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Tecwyn EC, Mazumder P, Buchsbaum D. One- and two-year-olds grasp that causes must precede their effects. Dev Psychol 2023; 59:1519-1531. [PMID: 37199925 DOI: 10.1037/dev0001551] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/19/2023]
Abstract
Knowing the temporal direction of causal relations is critical for producing desired outcomes and explaining events. Existing evidence suggests that children start to grasp that causes must precede their effects (the temporal priority principle) by age 3; however, whether younger children also understand this has, to our knowledge, not previously been tested. Given the importance of temporal priority in making sense of the world, we explored when knowledge of this principle develops. In the present study, conducted in a lab or museum in a Canadian city, 1- and 2-year-old children observed an adult perform action A on a puzzle box (e.g., spinning a dial), following which an effect E occurred (a sticker was dispensed), following which the adult performed action B (e.g., pushing a button; A-E-B sequence). In line with the temporal priority principle, toddlers were significantly more likely to manipulate A than B (Experiment 1, N = 41, 22 female), even when A was spatially disconnected from the sticker dispenser and further from it than action B (Experiment 2, N = 42, 25 female). In Experiment 3 (N = 50, 25 female), toddlers observed an A-B-E sequence such that both actions A and B were performed prior to effect E. Here, they primarily intervened on B, which ruled out that success in Experiments 1-2 was based on a primacy effect. A lack of any age effects across experiments suggests that within the second year of life, children already grasp that causes must precede their effects, providing key insights into causal reasoning in early childhood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
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Affiliation(s)
- Emma C Tecwyn
- School of Education, Language and Psychology, York St John University
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Abstract
The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, because the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here, we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: In three experiments (N = 607), the experienced event timings were determined by causality in real time. Adult participants viewed a simple three-item sequence, ACB, which is typically remembered as ABC in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, participants' points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite participants' full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by postperceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christos Bechlivanidis
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
| | | | - Emma C Tecwyn
- School of Social Sciences, Birmingham City University
| | - David A Lagnado
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
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Abstract
Unlike some other areas of psychology that have experienced a "reproducibility crisis," the extent to which research findings in comparative psychology are reliable is only just beginning to come under the spotlight. I outline what is known about where we as a field stand in terms of the reliability of our findings and highlight some characteristic features of our research that give may cause for concern, focusing primarily on experimental comparative cognition. I then discuss ways that we as individual researchers and a wider community can take steps to improve our current practices (and in some cases already are) and highlight the crucial role institutions and gatekeepers have to play in effecting change. By tackling potential issues head on, the field of comparative psychology can have more confidence that our research findings and the resultant claims we make about animal behavior and cognition are reliable. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
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Affiliation(s)
- Emma C Tecwyn
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, Birmingham City University
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Hoerl C, Lorimer S, McCormack T, Lagnado DA, Blakey E, Tecwyn EC, Buehner MJ. Temporal Binding, Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework. Cogn Sci 2021; 44:e12843. [PMID: 32419274 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12843] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/23/2018] [Revised: 04/07/2020] [Accepted: 04/13/2020] [Indexed: 01/21/2023]
Abstract
In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective "sense of agency." However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause-effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Sara Lorimer
- School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast
| | | | | | - Emma Blakey
- Department of Psychology, The University of Sheffield
| | - Emma C Tecwyn
- School of Social Sciences, Birmingham City University
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Lorimer S, McCormack T, Blakey E, Lagnado DA, Hoerl C, Tecwyn EC, Buehner MJ. The developmental profile of temporal binding: From childhood to adulthood. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2020; 73:1575-1586. [PMID: 32338574 PMCID: PMC7534204 DOI: 10.1177/1747021820925075] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6–7, 7–8, and 9–10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter’s button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sara Lorimer
- School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, UK
| | | | - Emma Blakey
- Department of Psychology, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
| | - David A Lagnado
- Department of Psychology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Christoph Hoerl
- Department of Philosophy, The University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
| | - Emma C Tecwyn
- School of Social Sciences, Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK
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Tecwyn EC, Bechlivanidis C, Lagnado DA, Hoerl C, Lorimer S, Blakey E, McCormack T, Buehner MJ. Causality influences children's and adults' experience of temporal order. Dev Psychol 2020; 56:739-755. [PMID: 31944800 DOI: 10.1037/dev0000889] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Although it has long been known that time is a cue to causation, recent work with adults has demonstrated that causality can also influence the experience of time. In causal reordering (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016) adults tend to report the causally consistent order of events rather than the correct temporal order. However, the effect has yet to be demonstrated in children. Across four preregistered experiments, 4- to 10-year-old children (N = 813) and adults (N = 178) watched a 3-object Michotte-style "pseudocollision." While in the canonical version of the clip, object A collided with B, which then collided with object C (order: ABC), the pseudocollision involved the same spatial array of objects but featured object C moving before object B (order: ACB), with no collision between B and C. Participants were asked to judge the temporal order of events and whether object B collided with C. Across all age groups, participants were significantly more likely to judge that B collided with C in the 3-object pseudocollision than in a 2-object control clip (where clear causal direction was lacking), despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two clips (Experiments 1-3). Collision judgments and temporal order judgments were not entirely consistent, with some participants-particularly in the younger age range-basing their temporal order judgments on spatial rather than temporal information (Experiment 4). We conclude that in both children and adults, rather than causal impressions being determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object movement, schemata are used in a top-down manner when interpreting perceptual displays. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | | | - Sara Lorimer
- School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast
| | - Emma Blakey
- Department of Psychology, The University of Sheffield
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Blakey E, Tecwyn EC, McCormack T, Lagnado DA, Hoerl C, Lorimer S, Buehner MJ. When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children. Dev Sci 2018; 22:e12769. [DOI: 10.1111/desc.12769] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/09/2018] [Accepted: 10/24/2018] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Emma Blakey
- Department of Psychology The University of Sheffield SheffieldUK
| | | | | | | | | | - Sara Lorimer
- School of Psychology Queen's University Belfast BelfastUK
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Tecwyn EC, Buchsbaum D. What factors really influence domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris) search for an item dropped down a diagonal tube? The tubes task revisited. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2018; 133:4-19. [PMID: 30382710 DOI: 10.1037/com0000145] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
It has been suggested that domestic dogs-like young human children-have a "gravity bias"; they expect an unsupported object to fall straight down, regardless of any obstacles that redirect or halt its path. In the diagonal tube task, this bias is revealed by a persistent tendency to search the incorrect location directly beneath the top of the tube the item is dropped into, rather than the correct location attached to the bottom of the tube. We presented dogs (N = 112) with seven different versions of the diagonal tube task, to examine what factors influence their search behavior for an object dropped down a diagonal tube, and investigate their physical reasoning skills more generally. Contrary to previous claims, we found no evidence for dogs exhibiting a persistent, or even a Trial 1, gravity bias. However, dogs were also unable to search correctly for the reward, even when it could be heard rolling through the tube, though they succeeded when the tube was transparent (Experiments 1a-c). Experiment 2 suggested that dogs might search on the basis of proximity, but Experiments 3a-b ruled this out and showed that they prefer to commence searching at the center of the apparatus. Finally, when potential sources of bias were eliminated from the task (Experiment 4), dogs' performance was improved, but still not above chance, suggesting that they are unable to reason about the tube's physical-causal mechanism. We conclude that, on current evidence, the gravity bias might be unique to some primate species. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
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Tecwyn EC, Denison S, Messer EJE, Buchsbaum D. Intuitive probabilistic inference in capuchin monkeys. Anim Cogn 2016; 20:243-256. [PMID: 27744528 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-016-1043-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2016] [Revised: 09/26/2016] [Accepted: 10/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
The ability to reason about probabilities has ecological relevance for many species. Recent research has shown that both preverbal infants and non-human great apes can make predictions about single-item samples randomly drawn from populations by reasoning about proportions. To further explore the evolutionary origins of this ability, we conducted the first investigation of probabilistic inference in a monkey species (capuchins; Sapajus spp.). Across four experiments, capuchins (N = 19) were presented with two populations of food items that differed in their relative distribution of preferred and non-preferred items, such that one population was more likely to yield a preferred item. In each trial, capuchins had to select between hidden single-item samples randomly drawn from each population. In Experiment 1 each population was homogeneous so reasoning about proportions was not required; Experiments 2-3 replicated previous probabilistic reasoning research with infants and apes; and Experiment 4 was a novel condition untested in other species, providing an important extension to previous work. Results revealed that at least some capuchins were able to make probabilistic inferences via reasoning about proportions as opposed to simpler quantity heuristics. Performance was relatively poor in Experiment 4, so the possibility remains that capuchins may use quantity-based heuristics in some situations, though further work is required to confirm this. Interestingly, performance was not at ceiling in Experiment 1, which did not involve reasoning about proportions, but did involve sampling. This suggests that the sampling task posed demands in addition to reasoning about proportions, possibly related to inhibitory control, working memory, and/or knowledge of object permanence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emma C Tecwyn
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, UK. .,Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.
| | | | - Emily J E Messer
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, UK.,Department of Psychology, School of Life Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
| | - Daphna Buchsbaum
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, UK.,Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
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Tecwyn EC, Thorpe SK, Chappell J. Development of planning in 4- to 10-year-old children: Reducing inhibitory demands does not improve performance. J Exp Child Psychol 2014; 125:85-101. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2014.02.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2013] [Revised: 02/19/2014] [Accepted: 02/19/2014] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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Tecwyn EC, Thorpe SKS, Chappell J. What cognitive strategies do orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) use to solve a trial-unique puzzle-tube task incorporating multiple obstacles? Anim Cogn 2011; 15:121-33. [PMID: 21761145 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-011-0438-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/16/2011] [Revised: 06/23/2011] [Accepted: 06/29/2011] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Apparently sophisticated behaviour during problem-solving is often the product of simple underlying mechanisms, such as associative learning or the use of procedural rules. These and other more parsimonious explanations need to be eliminated before higher-level cognitive processes such as causal reasoning or planning can be inferred. We presented three Bornean orangutans with 64 trial-unique configurations of a puzzle-tube to investigate whether they were able to consider multiple obstacles in two alternative paths, and subsequently choose the correct direction in which to move a reward in order to retrieve it. We were particularly interested in how subjects attempted to solve the task, namely which behavioural strategies they could have been using, as this is how we may begin to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning their choices. To explore this, we simulated performance outcomes across the 64 trials for various procedural rules and rule combinations that subjects may have been using based on the configuration of different obstacles. Two of the three subjects solved the task, suggesting that they were able to consider at least some of the obstacles in the puzzle-tube before executing action to retrieve the reward. This is impressive compared with the past performances of great apes on similar, arguably less complex tasks. Successful subjects may have been using a heuristic rule combination based on what they deemed to be the most relevant cue (the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends), which may be a cognitively economical strategy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emma C Tecwyn
- School of Biosciences, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, UK.
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