Counterfactually mediated emotions: A developmental study of regret and relief in a probabilistic gambling task

Neurocognitive underpinnings of cross-cultural differences in risky decision making

Culture permeates across human mind and behavior. Cultural influence is reported even in economic decision making, which involves basic cognitive process, once believed to be invariant across all humans. The current study investigated the neurocognitive processes underlying economic decision making in East Asians and European Americans, with an aim to understand the cross-cultural differences in the discrete mental processes of decision making. Participants performed a risky gambling task that captures the gain maximizing and loss minimizing strategies, while electroencephalography was simultaneously collected. Event-related potentials (ERPs) associated with spontaneous emotional arousal (P2) and effortful attentional allocation (P3) were examined to determine the cultural effects on mental processes during pre-decisional and post-decisional stages. Behaviorally, Americans showed greater loss minimization than Asians. ERPs demonstrated significant cultural differences during post-decisional evaluation of outcomes, but not during pre-decisional processes. In Asians', ERP associated with emotional arousal (P2) was strongly modulated by gains, while in Americans', ERP associated with attentional allocation (P3) was strongly modulated by losses. These results suggest that Americans make conscious efforts to be self-reliant when facing financial losses, whereas Asians are more emotionally aroused by financial gains, which invites a refinement to the current theoretical propositions about cultural influence on decision making.

Regret and Decision-Making: A Developmental Perspective

Regret is a common emotion that has important links with decision-making in adults. Recent research suggests that the ability to experience regret emerges relatively late in development. By around 6 years, most children will experience regret, but the likelihood of experiencing this emotion increases across childhood and into adolescence. The developmental emergence of regret seems to affect children’s decision-making: Children who experience regret about a choice are more likely to make a better choice next time, and regret also seems to help children learn to delay gratification and behave more prosocially.

Experiencing regret about a choice helps children learn to delay gratification

Children (6- and 7-year-olds) decided whether to wait for a short delay to win a prize or for a longer period to win a different prize. Those who chose to take their prize after a short delay won two candies but were shown that they would have won four candies if they had waited longer. We measured whether children regretted their choice not to wait. The next day, children were faced with the same choice again. Children who regretted choosing the short delay on Day 1 were more likely to delay gratification on Day 2 than children who had not regretted their previous choice. In a second study, we replicated this finding while controlling for intellectual ability and children's preference for four candies over two candies. This suggests that experiencing regret about a choice not to wait assists children in delaying gratification when faced with the same choice again.

Neural Substrates of Counterfactual Emotions After Risky Decisions in Late Adolescents and Young Adults

Adolescents' neural substrates of emotional reactions to the consequences of risky decisions are poorly understood. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, 30 late adolescents and 30 young adults made risky and neutral decisions in social scenarios and received valenced outcomes. Negative outcomes in risky decisions eliciting regret, as compared with negative outcomes in neutral decisions eliciting disappointment, activated executive control (orbitofrontal cortex) and self-relevance regions (middle temporal gyrus [MTG], posterior cingulate cortex, and precuneus) for both age groups. Young adults showed more activation than adolescents in regret and disappointment as compared with relief and elation conditions in the avoidance (insula), action monitoring (inferior frontal gyrus, pre-SMA, and caudate), and social-cognition regions (superior temporal sulcus and MTG). These late socio-emotional developments may pave the way for more adaptive decision-making behavior in social contexts.

The Influences of Described and Experienced Information on Adolescent Risky Decision Making

Adolescents are known to take more risks than adults, which can be harmful to their health and well-being. However, despite age differences in real-world risk taking, laboratory risk-taking paradigms often do not evince these developmental patterns. Recent findings in the literature suggest that this inconsistency may be due in part to differences between how adolescents process information about risk when it is described (e.g., in a description-based classroom intervention) versus when it is experienced (e.g., when a teenager experiences the outcome of a risky choice). The present review considers areas of research that can inform approaches to intervention by deepening our understanding of risk taking in described or experienced contexts. We examine the literature on the description-experience gap, which has generally been limited to studies of adult samples, but which highlights differential decision making when risk information is described versus experienced. Informed by this work, we then explore the developmental literature comparing adolescent to adult decision making, and consider whether inconsistencies in age-related findings might be explained by distinguishing between studies in which participants learn about decision outcomes through experience versus description. In light of evidence that studies using experience-based tasks more often show age differences in risk taking, we consider the implications of this pattern, and argue that experience-based tasks may be more ecologically valid measures of adolescent risky decision making, in part due to the heightened affective nature of these tasks. Finally, we propose a model to integrate our findings with theories of adolescent risk-taking, and discuss implications for risk-reduction messaging.

Knowing when to hold 'em: regret and the relation between missed opportunities and risk taking in children, adolescents and adults

Regret over missed opportunities leads adults to take more risks. Given recent evidence that the ability to experience regret impacts decisions made by 6-year-olds, and pronounced interest in the antecedents to risk taking in adolescence, we investigated the age at which a relationship between missed opportunities and risky decision-making emerges, and whether that relationship changes at different points in development. Six- and 8-year-olds, adolescents and adults completed a sequential risky decision-making task on which information about missed opportunities was available. Children also completed a task designed to measure their ability to report regret when explicitly prompted to do so. The relationship between missed opportunities and risky decision-making did not emerge until 8 years, at which age it was associated with the ability to explicitly report regret, and was stronger in adults than in adolescents. These novel results highlight the potential importance of the ability to experience regret in children and adolescents' risky decision-making.

Counterfactual Evaluation of Outcomes in Social Risk Decision-Making Situations: The Cognitive Developmental Paradox Revisited

We report a study that examined the existence of a cognitive developmental paradox in the counterfactual evaluation of decision-making outcomes. According to this paradox adolescents and young adults could be able to apply counterfactual reasoning and, yet, their counterfactual evaluation of outcomes could be biased in a salient socio-emotional context. To this aim, we analyzed the impact of health and social feedback on the counterfactual evaluation of outcomes in a laboratory decision-making task involving short narratives with the presence of peers. Forty risky (e.g., taking or refusing a drug), forty neutral decisions (e.g., eating a hamburger or a hotdog), and emotions felt following positive or negative outcomes were examined in 256 early, mid- and late adolescents, and young adults, evenly distributed. Results showed that emotional ratings to negative outcomes (regret and disappointment) but not to positive outcomes (relief and elation) were attenuated when feedback was provided. Evidence of development of cognitive decision-making capacities did also exist, as the capacity to perform faster emotional ratings and to differentially allocate more resources to the elaboration of emotional ratings when no feedback information was available increased with age. Overall, we interpret these findings as challenging the traditional cognitive developmental assumption that development necessarily proceeds from lesser to greater capacities, reflecting the impact of socio-emotional processes that could bias the counterfactual evaluation of social decision-making outcomes.

Do children who experience regret make better decisions? A developmental study of the behavioral consequences of regret

Although regret is assumed to facilitate good decision making, there is little research directly addressing this assumption. Four experiments (N = 326) examined the relation between children's ability to experience regret and the quality of their subsequent decision making. In Experiment 1 regret and adaptive decision making showed the same developmental profile, with both first appearing at about 7 years. In Experiments 2a and 2b, children aged 6-7 who experienced regret decided adaptively more often than children who did not experience regret, and this held even when controlling for age and verbal ability. Experiment 3 ruled out a memory-based interpretation of these findings. These findings suggest that the experience of regret facilitates children's ability to learn rapidly from bad outcomes.

Counterfactual Reasoning: Sharpening Conceptual Distinctions in Developmental Studies

Counterfactual reasoning (CFR)—mentally representing what the world would be like now if things had been different in the past—is an important aspect of human cognition and the focus of research in areas such as philosophy, social psychology, and clinical psychology. More recently, it has also gained broad interest in cognitive developmental psychology, mainly focusing on the question of how this kind of reasoning can be characterized. Studies have been inconsistent in identifying when children can use CFR. In this article, we present theoretical positions that may account for this inconsistency and evaluate them in the light of research on counterfactual emotions.

Osmotic release oral system-methylphenidate improves neural activity during low reward processing in children and adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder

Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is neurobehavioral disorder characterized by inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity and impaired reward system function, such as delay aversion and low reward sensitivity. The pharmacological treatment for ADHD includes methylphenidate (MPH), or osmotic release oral system-MPH (OROS-MPH), which increases extrasynaptic dopamine and noradrenaline levels by blocking their reuptake. Although previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies revealed that acute treatment with MPH alters activation of the nucleus accumbens during delay aversion in children and adolescents with ADHD, the effects a relatively long period of OROS-MPH treatment on delay aversion as well as reward sensitivity remain unclear. Thus, we evaluated brain activation with fMRI during a reward sensitivity paradigm that consists of high monetary reward and low monetary reward conditions before and after a 3-month treatment with OROS-MPH in 17 children and adolescents with ADHD (mean age, 13.3 ± 2.2) and 17 age- and sex-matched healthy controls (mean age, 13.0 ± 1.9). We found that before treatment there was decreased activation of the nucleus accumbens and thalamus in patients with ADHD during only the low monetary reward condition, which was improved to same level as those of the healthy controls after the treatment. The observed change in brain activity was associated with improved ADHD symptom scores, which were derived from Japanese versions of the ADHD rating scale-IV. These results suggest that treatment with OROS-MPH for a relatively long period is effective in controlling reward sensitivity in children and adolescents with ADHD.

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Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has low reward sensitivity.

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Activity in thalamus and nucleus accumbens was decreased in low monetary reward.

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Osmotic release oral system-methylphenidate (OROS-MPH) is a medication for ADHD.

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Brain activity and ADHD symptoms were improved by 3-month treatment with OROS-MPH.

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OROS-MPH treatment for long periods may change brain activity of pediatric ADHD.

The psychology of volition

Volition can be studied from two perspectives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique to humans, since it is seen in many other species including invertebrates. From the first-person view, our experience of volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of agency. We feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to happen and we can choose between different actions. Our experience of agency is not direct. It depends on sub-personal inferences derived from prior expectations and sensations associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and intuitions about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. Nevertheless, our experience of agency is not a mere epiphenomenon. Anticipation of the regret we might feel after making the wrong choice can alter behaviour. Furthermore, the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, has a critical role in creating social cohesion and group benefits. We can only study the experience of agency in humans who can describe their experiences. The discussion of the experience of volition, that introspection and communication make possible, can change our experience of volitional actions. As a result, agency, regret and responsibility are cultural phenomena that are unique to humans.

From risk-seeking to risk-averse: the development of economic risk preference from childhood to adulthood

Adolescence is often described as a period of heightened risk-taking. Adolescents are notorious for impulsivity, emotional volatility, and risky behaviors such as drinking and driving under the influence of alcohol. By contrast, we found that risk-taking declines linearly from childhood to adulthood when individuals make choices over monetary gambles. Further, with age we found increases in the sensitivity to economic risk, defined as the degree to which a preference for assured monetary gains over a risky payoff depends upon the variability in the risky payoff. These findings indicate that decisions about economic risk may follow a different developmental trajectory than other kinds of risk-taking, and that changes in sensitivity to risk may be a major factor in the development of mature risk aversion.