The core episodic simulation network dissociates as a function of subjective experience and objective content

What is autonoetic consciousness? Examining what underlies subjective experience in memory and future thinking

Autonoetic consciousness is the awareness that an event we remember is one that we ourselves experienced. It is a defining feature of our subjective experience of remembering and imagining future events. Given its subjective nature, there is ongoing debate about how to measure it. Our goal was to develop a framework to identify cognitive markers of autonoetic consciousness. Across two studies (N = 342) we asked young, healthy participants to provide written descriptions of two autobiographical memories, two plausible future events, and an experimentally encoded video. Participants then rated their subjective experience during remembering and imagining. Exploratory Factor Analysis of this data uncovered the latent variables underlying autonoetic consciousness across these different events. In contrast to work that emphasizes the distinction between Remember and Know as being key to autonoetic consciousness, Re-experiencing, and Pre-experiencing for future events, were consistently identified as core markers of autonoetic consciousness. This was alongside Mental Time Travel in all types of memory events, but not for imagining the future. In addition, our factor analysis allows us to demonstrate directly - for the first time - the features of mental imagery associated with the sense of autonoetic consciousness in autobiographical memory; vivid, visual imagery from a first-person perspective. Finally, with regression analysis, the emergent factor structure of autonoetic consciousness was able to predict the richness of autobiographical memory texts, but not of episodic recall of the encoded video. This work provides a novel way to assess autonoetic consciousness, illustrates how autonoetic consciousness manifests differently in memory and imagination and defines the mental representations intrinsic to this process.

Time spent imagining does not influence younger and older adults' episodic simulation of helping behavior

Shared cognitive processes underlie our ability to remember the past (i.e., episodic memory) and imagine the future (i.e., episodic simulation) and age-related declines in episodic memory are also noted when simulating future scenarios. Given older adults' reduced cognitive control and protracted memory retrieval time, we examined whether imposing time limits on episodic simulation of future helping scenarios affects younger and older adults' willingness to help, phenomenological experience, and the type of details produced. Relative to a control task, episodic simulation increased younger and older participants' willingness to help, scene vividness, and perspective-taking regardless of the time spent imagining future helping scenarios. Notably, time spent imagining influenced the number, but not proportion of internal details produced, suggesting that participants' use of episodic-like information remained consistent regardless of the time they spent imagining. The present findings highlight the importance of collecting phenomenological experience when assessing episodic simulation abilities across the lifespan.

Constructive Memory and Conscious Experience

Episodic memory relies on constructive processes that support simulating novel future events by flexibly recombining elements of past experiences, and that can also give rise to memory errors. In recent studies, we have developed methods to characterize the cognitive and neural processes that support conscious experiences linked to this process of episodic recombination, both when people simulate novel future events and commit recombination-related memory errors. In this Perspective, we summarize recent studies that illustrate these phenomena, and discuss broader implications for characterizing the basis of conscious experiences associated with constructive memory from a cognitive neuroscience perspective.

Hippocampal-cortical interactions during event boundaries support retention of complex narrative events

According to most memory theories, encoding involves continuous communication between the hippocampus and neocortex, but recent work has shown that key moments at the end of an event, called event boundaries, may be especially critical for memory formation. We sought to determine how communication between the hippocampus and neocortical regions during the encoding of naturalistic events related to subsequent retrieval of those events and whether this was particularly important at event boundaries. Participants encoded and recalled two cartoon movies during fMRI scanning. Higher functional connectivity between the hippocampus and the posterior medial network (PMN) at an event's offset is related to the subsequent successful recall of that event. Furthermore, hippocampal-PMN offset connectivity also predicted the amount of detail retrieved after a 2-day delay. These data demonstrate that the relationship between memory encoding and hippocampal-neocortical interaction is dynamic and biased toward boundaries.

Grandiose narcissism influences the phenomenology of remembered past and imagined future events

Little empirical work has examined future thinking in narcissistic grandiosity. We here extend prior work finding that people scoring high in grandiosity have self-bolstering tendencies in remembering past events, and we consider whether these tendencies extend to imagining future events. Across an initial study (N = 112) and replication (N = 169), participants wrote about remembered past events and imagined future events in which they embodied or would embody either positive or negative traits. Participants then rated those events on several subjective measures. We find that people scoring higher in grandiosity remember past events in which they embody positive traits with greater detail and ease than past events in which they embody negative traits. These same effects persist when people scoring high in grandiosity imagine possible events in their future. Those scoring higher in grandiosity endorse thinking about positive events in their past and future more frequently than negative events, and they judge positive future events as more plausible than negative future events. These tendencies did not extend to objective detail provided in their written narratives about these events. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that grandiosity is associated with self-bolstering tendencies in both remembering the past and imagining the future.

The shared and unique neural correlates of personal semantic, general semantic, and episodic memory

One of the most common distinctions in long-term memory is that between semantic (i.e., general world knowledge) and episodic (i.e., recollection of contextually specific events from one's past). However, emerging cognitive neuroscience data suggest a surprisingly large overlap between the neural correlates of semantic and episodic memory. Moreover, personal semantic memories (i.e., knowledge about the self and one's life) have been studied little and do not easily fit into the standard semantic-episodic dichotomy. Here, we used fMRI to record brain activity while 48 participants verified statements concerning general facts, autobiographical facts, repeated events, and unique events. In multivariate analysis, all four types of memory involved activity within a common network bilaterally (e.g., frontal pole, paracingulate gyrus, medial frontal cortex, middle/superior temporal gyrus, precuneus, posterior cingulate, angular gyrus) and some areas of the medial temporal lobe. Yet the four memory types differentially engaged this network, increasing in activity from general to autobiographical facts, from autobiographical facts to repeated events, and from repeated to unique events. Our data are compatible with a component process model, in which declarative memory types rely on different weightings of the same elementary processes, such as perceptual imagery, spatial features, and self-reflection.

Development of the neural correlates of recollection

Recollection of past events has been associated with the core recollection network comprising the posterior medial temporal lobe and parietal regions, as well as the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). The development of the brain basis for recollection is understudied. In a sample of adults (n = 22; 18-25 years) and children (n = 23; 9-13 years), the present study aimed to address this knowledge gap using a cued recall paradigm, known to elicit recollection experience. Successful recall was associated with activations in regions of the core recollection network and frontoparietal network. Adults exhibited greater successful recall activations compared with children in the precuneus and right angular gyrus. In contrast, similar levels of successful recall activations were observed in both age groups in the mPFC. Group differences were also seen in the hippocampus and lateral frontal regions. These findings suggest that the engagement of the mPFC in episodic retrieval may be relatively early maturing, whereas the contribution to episodic retrieval of more posterior regions such as the precuneus and angular gyrus undergoes more protracted maturation.

Drinking to Cope is Uniquely Associated with Less Specific and Bleaker Future Goal Generation in Young Hazardous Drinkers

Groups with mental health and/or substance use problems generate less detailed descriptions of their future goals. As substance use to cope with negative affect is common to both groups, this characteristic might be uniquely associated with less specific goal descriptions. To test this prediction, 229 past year hazardous drinking undergraduates aged 18-25 years wrote about three positive future life goals in an open-ended survey, before reporting their internalizing (anxiety and depression) symptoms, alcohol dependence severity and motivations for drinking: coping, conformity, enhancement and social. Future goal descriptions were experimenter-rated for detail specificity, and participant-self-rated for positivity, vividness, achievability, and importance. Effort in goal writing was indexed by time spent writing and total word count. Multiple regression analyses revealed that drinking to cope was uniquely associated with the production of less detailed goals, and lower self-rated positivity and vividness of goals (achievability and importance were also marginally lower), over and above internalizing symptoms, alcohol dependence severity, drinking for conformity, enhancement and social motives, age, and gender. However, drinking to cope was not uniquely associated with reduced effort in writing goals: time spent and word count. In sum, drinking to cope with negative affect is a unique characteristic predicting the generation of less detailed and bleaker (less positive and vivid) future goals, and this is not due to lower effort in reporting. Future goal generation may play a role in the aetiology of comorbidity of mental health and substance use problems, and therapeutic targeting of goal generation might benefit both conditions.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10862-023-10032-0.

Enhanced declarative memory in long-term mindfulness practitioners

OBJECTIVES

Mindfulness meditation (MM) practice is considered to benefit physical and mental health. In particular, several studies have shown a beneficial effect of MM practice on memory performance. However, it is still not clear how long-term training affects long-term declarative memory. In this study we aimed to examine whether long-term MM training impacts declarative memory formation for diverse memoranda types, as well as the role of trait mindfulness, and the possible mediating role of anxiety.

METHODS

We examined long-term memory performance in 23 experienced MM practitioners and 22 meditation-naïve age-matched individuals, by administering a variety of declarative memory tests, ranging from item recognition to narrative and autobiographical memory recollection and future projection. The participants also filled the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI).

RESULTS

Compared to the control group, long-term MM practitioners exhibited heightened memory performance for the picture recognition test and experienced enhanced vividness during autobiographic memory retrieval and future simulations. We also report a significant trait mindfulness and memory performance correlation, stemming exclusively from the Mm group.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings extend previous reports of the beneficial effect of a short-term MM training on memory performance, by showing the beneficial effect of long-term training on declarative memory. We also provide initial evidence that trait mindfulness is positively correlated with declarative memory performance, as a function of MM practice, and discuss these findings in light of the role of self-mode and cognitive diffusion, as well as attention and emotion.

Initial evaluation of domain-specific episodic future thinking on delay discounting and cannabis use

Episodic Future Thinking (EFT), mental simulation of personally relevant and positive future events, may modulate delay discounting (DD) in cannabis users. Whether EFT impacts cannabis use, whether DD mediates this effect, and whether EFT can be enhanced by prompting future events across specific life domains is unknown. Active, adult cannabis users (n = 90) recruited from Amazon mTurk and Qualtrics Panels were administered an Episodic Specificity Induction (ESI) to enhance quality of imagined events before being randomized to EFT, domain-specific-EFT (DS-EFT), or Episodic Recent Thinking (ERT). All participants created four, positive life events; DS-EFT participants imagined social, leisure, health, and financial events. Event-quality ratings were assessed (e.g., enjoyment). DD was assessed at baseline (Day 1), post-intervention (Days 2-4), and follow-up (Days 9-12). Cannabis use was assessed at baseline and follow-up. Differences in change in days and grams of cannabis use between conditions and mediation of changes in use by DD were examined. No differences in DD were observed between conditions. DS-EFT, but not EFT, showed significantly greater reductions in grams (d = .54) and days of cannabis use (d = .50) than ERT. DS-EFT and EFT demonstrated significantly greater event-quality ratings than ERT (ds > .55). EFT-based interventions showed potential for reducing cannabis use. Unexpectedly, effects on DD did not mediate this effect. Further testing with larger samples of cannabis users is needed to better understand EFT's mechanisms of action and determine optimal implementation strategies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Integrating Region- and Network-level Contributions to Episodic Recollection Using Multilevel Structural Equation Modeling

The brain is composed of networks of interacting brain regions that support higher-order cognition. Among these, a core network of regions has been associated with recollection and other forms of episodic construction. Past research has focused largely on the roles of individual brain regions in recollection or on their mutual engagement as part of an integrated network. However, the relationship between these region- and network-level contributions remains poorly understood. Here, we applied multilevel structural equation modeling to examine the functional organization of the posterior medial (PM) network and its relationship to episodic memory outcomes. We evaluated two aspects of functional heterogeneity in the PM network: first, the organization of individual regions into subnetworks, and second, the presence of regionally specific contributions while accounting for network-level effects. Our results suggest that the PM network is composed of ventral and dorsal subnetworks, with the ventral subnetwork making a unique contribution to recollection, especially to recollection of spatial information, and that memory-related activity in individual regions is well accounted for by these network-level effects. These findings highlight the importance of considering the functions of individual brain regions within the context of their affiliated networks.

Temporal pole volume is associated with episodic autobiographical memory in healthy older adults

Recollection of personal past events differs across the lifespan. Older individuals recall fewer episodic details and convey more semantic information than young. Here we examine how gray matter volumes in temporal lobe regions integral to episodic and semantic memory (hippocampus and temporal poles, respectively) are related to age differences in autobiographical recollection. Gray matter volumes were obtained in healthy young (n = 158) and old (n = 105) adults. The temporal pole was demarcated and hippocampus segmented into anterior and posterior regions to test for volume differences between age groups. The Autobiographical Interview was administered to measure episodic and semantic autobiographical memory. Volume associations with episodic and semantic autobiographical memory were then assessed. Brain volumes were smaller for older adults in the posterior hippocampus. Autobiographical memory was less episodic and more semanticized for older versus younger adults. Older adults also showed positive associations between temporal pole volumes and episodic autobiographical recall; in the young, temporal pole volume was positively associated with performance on standard laboratory measures of semantic memory. Exploratory analyses revealed that age-related episodic autobiographical memory associations with anterior hippocampal volumes depended on sex. These findings suggest that age differences in brain structures implicated in episodic and semantic memory may portend reorganization of neural circuits to support autobiographical memory in later life.

I remember therefore I am: Episodic memory retrieval and self-reported trait empathy judgments in young and older adults and individuals with medial temporal lobe excisions

How do we know what sort of people we are? Do we reflect on specific past instances of our own behaviour, or do we just have a general idea? Previous work has emphasized the role of personal semantic memory (general autobiographical knowledge) in how we assess our own personality traits. Using a standardized trait empathy questionnaire, we show in four experiments that episodic autobiographical memory (memory for specific personal events) is associated with people's judgments of their own trait empathy. Specifically, neurologically healthy young adults rated themselves as more empathic on questionnaire items that cued episodic memories of events in which they behaved empathically. This effect, however, was diminished in people who are known to have poor episodic memory: older adults and individuals who have undergone unilateral excision of medial temporal lobe tissue (as treatment for epilepsy). Further, self-report ratings on individual questionnaire items were generally predicted by subjectively rated phenomenological qualities of the memories cued by those items, such as sensory detail, scene coherence, and overall vividness. We argue that episodic and semantic memory play different roles with respect to self-knowledge depending on life experience, the integrity of the medial temporal lobes, and whether one is assessing general abstract traits versus more concrete behaviours that embody these traits. Future research should examine different types of self-knowledge as well as personality traits other than empathy.

Neural reactivation and judgements of vividness reveal separable contributions to mnemonic representation

Mnemonic representations vary in fidelity, sharpness, and strength-qualities that can be examined using both introspective judgements of mental states and objective measures of brain activity. Subjective and objective measures are both valid ways of "reading out" the content of someone's internal mnemonic states, each with different strengths and weaknesses. St-Laurent and colleagues (2015) compared the neural correlates of memory vividness ratings with patterns of neural reactivation evoked during memory recall and found considerable overlap between the two, suggesting a common neural basis underlying these different markers of representational quality. Here we extended this work with meta-analytic methods by pooling together four neuroimaging datasets in order to contrast the neural substrates of neural reactivation and those of vividness judgements. While reactivation and vividness judgements correlated positively with one another and were associated with common univariate activity in the dorsal attention network and anterior hippocampus, some notable differences were also observed. Vividness judgments were tied to stronger activation in the striatum and dorsal attention network, together with activity suppression in default mode network nodes. We also observed a trend for reactivation to be more closely associated with early visual cortex activity. A mediation analysis found support for the hypothesis that neural reactivation is necessary for memory vividness, with activity in the anterior hippocampus associated with greater reactivation. Our results suggest that neural reactivation and vividness judgements reflect common mnemonic processes but differ in the extent to which they engage effortful, attentional processes. Additionally, the similarity between reactivation and vividness appears to arise, partly, through hippocampal engagement during memory retrieval.

The role of episodic memory in imagining autobiographical events: the influence of event expectancy and context familiarity

Episodic memory plays a common role in constructing mental representations of past and imagined autobiographical events. Research has suggested that certain factors will affect how episodic memory is used during mental construction, such as the expectancy that an event will occur and the familiarity with an event's context. The aim of the current study was to understand how these factors affect episodic memory engagement and subjective experience during event imagination. In a within-subjects design, participants viewed context cues (high or low in familiarity), described imagined autobiographical events (expected or not expected to occur in these contexts) and rated their experience. 24-hours later, participants recalled and described the same events. We found that expectancy of the imagined events was associated with quicker access and increased episodic detail generation, regardless of context familiarity. Additionally, both event expectancy and context familiarity affected the subjective quality of the imagined events. Examining the episodic details in descriptions after the delay revealed comparable effects of these two factors. Our results underscore the importance of event expectancy in recruiting episodic memory for imagined autobiographical experiences.

Reduced calibration between subjective and objective measures of episodic future thinking in alcohol use disorder

BACKGROUND

A reduced capacity to mentally simulate future scenarios could be of clinical importance in alcohol use disorder (AUD). However, little is known about the mechanisms underlying episodic future thinking (EFT) impairment in AUD.

METHODS

We tested patients with severe AUD using two measures of EFT: the individual's own subjective experience of their imaginings (phenomenology) and the objective number of details included in imagined events, as assessed by an independent observer (examination). The comparison between the two measures allowed us to investigate the extent to which the subjective and objective characteristics of EFT are calibrated in healthy and AUD participants matched for age, education, and gender. The possible impact of cognitive functioning and disturbed mood on EFT measures was also investigated.

RESULTS

In terms of objective details of EFT, patients with AUD (n = 40) generated fewer episodic components and more non-episodic components than control participants (n = 40), even when controlling for cognitive functioning. However, self-ratings of phenomenological characteristics indicated that participants with AUD perceived imagined future events at a similar level of detail as control participants. Additionally, there was a significant correlation between objective and subjective measures in healthy individuals but not in the AUD group. A higher depression score in the AUD group was not associated with the EFT measures.

CONCLUSIONS

These results suggest a distorted self-assessment of the richness of imagined future events in individuals with AUD. We discuss these apparent limitations in metacognitive abilities and verbal descriptions of imagined events among individuals with AUD and their clinical implications.

Troubled past: A critical psychometric assessment of the self-report Survey of Autobiographical Memory (SAM)

The Survey of Autobiographical Memory (SAM) was designed as an easy-to-administer measure of self-perceived autobiographical memory (AM) recollection capacity. We provide a comprehensive psychometric evaluation of the SAM in younger and older adults. First, we evaluated the reliability of the SAM as a measure of self-perceived recollective capacity. Next, we tested whether the SAM was a valid measure of episodic and autobiographical memory performance, as assessed with widely used performance-based measures. Finally, we investigated associations between the SAM, cognitive measures and self-reported assessments of psychological functioning. The SAM demonstrated reliability as a self-report measure of perceived recollective capacity. High internal consistency was observed across subscales, with the exception of SAM-semantic. Evidence for independence among the subscales was mixed: SAM-episodic and SAM-semantic items showed poor correspondence with respective subscales. Good correspondence was observed between the future and spatial items and their SAM subscales. The SAM showed limited associations with AM performance as measured by the Autobiographical Interview (AI), yet was broadly associated with self-reported AI event vividness. SAM scores were weakly associated with performance-based memory measures and were age-invariant, inconsistent with known age effects on declarative memory. Converging evidence indicated that SAM-episodic and SAM-semantic subscales are not independent and should not be interpreted as specific measures of episodic or semantic memory. The SAM was robustly associated with self-efficacy, suggesting an association with confidence in domain general self-report abilities. We urge caution in the use and interpretation of the SAM as a measure of AM, pending revision and further psychometric validation.

I remember it like it was yesterday: Age-related differences in the subjective experience of remembering

It has been frequently described that older adults subjectively report the vividness of their memories as being as high, or even higher, than young adults, despite poorer objective memory performance. Here, we review studies that examined age-related differences in the subjective experience of memory vividness. By examining vividness calibration and resolution, studies using different types of approaches converge to suggest that older adults overestimate the intensity of their vividness ratings relative to young adults, and that they rely on retrieved memory details to a lesser extent to judge vividness. We discuss potential mechanisms underlying these observations. Inflation of memory vividness with regard to the richness of memory content may stem from age-differences in vividness criterion or scale interpretation and psycho-social factors. The reduced reliance on episodic memory details in older adults may stem from age-related differences in how they monitor these details to make their vividness ratings. Considered together, these findings emphasize the importance of examining age-differences in memory vividness using different analytical methods and they provide valuable evidence that the subjective experience of remembering is more than the reactivation of memory content. In this vein, we recommend that future studies explore the links between memory vividness and other subjective memory scales (e.g., ratings of details or memory confidence) in healthy aging and/or other populations, as it could be used as a window to better characterize the cognitive processes that underpin the subjective assessment of the quality of recollected events.

Subjective Time in Dementia: A Critical Review

The capacity for subjective time in humans encompasses the perception of time's unfolding from moment to moment, as well as the ability to traverse larger temporal expanses of past- and future-oriented thought via mental time travel. Disruption in time perception can result in maladaptive outcomes-from the innocuous lapse in timing that leads to a burnt piece of toast, to the grievous miscalculation that produces a traffic accident-while disruption to mental time travel can impact core functions from planning appointments to making long-term decisions. Mounting evidence suggests that disturbances to both time perception and mental time travel are prominent in dementia syndromes. Given that such disruptions can have severe consequences for independent functioning in everyday life, here we aim to provide a comprehensive exposition of subjective timing dysfunction in dementia, with a view to informing the management of such disturbances. We consider the neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning changes to both time perception and mental time travel across different dementia disorders. Moreover, we explicate the functional implications of altered subjective timing by reference to two key and representative adaptive capacities: prospective memory and intertemporal decision-making. Overall, our review sheds light on the transdiagnostic implications of subjective timing disturbances in dementia and highlights the high variability in performance across clinical syndromes and functional domains.

Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Subjective Experience of Remembering

The ability to remember events in vivid, multisensory detail is a significant part of human experience, allowing us to relive previous encounters and providing us with the store of memories that shape our identity. Recent research has sought to understand the subjective experience of remembering, that is, what it feels like to have a memory. Such remembering involves reactivating sensory-perceptual features of an event and the thoughts and feelings we had when the event occurred, integrating them into a conscious first-person experience. It allows us to reflect on the content of our memories and to understand and make judgments about them, such as distinguishing events that actually occurred from those we might have imagined or been told about. In this review, we consider recent evidence from functional neuroimaging in healthy participants and studies of neurological and psychiatric conditions, which is shedding new light on how we subjectively experience remembering. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 73 is January 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Evidence supporting a time-limited hippocampal role in retrieving autobiographical memories

The hippocampus is central to healthy memory function, yet its necessity for remembering events from the distant past remains unclear. Prominent hypotheses alternatively suggest a time-limited or an indefinite role. fMRI evidence, typically based on silent in-scanner recall, has been equivocal, possibly because it provides sparse information of the content being remembered. Here, we asked fMRI participants to verbally describe recent and remote memories. After accounting for neural activity associated with the moment-to-moment memory content of recalled memories, we observed a temporally graded pattern of activity within the posterior hippocampus and found that recent—but not remote—event recall significantly activated the hippocampus relative to a non-autobiographical control task. Our findings support a time-limited hippocampal role in autobiographical memory.

The necessity of the human hippocampus for remote autobiographical recall remains fiercely debated. The standard model of consolidation predicts a time-limited role for the hippocampus, but the competing multiple trace/trace transformation theories posit indefinite involvement. Lesion evidence remains inconclusive, and the inferences one can draw from functional MRI (fMRI) have been limited by reliance on covert (silent) recall, which obscures dynamic, moment-to-moment content of retrieved memories. Here, we capitalized on advances in fMRI denoising to employ overtly spoken recall. Forty participants retrieved recent and remote memories, describing each for approximately 2 min. Details associated with each memory were identified and modeled in the fMRI time-series data using a variant of the Autobiographical Interview procedure, and activity associated with the recall of recent and remote memories was then compared. Posterior hippocampal regions exhibited temporally graded activity patterns (recent events > remote events), as did several regions of frontal and parietal cortex. Consistent with predictions of the standard model, recall-related hippocampal activity differed from a non-autobiographical control task only for recent, and not remote, events. Task-based connectivity between posterior hippocampal regions and others associated with mental scene construction also exhibited a temporal gradient, with greater connectivity accompanying the recall of recent events. These findings support predictions of the standard model of consolidation and demonstrate the potential benefits of overt recall in neuroimaging experiments.

Divergent thinking and constructing future events: dissociating old from new ideas

Divergent thinking (the ability to generate creative ideas by combining diverse types of information) has been previously linked to the ability to imagine novel and specific future autobiographical events. Here, we examined whether divergent thinking is differentially associated with the ability to construct novel imagined future events and recast future events (i.e., actual past events recast as future events) as opposed to recalled past events. We also examined whether different types of creative ideas (i.e., old ideas from memory or new ideas from imagination) underlie the linkage between divergent thinking and various autobiographical events. Divergent thinking ability was measured using the Alternate Uses Task (AUT). In Experiment 1, the amount of episodic details for both novel and recast future events was associated with divergent thinking (AUT scores), and this relationship was significant with AUT scores for new creative ideas but not old creative ideas. There was no significant relationship between divergent thinking and the amount of episodic detail for recalled past events. We extended these findings in Experiment 2 to a different test of divergent thinking, the Consequences Task. These results demonstrate that individual differences in divergent thinking are associated with the capacity to both imagine and recast future events.

The Ventral and Dorsal Default Mode Networks Are Dissociably Modulated by the Vividness and Valence of Imagined Events

Recent work has shown that the brain's default mode network (DMN) is active when people imagine the future. Here, we test in human participants (both sexes) whether future imagination can be decomposed into two dissociable psychological processes linked to different subcomponents of the DMN. While measuring brain activity with fMRI as subjects imagine future events, we manipulate the vividness of these events to modulate the demands for event construction, and we manipulate the valence of these events to modulate the demands for event evaluation. We found that one subcomponent of the DMN, the ventral DMN or medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, responds to the vividness but not the valence of imagined events. In contrast, another subcomponent, the dorsal or core DMN, responds to the valence but not the vividness of imagined events. This separate modifiability of different subcomponents of the DMN by vividness and valence provides strong evidence for a neurocognitive dissociation between (1) the construction of novel, imagined events from individual components from memory and (2) the evaluation of these constructed events as desirable or undesirable.

Reinstatement of item-specific contextual details during retrieval supports recombination-related false memories

Flexible retrieval mechanisms that allow us to infer relationships across events may also lead to memory errors or distortion when details of one event are misattributed to the related event. Here, we tested how making successful inferences alters representation of overlapping events, leading to false memories. Participants encoded overlapping associations ('AB' and 'BC'), each of which was superimposed on different indoor and outdoor scenes that were pre-exposed prior to associative learning. Participants were subsequently tested on both the directly learned pairs ('AB' and 'BC') and inferred relationships across pairs ('AC'). We predicted that when people make a correct inference, features associated with overlapping events may become integrated in memory. To test this hypothesis, participants completed a final detailed retrieval test, in which they had to recall the scene associated with initially learned 'AB' pairs (or 'BC' pairs). We found that the outcome of inference decisions impacted the degree to which neural patterns elicited during detailed 'AB' retrieval reflected reinstatement of the scene associated with the overlapping 'BC' event. After successful inference, neural patterns in the anterior hippocampus, posterior medial prefrontal cortex, and our content-reinstatement region (left inferior temporal gyrus) were more similar to the overlapping, yet incorrect 'BC' context relative to after unsuccessful inference. Further, greater hippocampal activity during inference was associated with greater reinstatement of the incorrect, overlapping context in our content-reinstatement region, which in turn tracked contextual misattributions during detailed retrieval. These results suggest recombining memories during successful inference can lead to misattribution of contextual details across related events, resulting in false memories.

Modulation of hippocampal brain networks produces changes in episodic simulation and divergent thinking

Prior functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies indicate that a core network of brain regions, including the hippocampus, is jointly recruited during episodic memory, episodic simulation, and divergent creative thinking. Because fMRI data are correlational, it is unknown whether activity increases in the hippocampus, and the core network more broadly, play a causal role in episodic simulation and divergent thinking. Here we employed fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to assess whether temporary disruption of hippocampal brain networks impairs both episodic simulation and divergent thinking. For each of two TMS sessions, continuous θ-burst stimulation (cTBS) was applied to either a control site (vertex) or to a left angular gyrus target region. The target region was identified on the basis of a participant-specific resting-state functional connectivity analysis with a hippocampal seed region previously associated with memory, simulation, and divergent thinking. Following cTBS, participants underwent fMRI and performed a simulation, divergent thinking, and nonepisodic control task. cTBS to the target region reduced the number of episodic details produced for the simulation task and reduced idea production on divergent thinking. Performance in the control task did not statistically differ as a function of cTBS site. fMRI analyses revealed a selective and simultaneous reduction in hippocampal activity during episodic simulation and divergent thinking following cTBS to the angular gyrus versus vertex but not during the nonepisodic control task. Our findings provide evidence that hippocampal-targeted TMS can specifically modulate episodic simulation and divergent thinking, and suggest that the hippocampus is critical for these cognitive functions.

Deconstructing the Posterior Medial Episodic Network

Our ability to remember or imagine specific events involves the construction of complex mental representations, a process that engages cortical and hippocampal regions in a core posterior medial (PM) brain network. Existing theoretical approaches have described the overarching contributions of the PM network, but less is known about how episodic content is represented and transformed throughout this system. Here, we review evidence of key functional interactions among PM regions and their relation to the core cognitive operations and representations supporting episodic construction. Recent demonstrations of intranetwork functional diversity are integrated with existing accounts to inform a network-based model of episodic construction, in which PM regions flexibly share and manipulate event information to support the variable phenomenology of episodic memory and simulation.