Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model

Importance

The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model.

Objective

To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk.

Design, Setting, and Participants

A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021.

Exposure

Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization.

Results

Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001).

Conclusions

In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

Association Between Individual Primary Care Physician Merit-based Incentive Payment System Score and Measures of Process and Patient Outcomes

IMPORTANCE

The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) influences reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of US physicians, but little is known about whether program performance accurately captures the quality of care they provide.

OBJECTIVE

To examine whether primary care physicians' MIPS scores are associated with performance on process and outcome measures.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

Cross-sectional study of 80 246 US primary care physicians participating in the MIPS program in 2019.

EXPOSURES

MIPS score.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

The association between physician MIPS scores and performance on 5 unadjusted process measures, 6 adjusted outcome measures, and a composite outcome measure.

RESULTS

The study population included 3.4 million patients attributed to 80 246 primary care physicians, including 4773 physicians with low MIPS scores (≤30), 6151 physicians with medium MIPS scores (>30-75), and 69 322 physicians with high MIPS scores (>75). Compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly worse mean performance on 3 of 5 process measures: diabetic eye examinations (56.1% vs 63.2%; difference, -7.1 percentage points [95% CI, -8.0 to -6.2]; P < .001), diabetic HbA1c screening (84.6% vs 89.4%; difference, -4.8 percentage points [95% CI, -5.4 to -4.2]; P < .001), and mammography screening (58.2% vs 70.4%; difference, -12.2 percentage points [95% CI, -13.1 to -11.4]; P < .001) but significantly better mean performance on rates of influenza vaccination (78.0% vs 76.8%; difference, 1.2 percentage points [95% CI, 0.0 to 2.5]; P = .045] and tobacco screening (95.0% vs 94.1%; difference, 0.9 percentage points [95% CI, 0.3 to 1.5]; P = .001). MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with risk-adjusted patient outcomes: compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly better mean performance on 1 outcome (307.6 vs 316.4 emergency department visits per 1000 patients; difference, -8.9 [95% CI, -13.7 to -4.1]; P < .001), worse performance on 1 outcome (255.4 vs 225.2 all-cause hospitalizations per 1000 patients; difference, 30.2 [95% CI, 24.8 to 35.7]; P < .001), and did not have significantly different performance on 4 ambulatory care-sensitive admission outcomes. Nineteen percent of physicians with low MIPS scores had composite outcomes performance in the top quintile, while 21% of physicians with high MIPS scores had outcomes in the bottom quintile. Physicians with low MIPS scores but superior outcomes cared for more medically complex and socially vulnerable patients, compared with physicians with low MIPS scores and poor outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Among US primary care physicians in 2019, MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with performance on process and outcome measures. These findings suggest that the MIPS program may be ineffective at measuring and incentivizing quality improvement among US physicians.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND

The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes.

QUESTIONS/PURPOSES

We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS?

METHODS

Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100.

RESULTS

Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score.

CONCLUSION

Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level III, therapeutic study.

Financial strategies targeting healthcare providers to promote the prudent use of antibiotics: a systematic review of the evidence

Improving prudent use of antibiotics is one way to limit the spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). The objective of this systematic review was to assess the effects of financial strategies targeting healthcare providers on the prudent use of antibiotics. A systematic review of the literature was conducted searching PubMed, Embase and Cochrane databases, and the grey literature. Search terms related to antibacterial agents, drug resistance, financial strategies, and healthcare providers and/or prescribers. Twenty-two articles were included in the review, reporting on capitation and salary reimbursement, cost containment interventions, pay-for-performance initiatives, penalties, and a one-off bonus payment. There was substantial variation in the reported outcomes describing prescribing behaviours, including proportion of patients prescribed antibiotics, antibiotic prescriptions per patient, and number of cases treated with recommended antibiotic therapy. All financial strategies were associated with improvements in the appropriate prescription of antibiotics in the short-term, although the magnitude of observed effects varied across financial strategies. Financial penalties were associated with the greatest decreases in inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions, followed by capitation models and pay-for-performance schemes that paid bonuses upon achievement of performance targets. However, the risk of bias across studies must be noted. Findings point to the viability of financial strategies to promote the prudent use of antibiotics. Measuring the downstream impact of prescriber behaviour changes is key to estimating the true value of such interventions to tackle AMR. Research efforts should continue to build the evidence on causal mechanisms driving provider prescribing patterns for antibiotics and the long-term impact on antibiotic prescriptions.

Current Interventional Radiology-Related Benchmarked Clinical Quality Measures Are Less Likely to be "Capped" Than Diagnostic Radiology Clinical Quality Measures

In the merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), quality measures are considered topped out if national median performance rates are ≥95%. Quality measures worth 10 points can be capped at 7 points if topped out for ≥2 years. This report compares the availability of diagnostic radiology (DR)-related and interventional radiology (IR)-related measures worth 10 points. A total of 196 MIPS clinical quality measures were reviewed on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services MIPS website. There are significantly more IR-related measures worth 10 points than DR measures (2/9 DR measures vs 9/12 IR measures; P = .03), demonstrating that clinical IR services can help mixed IR/DR groups maximize their Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services payment adjustment.

Evaluation of Clinical and Economic Outcomes Following Implementation of a Medicare Pay-for-Performance Program for Surgical Procedures

IMPORTANCE

Surgical complications increase hospital costs by approximately $20 000 per admission and extend hospital stays by 9.7 days. Improving surgical care quality and reducing costs is needed for patients undergoing surgery, health care professionals, hospitals, and payers.

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the association of the Hospital-Acquired Conditions Present on Admission (HAC-POA) program, a mandated national pay-for-performance program by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, with surgical care quality and costs.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

A cross-sectional study of Medicare inpatient surgical care stays from October 2004 through September 2017 in the US was conducted. The National Inpatient Sample and a propensity score-weighted difference-in-differences analysis of hospital stays with associated primary surgical procedures was used to compare changes in outcomes for the intervention and control procedures before and after HAC-POA program implementation. The sample consisted of 1 317 262 inpatient surgical episodes representing 1 198 665 stays for targeted procedures and 118 597 stays for nontargeted procedures. Analyses were performed between November 1, 2020, and May 7, 2021.

EXPOSURES

Implementation of the HAC-POA program for the intervention procedures included in this study (fiscal year 2009).

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Incidence of surgical site infections and deep vein thrombosis, length of stay, in-hospital mortality, and hospital costs. Analyses were adjusted for patient and hospital characteristics and indicators for procedure type, hospital, and year.

RESULTS

In our propensity score-weighted sample, the intervention procedures group comprised 1 047 351 (88.5%) individuals who were White and 742 734 (60.6%) women; mean (SD) age was 75 (6.9) years. The control procedures group included 94 715 (88.0%) individuals who were White, and 65 436 (60.6%) women; mean (SD) age was 75 (7.1) years. After HAC-POA implementation, the incidence of surgical site infections in targeted procedures decreased by 0.3 percentage points (95% CI, -0.5 to -0.1 percentage points; P = .02) compared with nontargeted procedures. The program was associated with a reduction in length of stay by 0.5 days (95% CI, -0.6 to -0.4 days; P < .001) and hospital costs by 8.1% (95% CI, -10.2% to -6.1%; P < .001). No significant changes in deep vein thrombosis incidence and mortality were noted.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

The findings of this study suggest that the HAC-POA program is associated with small decreases in surgical site infection and length of stay and moderate decreases in hospital costs for patients enrolled in Medicare. Policy makers may consider these findings when evaluating the continuation and expansion of this program for other surgical procedures, and payers may want to consider adopting a similar policy.

Current and Future Status of Merit-Based Incentive Payment Systems

The Quality Payment Program was established by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) legislation in response to repeated efforts to create a permanent so-called doc fix in response to the failures of the sustainable growth formula. This article examines the history leading up to MACRA, the current pathways associated with the Quality Payment Program, and future expectation both from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, stakeholders, and patients.

Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings

BACKGROUND

Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

Troubling Trend: Texas' 2018 QPP Data Contains More Bad Signs

As the Centers for Medicare &amp; Medicaid Services continues to churn out glowing data annually on its Quality Payment Program (QPP), a full picture of the program's impact eludes the agency's reporting. According to the Texas Medical Association's analysis of state-level data in the 2018 QPP Experience Report, it's clear that small practices continue to feel most of the program's punitive pressures.

Invitations and incentives: a qualitative study of behavioral nudges for primary care screenings in Armenia

BACKGROUND

Non-communicable diseases account for a growing proportion of deaths in Armenia, which require early detection to achieve disease control and prevent complications. To increase rates of screening, demand-side interventions of personalized invitations, descriptive social norms, labeled cash transfers, and conditional cash transfers were tested in a field experiment. Our complementary qualitative study explores factors leading to the decision to attend screening and following through with that decision, and experiences with different intervention components.

METHODS

Informed by the Health Belief Model as our conceptual framework, we collected eighty in-depth interviews with service users and twenty service providers and analyzed them using open coding and thematic analysis.

RESULTS

An individual's decision to screen depends on 1) the perceived need for screening based on how they value their own health and perceive hypertension and diabetes as a harmful but manageable condition, and 2) the perceived utility of a facility-based screening, and whether screening will provide useful information on disease status or care management and is socially acceptable. Following through with the decision to screen depends on their knowledge of and ability to attend screenings, as well as any external motivators such as an invitation or financial incentive.

CONCLUSIONS

Personalized invitations from physicians can prompt individuals to reconsider their need for screening and can, along with financial incentives, motivate individuals to follow through with the decision to screen. The effect of descriptive social norms in invitations should be further studied. Efforts to increase preventive screenings as an entry point into primary care in Armenia may benefit from implementation of tailored messages and financial incentives.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

The protocol was approved on January 11, 2019 by the Institutional Review Board of the Center of Medical Genetics and Primary Health Care in Armenia (02570094). https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3776 .

General practitioners' income and activity: the impact of multi-professional group practice in France

France has first experimented, in 2009, and then generalized a practice level add-on payment to promote Multi-Professional Primary Care Groups (MPCGs). Team-based practices are intended to improve both the efficiency of outpatient care supply and the attractiveness of medically underserved areas for healthcare professionals. To evaluate its financial attractiveness and thus the sustainability of MPCGs, we analyzed the evolution of incomes (self-employed income and wages) of General Practitioners (GPs) enrolled in a MPCG, compared with other GPs. We also studied the impacts of working in a MPCG on GPs' activity through both the quantity of medical services provided and the number of patients encountered. Our analyses were based on a quasi-experimental design, with a panel dataset over the period 2008-2014. We accounted for the selection into MPCG by using together coarsened exact matching and difference-in-differences (DID) design with panel-data regression models to account for unobserved heterogeneity. We show that GPs enrolled in MPCGs during the period exhibited an increase in income 2.5% higher than that of other GPs; there was a greater increase in the number of patients seen by the GPs' (88 more) without involving a greater increase in the quantity of medical services provided. A complementary cross-sectional analysis for 2014 showed that these changes were not detrimental to quality in terms of bonuses related to the French pay-for-performance program for the year 2014. Hence, our results suggest that labor and income concerns should not be a barrier to the development of MPCGs, and that MPCGs may improve patient access to primary care services.

Can Pay-for Performance Incentive Levels be Determined Using a Cost-Effectiveness Framework?

BACKGROUND

Healthcare payers in the United States are increasingly tying provider payments to quality and value using pay-for-performance policies. Cost-effectiveness analysis quantifies value in healthcare but is not currently used to design or prioritize pay-for-performance strategies or metrics. Acute ischemic stroke care provides a useful application to demonstrate how simulation modeling can be used to determine cost-effective levels of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies and associated challenges with this approach.

METHODS AND RESULTS

Our framework requires a simulation model that can estimate quality-adjusted life years and costs resulting from improvements in a quality metric. A monetary level of incentives can then be back-calculated using the lifetime discounted quality-adjusted life year (which includes effectiveness of quality improvement) and cost (which includes incentive payments and cost offsets from quality improvements) outputs from the model. We applied this framework to an acute ischemic stroke microsimulation model to calculate the difference in population-level net monetary benefit (willingness-to-pay of $50 000 to $150 000/quality-adjusted life year) accrued under current Medicare policy (stroke payment not adjusted for performance) compared with various hypothetical pay-for-performance policies. Performance measurement was based on time-to-thrombolytic treatment with tPA (tissue-type plasminogen activator). Compared with current payment, equivalent population-level net monetary benefit was achieved in pay-for-performance policies with 10-minute door-to-needle time reductions (5057 more acute ischemic stroke cases/y in the 0-3-hour window) incentivized by increasing tPA payment by as much as 18% to 44% depending on willingness-to-pay for health.

CONCLUSIONS

Cost-effectiveness modeling can be used to determine the upper bound of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies, although currently, this approach is limited due to data requirements and modeling assumptions. For tPA payments in acute ischemic stroke, our model-based results suggest financial incentives leading to a 10-minute decrease in door-to-needle time should be implemented but not exceed 18% to 44% of current tPA payment. In general, the optimal level of financial incentives will depend on willingness-to-pay for health and other modeling assumptions around parameter uncertainty and the relationship between quality improvements and long-run quality-adjusted life expectancy and costs.

Factors influencing individuals' take-up of tax-subsidized private health insurance: a cross-sectional study in China

Aims: To identify factors influencing individuals' take-up of tax-subsidized private health insurance.Methods: A self-administered questionnaire survey was conducted to collect data in Hangzhou, China. A logistic regression analysis was applied to find factors influencing individuals' take-up of tax-subsidized private health insurance.Results: A total of 1,610 participants joined the survey, and 1,543 valid cases were obtained. The logistic regression results showed that educational level, marital status, the number of elderly people to support, types of basic medical insurance covered, disease history, reimbursement rate of outpatient visits, reimbursement rate of inpatient visits, knowledge of tax-subsidized private health insurance, and ratio of the deduction to income influenced individuals' take-up of tax-subsidized private health insurance.Limitations: Sample representativeness may be sacrificed by the fact that the data were collected from one city (Hangzhou) in a cross-sectional investigation.Conclusions: Demographic variables, such as educational level, marital status, and the number of elderly people to support, have an impact on individuals' take-up of tax-subsidized private health insurance, while age and gender are not significant. People with disease history are more likely to take out tax-subsidized private health insurance. The ratio of deduction to income is positively correlated with the take-up of tax-subsidized private health insurance. Suggestions, such as strengthening the publicity of tax-subsidized private health insurance, increasing the deduction amount, and encouraging employers to provide tax-subsidized private health insurance for employees' families are provided with the hope to promote the development of tax-subsidized private health insurance in China.

Monetary reinforcement for self-monitoring of blood glucose among young people with type 1 diabetes: evaluating effects on psychosocial functioning

AIMS

To explore the auxiliary psychosocial effects of a monetary reinforcement intervention targeting self-monitoring of blood glucose among young people with Type 1 diabetes.

METHODS

Sixty young people with Type 1 diabetes, HbA_1c concentrations between 58 and 119 mmol/mol (7.5-13.0%), and average self-monitoring of blood glucose <4 times per day were randomized to either enhanced usual care or a 24-week intervention of monetary rewards for self-monitoring of blood glucose and associated behaviours (e.g. uploading glucose meters). Data were collected from the young people and their parents at baseline, during the intervention (6, 12 and 24 weeks) and after the intervention (36 weeks).

RESULTS

Linear mixed models were used to evaluate the intervention effects on psychosocial outcomes, adjusting for corresponding baseline levels and potential moderation by baseline level. The intervention reduced diabetes distress at week 6 among young people who had average and high baseline distress. It also reduced diabetes distress at weeks 12 and 24 among those with low baseline distress. The intervention also reduced young person-reported diabetes-related family conflict and diabetes-related interference among those with high baseline scores in these areas; however, the intervention worsened young person-reported diabetes interference among those with low baseline interference. Effects were medium-sized and time-limited.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings indicate predominantly positive impacts of monetary reinforcement interventions on psychosocial outcomes, although effects varied by outcome and time point. Whereas early improvements in diabetes distress were observed for all who received the intervention, improvements in other areas varied according to the level of psychosocial challenge at baseline. Incorporating psychosocial interventions may bolster and maintain effects over time.

Association of Organizational Factors and Physician Practices' Participation in Alternative Payment Models

Importance

Consolidation among physician practices and between hospitals and physician practices has accelerated in the past decade, resulting in higher prices in commercial markets. The resulting integration of health care across clinicians and participation in alternative payment models (APMs), which aim to improve quality while constraining spending, are cited as reasons for consolidation, but little is known about the association between integration and APM participation.

Objective

To examine the association of organizational characteristics, ownership, and integration with intensity of participation in APMs among physician practices.

Design, Setting, and Participants

A cross-sectional descriptive study, adjusted for sampling and nonresponse weights, was conducted in US physician practice respondents to the National Survey of Healthcare Organizations and Systems conducted between June 16, 2017, and August 17, 2018; of 2333 responses received (response rate, 46.9%) and after exclusion of ineligible and incomplete responses, the number of practices included in the analysis was 2061. Data analysis was performed from April 1, 2019, to August 31, 2019.

Exposures

Self-reported physician practice characteristics, including ownership, integration (clinical, cultural, financial, and functional), care delivery capabilities, activities, and environmental factors.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Participation in APMs: (1) bundled payments, (2) comprehensive primary care and medical home programs, (3) pay-for-performance programs, (4) capitated contracts with commercial health plans, and (5) accountable care organization contracts.

Results

A total of 49.2% of the 2061 practices included reported participating in 3 or more APMs; most participated in pay-for-performance and accountable care organization models. Covariate-adjusted analyses suggested that operating within a health care system (odds ratio [OR] for medical group: 2.35; 95% CI, 1.70-3.25; P < .001; simple health system: 1.46; 95% CI, 1.08-1.97; P = .02; and complex health system: 1.76; 95% CI, 1.25-2.47; P = .001 relative to independent practices), greater clinical (OR, 4.68; 95% CI, 2.28-9.59; P < .001) and functional (OR, 4.24; 95% CI, 2.00-8.97; P < .001) integration, and being located in the Northeast (OR for Midwest: 0.47; 95% CI, 0.34-0.65; P < .001; South: 0.47; 95% CI, 0.34-0.66; P < .001; and West: 0.64; 95% CI, 0.46-0.91; P = .01) were associated with greater APM participation.

Conclusions and Relevance

Greater APM participation appears to be supported by integration and system ownership.

Physicians' perceptions of autonomy support during transition to value-based reimbursement: A multi-center psychometric evaluation of six-item and three-item measures

BACKGROUND

Successive health system reforms have steadily eroded physician autonomy. Escalating accountability demands placed on physicians concurrent with diminishing autonomy plus widespread "cost cutting" endanger clinical work-life quality and, in turn, threaten patient-care quality, safety, and continuity. This has engendered a renewed emphasis on bettering physician work-life to safeguard patient care. Research indicates that autonomy support could be an effective intervention point in this dynamic, and that improving healthcare practitioners' experience of autonomy can promote better patient outcomes. New measures of autonomy support towards physicians during systemic/organizational transformation are thus needed.

OBJECTIVE

We investigated the validity and reliability of two versions of a brief measure of physicians' perceptions of autonomy support.

DESIGN

Psychometric evaluation of practitioners' responses to a theory-based, pilot-tested, multi-center, cross-sectional survey-questionnaire.

PARTICIPANTS

Physicians serving in California, Massachusetts, or upstate New York clinical practices implementing pay-for-performance incentives were eligible. We obtained responses from 1,534 (35.14%) of 4,365 physicians surveyed.

ANALYSIS

We randomly partitioned the study sample equitably into derivation and validation subsamples. We conducted parallel analysis, inter-item/point-biserial correlations, and item-response-theory-based graded response modeling on six autonomy support items. Three items with the highest (a) point-biserial correlations, (b) item-level discrimination and (c) information capture were used to construct a short-form (3-item) version of the full (6-item) autonomy scale. We utilized exploratory structural equation modeling and confirmatory factor analysis to establish the factor structure and construct validity of the full-length and short-form scales before comparing their factor invariance, reliability and interrater agreement across physician subgroups.

FINDINGS

All six autonomy support items loaded highly onto one factor accounting for the majority of variance and demonstrating good data fit. The three most discriminating and informative items loaded equally well onto a single factor with similar goodness-of-fit to the data. The three-item scale correlated highly with its six-item parent, showing equally high sensitivity and specificity in discriminating high autonomy support. Variability in scores nested predominantly at within- rather than between-subgroup levels.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Our data supported the factor structure, construct validity, internal consistency, and reliability of six- and three-item autonomy support scales. These brief tools are easily incorporated into multi-dimensional questionnaires at relatively low cost.

Association of the Meaningful Use Electronic Health Record Incentive Program With Health Information Technology Venture Capital Funding

Importance

Although the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act has accelerated electronic health record (EHR) adoption since its passage, clinician satisfaction with EHRs remains low, and the association of HITECH with health care information technology (IT) entrepreneurship has remained largely unstudied.

Objective

To determine whether the passage of the HITECH Act was associated with an increase in key measures of health care IT entrepreneurship.

Design, Setting, and Participants

This economic evaluation of venture capital (VC) activity in the US from 2000 to 2019 examined funding trends in health care IT, EHR-related companies, and all VC investments before and after the passage of HITECH. A difference-in-differences analysis compared investments in health care IT companies with those of companies in 3 categories: general health care (non-IT), IT (non-health care), and all US VC transactions. Data were analyzed from September 2018 to August 2019.

Exposures

Venture capital funding received by US companies before and after the HITECH Act.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Venture capital investment in health care IT companies and the proportion of those investments going to seed-stage companies, a proxy for very early-stage entrepreneurship and innovation.

Results

The data included 70 982 investments, of which 9425 (13.3%) were seed stage, 10 706 (15.1%) were early stage, and 50 851 (71.6%) were growth stage. After passage of the HITECH Act, investment in both health care IT companies and EHR-related companies increased at a rate much faster (13.0% and 11.4%, respectively) than VC as a whole (6.9%). In addition, the proportion of investments going to seed-stage health care IT companies increased compared with both overall VC investments and non-IT health care investments. Health care IT companies saw increased probabilities of transactions being seed-stage of 5.1% (SE, 2.2%; 95% CI, 0.8% to 9.3%; P = .02) compared with the entire sample of VC transactions and 13.6% (SE, 1.9%; 95% CI, 9.9% to 17.2%; P < .001) compared with non-IT health care VC transactions. Health care IT had essentially 0 increased probability of a transaction being seed stage compared with IT companies outside health care (-0.8% probability; SE, 2.4%; 95% CI, -5.4% to 3.9%; P = .75).

Conclusions and Relevance

Although widespread clinician dissatisfaction with EHR systems remains a challenge, the HITECH Act's incentive program may have catalyzed early-stage entrepreneurship in health care IT, suggesting an important role for incentives in promoting innovation.

Do financial incentives influence the hospitalization rate of nursing home residents? Evidence from Germany

Efficient health-care provision for nursing home residents is a concern in many OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. This paper analyzes whether nursing homes respond to financial incentives when deciding whether to hospitalize their residents. In Germany, reimbursements for nursing homes are reduced after a defined number of days when a resident stays in a hospital instead of a nursing home. As a result of a federal law introduced in 2008, some German states had to change the point at which reimbursements to nursing homes are reduced so that reductions are made from Day 4 instead of Day 1 of a resident's absence. This exogenously raised an incentive for the nursing homes affected to hospitalize residents especially for an expected short-term stay. This analysis exploits the introduction of the law in a difference-in-difference approach, using market-wide German-DRG files covering all hospital patients discharged from hospitals to nursing homes from 2007 to 2011. The results suggest an increase of approximately 11% in short-term hospital stays as a consequence of the longer reimbursement period introduced by the law.

Primary Care Physicians in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS): a Qualitative Investigation of Participants' Experiences, Self-Reported Practice Changes, and Suggestions for Program Administrators

BACKGROUND

While both administrators of pay-for-performance programs and practicing physicians strive to improve healthcare quality, they sometimes disagree on the best approach. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 mandated the creation of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), a program that incentivizes more than 700,000 physician participants to report on four domains of care, including healthcare quality. While MIPS performance scores were recently released, little is known about how primary care physicians (PCPs) and their practices are being affected by the program and what actions they are taking in response to MIPS.

OBJECTIVES

To (1) describe PCP perspectives and self-reported practice changes related to quality measurement under MIPS and (2) disseminate PCP suggestions for improving the program.

DESIGN

Qualitative study employing semi-structured interviews.

PARTICIPANTS

Twenty PCPs trained in internal medicine or family medicine who were expected to report under MIPS for calendar year 2017 were interviewed between October 2017 and June 2018. Eight PCPs self-reported to be knowledgeable about MIPS. Seven PCPs worked in small practices.

KEY RESULTS

Most PCPs identified advantages of quality measurement under MIPS, including the creation of practice-level systems for quality improvement. However, they also cited disadvantages, including administrative burdens and fears that practices serving vulnerable patients could be penalized. Many participants reported using technology or altering staffing to help with data collection and performance improvement. A few participants were considering selling small practices or joining larger ones to avoid administrative tasks. Suggestions for improving MIPS included simplifying the program to reduce administrative burdens, protecting practices serving vulnerable populations, and improving communication between program administrators and PCPs.

CONCLUSIONS

MIPS is succeeding in nudging PCPs to develop quality measurement and improvement systems, but PCPs are concerned that administrative burdens are leading to the diversion of clinical resources away from patient-centered care and negatively impacting patient and clinician satisfaction. Program administrators should improve communication with participants and consider simplifying the program to make it less burdensome. Future work should be done to investigate how technical assistance programs can target PCPs that serve vulnerable patient populations and are having difficulty adapting to MIPS.

Effectiveness of quality incentive payments in general practice (EQuIP-GP): a study protocol for a cluster-randomised trial of an outcomes-based funding model in Australian general practice to improve patient care

BACKGROUND

There is international interest in whether improved primary care, in particular for patients with chronic or complex conditions, can lead to decreased use of health resources and whether financial incentives help achieve this goal. This trial (EQuIP-GP) will investigate whether a funding model based upon targeted, continuous quality incentive payments for Australian general practices increases relational continuity of care, and lessens health-service utilisation, for high-risk patients and children.

METHODS

We will use a mixed methods approach incorporating a two-arm pragmatic cluster randomised control trial with nested qualitative case studies. We aim to recruit 36 general practices from Practice-Based Research Networks (PBRN) covering urban and regional areas of Australia, randomised into intervention and control groups. Control practices will provide usual care while intervention practices will be supported to implement a new service model incorporating incentives for relational continuity and timely access to appointments. Patients will comprise three groups: older (over 65 years); 18-65 years with chronic and/or complex conditions; and those aged less than 16 years with increased risk of hospitalisation. The funding model includes financial incentives to general practitioners (GPs) for providing longer consultations, same day access and timely follow-up after hospitalisation to enrolled patients. The payments are proportional to expected health system savings associated with improved quality of GP care. An outreach facilitator will work with practices to help incorporate the incentive model into usual work. The main outcome measure is relational continuity of care (Primary Care Assessment Tool short-form survey), with secondary outcomes including health-related quality of life and health service use (hospitalisations, emergency presentations, GP and specialist services in the community, medicine prescriptions and targeted pathology and imaging ordering). Outcomes will be initially evaluated over a period of 12 months, with ongoing data collection for 5 years.

DISCUSSION

The trial will provide robust evidence on a novel approach to providing continuous incentives for improving quality of general practice care, which can be compared to block payment incentives awarded at target quality levels of pay-for-performance, both within Australia and also internationally.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12618000105246. Registered on 23 January 2018.

Health Care Spending, Utilization, and Quality 8 Years into Global Payment

BACKGROUND

Population-based global payment gives health care providers a spending target for the care of a defined group of patients. We examined changes in spending, utilization, and quality through 8 years of the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) of Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts, a population-based payment model that includes financial rewards and penalties (two-sided risk).

METHODS

Using a difference-in-differences method to analyze data from 2006 through 2016, we compared spending among enrollees whose physician organizations entered the AQC starting in 2009 with spending among privately insured enrollees in control states. We examined quantities of sentinel services using an analogous approach. We then compared process and outcome quality measures with averages in New England and the United States.

RESULTS

During the 8-year post-intervention period from 2009 to 2016, the increase in the average annual medical spending on claims for the enrollees in organizations that entered the AQC in 2009 was $461 lower per enrollee than spending in the control states (P<0.001), an 11.7% relative savings on claims. Savings on claims were driven in the early years by lower prices and in the later years by lower utilization of services, including use of laboratory testing, certain imaging tests, and emergency department visits. Most quality measures of processes and outcomes improved more in the AQC cohorts than they did in New England and the nation in unadjusted analyses. Savings were generally larger among subpopulations that were enrolled longer. Enrollees of organizations that entered the AQC in 2010, 2011, and 2012 had medical claims savings of 11.9%, 6.9%, and 2.3%, respectively, by 2016. The savings for the 2012 cohort were statistically less precise than those for the other cohorts. In the later years of the initial AQC cohorts and across the years of the later-entry cohorts, the savings on claims exceeded incentive payments, which included quality bonuses and providers' share of the savings below spending targets.

CONCLUSIONS

During the first 8 years after its introduction, the BCBS population-based payment model was associated with slower growth in medical spending on claims, resulting in savings that over time began to exceed incentive payments. Unadjusted measures of quality under this model were higher than or similar to average regional and national quality measures. (Funded by the National Institutes of Health.).

How do hospitals respond to price changes in emergency departments?

Little is known about how prospective provider payment affects the provision of services led by unpredictable demand. We investigate hospital responses to a 32% increase in price for two treatments in emergency departments in England in April 2011 using data on 11,532,304 attendances (79 hospitals) between 2009/2010 and 2013/2014. We compare changes in the volumes of these two treatments to a treatment not attracting additional reimbursement using a difference-in-differences framework. Additional reimbursement led to 76% and 152% increases in the volumes of the two incentivised treatments. Hospitals received an additional £64.4 M between April 2011 and March 2014 for providing these treatments, of which 40% (£25.9 M) was attributable to the unanticipated hospital response to the price increase. We use time in treatment to distinguish real increases in treatment from reductions in undercoding or increases in upcoding. The association between the recorded receipt of these treatments and time spent in treatment was the same before and after the price increase, and there was no association between hospital-specific increases in recorded treatment volumes and changes in treatment times. The persistence of the treatment time increment suggests the increase in recorded treatment was a real increase in provision of treatments.

Gendered effects of pay for performance among family physicians for chronic disease care: an economic evaluation in a context of universal health coverage

BACKGROUND

Despite increasing popularity among health organizations of pay for performance (P4P) for the provision of comprehensive care for chronic non-communicable diseases, evidence of its effectiveness in improving health system outcomes is weak. An important void in the evidence base is whether there are gendered differences in P4P uptake and in related outcomes amenable to healthcare improvement. This study assesses the gender-specific effects of P4P among family physicians on diabetes healthcare costs in a context of universal health coverage.

METHODS

We use population-based linked longitudinal administrative datasets on chronic disease cases, physician billings, hospital discharge abstracts, and physician and resident registries in the province of New Brunswick, Canada. We estimate the effects of introduction of a P4P scheme on excess public healthcare costs among cohorts of adult diabetes patients using propensity score-adjusted difference-in-differences regressions stratified by physician's gender.

RESULTS

We observed greater male physician uptake of incentive payments, seemingly exacerbating gender gaps in professional remuneration. Regression results indicated P4P did not lead to improved outcomes in terms of preventing hospitalization costs among patients, only measurable increases in compensation for both the male and female physician workforce.

CONCLUSIONS

While P4P was not attributed in this study to reduced hospital burden and enhanced sustainability of healthcare financing, incentive payments were found to be related to earning gaps by physician's gender. Decision-makers should consider that benefits of P4P be monitored not only for patient metrics but also for provider metrics in terms of gender equality especially given feminization of primary care medical workforces.

Differential payment to research participants in the same study: an ethical analysis

Recognising that offers of payment to research participants can serve various purposes-reimbursement, compensation and incentive-helps uncover differences between participants, which can justify differential payment of participants within the same study. Participants with different study-related expenses will need different amounts of reimbursement to be restored to their preparticipation financial baseline. Differential compensation can be acceptable when some research participants commit more time or assume greater burdens than others, or if inter-site differences affect the value of compensation. Finally, it may be permissible to offer differential incentive payments if necessary to advance the goals of a study. We encourage investigators and Institutional Review Boards to think about whether to offer payment, in what amounts and for what purpose, and also to consider whether differential payment can help promote the scientific and ethical goals of clinical research.

Association of the New Peer Group-Stratified Method With the Reclassification of Penalty Status in the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program

IMPORTANCE

Since the introduction of the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP), readmission penalties have been applied disproportionately to institutions that serve low-income populations. To address this concern, the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid introduced a new, stratified payment adjustment method in fiscal year (FY; October 1 to September 30) 2019.

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether the introduction of a new, stratified payment adjustment method was associated with an alteration in the distribution of penalties among hospitals included in the HRRP.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

In this retrospective cross-sectional study, US hospitals included in the HRRP for FY 2018 and FY 2019 were identified. Penalty status of participating hospitals for FY 2019 was determined based on nonstratified HRRP methods and the new, stratified payment adjustment method. Hospitals caring for the highest proportion of patients enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid based on quintile were assigned to the low-socioeconomic status (SES) group.

EXPOSURES

Nonstratified and stratified Centers for Medicare & Medicaid payment adjustment methods.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Net reclassification of penalties among all hospitals and hospitals in the low-SES group, in states participating in Medicaid expansion, and for 4 targeted medical conditions (acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and pneumonia).

RESULTS

Penalty status by both payment adjustment methods (nonstratified and stratified) was available for 3173 hospitals. For FY 2019, the new, stratified payment method was associated with penalties for 75.04% of hospitals (2381 of 3173), while the old, nonstratified method was associated with penalties for 79.07% (2509 hospitals), resulting in a net down-classification in penalty status for all hospitals by 4.03 percentage points (95% CI, 2.95-5.11; P < .001). For the 634 low-SES hospitals in the sample, the new method was associated with penalties for 77.60% of hospitals (492 of 634), while the old method was associated with penalties for 91.64% (581 hospitals), resulting in a net down-classification in penalty status of 14.04 percentage points (95% CI, 11.18-16.90; P < .001). Among hospitals that were not low SES (quintiles 1-4), the new payment method was associated with a small decrease in penalty status (1928 vs 1889; net down-classification, 1.54 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.38-2.69; P = .01). Among target medical conditions, the greatest reduction in penalties was observed among cardiovascular conditions (net down-classification, 6.18 percentage points; 95% CI, 4.96-7.39; P < .001).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

The new, stratified payment adjustment method for the HRRP was associated with a reduction in penalties across hospitals included in the program; the greatest reductions were observed among hospitals in the low-SES group, lessening but not eliminating the previously unbalanced penalty burden carried by these hospitals. Additional public policy research efforts are needed to achieve equitable payment adjustment models for all hospitals.

Knowledge, Attitudes, and Confidence in Accountable Care Organization-Based Payment Models Among RI Physicians

Study Objective or Background: To assess Rhode Island (RI) physician knowledge, attitudes, and confidence to succeed in Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). Study Design and Methods: We surveyed RI physicians' attitudes and beliefs about ACOs, including scales measuring Physician Knowledge (7 Multiple Choice and True/False items), Attitudes (8 Likert scale items), and Confidence (7 Likert Scale Items), and examined how physician characteristics related to these measures. Primary Results: The response rate was 6 percent (72/1183). Means (100-point scale) and standard deviations were calculated for Knowledge 65.3 (22), Attitudes for ACO participants 56.3 (13.2) and ACO non-participants 42.7 (14.3), and Confidence 32.4 (25.9). Primary care physicians had higher Attitudes compared with specialists among ACO participants (60.2 vs. 51.8, p=.047) and ACO non-participants (48.2 vs. 34.4, p=.030). Principal Conclusions: RI Physicians have low scores in Knowledge, Attitudes, and Confidence scales in ACOs. Primary care physicians have more positive Attitudes about ACOs than specialists. This study is limited by its low response rate. [Full article available at http://rimed.org/rimedicaljournal-2019-03.asp].

Are value-based incentives driving behavior change to improve value?

OBJECTIVES

To understand physician organization (PO) responses to financial incentives for quality and total cost of care among POs that were exposed to a statewide multipayer value-based payment (VBP) program, and to identify challenges that POs face in advancing the goals of VBP.

STUDY DESIGN

Semistructured qualitative interviews and survey.

METHODS

We drew a stratified random sample of 40 multispecialty California POs (25% of the POs that were eligible for incentives). In-person interviews were conducted with physician leaders and a survey was administered on actions being taken to reduce costs and redesign care and to discuss the challenges to improving value. We performed a thematic analysis of interview transcripts to identify common actions taken and challenges to reducing costs.

RESULTS

VBP helps to promote care delivery transformation among POs, although efforts varied across organizations. Investments are occurring primarily in strategies to control hospital costs and redesign primary care, particularly for chronically ill patients; specialty care redesign is largely absent. Physician payment incentives for value remain small relative to total compensation, with continued emphasis on productivity. Challenges cited include the lack of a single enterprisewide electronic health records platform for information exchange, limited ability to influence specialists who were not exclusive to the organization, lack of payer cost and utilization data to manage costs, inability to recoup care redesign investments given the small size of VBP incentives, and lack of physician cost awareness.

CONCLUSIONS

Transformation could be advanced by strengthening financial incentives for value; engaging specialists in care redesign and delivering value; enhancing partnerships among POs, hospitals, and payers to align quality and cost actions; strengthening information exchange across providers; and applying other strategies to influence physician behavior.

Association between Freestanding Dialysis Facility Size and Medicare Quality Incentive Program Performance Scores

BACKGROUND

Medicare uses a quality incentive program (QIP) criteria to evaluate care in dialysis facilities and apply monetary penalties on underperforming facilities. Smaller dialysis facilities are likely to be rural and operate on lower profit margin; therefore, such facilities are likely to underperform and face Medicare penalties. The variation in QIP scores by facility size is not yet known. We investigated the association between freestanding dialysis facility size and QIP scores.

METHODS

Our cross-sectional analysis compared QIP scores across levels of facility size for 5,193 freestanding dialysis facilities that received QIP scores in 2015. We used Medicare facility data including Dialysis Facility Compare, Performance Scores, Facility-Level Impact, and Area Health Resource and United States Renal Data System files for the payment year 2015. We measured the facility size using the number of dialysis stations per dialysis facility. QIP scores were used to determine the quality of care. A generalized linear model was estimated at an alpha level of 0.05.

RESULTS

Facilities operating more than 10 dialysis stations scored higher than those operating fewer. Further, facilities in the South and Northeast, not offering peritoneal dialysis, affiliated with chains (except chain 3) and spending more hours per dialysis achieved higher QIP scores. Facilities reporting a higher proportion of Hispanic patients and of patients with access to pre-end-stage renal disease (ESRD) nephrologist care achieved higher QIP scores. Conversely, facilities with a higher Black patient population and higher patient travel distances scored lower.

CONCLUSIONS

The current study provides important finding about the performance of the dialysis facilities with ≤10 dialysis stations. Quality improvement strategies are needed, especially for the dialysis facilities with ≤10 stations, to prevent penalties and eventual closure of such facilities due to financial insolvency. Failure to address these issues will increase further disparities in ESRD care.

Changes to the Merit-based Incentive Payment System Pertinent to Small and Rural Practices, 2018

This brief highlights key regulatory changes to the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) in 2018. We discuss the importance of these changes, particularly as they affect small and rural practices.

Firm responses to targeted consumer incentives: Evidence from reference pricing for surgical services

This paper examines how health care providers respond to a reference pricing insurance program that increases consumer cost sharing when consumers choose high-priced surgical providers. We use geographic variation in the population covered by the program to estimate supply-side responses. We find limited evidence of market segmentation and price reductions for providers with baseline prices above the reference price. Finally, approximately 75% of the reduction in provider prices is in the form of a positive externality that benefits a population not subject to the program.

The Results Are In: Physicians Finally See How They Fared in First Year of MIPS

Physicians finally see how they fared in the first year of Medicare's "MIPS" quality payment program.

Health Care Quality: It's Motherhood and Apple Pie. Until You Start To Measure It

The pay-for-value movement could justify rewarding-and punishing-doctors based on quality scores.

PROBLEM

Hardly anyone likes the current ways quality is measured, especially physicians. Few believe that Medicare's Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) will clear things up. In fact, it might cause more confusion.

Moneyball in Medicare

US policymakers place high priority on tying Medicare payments to the value of care delivered. A critical part of this effort is the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program (HVBP), which rewards or penalizes hospitals based on their quality and episode-based costs of care and incentivizes integration between hospitals and post-acute care providers. Within HVBP, each patient affects hospital performance on a variety of quality and spending measures, and performance translates directly to changes in program points and ultimately dollars. In short, hospital revenue from a patient consists not only of the DRG payment, but also of that patient's marginal future reimbursement. We estimate the magnitude of the marginal future reimbursement for individual patients across each type of quality and performance measure. We describe how those incentives differ across hospitals, including integrated and safety-net hospitals. We find evidence that hospitals improved their performance over time in the areas where they have the highest marginal incentives to improve care, and that integrated hospitals responded more than non-integrated hospitals.

Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Policy Changes and Fiscal Year 2019 Rates; Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers; Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Programs (Promoting Interoperability Programs) Requirements for Eligible Hospitals, Critical Access Hospitals, and Eligible Professionals; Medicare Cost Reporting Requirements; and Physician Certification and Recertification of Claims. Final rule

We are revising the Medicare hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) for operating and capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems for FY 2019. Some of these changes implement certain statutory provisions contained in the 21st Century Cures Act and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, and other legislation. We also are making changes relating to Medicare graduate medical education (GME) affiliation agreements for new urban teaching hospitals. In addition, we are providing the market basket update that will apply to the rate-of-increase limits for certain hospitals excluded from the IPPS that are paid on a reasonable cost basis, subject to these limits for FY 2019. We are updating the payment policies and the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) for FY 2019. In addition, we are establishing new requirements or revising existing requirements for quality reporting by specific Medicare providers (acute care hospitals, PPS-exempt cancer hospitals, and LTCHs). We also are establishing new requirements or revising existing requirements for eligible professionals (EPs), eligible hospitals, and critical access hospitals (CAHs) participating in the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Programs (now referred to as the Promoting Interoperability Programs). In addition, we are finalizing modifications to the requirements that apply to States operating Medicaid Promoting Interoperability Programs. We are updating policies for the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, and the Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program. We also are making changes relating to the required supporting documentation for an acceptable Medicare cost report submission and the supporting information for physician certification and recertification of claims.

Pay-for-performance as a cost-effective implementation strategy: results from a cluster randomized trial

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been recommended as a promising strategy to improve implementation of high-quality care. This study examined the incremental cost-effectiveness of a P4P strategy found to be highly effective in improving the implementation and effectiveness of the Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach (A-CRA), an evidence-based treatment (EBT) for adolescent substance use disorders (SUDs).

METHODS

Building on a $30 million national initiative to implement A-CRA in SUD treatment settings, urn randomization was used to assign 29 organizations and their 105 therapists and 1173 patients to one of two conditions (implementation-as-usual (IAU) control condition or IAU+P4P experimental condition). It was not possible to blind organizations, therapists, or all research staff to condition assignment. All treatment organizations and their therapists received a multifaceted implementation strategy. In addition to those IAU strategies, therapists in the IAU+P4P condition received US $50 for each month that they demonstrated competence in treatment delivery (A-CRA competence) and US $200 for each patient who received a specified number of treatment procedures and sessions found to be associated with significantly improved patient outcomes (target A-CRA). Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs), which represent the difference between the two conditions in average cost per treatment organization divided by the corresponding average difference in effectiveness per organization, and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) were the primary outcomes.

RESULTS

At trial completion, 15 organizations were randomized to the IAU condition and 14 organizations were randomized to the IAU+P4P condition. Data from all 29 organizations were analyzed. Cluster-level analyses suggested the P4P strategy led to significantly higher average total costs compared to the IAU control condition, yet this average increase of 5% resulted in a 116% increase in the average number of months therapists demonstrated competence in treatment delivery (ICER = $333), a 325% increase in the average number of patients who received the targeted dosage of treatment (ICER = $453), and a 325% increase in the number of days of abstinence per patient in treatment (ICER = $8.134). Further supporting P4P as a cost-effective implementation strategy, the cost per QALY was only $8681 (95% confidence interval $1191-$16,171).

CONCLUSION

This study provides experimental evidence supporting P4P as a cost-effective implementation strategy.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

NCT01016704 .

Pay-for-Performance and Veteran Care in the VHA and the Community: a Systematic Review

BACKGROUND

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) strategies have been used by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for over a decade, the long-term benefits of P4P are unclear. The use of P4P is further complicated by the increased use of non-VHA healthcare providers as part of the Veterans Choice Program. We conducted a systematic review and key informant interviews to better understand the effectiveness and potential unintended consequences of P4P, as well as the implementation factors and design features important in both VHA and non-VHA/community settings.

METHODS

We searched PubMed, PsycINFO, and CINAHL through March 2017 and reviewed reference lists. We included trials and observational studies of P4P targeting Veteran health. Two investigators abstracted data and assessed study quality. We interviewed VHA stakeholders to gain further insight.

RESULTS

The literature search yielded 1031 titles and abstracts, of which 30 studies met pre-specified inclusion criteria. Twenty-five examined P4P in VHA settings and 5 in community settings. There was no strong evidence supporting the effectiveness of P4P in VHA settings. Interviews with 17 key informants were consistent with studies that identified the potential for overtreatment associated with performance metrics in the VHA. Key informants' views on P4P in community settings included the need to develop relationships with providers and health systems with records of strong performance, to improve coordination by targeting documentation and data sharing processes, and to troubleshoot the limited impact of P4P among practices where Veterans make up a small fraction of the patient population.

DISCUSSION

The evidence to support the effectiveness of P4P on Veteran health is limited. Key informants recognize the potential for unintended consequences, such as overtreatment in VHA settings, and suggest that implementation of P4P in the community focus on relationship building and target areas such as documentation and coordination of care.

Evaluation of the Methods Used by Medicare's Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program to Identify Outlier Hospitals for Surgical Site Infection

BACKGROUND

The Hospital Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP) is a national pay-for-performance program that includes a measure of surgical site infection (SSI) after hysterectomy and colectomy. This study compares the HACRP SSI measure with other published methods.

STUDY DESIGN

This was a retrospective cohort study from the Michigan Surgical Quality Collaborative (MSQC). The outcome was 30-day, adjusted deep and organ space SSI ("complex SSI"). Observed-to-expected ratios of complex SSI for each hospital were calculated using HACRP, National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN), and MSQC methodologies. C-statistics were compared between models. Hospital rankings were compared, and ladder plots show changes in hospitals' HACRP scores that derive from each algorithm.

RESULTS

Complex SSI occurred in 1.1% (190 of 16,672) of hysterectomies and 4.8% (n = 514 of 10,725) of colectomies. The HACRP risk-adjustment model for hysterectomy had a C-statistic of 0.55, significantly lower than NHSN (0.61, p = 0.0461) or MSQC models (0.77, p < 0.0001). For colectomy, C-statistics were 0.57, 0.66 (p < 0.0001) and 0.73 (p < 0.0001), respectively. For both operations, there were 5 high-outlier hospitals using HACRP, but fewer (4 or 3) using the other methods. Most hospitals in the bottom quartile were not statistical outliers, but would be flagged under HACRP. More than 50% of hospitals changed ranking position between models, which would result in different scores under HACRP.

CONCLUSIONS

This study showed that the HACRP SSI measure unfairly places hospitals at risk for financial penalties that are not statistical outliers. Policy makers need to weigh the burden of data collection and the accuracy needed to identify hospitals for financial reward or penalty.

Medicare Program; Changes to the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model (CJR): Extreme and Uncontrollable Circumstances Policy for the CJR Model. Final rule

This final rule finalizes a policy that provides flexibility in the determination of episode spending for Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model (CJR) participant hospitals located in areas impacted by extreme and uncontrollable circumstances for performance years 3 through 5.

Financial Incentives to Reduce Hospital-Acquired Infections Under Alternative Payment Arrangements

OBJECTIVEThe financial incentives for hospitals to improve care may be weaker if higher insurer payments for adverse conditions offset a portion of hospital costs. The purpose of this study was to simulate incentives for reducing hospital-acquired infections under various payment configurations by Medicare, Medicaid, and private payers.DESIGNMatched case-control study.SETTINGA large, urban hospital system with 1 community hospital and 2 tertiary-care hospitals.PATIENTSAll patients discharged in 2013 and 2014.METHODSUsing electronic hospital records, we identified hospital-acquired bloodstream infections (BSIs) and urinary tract infections (UTIs) with a validated algorithm. We assessed excess hospital costs, length of stay, and payments due to infection, and we compared them to those of uninfected patients matched by propensity for infection.RESULTSIn most scenarios, hospitals recovered only a portion of excess HAI costs through increased payments. Patients with UTIs incurred incremental costs of $6,238 (P<.01), while payments increased $1,901 (P<.05) at public diagnosis-related group (DRG) rates. For BSIs, incremental costs were $15,367 (P<.01), while payments increased $7,895 (P<.01). If private payers reimbursed a 200% markup over Medicare DRG rates, hospitals recovered 55% of costs from BSI and UTI among private-pay patients and 54% for BSI and 33% for UTI, respectively, across all patients. Under per-diem payment for private patients with no markup, hospitals recovered 71% of excess costs of BSI and 88% for UTI. At 150% markup and per-diem payments, hospitals profited.CONCLUSIONSHospital incentives for investing in patient safety vary by payer and payment configuration. Higher payments provide resources to improve patient safety, but current payment structures may also reduce the willingness of hospitals to invest in patient safety.Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2018;39:509-515.

Supporting Transformation through Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Programs: Lessons from New York State

The New York Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (DSRIP) waiver was viewed as a prototype for Medicaid and safety net redesign waivers in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) era. After the insurance expansions of the ACA were implemented, it was apparent that accountability, value, and quality improvement would be priorities in future waivers in many states. Despite New York's distinct provider relationships, previous coverage expansions, and local and state politics, it is important to understand the key characteristics of the waiver so that other states can learn how to better incorporate value-based arrangements into future waivers or attempts to limit spending under proposed Medicaid per-capita caps or block grants. In this article, we examine the New York DSRIP waiver by drawing on its design, early experiences, and evolution to inform recommendations for the future renewal, implementation, and expansion of redesigned or transformational Medicaid waivers.

Incorporating value into physician payment and patient cost sharing

The United States is simultaneously moving toward value-based payments for populations and precision medicine for individuals. During this evolution, innovations in payment and delivery that enhance tailoring of treatments to individuals while improving the value of care are needed. We propose one such innovation that would allow physician payment and patient cost sharing to better reflect the value of care by allowing the appropriateness of a service for a given patient in a given clinical situation to play a more meaningful role in the design of such incentives. We introduce the idea of a payment modifier, based on indication and appropriateness, and discuss its advantages and challenges to implementation.