An active role of inferior frontal cortex in conscious experience

Task-based EEG and fMRI paradigms in a multimodal clinical diagnostic framework for disorders of consciousness

Disorders of consciousness (DoC) are generally diagnosed by clinical assessment, which is a predominantly motor-driven process and accounts for up to 40 % of non-communication being misdiagnosed as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) (previously known as prolonged/persistent vegetative state). Given the consequences of misdiagnosis, a more reliable and objective multimodal protocol to diagnosing DoC is needed, but has not been produced due to concerns regarding their interpretation and reliability. Of the techniques commonly used to detect consciousness in DoC, task-based paradigms (active paradigms) produce the most unequivocal result when findings are positive. It is well-established that command following (CF) reliably reflects preserved consciousness. Task-based electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can detect motor-independent CF and reveal preserved covert consciousness in up to 14 % of UWS patients. Accordingly, to improve the diagnostic accuracy of DoC, we propose a practical multimodal clinical decision framework centered on task-based EEG and fMRI, and complemented by measures like transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS-EEG).

Ultrahigh Field fMRI Reveals Different Roles of the Temporal and Frontoparietal Cortices in Subjective Awareness

A central question in consciousness theories is whether one is dealing with a dichotomous ("all-or-none") or a gradual phenomenon. In this 7T fMRI study, we investigated whether dichotomy or gradualness in fact depends on the brain region associated with perceptual awareness reports. Both male and female human subjects performed an emotion discrimination task (fear vs neutral bodies) presented under continuous flash suppression with trial-based perceptual awareness measures. Behaviorally, recognition sensitivity increased linearly with increased stimuli awareness and was at chance level during perceptual unawareness. Physiologically, threat stimuli triggered a slower heart rate than neutral ones during "almost clear" stimulus experience, indicating freezing behavior. Brain results showed that activity in the occipitotemporal, parietal, and frontal regions as well as in the amygdala increased with increased stimulus awareness while early visual areas showed the opposite pattern. The relationship between temporal area activity and perceptual awareness best fitted a gradual model while the activity in frontoparietal areas fitted a dichotomous model. Furthermore, our findings illustrate that specific experimental decisions, such as stimulus type or the approach used to evaluate awareness, play pivotal roles in consciousness studies and warrant careful consideration.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness

In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces of sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of the data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness and then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions.

The cognitive reality monitoring network and theories of consciousness

Theories of consciousness abound. However, it is difficult to arbitrate reliably among competing theories because they target different levels of neural and cognitive processing or anatomical loci, and only some were developed with computational models in mind. In particular, theories of consciousness need to fully address the three levels of understanding of the brain proposed by David Marr: computational theory, algorithms and hardware. Most major theories refer to only one or two levels, often indirectly. The cognitive reality monitoring network (CRMN) model is derived from computational theories of mixture-of-experts architecture, hierarchical reinforcement learning and generative/inference computing modules, addressing all three levels of understanding. A central feature of the CRMN is the mapping of a gating network onto the prefrontal cortex, making it a prime coding circuit involved in monitoring the accuracy of one's mental states and distinguishing them from external reality. Because the CRMN builds on the hierarchical and layer structure of the cerebral cortex, it may connect research and findings across species, further enabling concrete computational models of consciousness with new, explicitly testable hypotheses. In sum, we discuss how the CRMN model can help further our understanding of the nature and function of consciousness.

Spontaneously emerging internal models of visual sequences combine abstract and event-specific information in the prefrontal cortex

When exposed to sensory sequences, do macaque monkeys spontaneously form abstract internal models that generalize to novel experiences? Here, we show that neuronal populations in macaque ventrolateral prefrontal cortex jointly encode visual sequences by separate codes for the specific pictures presented and for their abstract sequential structure. We recorded prefrontal neurons while macaque monkeys passively viewed visual sequences and sequence mismatches in the local-global paradigm. Even without any overt task or response requirements, prefrontal populations spontaneously form representations of sequence structure, serial order, and image identity within distinct but superimposed neuronal subspaces. Representations of sequence structure rapidly update following single exposure to a mismatch sequence, while distinct populations represent mismatches for sequences of different complexity. Finally, those representations generalize across sequences following the same repetition structure but comprising different images. These results suggest that prefrontal populations spontaneously encode rich internal models of visual sequences reflecting both content-specific and abstract information.

Where is the ghost in the shell?

The neurobiology of conscious experience is one of the fundamental mysteries in science. New evidence suggests that transcranial magnetic stimulation of the parietal cortex does not modulate bistable perception. What does this mean for the neural correlates of consciousness, and how should we search for them?

Computational components of visual predictive coding circuitry

If a full visual percept can be said to be a 'hypothesis', so too can a neural 'prediction' - although the latter addresses one particular component of image content (such as 3-dimensional organisation, the interplay between lighting and surface colour, the future trajectory of moving objects, and so on). And, because processing is hierarchical, predictions generated at one level are conveyed in a backward direction to a lower level, seeking to predict, in fact, the neural activity at that prior stage of processing, and learning from errors signalled in the opposite direction. This is the essence of 'predictive coding', at once an algorithm for information processing and a theoretical basis for the nature of operations performed by the cerebral cortex. Neural models for the implementation of predictive coding invoke specific functional classes of neuron for generating, transmitting and receiving predictions, and for producing reciprocal error signals. Also a third general class, 'precision' neurons, tasked with regulating the magnitude of error signals contingent upon the confidence placed upon the prediction, i.e., the reliability and behavioural utility of the sensory data that it predicts. So, what is the ultimate source of a 'prediction'? The answer is multifactorial: knowledge of the current environmental context and the immediate past, allied to memory and lifetime experience of the way of the world, doubtless fine-tuned by evolutionary history too. There are, in consequence, numerous potential avenues for experimenters seeking to manipulate subjects' expectation, and examine the neural signals elicited by surprising, and less surprising visual stimuli. This review focuses upon the predictive physiology of mouse and monkey visual cortex, summarising and commenting on evidence to date, and placing it in the context of the broader field. It is concluded that predictive coding has a firm grounding in basic neuroscience and that, unsurprisingly, there remains much to learn.

Impact of Intolerance of Uncertainty on Brain Structural Changes in Panic Disorder

OBJECTIVE

This study investigated the impact of intolerance of uncertainty (IU) on structural changes in the brain and symptom severity in patients with panic disorder.

METHODS

This study included 90 participants diagnosed with panic disorder. The IU Scale, Panic Disorder Severity Scale (PDSS), Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II), Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), Self-Forgiveness Scale (SFS), and Short Form 36 Health Survey (SF) were used. A voxel-wise correlation analysis was conducted to investigate the structural differences in the gray matter.

RESULTS

As IU increased, the cortical thickness of the right lingual gyrus decreased significantly, while the gray matter volume of the right pars triangularis increased. The cortical thickness of the right lingual gyrus showed a significant negative correlation with the BDI-II score and a positive correlation with the SFS. Additionally, the gray matter volume of the right pars triangularis was positively correlated with the PDSS, PSWQ, and BDI-II scores and negatively correlated with the mental health domain of the SF.

CONCLUSION

According to our findings, elevated IU in participants with panic disorder was associated with cortical thinning in the lingual gyrus and increased gray matter volume in the pars triangularis. These structural alterations may also have an impact on perceived quality of life, as well as high levels of depression and anxiety.

Region- and time- specific effects of ketamine on cerebral blood flow: a randomized controlled trial

There is intriguing evidence suggesting that ketamine might have distinct acute and delayed neurofunctional effects, as its acute administration transiently induces schizophrenia-like symptoms, while antidepressant effects slowly emerge and are most pronounced 24 h after administration. Studies attempting to characterize ketamine's mechanism of action by using blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) imaging have yielded inconsistent results regarding implicated brain regions and direction of effects. This may be due to intrinsic properties of the BOLD contrast, while cerebral blood flow (CBF), as measured with arterial spin labeling, is a single physiological marker more directly related to neural activity. As effects of acute ketamine challenge are sensitive to modulation by pretreatment with lamotrigine, which inhibits glutamate release, a combination of these approaches should be particularly suited to offer novel insights. In total, 75 healthy participants were investigated in a double blind, placebo-controlled, randomized, parallel-group study and underwent two scanning sessions (acute/post 24 h.). Acute ketamine administration was associated with higher perfusion in interior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), but no other investigated brain region. Inhibition of glutamate release by pretreatment with lamotrigine abolished ketamine's effect on perfusion. At the delayed time point, pretreatment with lamotrigine was associated with lower perfusion in IFG. These findings underscore the idea that regionally selective patterns of CBF changes reflect proximate effects of modulated glutamate release on neuronal activity. Furthermore, region- specific sustained effects indicate both a swift restoration of disturbed homeostasis in DLPFC as well changes occurring beyond the immediate effects on glutamate signaling in IFG.

Neural patterns of conscious visual awareness in the Riddoch syndrome

The Riddoch syndrome is one in which patients blinded by lesions to their primary visual cortex can consciously perceive visual motion in their blind field, an ability that correlates with activity in motion area V5. Our assessment of the characteristics of this syndrome in patient ST, using multimodal MRI, showed that: 1. ST's V5 is intact, receives direct subcortical input, and decodable neural patterns emerge in it only during the conscious perception of visual motion; 2. moving stimuli activate medial visual areas but, unless associated with decodable V5 activity, they remain unperceived; 3. ST's high confidence ratings when discriminating motion at chance levels, is associated with inferior frontal gyrus activity. Finally, we report that ST's Riddoch Syndrome results in hallucinatory motion with hippocampal activity as a correlate. Our results shed new light on perceptual experiences associated with this syndrome and on the neural determinants of conscious visual experience.

The role of conflict processing in multisensory perception: behavioural and electroencephalography evidence

To form coherent multisensory perceptual representations, the brain must solve a causal inference problem: to decide if two sensory cues originated from the same event and should be combined, or if they came from different events and should be processed independently. According to current models of multisensory integration, during this process, the integrated (common cause) and segregated (different causes) internal perceptual models are entertained. In the present study, we propose that the causal inference process involves competition between these alternative perceptual models that engages the brain mechanisms of conflict processing. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two experiments, measuring reaction times (RTs) and electroencephalography, using an audiovisual ventriloquist illusion paradigm with varying degrees of intersensory disparities. Consistent with our hypotheses, incongruent trials led to slower RTs and higher fronto-medial theta power, both indicative of conflict. We also predicted that intermediate disparities would yield slower RTs and higher theta power when compared to congruent stimuli and to large disparities, owing to the steeper competition between causal models. Although this prediction was only validated in the RT study, both experiments displayed the anticipated trend. In conclusion, our findings suggest a potential involvement of the conflict mechanisms in multisensory integration of spatial information. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Spontaneous Necker-cube reversals may not be that spontaneous

Introduction

During observation of the ambiguous Necker cube, our perception suddenly reverses between two about equally possible 3D interpretations. During passive observation, perceptual reversals seem to be sudden and spontaneous. A number of theoretical approaches postulate destabilization of neural representations as a pre-condition for reversals of ambiguous figures. In the current study, we focused on possible Electroencephalogram (EEG) correlates of perceptual destabilization, that may allow prediction of an upcoming perceptual reversal.

Methods

We presented ambiguous Necker cube stimuli in an onset-paradigm and investigated the neural processes underlying endogenous reversals as compared to perceptual stability across two consecutive stimulus presentations. In a separate experimental condition, disambiguated cube variants were alternated randomly, to exogenously induce perceptual reversals. We compared the EEG immediately before and during endogenous Necker cube reversals with corresponding time windows during exogenously induced perceptual reversals of disambiguated cube variants.

Results

For the ambiguous Necker cube stimuli, we found the earliest differences in the EEG between reversal trials and stability trials already 1 s before a reversal occurred, at bilateral parietal electrodes. The traces remained similar until approximately 1100 ms before a perceived reversal, became maximally different at around 890 ms (p = 7.59 × 10^-6, Cohen's d = 1.35) and remained different until shortly before offset of the stimulus preceding the reversal. No such patterns were found in the case of disambiguated cube variants.

Discussion

The identified EEG effects may reflect destabilized states of neural representations, related to destabilized perceptual states preceding a perceptual reversal. They further indicate that spontaneous Necker cube reversals are most probably not as spontaneous as generally thought. Rather, the destabilization may occur over a longer time scale, at least 1 s before a reversal event, despite the reversal event as such being perceived as spontaneous by the viewer.

In vivo phase-dependent enhancement and suppression of human brain oscillations by transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS)

Transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) can influence perception and behavior, with recent evidence also highlighting its potential impact in clinical settings, but its underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. Behavioral and indirect physiological evidence indicates that phase-dependent constructive and destructive interference between the applied electric field and brain oscillations at the stimulation frequency may play an important role, but in vivo validation during stimulation was unfeasible because stimulation artifacts impede single-trial assessment of brain oscillations during tACS. Here, we attenuated stimulation artifacts to provide evidence for phase-dependent enhancement and suppression of visually evoked steady state responses (SSR) during amplitude-modulated tACS (AM-tACS). We found that AM-tACS enhanced and suppressed SSR by 5.77 ± 2.95 %, while it enhanced and suppressed corresponding visual perception by 7.99 ± 5.15 %. While not designed to investigate the underlying mechanisms of this effect, our study suggests feasibility and superiority of phase-locked (closed-loop) AM-tACS over conventional (open-loop) AM-tACS to purposefully enhance or suppress brain oscillations at specific frequencies.

Feedback information sharing in the human brain reflects bistable perception in the absence of report

In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and the cognitive processes associated with reporting perception are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here, we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a bistable visual stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation. At any given moment, observers either perceive the stimulus as one integrated unitary object or as two differentiated objects that are clearly distinct from each other. Using electroencephalography, we show that measures of integration and differentiation based on information theory closely follow participants' perceptual experience of those contents when switches were reported. We observed increased information integration between anterior to posterior electrodes (front to back) prior to a switch to the integrated percept, and higher information differentiation of anterior signals leading up to reporting the differentiated percept. Crucially, information integration was closely linked to perception and even observed in a no-report condition when perceptual transitions were inferred from eye movements alone. In contrast, the link between neural differentiation and perception was observed solely in the active report condition. Our results, therefore, suggest that perception and the processes associated with report require distinct amounts of anterior-posterior network communication and anterior information differentiation. While front-to-back directed information is associated with changes in the content of perception when viewing bistable visual stimuli, regardless of report, frontal information differentiation was absent in the no-report condition and therefore is not directly linked to perception per se.

Towards causal mechanisms of consciousness through focused transcranial brain stimulation

Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.

Revealing robust neural correlates of conscious and unconscious visual processing: activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses

Our ability to consciously perceive information from the visual scene relies on a myriad of intrinsic neural mechanisms. Functional neuroimaging studies have sought to identify the neural correlates of conscious visual processing and to further dissociate from those pertaining to preconscious and unconscious visual processing. However, delineating what core brain regions are involved in eliciting a conscious percept remains a challenge, particularly regarding the role of prefrontal-parietal regions. We performed a systematic search of the literature that yielded a total of 54 functional neuroimaging studies. We conducted two quantitative meta-analyses using activation likelihood estimation to identify reliable patterns of activation engaged by i. conscious (n = 45 studies, comprising 704 participants) and ii. unconscious (n = 16 studies, comprising 262 participants) visual processing during various task performances. Results of the meta-analysis specific to conscious percepts quantitatively revealed reliable activations across a constellation of regions comprising the bilateral inferior frontal junction, intraparietal sulcus, dorsal anterior cingulate, angular gyrus, temporo-occipital cortex and anterior insula. Neurosynth reverse inference revealed conscious visual processing to be intertwined with cognitive terms related to attention, cognitive control and working memory. Results of the meta-analysis on unconscious percepts revealed consistent activations in the lateral occipital complex, intraparietal sulcus and precuneus. These findings highlight the notion that conscious visual processing readily engages higher-level regions including the inferior frontal junction and unconscious processing reliably recruits posterior regions, mainly the lateral occipital complex.

Neural representations of competing stimuli along the dorsal and ventral visual pathways during binocular rivalry

Binocular rivalry arises when two discrepant stimuli are simultaneously presented to different eyes, during which observers consciously experience vivid perceptual alternations without physical changes in visual inputs. Neural dynamics tracking such perceptual alternations have been identified at both early and late visual areas, leading to the fundamental debate concerning the primary neural substrate underlying binocular rivalry. One promising hypothesis that might reconcile these seemingly paradoxical findings is a gradual shift from interocular competition between monocular neurons to pattern competition among binocular neurons. Here, we examined this hypothesis by investigating how neural representations of rivalrous stimuli evolved along the visual pathway. We found that representations of the dominant and the suppressed stimuli initially co-existed in V1, which were enhanced and attenuated respectively in extrastriate visual areas. Notably, neural activity in V4 was dictated by the representation of the dominant stimulus, while the representation of the suppressed stimulus was only partially inhibited in dorsal areas V3A and MT+. Our findings revealed a progressive transition from the co-existing representations of the rivalrous inputs to the dictatorial representation of the dominant stimulus in the ventral pathway, and advocated different cortical evolutionary patterns of visual representations between the dorsal and the ventral pathways.

Bistability of prefrontal states gates access to consciousness

Access of sensory information to consciousness has been linked to the ignition of content-specific representations in association cortices. How does ignition interact with intrinsic cortical state fluctuations to give rise to conscious perception? We addressed this question in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) by combining multi-electrode recordings with a binocular rivalry (BR) paradigm inducing spontaneously driven changes in the content of consciousness, inferred from the reflexive optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) pattern. We find that fluctuations between low-frequency (LF, 1-9 Hz) and beta (∼20-40 Hz) local field potentials (LFPs) reflect competition between spontaneous updates and stability of conscious contents, respectively. Both LF and beta events were locally modulated. The phase of the former locked differentially to the competing populations just before a spontaneous transition while the latter synchronized the neuronal ensemble coding the consciously perceived content. These results suggest that prefrontal state fluctuations gate conscious perception by mediating internal states that facilitate perceptual update and stability.

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency

The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

Early neural activity changes associated with stimulus detection during visual conscious perception

The earliest cortical neural signals following consciously perceived visual stimuli in humans are poorly understood. Using intracranial electroencephalography, we investigated neural activity changes associated with the earliest stages of stimulus detection during visual conscious perception. Participants (N = 10; 1,693 electrode contacts) completed a continuous performance task where subjects were asked to press a button when they saw a target letter among a series of nontargets. Broadband gamma power (40-115 Hz) was analyzed as marker of cortical population neural activity. Regardless of target or nontarget letter type, we observed early gamma power changes within 30-180 ms from stimulus onset in a network including increases in bilateral occipital, fusiform, frontal (including frontal eye fields), and medial temporal cortex; increases in left lateral parietal-temporal cortex; and decreases in the right anterior medial occipital cortex. No significant differences were observed between target and nontarget stimuli until >180 ms post-stimulus, when we saw greater gamma power increases in left motor and premotor areas, suggesting a possible role in perceptual decision-making and/or motor responses with the right hand. The early gamma power findings support a broadly distributed cortical visual detection network that is engaged at early times tens of milliseconds after signal transduction from the retina.

Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness

Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.

Perceptual Awareness and Its Relationship with Consciousness: Hints from Perceptual Multistability

Many interesting theories of consciousness have been proposed, but so far, there is no “unified” theory capable of encompassing all aspects of this phenomenon. We are all aware of what it feels like to be conscious and what happens if there is an absence of consciousness. We are becoming more and more skilled in measuring consciousness states; nevertheless, we still “don’t get it” in its deeper essence. How does all the processed information converge from different brain areas and structures to a common unity, giving us this very private “feeling of being conscious”, despite the constantly changing flow of information between internal and external states? “Multistability” refers to a class of perceptual phenomena where subjective awareness spontaneously and continuously alternates between different percepts, although the objective stimuli do not change, supporting the idea that the brain “interprets” sensorial input in a “constructive” way. In this perspective paper, multistability and perceptual awareness are discussed as a methodological window for understanding the “local” states of consciousness, a privileged position from which it is possible to observe the brain dynamics and mechanisms producing the subjective phenomena of perceptual awareness in the very moment they are happening.

Multistability, perceptual value, and internal foraging

Substantial experimental, theoretical, and computational insights into sensory processing have been derived from the phenomena of perceptual multistability-when two or more percepts alternate or switch in response to a single sensory input. Here, we review a range of findings suggesting that alternations can be seen as internal choices by the brain responding to values. We discuss how elements of external, experimenter-controlled values and internal, uncertainty- and aesthetics-dependent values influence multistability. We then consider the implications for the involvement in switching of regions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex, which are more conventionally tied to value-dependent operations such as cognitive control and foraging.

Increased insula activity precedes the formation of subjective illusory Gestalt

The constructive nature of human perception sometimes leads us to perceiving rather complex impressions from simple sensory input: for example, recognizing animal contours in cloud formations or seeing living creatures in shadows of objects. A special type of bistable stimuli gives us a rare opportunity to study the neural mechanisms behind this process. Such stimuli can be visually interpreted either as simple or as more complex illusory content on the basis of the same sensory input. Previous studies demonstrated increased activity in the superior parietal cortex during the perception of an illusory Gestalt impression compared to a simpler interpretation. Here, we examined the role of slow fluctuations of resting-state fMRI activity in shaping the subsequent illusory interpretation by investigating activity related to the illusory Gestalt not only during, but also prior to its perception. We presented 31 participants with a bistable motion stimulus, which can be perceived either as four moving dot pairs (local) or two moving illusory squares (global). fMRI was used to measure brain activity in a slow event-related design. We observed stronger IPS and putamen responses to the stimulus when participants perceived the global interpretation compared to the local, confirming the findings of previous studies. Most importantly, we also observed that the global stimulus interpretation was preceded by an increased activity of the bilateral dorsal insula, which is known to process saliency and gate information for conscious access. Our data suggest an important role of the dorsal insula in shaping complex illusory interpretations of the sensory input.

The Perceptual Magic of Binocular Rivalry

Binocular rivalry (BR) refers to the spontaneous, unpredictable fluctuations in visual awareness provoked by dissimilar stimulation of the two eyes. Reports of the phenomenon date back several centuries, but interest in BR has exploded in recent years as researchers in diverse disciplines—psychology, neuroscience, medicine, philosophy—have found reasons to study it. New ideas about BR have emerged, sparking controversies about its neural bases, which may be resolved thanks to new methodological developments. This essay provides a synopsis of some key empirically determined aspects of BR as well as an overview of theoretical developments in this field. Work published during the past decade or so is emphasized (and explicitly referenced); earlier key findings are mentioned and referenced in the annotated bibliography included in the Supplemental Material.

Capacity for consciousness under ketamine anaesthesia is selectively associated with activity in posteromedial cortex in rats

It remains unclear how specific cortical regions contribute to the brain’s overall capacity for consciousness. Clarifying this could help distinguish between theories of consciousness. Here, we investigate the association between markers of regionally specific (de)activation and the brain’s overall capacity for consciousness. We recorded electroencephalographic responses to cortical electrical stimulation in six rats and computed Perturbational Complexity Index state-transition (PCI^ST), which has been extensively validated as an index of the capacity for consciousness in humans. We also estimated the balance between activation and inhibition of specific cortical areas with the ratio between high and low frequency power from spontaneous electroencephalographic activity at each electrode. We repeated these measurements during wakefulness, and during two levels of ketamine anaesthesia: with the minimal dose needed to induce behavioural unresponsiveness and twice this dose. We found that PCI^ST was only slightly reduced from wakefulness to light ketamine anaesthesia, but dropped significantly with deeper anaesthesia. The high-dose effect was selectively associated with reduced high frequency/low frequency ratio in the posteromedial cortex, which strongly correlated with PCI^ST. Conversely, behavioural unresponsiveness induced by light ketamine anaesthesia was associated with similar spectral changes in frontal, but not posterior cortical regions. Thus, activity in the posteromedial cortex correlates with the capacity for consciousness, as assessed by PCI^ST, during different depths of ketamine anaesthesia, in rats, independently of behaviour. These results are discussed in relation to different theories of consciousness.

Neural oscillations promoting perceptual stability and perceptual memory during bistable perception

Ambiguous images elicit bistable perception, wherein periods of momentary perceptual stability are interrupted by sudden perceptual switches. When intermittently presented, ambiguous images trigger a perceptual memory trace in the intervening blank periods. Understanding the neural bases of perceptual stability and perceptual memory during bistable perception may hold clues for explaining the apparent stability of visual experience in the natural world, where ambiguous and fleeting images are prevalent. Motivated by recent work showing the involvement of the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) in bistable perception, we conducted a transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) study with a double-blind, within-subject cross-over design to test a potential causal role of rIFG in these processes. Subjects viewed ambiguous images presented continuously or intermittently while under EEG recording. We did not find any significant tDCS effect on perceptual behavior. However, the fluctuations of oscillatory power in the alpha and beta bands predicted perceptual stability, with higher power corresponding to longer percept durations. In addition, higher alpha and beta power predicted enhanced perceptual memory during intermittent viewing. These results reveal a unified neurophysiological mechanism sustaining perceptual stability and perceptual memory when the visual system is faced with ambiguous input.

Non-stimulated regions in early visual cortex encode the contents of conscious visual perception

Predictions shape our perception. The theory of predictive processing poses that our brains make sense of incoming sensory input by generating predictions, which are sent back from higher to lower levels of the processing hierarchy. These predictions are based on our internal model of the world and enable inferences about the hidden causes of the sensory input data. It has been proposed that conscious perception corresponds to the currently most probable internal model of the world. Accordingly, predictions influencing conscious perception should be fed back from higher to lower levels of the processing hierarchy. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and multivoxel pattern analysis to show that non‐stimulated regions of early visual areas contain information about the conscious perception of an ambiguous visual stimulus. These results indicate that early sensory cortices in the human brain receive predictive feedback signals that reflect the current contents of conscious perception.

Causal roles of prefrontal cortex during spontaneous perceptual switching are determined by brain state dynamics

The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is thought to orchestrate cognitive dynamics. However, in tests of bistable visual perception, no direct evidence supporting such presumable causal roles of the PFC has been reported except for a recent work. Here, using a novel brain-state-dependent neural stimulation system, we identified causal effects on percept dynamics in three PFC activities—right frontal eye fields, dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC), and inferior frontal cortex (IFC). The causality is behaviourally detectable only when we track brain state dynamics and modulate the PFC activity in brain-state-/state-history-dependent manners. The behavioural effects are underpinned by transient neural changes in the brain state dynamics, and such neural effects are quantitatively explainable by structural transformations of the hypothetical energy landscapes. Moreover, these findings indicate distinct functions of the three PFC areas: in particular, the DLPFC enhances the integration of two PFC-active brain states, whereas IFC promotes the functional segregation between them. This work resolves the controversy over the PFC roles in spontaneous perceptual switching and underlines brain state dynamics in fine investigations of brain-behaviour causality.

A cube that seems to shift its spatial arrangement as you keep looking; the elegant silhouette of a pirouetting dancer, which starts to spin in the opposite direction the more you stare at it; an illustration that shows two profiles – or is it a vase? These optical illusions are examples of bistable visual perception. Beyond their entertaining aspect, they provide a way for scientists to explore the dynamics of human consciousness, and the neural regions involved in this process.

Some studies show that bistable visual perception is associated with the activation of the prefrontal cortex, a brain area involved in complex cognitive processes. However, it is unclear whether this region is required for the illusions to emerge. Some research has showed that even if sections of the prefrontal cortex are temporally deactivated, participants can still experience the illusions.

Instead, Takamitsu Watanabe proposes that bistable visual perception is a process tied to dynamic brain states – that is, that distinct regions of the prefontal cortex are required for this fluctuating visual awareness, depending on the state of the whole brain. Such causal link cannot be observed if brain activity is not tracked closely.

To investigate this, the brain states of 65 participants were recorded as individuals were experiencing the optical illusions; the activity of their various brain regions could therefore be mapped, and then areas of the prefrontal cortex could precisely be inhibited at the right time using transcranial magnetic stimulation. This revealed that, indeed, prefrontal cortex regions were necessary for bistable visual perception, but not in a simple way. Instead, which ones were required and when depended on activity dynamics taking place in the whole brain. Overall, these results indicate that monitoring brain states is necessary to better understand – and ultimately, control – the neural pathways underlying perception and behaviour.

From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach

The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.

Consciousness: What is the role of prefrontal cortex?

Consciousness, its neural underpinnings, and the role of frontal cortex are highly debated topics. New evidence shows that human frontal cortex can bias conscious perception. What does this really mean about its contribution to consciousness?