Temporal binding effect in the action observation domain: Evidence from an action-based somatosensory paradigm

Neural correlates of an illusionary sense of agency caused by virtual reality

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation that self-actions lead to ensuing perceptual consequences. The prospective mechanism emphasizes that SoA arises from motor prediction and its comparison with actual action outcomes, while the reconstructive mechanism stresses that SoA emerges from retrospective causal processing about the action outcomes. Consistent with the prospective mechanism, motor planning regions were identified by neuroimaging studies using the temporal binding (TB) effect, a behavioral measure often linked to implicit SoA. Yet, TB also occurs during passive observation of another's action, lending support to the reconstructive mechanism, but its neural correlates remain unexplored. Here, we employed virtual reality (VR) to modulate such observation-based SoA and examined it with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). After manipulating an avatar hand in VR, participants passively observed an avatar's "action" and showed a significant increase in TB. The binding effect was associated with the right angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, which are critical nodes for inferential and agency processing. These results suggest that the experience of controlling an avatar may potentiate inferential processing within the right inferior parietal cortex and give rise to the illusionary SoA without voluntary action.

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects

People form coherent representations of goal-directed actions. Such agency experiences of intentional action are reflected by a shift in temporal perception: self-generated motor movements and subsequent sensory effects are perceived to occur closer together in time—a phenomenon termed intentional binding. Building on recent research suggesting that temporal binding occurs without intentionally performing actions, we further examined whether such perceptual compression occurs when motor action is fully absent. In three experiments, we used a novel sensory-based adaptation of the Libet clock paradigm to assess how a brief tactile sensation on the index finger and a resulting auditory stimulus perceptually bind together in time. Findings revealed robust temporal repulsion (instead of binding) between tactile sensation and auditory effect. Temporal repulsion was attenuated when participants could anticipate the identity and temporal onset (two crucial components of intentional action) of the tactile sensation. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of differences between intentional movement and anticipated bodily sensations in shaping action coherence and agentic experiences.

Striatal dopamine D2 binding correlates with locus of control: Preliminary evidence from [11C]raclopride Positron Emission Tomography

The ability to exert control has been widely investigated as a hallmark of adaptive behaviour. Dopamine is recognized as the key neuromodulator mediating various control-related processes. The neural mechanisms underlying the subjective perception of being in control, or Locus of Control (LOC) are however less clear. LOC indicates the subjective tendency to attribute environmental outcomes to one's actions (internal LOC) or instead to external incontrollable factors (external LOC). Here we hypothesized that dopamine levels also relate to LOC. Previous work shows that dopamine signaling mediates learning of action-outcome relationships, outcome predictability, and opportunity cost. Prominent theories propose dopamine dysregulation as the key pathogenetic mechanism in schizophrenia and depression. Critically, external LOC is a risk factor for schizophrenia and depression, and predicts increased vulnerability to stress. However, a direct link between LOC and dopamine levels in healthy control had not been demonstrated. The purpose of our study was to investigate this link. Using [¹¹C]raclopride Positron Emission Tomography we tested the relationship between D2 receptor binding in the striatum and LOC (measured with the Rotter Locus of Control scale) in 15 healthy volunteers. Our results show a large and positive correlation: increased striatal D2 binding was associated with External LOC. This finding opens promising avenues for the study of several psychological impairments that have been associated with both dopamine and LOC, such as addiction, schizophrenia, and depression.