Effects of Payment for Performance on accountability mechanisms: Evidence from Pwani, Tanzania

Facilitators for and Barriers to the Implementation of Performance Accountability Mechanisms for Quality Improvement in the Delivery of Maternal Health Services in a District Hospital in Pwani Region, Tanzania

Tanzania experiences a burden of maternal mortality and morbidity. Despite the efforts to institute accountability mechanisms, little is known about quality improvement in the delivery of maternal health services. This study aimed at exploring barriers and facilitators to enforcing performance accountability mechanisms for quality improvement in maternal health services. A case study design was used to conduct semi-structured interviews with thirteen key informants. Data were analyzed using thematic analyses. The findings were linked to two main performance accountability mechanisms: maternal and perinatal death reviews (MPDRs) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Prioritization of the maternal health agenda by the government and the presence of maternal death review committees were the main facilitators for MPDRs, while negligence, inadequate follow-up, poor record-keeping, and delays were the main barriers facing MPDRs. M&E was facilitated by the availability of health management information systems, day-to-day ward rounds, online ordering of medicines, and the use of biometrics. Non-use of data for decision-making, supervision being performed on an ad hoc basis, and inadequate health workforce were the main barriers to M&E. The findings underscore that barriers to the performance accountability mechanisms are systemic and account for limited effectiveness in the improvement of quality of care.

Use of community engagement interventions to improve child immunisation in low-income and middle-income countries: a systematic review and meta-analysis

OBJECTIVE

To support evidence informed decision-making, we systematically examine the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of community engagement interventions on routine childhood immunisation outcomes in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) and identify contextual, design and implementation features associated with effectiveness.

DESIGN

Mixed-methods systematic review and meta-analysis.

DATA SOURCES

21 databases of academic and grey literature and 12 additional websites were searched in May 2019 and May 2020.

ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR SELECTING STUDIES

We included experimental and quasi-experimental impact evaluations of community engagement interventions considering outcomes related to routine child immunisation in LMICs. No language, publication type, or date restrictions were imposed.

DATA EXTRACTION AND SYNTHESIS

Two independent researchers extracted summary data from published reports and appraised quantitative risk of bias using adapted Cochrane tools. Random effects meta-analysis was used to examine effects on the primary outcome, full immunisation coverage.

RESULTS

Our search identified over 43 000 studies and 61 were eligible for analysis. The average pooled effect of community engagement interventions on full immunisation coverage was standardised mean difference 0.14 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.23, I2=94.46). The most common source of risk to the quality of evidence (risk of bias) was outcome reporting bias: most studies used caregiver-reported measures of vaccinations received by a child in the absence or incompleteness of immunisation cards. Reasons consistently cited for intervention success include appropriate intervention design, including building in community engagement features; addressing common contextual barriers of immunisation and leveraging facilitators; and accounting for existing implementation constraints. The median intervention cost per treated child per vaccine dose (excluding the cost of vaccines) to increase absolute immunisation coverage by one percent was US$3.68.

CONCLUSION

Community engagement interventions are successful in improving outcomes related to routine child immunisation. The findings are robust to exclusion of studies assessed as high risk of bias.

Long-term effects of payment for performance on maternal and child health outcomes: evidence from Tanzania

BACKGROUND

The success of payment for performance (P4P) schemes relies on their ability to generate sustainable changes in the behaviour of healthcare providers. This paper examines short-term and longer-term effects of P4P in Tanzania and the reasons for these changes.

METHODS

We conducted a controlled before and after study and an embedded process evaluation. Three rounds of facility, patient and household survey data (at baseline, after 13 months and at 36 months) measured programme effects in seven intervention districts and four comparison districts. We used linear difference-in-difference regression analysis to determine programme effects, and differential effects over time. Four rounds of qualitative data examined evolution in programme design, implementation and mechanisms of change.

RESULTS

Programme effects on the rate of institutional deliveries and antimalarial treatment during antenatal care reduced overtime, with stock out rates of antimalarials increasing over time to baseline levels. P4P led to sustained improvements in kindness during deliveries, with a wider set of improvements in patient experience of care in the longer term. A change in programme management and funding delayed incentive payments affecting performance on some indicators. The verification system became more integrated within routine systems over time, reducing the time burden on managers and health workers. Ongoing financial autonomy and supervision sustained motivational effects in those aspects of care giving not reliant on funding.

CONCLUSION

Our study adds to limited and mixed evidence documenting how P4P effects evolve over time. Our findings highlight the importance of undertaking ongoing assessment of effects over time.

Understanding the maternal and child health system response to payment for performance in Tanzania using a causal loop diagram approach

Payment for performance (P4P) has been employed in low and middle-income (LMIC) countries to improve quality and coverage of maternal and child health (MCH) services. However, there is a lack of consensus on how P4P affects health systems. There is a need to evaluate P4P effects on health systems using methods suitable for evaluating complex systems. We developed a causal loop diagram (CLD) to further understand the pathways to impact of P4P on delivery and uptake of MCH services in Tanzania. The CLD was developed and validated using qualitative data from a process evaluation of a P4P scheme in Tanzania, with additional stakeholder dialogue sought to strengthen confidence in the diagram. The CLD maps the interacting mechanisms involved in provider achievement of targets, reporting of health information, and population care seeking, and identifies those mechanisms affected by P4P. For example, the availability of drugs and medical commodities impacts not only provider achievement of P4P targets but also demand of services and is impacted by P4P through the availability of additional facility resources and the incentivisation of district managers to reduce drug stock outs. The CLD also identifies mechanisms key to facility achievement of targets but are not within the scope of the programme; the activities of health facility governing committees and community health workers, for example, are key to demand stimulation and effective resource use at the facility level but both groups were omitted from the incentive system. P4P design considerations generated from this work include appropriately incentivising the availability of drugs and staffing in facilities and those responsible for demand creation in communities. Further research using CLDs to study heath systems in LMIC is urgently needed to further our understanding of how systems respond to interventions and how to strengthen systems to deliver better coverage and quality of care.

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Holistic analysis key to avoiding suboptimal P4P performance.

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Availability of drugs is influenced by P4P and affects success of P4P.

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Need to incentivise groups outside facility that support service coverage.

Strategic Health Purchasing Progress Mapping in Cameroon: A Scoping Review

Many low- and middle-income countries are adopting far-reaching health financing policies using strategic health purchasing (SHP) approaches to address their health sector challenges. However, limited efforts have been directed toward analyzing the SHP activities nationwide. Our objective was to explore the scope and development of SHP in Cameroon. We conducted a scoping review applying the framework developed by Arksey and O'Malley and modified by Levac et al. to identify and extract data from relevant SHP studies and documents published between 2000 and 2019, which focused on Cameroon. Among the existing 30 health financing schemes, 5 present the elements of SHP: (1) national health insurance (NHI), (2) performance-based financing (PBF), (3) voucher system, (4) private health insurance, and (5) mutual health organizations. The findings suggest that the governance function of purchasing is very challenging due to the multiple purchaser markets and the resulting fragmentation of the health financing system. In addition, the misalignment of the different benefit packages across schemes leads to considerable gaps and overlaps in the population coverage. The issue of multiple highly fragmented payment systems also remains a big concern across the different schemes, with tentative harmonization observed with NHI and PBF. Achieving the full potential of SHP in Cameroon will require (1) a defragmentation of the multiple schemes, (2) an effective oversight arrangement, and (3) an alignment of provider payment method to a coherent set of incentives across the system, with the ultimate aim of promoting equity, efficiency and quality.

Paying for performance to improve the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries

BACKGROUND

There is growing interest in paying for performance (P4P) as a means to align the incentives of healthcare providers with public health goals. Rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in improving health care and health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is lacking; this is an update of the 2012 review on this topic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effects of paying for performance on the provision of health care and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, and 10 other databases between April and June 2018. We also searched two trial registries, websites, online resources of international agencies, organizations and universities, and contacted experts in the field. Studies identified from rerunning searches in 2020 are under 'Studies awaiting classification.'

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized or non-randomized trials, controlled before-after studies, or interrupted time series studies conducted in LMICs (as defined by the World Bank in 2018). P4P refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. To be included, a study had to report at least one of the following outcomes: patient health outcomes, changes in targeted measures of provider performance (such as the delivery of healthcare services), unintended effects, or changes in resource use.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We extracted data as per original review protocol and narratively synthesised findings. We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. Given diversity and variability in intervention types, patient populations, analyses and outcome reporting, we deemed meta-analysis inappropriate. We noted the range of effects associated with P4P against each outcome of interest. Based on intervention descriptions provided in documents, we classified design schemes and explored variation in effect by scheme design.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 59 studies: controlled before-after studies (19), non-randomized (16) or cluster randomized trials (14);  and interrupted time-series studies (9). One study included both an interrupted time series and a controlled before-after study. Studies focused on a wide range of P4P interventions, including target payments and payment for outputs as modified by quality (or quality and equity assessments). Only one study assessed results-based aid. Many schemes were funded by national governments (23 studies) with the World Bank funding most externally funded schemes (11 studies). Targeted services varied; however, most interventions focused on reproductive, maternal and child health indicators. Participants were predominantly located in public or in a mix of public, non-governmental and faith-based facilities (54 studies). P4P was assessed predominantly at health facility level, though districts and other levels were also involved. Most studies assessed the effects of P4P against a status quo control (49 studies); however, some studies assessed effects against comparator interventions (predominantly enhanced financing intended to match P4P funds (17 studies)). Four studies reported intervention effects against both comparator and status quo. Controlled before-after studies were at higher risk of bias than other study designs. However, some randomised trials were also downgraded due to risk of bias. The interrupted time-series studies provided insufficient information on other concurrent changes in the study context. P4P compared to a status quo control For health services that are specifically targeted, P4P may slightly improve health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may also improve service quality overall (low certainty evidence); and probably increases the availability of health workers, medicines and well-functioning infrastructure and equipment (moderate certainty evidence). P4P may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of services (low certainty evidence) and may have few or no distorting unintended effects on outcomes that were not targeted (low-certainty evidence), but few studies assessed these. For secondary outcomes, P4P may make little or no difference to provider absenteeism, motivation or satisfaction (low certainty evidence); but may improve patient satisfaction and acceptability (low certainty evidence); and may positively affect facility managerial autonomy (low certainty evidence). P4P probably makes little to no difference to management quality or facility governance (low certainty evidence). Impacts on equity were mixed (low certainty evidence). For health services that are untargeted, P4P probably improves some health outcomes (moderate certainty evidence); may improve the delivery, use and quality of some health services but may make little or no difference to others (low certainty evidence); and may have few or no distorting unintended effects (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on the availability of medicines and other resources are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). P4P compared to other strategies For health outcomes and services that are specifically targeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may improve service quality (low certainty evidence); and may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of health services and on the availability of equipment and medicines (low certainty evidence). For health outcomes and services that are untargeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes and to the delivery and use of health services (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on service quality, resource availability and unintended effects are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). Findings of subgroup analyses Results-based aid, and schemes using payment per output adjusted for service quality, appeared to yield the greatest positive effects on outcomes. However, only one study evaluated results-based aid, so the effects may be spurious. Overall, schemes adjusting both for quality of service and rewarding equitable delivery of services appeared to perform best in relation to service utilization outcomes.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The evidence base on the impacts of P4P schemes has grown considerably, with study quality gradually increasing. P4P schemes may have mixed effects on outcomes of interest, and there is high heterogeneity in the types of schemes implemented and evaluations conducted. P4P is not a uniform intervention, but rather a range of approaches. Its effects depend on the interaction of several variables, including the design of the intervention (e.g., who receives payments ), the amount of additional funding,  ancillary components (such as technical support) and contextual factors (including organizational context).

A realist review to assess for whom, under what conditions and how pay for performance programmes work in low- and middle-income countries

Pay for performance (P4P) programmes are popular health system-focused interventions aiming to improve health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). This realist review aims to understand how, why and under what circumstance P4P works in LMICs.We systematically searched peer-reviewed and grey literature databases, and examined the mechanisms underpinning P4P effects on: utilisation of services, patient satisfaction, provider productivity and broader health system, and contextual factors moderating these. This evidence was then used to construct a causal loop diagram.We included 112 records (19 grey literature; 93 peer-reviewed articles) assessing P4P schemes in 36 countries. Although we found mixed evidence of P4P's effects on identified outcomes, common pathways to improved outcomes include: community outreach; adherence to clinical guidelines, patient-provider interactions, patient trust, facility improvements, access to drugs and equipment, facility autonomy, and lower user fees. Contextual factors shaping the system response to P4P include: degree of facility autonomy, efficiency of banking, role of user charges in financing public services; staffing levels; staff training and motivation, quality of facility infrastructure and community social norms. Programme design features supporting or impeding health system effects of P4P included: scope of incentivised indicators, fairness and reach of incentives, timely payments and a supportive, robust verification system that does not overburden staff. Facility bonuses are a key element of P4P, but rely on provider autonomy for maximum effect. If health system inputs are vastly underperforming pre-P4P, they are unlikely to improve only due to P4P. This is the first realist review describing how and why P4P initiatives work (or fail) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the underlying mechanisms and contextual and programme design moderators. Future studies should systematically examine health system pathways to outcomes for P4P and other health system strengthening initiatives, and offer more understanding of how programme design shapes mechanisms and effects.

Pay for Performance: A Reflection on How a Global Perspective Could Enhance Policy and Research

Pay-for-performance (P4P) is the provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers based on pre-specified performance targets. P4P has been used as a policy tool to improve healthcare provision globally. However, researchers tend to cluster into those working on high or low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), with still limited knowledge exchange, potentially constraining opportunities for learning from across income settings. We reflect here on some commonalities and differences in the design of P4P schemes, research questions, methods and data across income settings. We highlight how a global perspective on knowledge synthesis could lead to innovations and further knowledge advancement.

Implementing performance-based financing in peripheral health centres in Mali: what can we learn from it?

Introduction

Numerous sub-Saharan African countries have experimented with performance-based financing (PBF) with the goal of improving health system performance. To date, few articles have examined the implementation of this type of complex intervention in Francophone West Africa. This qualitative research aims to understand the process of implementing a PBF pilot project in Mali's Koulikoro region.

Method

We conducted a contrasted multiple case study of performance in 12 community health centres in three districts. We collected 161 semi-structured interviews, 69 informal interviews and 96 non-participant observation sessions. Data collection and analysis were guided by the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research adapted to the research topic and local context.

Results

Our analysis revealed that the internal context of the PBF implementation played a key role in the process. High-performing centres exercised leadership and commitment more strongly than low-performing ones. These two characteristics were associated with taking initiatives to promote PBF implementation and strengthening team spirit. Information regarding the intervention was best appropriated by qualified health professionals. However, the limited duration of the implementation did not allow for the emergence of networks or champions. The enthusiasm initially generated by PBF quickly dissipated, mainly due to delays in the implementation schedule and the payment modalities.

Conclusion

PBF is a complex intervention in which many actors intervene in diverse contexts. The initial level of performance and the internal and external contexts of primary healthcare facilities influence the implementation of PBF. Future work in this area would benefit from an interdisciplinary approach combining public health and anthropology to better understand such an intervention. The deductive–inductive approach must be the stepping-stone of such a methodological approach.

Understanding efficiency and the effect of pay-for-performance across health facilities in Tanzania

BACKGROUND

Ensuring efficient use and allocation of limited resources is crucial to achieving the UHC goal. Performance-based financing that provides financial incentives for health providers reaching predefined targets would be expected to enhance technical efficiency across facilities by promoting an output-oriented payment system. However, there is no study which has systematically assessed efficiency scores across facilities before and after the introduction of pay-for-performance (P4P). This paper seeks to fill this knowledge gap.

METHODS

We used data of P4P evaluation related to healthcare inputs (staff, equipment, medicines) and outputs (outpatient consultations and institutional deliveries) from 75 health facilities implementing P4P in Pwani region, and 75 from comparison districts in Tanzania. We measured technical efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis and obtained efficiency scores across facilities before and after P4P scheme. We analysed which factors influence technical efficiency by regressing the efficiency scores over a number of contextual factors. We also tested the impact of P4P on efficiency through a difference-in-differences regression analysis.

RESULTS

The overall technical efficiency scores ranged between 0.40 and 0.65 for hospitals and health centres, and around 0.20 for dispensaries. Only 21% of hospitals and health centres were efficient when outpatient consultations and deliveries were considered as output, and <3% out of all facilities were efficient when outpatient consultations only were considered as outputs. Higher efficiency scores were significantly associated with the level of care (hospital and health centre) and wealthier catchment populations. Despite no evidence of P4P effect on efficiency on average, P4P might have improved efficiency marginally among public facilities.

CONCLUSION

Most facilities were not operating at their full capacity indicating potential for improving resource usage. A better understanding of the production process at the facility level and of how different healthcare financing reforms affects efficiency is needed. Effective reforms should improve inputs, outputs but also efficiency.

How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs.

METHODS

We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR were searched.

RESULTS

We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature - with many studies failing to report key design features.

CONCLUSIONS

We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point.

Characteristics and Effects of Multiple and Mixed Funding Flows to Public Healthcare Facilities on Financing Outcomes: A Case Study From Nigeria

Introduction: Most public hospitals in Nigeria are usually financed by funding flows from different health financing mechanisms, which could potentially trigger different provider behaviors that can affect the health system goals of efficiency, equity, and quality of care. The study examined how healthcare providers respond to multiple funding flows and the implications of such flows for achieving equity, efficiency, and quality.

Methods: A cross-sectional qualitative study of selected healthcare providers and purchasers in Enugu state was used. Four public hospitals were selected—two tertiary and two secondary; because they received funding from more than one healthcare financing mechanism. Key informants were individual healthcare providers and decision-makers in the hospitals, State Ministry of Health, National Health Insurance Scheme and Health Maintenance Organizations. Service users from each hospital were purposively selected for focus group discussions (FGDs). A total of 66 key informant interviews and 8 FGDs were conducted.

Findings: The multiple flows that were received by public hospitals varied by type of health facility (Secondary vs. Tertiary), ownership of health facility (Federal government vs. State government) and population served. Out-of-pocket payment (OOP) and government budget were the only recurring forms of funding to all the public hospitals. It was found that multiple funding flows, generate different signals to service providers, resulting in positive and negative consequences. The results also showed that multiple flows lead to predictability and stability of funding to public hospitals. Hospital Managers and administrators reported that multiple flows increased their financial pool and capacity to undertake capital projects and enabled the provision of a wider range of services to clients. Multiple sources of funding also give a sense of security to health facilities, because there would always be a back-up source of funding if one flow delays or defaults in payment. Nevertheless, health providers were seen to shift resources from less attractive to more attractive flows in response to the relative size perceived adequacy, predictability, and flexibility of funding flow. Patients were also shifted from less predictable to more predictable funding flows and providers charged different rates to different funding flows to make up for the inadequacies in some sources of funding. The negative consequences of multiple funding flows on provider behavior that was reported in the study were wastage/under-utilization of resources, differential quality of care provided to clients, and inequities in resource distribution and access to health services. In some instances, providers' responses resulted in better quality of care for clients and improved access to services that were not ordinarily available or clients could not have been afforded.

Conclusion: Multiple funding flows to public hospitals are beneficial as well as constraining to health providers. They can be beneficial in ensuring that hospitals have a ready and predictable pool of funds to render services with. However, they could be detrimental to some patients that could be charged more for some services that other patients pay less and may also lead of provision of differential quality of services to different payments depending on the funding flows that are used to purchase services for them. Ultimately, some of the consequences of multiple funding flows if not properly managed, will affect health systems goals of equity, efficiency and quality of care, either positively or negatively.

How does performance-based financing affect the availability of essential medicines in Cameroon? A qualitative study

Performance-based financing (PBF) is being implemented across low- and middle-income countries to improve the availability and quality of health services, including medicines. Although a few studies have examined the effects of PBF on the availability of essential medicines (EMs) in low- and middle-income countries, there is limited knowledge of the mechanisms underlying these effects. Our research aimed to explore how PBF in Cameroon influenced the availability of EMs, and to understand the pathways leading to the experiential dimension related with the observed changes. The design was an exploratory qualitative study. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, using semi-structured questionnaires. Key informants were selected using purposive sampling. The respondents (n = 55) included health services managers, healthcare providers, health authorities, regional drugs store managers and community members. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using qualitative data analysis software. Thematic analysis was performed. Our findings suggest that the PBF programme improved the perceived availability of EMs in three regions in Cameroon. The change in availability of EMs experienced by stakeholders resulted from several pathways, including the greater autonomy of facilities, the enforced regulation from the district medical team, the greater accountability of the pharmacy attendant and supply system liberalization. However, a sequence of challenges, including delays in PBF payments, limited autonomy, lack of leadership and contextual factors such as remoteness or difficulty in access, was perceived to hinder the capacity to yield optimal changes, resulting in heterogeneity in performance between health facilities. The participants raised concerns regarding the quality control of drugs, the inequalities between facilities and the fragmentation of the drug management system. The study highlights that some specific dimensions of PBF, such as pharmacy autonomy and the liberalization of drugs supply systems, need to be supported by equity interventions, reinforced regulation and measures to ensure the quality of drugs at all levels.

Does payment for performance increase performance inequalities across health providers? A case study of Tanzania

The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antimalarials during antenatal care (ANC)], to also assess whether incentive design matters for performance inequalities. We used data from 150 facilities from intervention and comparison areas in January 2012 and 13 months later. Our primary data were gathered through facility survey and household survey, while data on performance payouts were obtained from the programme administrator. Descriptive inequality measures were used to examine the distribution of payouts across facility subgroups. Difference-in-differences regression analyses were used to identify P4P differential effects on the two service coverage outcomes across facility subgroups. We found that performance payouts were initially higher among higher-level facilities (hospitals and health centres) compared with dispensaries, among facilities with more medical commodities and among facilities serving wealthier populations, but these inequalities declined over time. P4P had greater effects on coverage of institutional deliveries among facilities with low baseline performance, serving middle wealth populations and located in rural areas. P4P effects on antimalarials provision during ANC was similar across facilities. Performance inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility characteristics; however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have affected provider response. Further research is needed to examine in more detail the effects of incentive design on outcomes and researchers should be encouraged to report on design aspects in their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report subgroup effects across providers.

Health care purchasing in Kenya: Experiences of health care providers with capitation and fee-for-service provider payment mechanisms

BACKGROUND

Provider payment mechanisms (PPMs) play a critical role in universal health coverage due to the incentives they create for health care providers to deliver needed services, quality, and efficiency. We set out to explore public, private, and faith-based providers' experiences with capitation and fee-for-service in Kenya and identified attributes of PPMs that providers considered important.

METHODS

We conducted a qualitative study in two counties in Kenya. Data were collected using semistructured interviews with 29 management team members in six health providers accredited by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF).

RESULTS

Capitation and fee-for-service payments from the NHIF and private insurers were reported as good revenue sources as they contributed to providers' overall income. The expected fee-for-service payment amounts from NHIF and private insurers were predictable while capitation funds from NHIF were not because providers did not have information on the number of enrolees in their capitation pool. Moreover, capitation payment rates were perceived as inadequate. Capitation and fee-for-service payments from NHIF and private insurers were disbursed late. Finally, public providers had lost their autonomy to access and utilise capitation and fee-for-service payments from the NHIF.

CONCLUSION

Through their experiences, health care providers revealed characteristics of PPMs that they considered important.

What's Needed to Develop Strategic Purchasing in Healthcare? Policy Lessons from a Realist Review

BACKGROUND

In the context of serious concerns over the affordability of healthcare, various authors and international policy bodies advise that strategic purchasing is a key means of improving health system performance. Such advice is typically informed by theories from the economics of organization (EOO). This paper proposes that these theories are insufficient for a full understanding of strategic purchasing in healthcare, because they focus on safeguarding against poor performance and ignore the coordination and adaptation needed to improve performance. We suggest that insights from other, complementary theories are needed.

METHODS

A realist review method was adopted involving 3 steps: first, drawing upon complementary theories from the EOO and inter-organizational relationships (IOR) perspectives, a theoretical interpretation framework was developed to guide the review; second, a purposive search of scholarly databases to find relevant literature addressing healthcare purchasing; and third, qualitative analysis of the selected texts and thematic synthesis of the results focusing on lessons relevant to 3 key policy objectives taken from the international health policy literature. Texts were included if they provided relevant empirical data and met specified standards of rigour and robustness.

RESULTS

A total of 58 texts were included in the final analysis. Lessons for patient empowerment included: the need for clearly defined rights for patients and responsibilities for purchasers, and for these to be enacted through regular patientpurchaser interaction. Lessons for government stewardship included: the need for health strategy to contain specific targets to incentivise purchasers to align with national policy objectives, and for national government actors to build close, trusting relationships with purchasers to facilitate access to local knowledge about needs and priorities. Lessons for provider performance included: provider decision autonomy may drive innovation and efficient resource use, but may also create scope for opportunism, and interdependence likely to be the best power structure to incentivise collaboration needed to drive performance improvement.

CONCLUSION

Using complementary theories suggests a range of general policy lessons for strategic purchasing in healthcare, but further empirical work is needed to explore how far these lessons are a practically useful guide to policy in a variety of healthcare systems, country settings and purchasing process phases.

Bank accounts for public primary health care facilities: Reflections on implementation from three districts in Tanzania

Health care financing reforms are gaining popularity in a number of African countries to increase financial resources and promote financial autonomy, particularly at peripheral health care facilities. The paper explores the establishment of facility bank accounts at public primary facilities in Tanzania, with the intention of informing other countries embarking on such reform of the lessons learned from its implementation process. A case study approach was used, in which three district councils were purposively sampled. A total of 34 focus group discussions and 14 in-depth interviews were conducted. Thematic content analysis was used during analysis. The study revealed that the main use of bank account revenue was for the purchase of drugs, medical supplies, and minor facility needs. To ensure accountability for funds, health care facilities had to submit monthly reports of expenditures incurred. District managers also undertook quality control of facility infrastructure, which had been renovated using facility resources and purchases of facility needs. Facility autonomy in the use of revenue retained in their accounts would improve the availability of drugs and service delivery. The experienced process of opening facility bank accounts, managing, and using the funds highlights the need to strengthen the capacity of staff and health-governing committees.

Towards improved health service quality in Tanzania: An approach to increase efficiency and effectiveness of routine supportive supervision

Effective supportive supervision of healthcare services is crucial for improving and maintaining quality of care. However, this process can be challenging in an environment with chronic shortage of qualified human resources, overburdened healthcare providers, multiple roles of district managers, weak supply chains, high donor fragmentation and inefficient allocation of limited financial resources. Operating in this environment, we systematically evaluated an approach developed in Tanzania to strengthen the implementation of routine supportive supervision of primary healthcare providers. The approach included a systematic quality assessment at health facilities using an electronic tool and subsequent result dissemination at council level. Mixed methods were used to compare the new supportive supervision approach with routine supportive supervision. Qualitative data was collected through in-depth interviews in three councils. Observational data and informal communication as well as secondary data complemented the data set. Additionally, an economic costing analysis was carried out in the same councils. Compared to routine supportive supervision, the new approach increased healthcare providers’ knowledge and skills, as well as quality of data collected and acceptance of supportive supervision amongst stakeholders involved. It also ensured better availability of evidence for follow-up actions, including budgeting and planning, and higher stakeholder motivation and ownership of subsequent quality improvement measures. The new approach reduced time and cost spent during supportive supervision. This increased feasibility of supportive supervision and hence the likelihood of its implementation. Thus, the results presented together with previous findings suggested that if used as the standard approach for routine supportive supervision the new approach offers a suitable option to make supportive supervision more efficient and effective and therewith more sustainable. Moreover, the new approach also provides informed guidance to overcome several problems of supportive supervision and healthcare quality assessments in low- and middle income countries.

Understanding for whom, why and in what circumstances payment for performance works in low and middle income countries: protocol for a realist review

Background

Many low and middle income countries (LMIC) are implementing payment for performance (P4P) schemes to strengthen health systems and make progress towards universal health coverage. A number of systematic reviews have considered P4P effectiveness but did not explore how P4P works in different settings to improve outcomes or shed light on pathways or mechanisms of programme effect. This research will undertake a realist review to investigate how, why and in what circumstances P4P leads to intended and unintended outcomes in LMIC.

Methods

Our search was guided by an initial programme theory of mechanisms and involved a systematic search of Medline, Embase, Popline, Business Source Premier, Emerald Insight and EconLit databases for studies on P4P and health in LMIC. Inclusion and exclusion criteria identify literature that is relevant to the initial programme theory and the research questions underpinning the review. Retained evidence will be used to test, revise or refine the programme theory and identify knowledge gaps. The evidence will be interrogated by examining the relationship between context, mechanisms and intended and unintended outcomes to establish what works for who, in which contexts and why.

Discussion

By synthesising current knowledge on how P4P affects health systems to produce outcomes in different contexts and to what extent the programme design affects this, we will inform more effective P4P programmes to strengthen health systems and achieve sustainable service delivery and health impacts.

Who benefits from increased service utilisation? Examining the distributional effects of payment for performance in Tanzania

BACKGROUND

Payment for performance (P4P) strategies, which provide financial incentives to health workers and/or facilities for reaching pre-defined performance targets, can improve healthcare utilisation and quality. P4P may also reduce inequalities in healthcare use and access by enhancing universal access to care, for example, through reducing the financial barriers to accessing care. However, P4P may also enhance inequalities in healthcare if providers cherry-pick the easier-to-reach patients to meet their performance targets. In this study, we examine the heterogeneity of P4P effects on service utilisation across population subgroups and its implications for inequalities in Tanzania.

METHODS

We used household data from an evaluation of a P4P programme in Tanzania. We surveyed about 3000 households with women who delivered in the last 12 months prior to the interview from seven intervention and four comparison districts in January 2012 and a similar number of households in 13 months later. The household data were used to generate the population subgroups and to measure the incentivised service utilisation outcomes. We focused on two outcomes that improved significantly under the P4P, i.e. institutional delivery rate and the uptake of antimalarials for pregnant women. We used a difference-in-differences linear regression model to estimate the effect of P4P on utilisation outcomes across the different population subgroups.

RESULTS

P4P led to a significant increase in the rate of institutional deliveries among women in poorest and in middle wealth status households, but not among women in least poor households. However, the differential effect was marginally greater among women in the middle wealth households compared to women in the least poor households (p = 0.094). The effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was also significantly higher among women in rural districts compared to women in urban districts (p = 0.028 for differential effect), and among uninsured women than insured women (p = 0.001 for differential effect). The effect of P4P on the uptake of antimalarials was equally distributed across population subgroups.

CONCLUSION

P4P can enhance equitable healthcare access and use especially when the demand-side barriers to access care such as user fees associated with drug purchase due to stock-outs have been reduced.

Combining Theory-Driven Evaluation and Causal Loop Diagramming for Opening the 'Black Box' of an Intervention in the Health Sector: A Case of Performance-Based Financing in Western Uganda

Increased attention on "complexity" in health systems evaluation has resulted in many different methodological responses. Theory-driven evaluations and systems thinking are two such responses that aim for better understanding of the mechanisms underlying given outcomes. Here, we studied the implementation of a performance-based financing intervention by the Belgian Technical Cooperation in Western Uganda to illustrate a methodological strategy of combining these two approaches. We utilized a systems dynamics tool called causal loop diagramming (CLD) to generate hypotheses feeding into a theory-driven evaluation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 health workers from two districts (Kasese and Kyenjojo) and with 16 key informants. After CLD, we identified three relevant hypotheses: "success to the successful", "growth and underinvestment", and "supervision conundrum". The first hypothesis leads to increasing improvements in performance, as better performance leads to more incentives, which in turn leads to better performance. The latter two hypotheses point to potential bottlenecks. Thus, the proposed methodological strategy was a useful tool for identifying hypotheses that can inform a theory-driven evaluation. The hypotheses are represented in a comprehensible way while highlighting the underlying assumptions, and are more easily falsifiable than hypotheses identified without using CLD.