in a decrease in the number of swaps (where participants reverse the order of the targets but identify them correctly) and in the spread of temporal binding errors with age. These findings suggest that the characteristics of the AB and its development are task dependent and also suggest that the development of binding abilities in visual search tasks mirrors the time course of multisensory binding effects, perhaps suggesting a common mechanism.

Temporal distortion in the perception of actions and events

In everyday life, actions and sensory events occur in complex sequences, with events triggering actions that in turn give rise to additional events and so on. Earlier work has shown that a sensory event that is triggered by a voluntary action is perceived to have occurred earlier in time than an identical event that is not triggered by an action. In other words, events that are believed to be caused by our actions are drawn forward in time towards our actions. Similarly, when a sensory event triggers an action, that event is again drawn in time towards the action and is thus perceived to have occurred later than it really did. This alteration in time perception serves to bind together events and actions that are causally linked. It is not clear, however, whether or not the perceived timing of a sensory event embedded within a longer series of actions and sensory events is also temporally bound to the actions in that sequence. In the current study, we measured the temporal binding in sequences consisting of two simple dyads of event-action and action-event in a series of manual action tasks: an event-action-event triad (Experiment 1) and an action-event-action triad (Experiment 2). Auditory tones either triggered an action or were presented 250ms after an action was performed. To reduce the influence of sensory events other than the tone, such as a noise associated with pressing a key on a keyboard, we used an optical sensor to detect hand movements where no contact was made with a surface. In Experiment 1, there appeared to be no change in the perceived onset of an auditory tone when the onset of that tone followed a hand movement and then the tone triggered a second hand movement. It was as if the temporal binding between the action and the tone and then the tone and the subsequent action summed algebraically and cancelled each other out. In Experiment 2, both the perceived onset of an initial tone which triggered an action and the perceived onset of a second tone which was presented 250ms after the action were temporally bound to the action. Taken together, the present study suggests that the temporal binding between our actions and sensory events occur separately in each dyad within a longer sequence of actions and events.

Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency

We investigated the effect of effort on implicit agency ascription for actions performed under varying levels of physical effort or cognitive load. People are able to estimate the interval between two events accurately, but they underestimate the interval between their own actions and their outcomes. This effect is known as 'intentional binding', and may provide feedback regarding the consequences of our actions. Concurrently with the interval reproduction task, our participants pulled sports resistance bands at high and low resistance levels (Experiments 1 and 2), or performed a working memory task with high and low set-sizes (Experiment 3). Intentional binding was greater under low than high effort. When the effort was task-related (Experiment 1), this effect depended on the individual's explicit appraisal of exertion, while the effect of effort was evident at the group level when the effort was task-unrelated (physical, Experiment 2; mental, Experiment 3). These findings imply that the process of intentional binding is compromised when cognitive resources are depleted, either through physical or mental strain. We discuss this notion in relation to the integration of direct sensorimotor feedback with signals of agency and other instances of cognitive resource depletion and action control during strain.

Intentional Binding is independent of the validity of the action effect's identity

When an action produces an effect, both events are perceived to be shifted in time toward each other. This shift is called Intentional Binding (IB) effect. First evidence shows that this shift does not depend on the statistical predictability of the produced effect's identity (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). We confirm this result by comparing the perceived duration of action-effect intervals before valid and invalid action effects using the method of constant stimuli. The perceived duration of action-effect intervals did not differ for valid and invalid effects. This result was true for different durations of the action-effect interval (Experiments 1-4: 250 ms, Experiments 1 & 2: 400 ms), different effect modalities (Experiments 1 & 3: visual, Experiments 2-4: auditive), and two types of validity variations (Experiments 1 & 2: 80% valid, Experiments 3 & 4: 100% valid vs. random). We validated our results by using a clock paradigm and a numerical duration estimation task (Experiment 4). We conclude that the IB effect is not the result of internal prediction due to action-effect bindings, but might rely on higher-order processes.

Temporal binding of neural responses for focused attention in biosonar

Big brown bats emit biosonar sounds and perceive their surroundings from the delays of echoes received by the ears. Broadcasts are frequency modulated (FM) and contain two prominent harmonics sweeping from 50 to 25 kHz (FM1) and from 100 to 50 kHz (FM2). Individual frequencies in each broadcast and each echo evoke single-spike auditory responses. Echo delay is encoded by the time elapsed between volleys of responses to broadcasts and volleys of responses to echoes. If echoes have the same spectrum as broadcasts, the volley of neural responses to FM1 and FM2 is internally synchronized for each sound, which leads to sharply focused delay images. Because of amplitude-latency trading, disruption of response synchrony within the volleys occurs if the echoes are lowpass filtered, leading to blurred, defocused delay images. This effect is consistent with the temporal binding hypothesis for perceptual image formation. Bats perform inexplicably well in cluttered surroundings where echoes from off-side objects ought to cause masking. Off-side echoes are lowpass filtered because of the shape of the broadcast beam, and they evoke desynchronized auditory responses. The resulting defocused images of clutter do not mask perception of focused images for targets. Neural response synchronization may select a target to be the focus of attention, while desynchronization may impose inattention on the surroundings by defocusing perception of clutter. The formation of focused biosonar images from synchronized neural responses, and the defocusing that occurs with disruption of synchrony, quantitatively demonstrates how temporal binding may control attention and bring a perceptual object into existence.

Re-construction of action awareness depends on an internal model of action-outcome timing

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Action awareness can shift retrospectively at the time of an action-outcome.

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In principle, this could reflect bottom-up interference and not subjective agency.

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We keep bottom-up drive constant and manipulate temporal outcome variability instead.

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Action awareness is shifted retrospectively in a context of variable outcome timing.

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This top-down process may bias subjective agency when an outcome is unpredictable.

The subjective time of an instrumental action is shifted towards its outcome. This temporal binding effect is partially retrospective, i.e., occurs upon outcome perception. Retrospective binding is thought to reflect post-hoc inference on agency based on sensory evidence of the action – outcome association. However, many previous binding paradigms cannot exclude the possibility that retrospective binding results from bottom-up interference of sensory outcome processing with action awareness and is functionally unrelated to the processing of the action – outcome association. Here, we keep bottom-up interference constant and use a contextual manipulation instead. We demonstrate a shift of subjective action time by its outcome in a context of variable outcome timing. Crucially, this shift is absent when there is no such variability. Thus, retrospective action binding reflects a context-dependent, model-based phenomenon. Such top-down re-construction of action awareness seems to bias agency attribution when outcome predictability is low.