Information-Theoretical Analysis of the Cycle of Creation of Knowledge and Meaning in Brains under Multiple Cognitive Modalities

It is of great interest to develop advanced sensory technologies allowing non-invasive monitoring of neural correlates of cognitive processing in people performing everyday tasks. A lot of progress has been reported in recent years in this research area using scalp EEG arrays, but the high level of noise in the electrode signals poses a lot of challenges. This study presents results of detailed statistical analysis of experimental data on the cycle of creation of knowledge and meaning in human brains under multiple cognitive modalities. We measure brain dynamics using a HydroCel Geodesic Sensor Net, 128-electrode dense-array electroencephalography (EEG). We compute a pragmatic information (PI) index derived from analytic amplitude and phase, by Hilbert transforming the EEG signals of 20 participants in six modalities, which combine various audiovisual stimuli, leading to different mental states, including relaxed and cognitively engaged conditions. We derive several relevant measures to classify different brain states based on the PI indices. We demonstrate significant differences between engaged brain states that require sensory information processing to create meaning and knowledge for intentional action, and relaxed-meditative brain states with less demand on psychophysiological resources. We also point out that different kinds of meanings may lead to different brain dynamics and behavioral responses.

Bridging Intention and Action for Employee Well-Being Using the Intentional Action (InAct) Process: Workshop-Lecture Series

Background

Employee wellness programs can help manage stress and alleviate burnout.

Objective

To pilot and disseminate the Intentional Action(InAct) concept for employee wellbeing.

Methods

Five independent interactive workshop-lectures with an automated audience response system. Descriptive analysis of participant response data.

Results

Participants (n = 275): rated spirituality, physical environment and nutrition the most highly in contributing to their present well-being. Ninety-eight percent (n = 269) of participants identified a focus area to work on. The well-being area most selected was Exercise, (35% n = 95), however, other non-traditional areas, including Personal and Professional Development (18% n = 48), Relationships and Communication (17% n = 47), were selected, along with mind-body connection and mindful awareness (6% n = 15 and n = 16).

Conclusion

The pilot engaged employees to reflect and set goals for their future well-being. Healthcare institutions implementing programs should consider a broad range of whole person strategies addressing employee well-being, which go beyond the traditional focus on exercise and nutrition.

Item-Specificity and Intention in Episodic Memory

Schmidt et al.'s (2020) PEP model accurately reflects the complexity of task switching based on bottom-up assumptions and episodic memory, re-evaluating the contribution of commonly presumed top-down processes. Extending it to long-term bindings and their item-specific effects could eludicate puzzling findings regarding the independence of long-term bindings between stimuli, responses, and task-specific categorizations as well as the relation between short-term and long-term bindings. Moreover, ideomotor theories of action control provide a bottom-up basis of incorporating volition and intentional action into the PEP model which is currently restricted to stimulus-based action.

What exactly is missing here? The sensory processing of unpredictable omissions is modulated by the specificity of expected action-effects

We select our actions according to the desired outcomes; for instance, piano players press certain keys to generate specific musical notes. It is well-described that the omission of a predicted action-effect may elicit prediction error signals in the brain, but what happens in the case of simultaneous effector-specific (by contrast to effector-unspecific) predictions? To answer this question, we asked participants to press left and right keys to generate tones A and B; based on the action-effect association, the tones' identity was either predictable or unpredictable, while rarely, the expected input was omitted. Crucially, the data show that omissions following hand-specific associations reliably elicited a late omission N1 (oN1) component, by contrast to the hand-unspecific associations, where the late oN1 was rather weak. An additional condition where both key-presses generated a unique tone was implemented. Here, rare omissions of the expected tone generated both early and late oN1 responses, by contrast to the condition in which two simultaneous action-effect representations had to be maintained, where only late oN1 responses were elicited. Finally, omission P3 (oP3) responses were strongly elicited for all omission types without differences, indicating that a general expectation based on a tone presentation (rather than which tone), is likely indexed at this stage. The present results emphasize the top-down effects of action intention on the sensory processing of omissions, where unspecific (vs. specific) and multiple (vs. single) action-effect representations are associated with processing costs at the early sensory levels.

The developmental profile of temporal binding: From childhood to adulthood

Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6–7, 7–8, and 9–10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter’s button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.

From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action

There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional actions, including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control.

Two Distinctions That Help to Chart the Interplay Between Conscious and Unconscious Volition

Research initiated by Benjamin Libet suggests that short-term conscious intentions are not the onsets of bodily actions. However, other research, particularly on longer-term intentions, seems to show that at least some conscious intentions are effective. This leads to the idea that volition is a complex interplay between conscious and unconscious processes. The nature and structure of this interplay is mostly uncharted territory. In this article, I will highlight two currently neglected distinctions that will help to chart the territory. The first distinction is between intentions we become conscious of (passive) and consciously formed intentions (active). The second is Fred Dretske’s distinction between structuring and triggering causes. I will introduce both distinctions by discussing how they tie in with and strengthen recent criticism of free selection paradigms and support the idea that consciously self-initiated action issues from processes of conscious deliberation and/or information integration. I will argue that consciously self-initiated action typically involves consciously formed intentions that are the structuring causes of our actions. This notion of conscious intentional action allows us to identify at least four stages in which unconscious processes co-determine our actions—without undermining their self-initiated character.

Context-Dependence and Context-Invariance in the Neural Coding of Intentional Action

Maintaining intentions over time is fundamental to goal-directed action, and previous research demonstrated that intentions are encoded and maintained in a fronto-parietal network including e.g., the dlPFC and IPS. Yet, intention maintenance is highly challenging in the constantly changing environments we experience every day. While we might have formed an intention under specific conditions, this context can change rapidly and unexpectedly. Some suggested that intentions representations in the fronto-parietal cortex change flexibly when external demands change (context-dependent coding). Others suggested that these representations are encoded in an abstract format that is not affected by changes in external demands (context-invariant coding). Here, I will first outline an analysis approach using multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data to comprehensively assess the context-dependence / invariance of intention representations in the fronto-parietal cortex. I will then highlight some research following the proposed analysis strategy. Results to date are mixed, showing context-dependence in some, but context-invariance in other cases. In an attempt to synthesize these somewhat divergent results, I will argue that depending on characteristics of the intentions as well as the environment, intentions can either be encoded in a context-dependent or a context-invariant format. This enables us to achieve both stability and flexibility of behavior under constantly changing external demands.

Dissecting the neurofunctional bases of intentional action

Here we challenge and present evidence that expands the what, when, and whether anatomical model of intentional action, which states that internally driven decisions about the content and timing of our actions and about whether to act at all depend on separable neural systems, anatomically segregated along the medial wall of the frontal lobe. In our fMRI event-related paradigm, subjects acted following conditional cues or following their intentions. The content of the actions, their timing, or their very occurrence were the variables investigated, together with the modulating factor of intentionality. Besides a shared activation of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for all components and the SMA proper for the when component, we found specific activations beyond the mesial prefrontal wall involving the parietal cortex for the what component or subcortical gray structures for the when component. Moreover, we found behavioral, functional, anatomical, and brain connectivity evidence that the self-driven decisions on whether to act require a higher interhemispheric cooperation: This was indexed by a specific activation of the corpus callosum whereby the less the callosal activation, the greater was the decision cost at the time of the action in the whether trials. Furthermore, tractography confirmed that the fibers passing through the callosal focus of activation connect the two sides of the frontal lobes involved in intentional trials. This is evidence of non-unitary neural foundations for the processes involved in intentional actions with the pre-SMA/ACC operating as an intentional hub. These findings may guide the exploration of specific instances of disturbed intentionality.

The What, the When, and the Whether of Intentional Action in the Brain: A Meta-Analytical Review

In their attempt to define discrete subcomponents of intentionality, Brass and Haggard (2008) proposed their What, When, and Whether model (www-model) which postulates that the content, the timing and the possibility of generating an action can be partially independent both at the cognitive level and at the level of their neural implementation. The original proposal was based on a limited number of studies, which were reviewed with a discursive approach. To assess whether the model stands in front of the more recently published data, we performed a systematic review of the literature with a meta-analytic method based on a hierarchical clustering (HC) algorithm. We identified 15 PET/fMRI studies well-suited for this quest. HC revealed the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the medial prefrontal cortex, with the more anterior regions (the anterior cingulum) involved in more abstract decisions of whether to execute an action and the more posterior ones (the middle cingulum or the SMA) recruited in specifying the content and the timing components of actions. However, in contrast with the original www-model, this dissociation involves also brain regions well outside the median wall of the frontal lobe, in a component specific manner: the supramarginal gyrus for the what component, the pallidum and the thalamus for the when component, the putamen and the insula for the whether component. We then calculated co-activation maps on the three component-specific www clusters of the medial wall of the frontal/limbic lobe: to this end, we used the activation likelihood approach that we applied on the imaging studies on action contained in the BrainMap.org database. This analysis confirmed the main findings of the HC analyses. However, the BrainMap.org data analyses also showed that the aforementioned segregations are generated by paradigms in which subjects act in response to conditional stimuli rather than while driven by their own intentions. We conclude that the available data confirm that the neural underpinnings of intentionality can be fractionated in discrete components that are partially independent. We also suggest that intentionality manifests itself in discrete components through the boosting of general purpose action-related regions specialized for different aspects of action selection and inhibition.

Increased Event-Related Potentials and Alpha-, Beta-, and Gamma-Activity Associated with Intentional Actions

Objective: Internally guided actions are defined as being purposeful, self-generated and offering choices between alternatives. Intentional actions are essential to reach individual goals. In previous empirical studies, internally guided actions were predominantly related to functional responses in frontal and parietal areas. The aim of the present study was to distinguish event-related potentials and oscillatory responses of intentional actions and externally guided actions. In addition, we compared neurobiological findings of the decision which action to perform with those referring to the decision whether or not to perform an action.

Methods: Twenty-eight subjects participated in adapted go/nogo paradigms, including a voluntary selection condition allowing participants to (1) freely decide whether to press the response button or (2) to decide whether they wanted to press the response button with the right index finger or the left index finger.

Results: The reaction times were increased when participants freely decided whether and how they wanted to respond compared to the go condition. Intentional processes were associated with a fronto-centrally located N2 and P3 potential. N2 and P3 amplitudes were increased during intentional actions compared to instructed responses (go). In addition, increased activity in the alpha-, beta- and gamma-frequency range was shown during voluntary behavior rather than during externally guided responses.

Conclusion: These results may indicate that an additional cognitive process is needed for intentional actions compared to instructed behavior. However, the neural responses were comparatively independent of the kind of decision that was made (1) decision which action to perform; (2) decision whether or not to perform an action).

Significance: The study demonstrates the importance of fronto-central alpha-, beta-, and gamma oscillations for voluntary behavior.

Investigating conceptions of intentional action by analyzing participant generated scenarios

We describe and report on results of employing a new method for analyzing lay conceptions of intentional and unintentional action. Instead of asking people for their conceptual intuitions with regard to construed scenarios, we asked our participants to come up with their own scenarios and to explain why these are examples of intentional or unintentional actions. By way of content analysis, we extracted contexts and components that people associated with these action types. Our participants associated unintentional actions predominantly with bad outcomes for all persons involved and linked intentional actions more strongly to positive outcomes, especially concerning the agent. People’s conceptions of intentional action seem to involve more aspects than commonly assumed in philosophical models of intentional action that solely stress the importance of intentions, desires, and beliefs. The additional aspects include decisions and thoughts about the action. In addition, we found that the criteria that participants generated for unintentional actions are not a mere inversion of those used in explanations for intentional actions. Associations between involuntariness and unintentional action seem to be stronger than associations between aspects of voluntariness and intentional action.

Moral asymmetries in judgments of agency withstand ludicrous causal deviance

Americans have been shown to attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the target). However, past research has yet to assess whether this asymmetry persists in cases of extreme causal deviance. Here, we manipulated the level of mild to extreme causal deviance of an immoral versus amoral act. The asymmetry in attributions of intentionality was observed at all but the most extreme level of causal deviance, and, as we hypothesized, was mediated by attributions of blame/credit and judgments of action performance. These findings are discussed as they support a multiple-concepts interpretation of the asymmetry, wherein blame renders a naïve concept of intentional action (the outcome matches the intention) more salient than a composite concept (the outcome matches the intention and was brought about by planned means), and in terms of their implications for cross-cultural research on judgments of agency.

Happiness in action: the impact of positive affect on the time of the conscious intention to act

The temporal relationship between our conscious intentions to act and the action itself has been widely investigated. Previous research consistently shows that the motor intention enters awareness a few 100 ms before movement onset. As research in other domains has shown that most behavior is affected by the emotional state people are in, it is remarkable that the role of emotional states on intention awareness has never been investigated. Here we tested the hypothesis that positive and negative affects have opposite effects on the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself. A mood induction procedure that combined guided imagery and music listening was employed to induce positive, negative, or neutral affective states. After each mood induction session, participants were asked to execute voluntary self-paced movements and to report when they formed the intention to act. Exposure to pleasant material, as compared to exposure to unpleasant material, enhanced positive affect and dampened negative affect. Importantly, in the positive affect condition participants reported their intention to act earlier in time with respect to action onset, as compared to when they were in the negative or in the neutral affect conditions. Conversely the reported time of the intention to act when participants experienced negative affect did not differ significantly from the neutral condition. These findings suggest that the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself is malleable to changes in affective states and may indicate that positive affect enhances intentional awareness.

Dissociating what and when of intentional actions

Recent brain imaging research revealed that internally guided actions involve the frontomedian wall, in particular the preSMA and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ). However, a systematic decomposition of different components of intentional action is still lacking. We propose a new paradigm to dissociate two components of internally guided behavior: Which action to perform (selection component) and when to perform the action (timing component). Our results suggest a neuro-functional dissociation of intentional action timing and intentional action selection. While the RCZ is more strongly activated for the selection component, a part of the superior medial frontal gyrus is more strongly activated for the timing component. However, in a post hoc conducted signal strength analysis we did also observe an interaction between action timing and action selection, indicating that decisional processes concerning action timing and action selection are not completely dissociated but interdependent. Altogether this study challenges the idea of a unitary system supporting voluntary action and instead suggests the existence of different neuroanatomically dissociable subfunctions.

Detecting agency from the biological motion of veridical vs animated agents

The ability to detect agency is fundamental for understanding the social world. Underlying this capacity are neural circuits that respond to patterns of intentional biological motion in the superior temporal sulcus and temporoparietal junction. Here we show that the brain's blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response to such motion is modulated by the representation of the actor. Dynamic social interactions were portrayed by either live-action agents or computer-animated agents, enacting the exact same patterns of biological motion. Using an event-related design, we found that the BOLD response associated with the perception and interpretation of agency was greater when identical physical movements were performed by real rather than animated agents. This finding has important implications for previous work on biological motion that has relied upon computer-animated stimuli and demonstrates that the neural substrates of social perception are finely tuned toward real-world agents. In addition, the response in lateral temporal areas was observed in the absence of instructions to make mental inferences, thus demonstrating the spontaneous implementation of the intentional stance.

Planning and representing intentional action

This paper reviews recent approaches to human action planning and the cognitive representation of intentional actions. Evidence suggests that action planning takes place in terms of anticipated features of the intended goal, that is, in terms of action effects. These effects are acquired from early infancy on by registering contingencies between movements and perceptual movement outcomes. Co-occurrence of movements and effects leads to the creation of bidirectional associations between the underlying internal codes, thus establishing distributed perception-action networks subserving both perceiving external events and intentionally producing them. Action plans determine only the general, goal-relevant features of intended actions, while the fine-tuning is left to on-line sensory-motor processing. Action plans emerge from competition for action control between several factors: overlearned habits, perceptual events, and emotional influences, among others. Accordingly, action control represents a balance between personal intentions and wishes on the one hand and environmental affordances and demands on the other.