Teleology and the intentions of supernatural agents

Biological agency: a concept without a research program

This paper evaluates recent work purporting to show that the "agency" of organisms is an important phenomenon for evolutionary biology to study. Biological agency is understood as the capacity for goal-directed, self-determining activity-a capacity that is present in all organisms irrespective of their complexity and whether or not they have a nervous system. Proponents of the "agency perspective" on biological systems have claimed that agency is not explainable by physiological or developmental mechanisms, or by adaptation via natural selection. We show that this idea is theoretically unsound and unsupported by current biology. There is no empirical evidence that the agency perspective has the potential to advance experimental research in the life sciences. Instead, the phenomena that the agency perspective purports to make sense of are better explained using the well-established idea that complex multiscale feedback mechanisms evolve through natural selection.

Paranoid and teleological thinking give rise to distinct social hallucinations in vision

Paranoia (believing others intend harm) and excess teleological thinking (ascribing too much purpose) are non-consensual beliefs about agents. Human vision rapidly detects agents and their intentions. Might paranoia and teleology have roots in visual perception? Using displays that evoke the impression that one disc ('wolf') is chasing another ('sheep'), we find that paranoia and teleology involve perceiving chasing when there is none (studies 1 and 2) - errors we characterize as social hallucinations. When asked to identify the wolf or the sheep (studies 3, 4a, and 4b), we find high-paranoia participants struggled to identify sheep, while high-teleology participants were impaired at identifying wolves - both despite high-confidence. Both types of errors correlated with hallucinatory percepts in the real world. Although paranoia and teleology both involve excess perception of agency, the current results collectively suggest a perceptual distinction between the two, perhaps with clinical import.

Preschoolers' retrospective and prospective judgements of immanent justice following distributive actions

Prior research provided evidence for retrospective and prospective judgements of immanent justice in adults, but the developmental origins of judgements of immanent justice remain unknown. Both retrospective and prospective judgements were investigated in preschool age, using explicit and implicit measures. In Experiment 1, 2.5- and 4-year-olds were first shown events in which one agent distributed resources fairly or unfairly, and then they saw test events in which both distributors were damaged by a misfortune. Later, they were presented with a verbal task, in which they had to respond to two questions on evaluation of the deservingness, by using explicit measures. All children were likely to approve of deserved outcomes when deeds and outcomes were congruent (i.e., unfair distributor-misfortune), and only older ones were likely to disapprove when they were incongruent (i.e., fair distributor-misfortune). In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds after seeing familiarization events of Experiment 1, were presented with two verbal questions to explore prospective judgements of immanent justice, by using explicit measures. In Experiment 3, 4-year-olds were first shown familiarization events of Experiment 1 and listened to respective narratives, then before the outcome was revealed they were assessed with a reaching task to investigate prospective judgements of immanent justice, by using implicit measures. Children reached the image depicting a bad outcome for the unfair distributor, and that illustrated a good outcome for the fair distributor. The results of the last two experiments demonstrated a fine ability to make prospective judgements at 4 years of life, and found that they were to be more prone to apply immanent justice reasoning to positive outcomes following good actions. Taken together, these results provide new evidence for preschoolers' retrospective and prospective judgements of immanent justice.

Facial icons as indexes of emotions and intentions

Various objects and artifacts incorporate representations of faces, encompassing artworks like portraits, as well as ethnographic or industrial artifacts such as masks or humanoid robots. These representations exhibit diverse degrees of human-likeness, serving different functions and objectives. Despite these variations, they share common features, particularly facial attributes that serve as building blocks for facial expressions-an effective means of communicating emotions. To provide a unified conceptualization for this broad spectrum of face representations, we propose the term "facial icons" drawing upon Peirce's semiotic concepts. Additionally, based on these semiotic principles, we posit that facial icons function as indexes of emotions and intentions, and introduce a significant anthropological theory aligning with our proposition. Subsequently, we support our assertions by examining processes related to face and facial expression perception, as well as sensorimotor simulation processes involved in discerning others' mental states, including emotions. Our argumentation integrates cognitive and experimental evidence, reinforcing the pivotal role of facial icons in conveying mental states.

The Consequences of Anthropomorphic and Teleological Beliefs in a Global Pandemic

To describe something in terms of its purpose or function is to describe its teleology. Previous studies have found that teleological beliefs are positively related to anthropomorphism, and that anthropomorphism decreases the perceived unpredictability of non-human agents. In the current study, we explore these relationships using the highly salient example of beliefs about the coronavirus pandemic. Results showed that both anthropomorphism and teleology were negatively associated with perceived uncertainty and threat, and positively associated with self-reported behavioural change in response to the pandemic. These findings suggest that highly anthropomorphic and teleological individuals may view coronavirus as agentive and goal-directed. While anthropomorphic and teleological beliefs may facilitate behavioural change in response to the pandemic, we also found that the associated reduction in uncertainty and threat may be detrimental to behavioural change. We discuss the implications of these findings for messaging about global events more broadly.

Reasons Things Happen for a Reason: An Integrative Theory of Teleology

Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes, such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes, such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett's intentional-systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett's intentional-systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.

How cultural learning and cognitive biases shape religious beliefs

What explains the ubiquity and diversity of religions around the world? Widespread cognitive tendencies, including mentalizing and intuitive thinking, offer part of the explanation for recurrent features of religion, and individual differences in religious commitments. However, vast diversity in religious beliefs points to the importance of the cultural context in which religious beliefs are transmitted. Cultural evolutionary theory provides the basis of a unified explanation for how cognition and culture interact to shape religious beliefs, in ways that are uniquely adapted to local ecological pressures. These insights lay the groundwork for future research regarding how cultural learning interacts with other evolved aspects of human psychology to generate the recurrent and the diverse forms of religious commitments observed around the world.