Saviour embryos? Preimplantation genetic diagnosis as a therapeutic technology

Born to donate: proposals for "savior sibling" regulation in Latin America

A Savior Sibling is a child who is born to provide an organ, bone marrow or cell transplant, to a sibling that is affected with a fatal disease. There are created with the in vitro fertilization and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and, in the process, the ethical standards for organ donation of children become less demanding. Therefore, we propose that the authorization of the technique considers, unavoidably, the opinion of an impartial third party that can guarantee the welfare of the child. We develop a critical analysis of the laws that regulate the creation of babies to serve as organ donors. We evaluate under what circumstances the organizations that play a part in the decisions, fulfill the ethical standards to allow the organ donation of children.

Double-effect reasoning and the conception of human embryos

Some commentators argue that conception signals the onset of human personhood and that moral responsibilities toward zygotic or embryonic persons begin at this point, not the least of which is to protect them from exposure to death. Critics of the conception threshold of personhood ask how it can be morally consistent to object to the embryo loss that occurs in fertility medicine and research but not object to the significant embryo loss that occurs through conception in vivo. Using that apparent inconsistency as a starting point, they argue that if that embryo loss is tolerable as a way of conceiving children, it should be tolerable in fertility medicine and human embryonic research. Double-effect reasoning shows, by contrast, that conception in vivo is justified even if it involves the death of persons because the motives for wanting children are not inherently objectionable, because the embryo loss that occurs in unassisted conception is not the means by which successful conception occurs, and because the effect of having children is proportionate to the loss involved. A similar outcome holds true for in vitro fertilisation in fertility medicine but not for in vitro fertilisation for research involving human embryos.

Embryo loss and double effect

I defend the argument that if embryo loss in stem cell research is morally problematic, then embryo loss in in vivo conception is similarly morally problematic. According to a recent challenge to this argument, we can distinguish between in vivo embryo loss and the in vitro embryo loss of stem cell research by appealing to the doctrine of double effect. I argue that this challenge fails to show that in vivo embryo loss is a mere unintended side effect while in vitro embryo loss is an intended means and that, even if we refine the challenge by appealing to Michael Bratman's three roles of intention, the distinction is still unwarranted.

Embryo deaths in reproduction and embryo research: a reply to Murphy's double effect argument

The majority of embryos created in natural reproduction die spontaneously within a few weeks of conception. Some have argued that, therefore, if one believes the embryo is a person (in the normative sense) one should find 'natural' reproduction morally problematic. An extension of this argument holds that, if one accepts embryo deaths in natural reproduction, consistency requires that one also accepts embryo deaths that occur in (i) assisted reproduction via in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and (ii) embryo research. In a recent paper in this journal, Timothy Murphy criticises both the initial argument and its extension. Murphy argues that double-effect reasoning can justify embryo deaths both in natural reproduction and IVF, but not in embryo research. Thus, according to Murphy, one can, without being inconsistent, (1) believe the embryo is a person and accept natural reproduction and IVF, and (2) accept natural reproduction and IVF, while rejecting embryo research on the ground that it involves embryo deaths. I show that Murphy's argument is problematic because double effect cannot justify embryo deaths in standard IVF practices. The problem is that the proportionality criterion of double effect is not met by such practices. Thus, Murphy's argument fails to support (1) and (2). An implication of his argument failing to support (2) is that it does not defeat the position I have defended in the past-that if one accepts standard IVF practices one should also accept embryo research, including research with embryos created solely for that purpose.