Detecting deception: the scope and limits

Exploring lie frequency and emotional experiences of deceptive decision-making in autistic adults

Deception is a multi-faceted social behaviour that is pervasive in human communication. Due to differences in social communication and experiences, autistic and non-autistic adults may contrast in how they respond to situations that elicit deceptive decision-making. This study examined whether autistic and non-autistic adults differed in their general lie frequency, their inclination to produce different lie types, and their emotional experiences of lying. Fifty-eight non-autistic and fifty-six autistic university students matched on age and gender completed self-report measures of their general lying patterns, how often they lied in the past 24 hours, and whether they would lie across hypothetical scenarios with differing beneficiaries (self, other, group) and motivations (protective, beneficial). The groups did not significantly differ in their general lying behaviour or frequency of lies told over 24 hours. Yet, autistic adults indicated that they would be significantly less likely to lie in group scenarios and would experience increased difficulty, more guilt, and greater concerns about their believability when lying. These results advance theoretical understanding by suggesting that autistic adults' deceptive decision-making may be context-dependent. Future research may benefit from examining autistic deception across numerous social situations as more general lie frequency measures may be insensitive to nuanced population differences.Lay AbstractLying, a universal social behaviour, is frequent in everyday communication. Due to differences in social communication and experiences, autistic and non-autistic adults may react differently in situations where they must decide whether to lie or tell the truth. We investigated whether autistic and non-autistic adults differ in their general lying behaviour (e.g. how often they lie) and their likelihood of lying in a range of hypothetical social scenarios with different motivations (why people lie - to benefit or protect) and orientations (who people lie for; themselves, other, a group). We also examined participants' emotional experiences of lying and truth-telling. We found that autistic and non-autistic adults' general lying frequencies and emotional experiences were similar. However, the social scenario responses revealed that autistic adults would be less likely to lie to benefit or protect a social group they are part of. Moreover, autistic adults indicated that they would find lying more difficult across all social scenarios, experience more guilt, and would be less confident that their lie would be believed. This research highlights how autistic adults' lying may be context-dependent and considers how a reduction in the likelihood of lying for their social group could increase strain on autistic adults' social relationships.

Honesty threshold affects individuals' resistance to monetary temptations

This study investigated whether honesty is a stable trait or varies depending on situational factors. Using a coin flip guessing paradigm with monetary rewards, 33 participants completed trials with rewards ranging from 0.01 to 3 yuan. Modeling of behavioral data showed individuals have varying "honesty thresholds" where they switch from honest to dishonest behavior. EEG analysis revealed increased P300 amplitude when resisting greater monetary temptation, and individuals with higher honesty thresholds had lower P300 amplitudes for the same rewards. A late positive component indicated greater cognitive conflict when the reward amount neared an individual's honesty threshold. These findings challenge the conception of honesty as a stable trait, instead demonstrating it varies based on contextual factors like reward size. Computational modeling and EEG provide insight into the cognitive processes underlying contextual shifts in honest behavior.

Distinguishing deception from its confounds by improving the validity of fMRI-based neural prediction

Deception is a universal human behavior. Yet longstanding skepticism about the validity of measures used to characterize the biological mechanisms underlying deceptive behavior has relegated such studies to the scientific periphery. Here, we address these fundamental questions by applying machine learning methods and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to signaling games capturing motivated deception in human participants. First, we develop an approach to test for the presence of confounding processes and validate past skepticism by showing that much of the predictive power of neural predictors trained on deception data comes from processes other than deception. Specifically, we demonstrate that discriminant validity is compromised by the predictor's ability to predict behavior in a control task that does not involve deception. Second, we show that the presence of confounding signals need not be fatal and that the validity of the neural predictor can be improved by removing confounding signals while retaining those associated with the task of interest. To this end, we develop a "dual-goal tuning" approach in which, beyond the typical goal of predicting the behavior of interest, the predictor also incorporates a second compulsory goal that enforces chance performance in the control task. Together, these findings provide a firmer scientific foundation for understanding the neural basis of a neglected class of behavior, and they suggest an approach for improving validity of neural predictors.

To lie or to tell the truth? The influence of processing the opponent's feedback on the forthcoming choice

Introduction

The brain mechanisms of deceptive behavior are relatively well studied, and the key brain regions involved in its processing were established. At the same time, the brain mechanisms underlying the processes of preparation for deception are less known.

Methods

We studied BOLD-signal changes during the presentation of the opponent's feedback to a previous deceptive or honest action during the computer game. The goal of the game was to mislead the opponent either by means of deception or by means of telling the truth.

Results

As a result, it was shown that several brain regions that were previously demonstrated as involved in deception execution, such as the left anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula, also underlie processes related to deception preparation.

Discussion

The results obtained also allowed us to suggest that brain regions responsible for performance monitoring, intention assessment, suppression of non-selected solutions, and reward processing could be involved in shaping future action selection and preparation for deception. By shedding light on the brain mechanisms underlying deception, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of this complex cognitive process. Furthermore, it emphasizes the significance of exploring brain mechanisms governing the choice between deception and truth at various stages of decision-making.

Autistic adults' inclination to lie in everyday situations

LAY ABSTRACT

Differences in social communication and understanding others' mental states may mean that autistic adults are less likely to deceive others than non-autistic individuals. We investigated whether autistic and non-autistic adults differ in their inclination to lie and which psychological factors are involved in the inclination to lie. We found that autistic and non-autistic groups reported a similar inclination to lie, and the extent to which participants viewed lying as acceptable helped to explain their inclination to deceive others. However, the other underlying psychological factors associated with deception inclination differed between autistic and non-autistic groups. Autistic adults' belief about their ability to lie and also how quickly they could lie helped to explain whether they were more or less inclined to lie. For non-autistic adults, their memory and ability to understand others' mental states helped to explain their lie inclination. We discuss these findings and recommend areas for future research.

An Examination of the Motives for Attributing and Interpreting Deception in People with Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment

The aim of the present study was to examine how a person with amnestic mild cognitive impairment perceives the phenomenon of deception. Amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) usually represents the prodromal phase of Alzheimer's disease (AD), with patients showing memory impairment but with normal activities of daily living. It was expected that aMCI patients would face difficulties in the attribution and interpretation of deceptive behavior due to deficits regarding their diagnosis. The main sample of the study consisted of 76 older adults who were patients of a daycare center diagnosed with aMCI. A sample of 55 highly educated young adults was also examined in the same experiment to qualitatively compare their performance with that of aMCI patients. Participants were assigned a scenario where a hypothetical partner (either a friend or a stranger) was engaged in a task in which the partner could lie to boost their earnings at the expense of the participant. The results showed that aMCI patients, even if they understood that something was going wrong, did not invest in interpretations of potential deception and tended to avoid searching for confirmative information related to the hypothetical lie of their partner compared to highly educated young adults. It seems that aMCI patients become somehow "innocent", and this is discussed in terms of cognitive impairment and/or socioemotional selectivity.

Altered neural mechanisms of deception in individuals with autistic traits

A successful deception involves making a decision, acting on it, and evaluating results. Here, we investigated deception in a non-clinical sample (n = 36) with varying autism traits using a coin-toss paradigm of active deception. The subjects were asked to react to the instructions by clicking one of the two boxes that could mislead their opponents, followed by feedback on their success or failure. During this reaction, their EEG activity was recorded, and the results suggested that people with high autistic traits exhibited longer reaction times and lower amplitude of P3 in the decision-making stage compared to individuals with low autistic traits. The feedback evaluation stage in the high autistic trait group elicited lower amplitude of FRN and P3. Overall, these results indicated that people with high autistic traits experienced difficulties in deceiving, which could be related to atypical neural mechanisms.

Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

The path of dishonesty: identification of mental processes with electrical neuroimaging

Much research finds that lying takes longer than truth-telling. Yet, the source of this response time difference remains elusive. Here, we assessed the spatiotemporal evolution of electrical brain activity during honesty and dishonesty in 150 participants using a sophisticated electrical neuroimaging approach-the microstate approach. This uniquely positioned us to identify and contrast the entire chain of mental processes involved during honesty and dishonesty. Specifically, we find that the response time difference is the result of an additional late-occurring mental process, unique to dishonest decisions, interrupting the antecedent mental processing. We suggest that this process inhibits the activation of the truth, thus permitting the execution of the lie. These results advance our understanding of dishonesty and clarify existing theories about the role of increased cognitive load. More broadly, we demonstrate the vast potential of our approach to illuminate the temporal organization of mental processes involved in decision-making.

Effects of Online Single Pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation on Prefrontal and Parietal Cortices in Deceptive Processing: A Preliminary Study

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to test the functional role of parietal and prefrontal cortical regions activated during a playing card Guilty Knowledge Task (GKT). Single-pulse TMS was applied to 15 healthy volunteers at each of three target sites: left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and midline parietal cortex. TMS pulses were applied at each of five latencies (from 0 to 480 ms) after the onset of a card stimulus. TMS applied to the parietal cortex exerted a latency-specific increase in inverse efficiency score and in reaction time when subjects were instructed to lie relative to when asked to respond with the truth, and this effect was specific to when TMS was applied at 240 ms after stimulus onset. No effects of TMS were detected at left or right DLPFC sites. This manipulation with TMS of performance in a deception task appears to support a critical role for the parietal cortex in intentional false responding, particularly in stimulus selection processes needed to execute a deceptive response in the context of a GKT. However, this interpretation is only preliminary, as further experiments are needed to compare performance within and outside of a deceptive context to clarify the effects of deceptive intent.

The tangled webs they weave: A scoping review of deception detection and production in relation to Dark Triad traits

People deceive for different reasons, from avoiding interpersonal conflicts to preserving, protecting, and nurturing interpersonal relationships, and to obtaining social status and power. A growing body of research highlights the role of personality in both deception detection and production, with a particular focus on high Dark Triad (DT) traits (Narcissism, Machiavellianism and Psychopathy), for their shared tendency to engage in unethical self-benefitting behaviors, despite negative consequences for others. The main goal of the current scoping review was to bring together the studies investigating self-reported and performance-based deception production and detection performances, as presented in individuals characterized by high DT traits and point out the possible contribution of DT to deception research. To do so, we identified the relevant studies documenting the similarities and discrepancies between the three personality traits and presented their results, based on the procedure used for deception assessment: subjective or objective measurements for production / detection. Then, we discussed possible explanatory mechanisms for inter-individual differences in lie detection / production and argue for the contribution of DT to deception research beyond the typical personality models, particularly for the antisocial character of deception.

Deceptive behaviour in autism: A scoping review

LAY ABSTRACT

The ability to deceive others is an important skill that usually develops in early childhood. In this review, we give an overview of studies that have examined deceptive behaviour in autistic children, adolescents and adults. We separated the study findings into three main categories and seven sub-categories: (1) Deception ability and prevalence (1a) gameplay deception; (1b) naturalistic deception; (2) Psychological processes in deception (2a) verbal, intellectual and social ability; (2b) ability to understand others' thoughts and beliefs; (2c) cognitive ability; and (3) Social learning (3a) training; (3b) social contexts. Contrary to some stereotypes, we found that autistic people can and do deceive but often find this more difficult than non-autistic people. We also found that autistic people may use different psychological processes than non-autistic people when deceiving and may get better at deception in adulthood.

Who did I lie to that day? Deception impairs memory in daily life

Research has demonstrated that deceptive responses can undermine item and source memories. However, previous studies have often randomly assigned participants to an honest or deception group and asked them to respond in specific ways in an interview, rather than providing them a choice of what response to give. Moreover, little attention has been given to destination memory in previous research. Using a daily life paradigm, we investigated the effects of deception on memory. After completing a mock shopping task, participants were told that someone would ask them questions about their shopping lists. The participants voluntarily chose to tell the truth or lie in the interview and were encouraged to respond as they would in their daily lives. An item memory test, source memory test and destination memory test were given 48 h after the interview. Source and destination memories but not item memories were impaired for participants who chose to lie. Specifically, liars forgot the things about which they lied and mistakenly believed that they lied about many things that they did not, and they also did not remember to whom they lied. We conclude that deception can disrupt memory in daily life.

Functional Interactions Between Neural Substrates of Socio-cognitive Mechanisms Involved in Simple Deception and Manipulative Truth

Introduction: Deceptive intentions may be realized by imparting false (simple deception) or true (manipulative truth) information. Both forms of deception require inferring others' thoughts and are underpinned by the theory of mind (TOM) neural system. Manipulative truth is thought to more strongly recruit these processes. However, the organization of functional interactions underlying simple deception and manipulative truth remains unclear. Materials and Methods: We performed psychophysiological interaction analysis for a key node in the TOM system, the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), using functional MRI data obtained from 23 volunteers (14 men and 9 women, age range 18-45 years) during the sender-receiver game. During the game, participants sent true, simple deceptive, or manipulative truthful messages to another player according to their own choice. A Bayesian approach to statistics was employed to perform statistical inference and define voxels with significant changes in functional interactions. Results: We observed functional interactions between nodes of the TOM system (bilateral TPJ, left precuneus, left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and right superior temporal sulcus) characterizing both forms of deception. We identified an increment in functional interactions of the rTPJ with the left TPJ (lTPJ) and right precuneus associated with manipulative truth. Furthermore, we demonstrated that a higher rate of manipulative truthful actions was associated with weaker functional interactions between the rTPJ and lTPJ, left precuneus, and left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Discussion: Compared with simple deception, manipulative truth is associated with a higher demand for socio-cognitive processes that contributes to the cognitive load of this form of deception.

The role of anterior prefrontal cortex (area 10) in face-to-face deception measured with fNIRS

Anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC, Brodmann area 10) activations are often, but not always, found in neuroimaging studies investigating deception, and the precise role of this area remains unclear. To explore the role of the PFC in face-to-face deception, we invited pairs of participants to play a card game involving lying and lie detection while we used functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to record brain activity in the PFC. Participants could win points for successfully lying about the value of their cards or for detecting lies. We contrasted patterns of brain activation when the participants either told the truth or lied, when they were either forced into this or did so voluntarily and when they either succeeded or failed to detect a lie. Activation in the anterior PFC was found in both lie production and detection, unrelated to reward. Analysis of cross-brain activation patterns between participants identified areas of the PFC where the lead player’s brain activity synchronized their partner’s later brain activity. These results suggest that during situations that involve close interpersonal interaction, the anterior PFC supports processing widely involved in deception, possibly relating to the demands of monitoring one’s own and other people’s behaviour.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.

Robot Gaze Behavior Affects Honesty in Human-Robot Interaction

As the use of humanoid robots proliferates, an increasing amount of people may find themselves face-to-“face” with a robot in everyday life. Although there is a plethora of information available on facial social cues and how we interpret them in the field of human-human social interaction, we cannot assume that these findings flawlessly transfer to human-robot interaction. Therefore, more research on facial cues in human-robot interaction is required. This study investigated deception in human-robot interaction context, focusing on the effect that eye contact with a robot has on honesty toward this robot. In an iterative task, participants could assist a humanoid robot by providing it with correct information, or potentially secure a reward for themselves by providing it with incorrect information. Results show that participants are increasingly honest after the robot establishes eye contact with them, but only if this is in response to deceptive behavior. Behavior is not influenced by the establishment of eye contact if the participant is actively engaging in honest behavior. These findings support the notion that humanoid robots can be perceived as, and treated like, social agents, since the herein described effect mirrors one present in human-human social interaction.

The P300 and MFN as indicators of concealed knowledge in situations with negative and positive moral valence

Many studies on concealed knowledge involve mock-thefts. The present study compares ERPs of participants concealing knowledge of a morally negative behavior (mock-theft) with ERPs of participants concealing knowledge of a morally positive behavior. Some participants (n= 33) stole a candy box out of an office, whereas others (n= 28) put the candy box into an office as a present. During a concealed information test, participants concealed knowledge of the candy box and a key they had seen in the office (probe stimuli) and honestly indicated not knowing similar irrelevant stimuli. P300s were enlarged for probe, compared to irrelevant stimuli in both conditions, revealing that probe stimuli were more salient than irrelevant stimuli regardless of their moral valence. Likewise, medial frontal negativities were enlarged for probe versus irrelevant stimuli in both conditions, indicating response conflicts when answering deceptively to probe items in both situations.

Neural correlates of spontaneous deception in a non-competitive interpersonal scenario: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study

This study aims to examine neural correlates of spontaneous deception in a non-competitive interpersonal situation, and the difference in neural correlates between spontaneous deception and instructed deception using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). We used a modified poker game in which participants freely decided whether sending a piece of truthful/deceptive information to other participants. In the instructed session, participants sent truthful/deceptive information per the instructions. In this non-competitive interpersonal situation in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), deception produced higher neural activities than truth-telling. In addition, spontaneous deception exhibited higher neural activities than instructed deception in the frontopolar area, DLPFC, and frontal eye fields. Spontaneous truth-telling produced higher neural activities than instructed truth-telling in frontal eye fields and frontopolar area. This study provides evidence about neural correlates of spontaneous deception during non-competitive interpersonal scenarios and the difference between spontaneous deception and instructed deception.

Cognitive processes during deception about attitudes revisited: a replication study

Event-related potential (ERP) studies about deception often apply recognition tasks. It remains questionable whether reported ERP patterns and cognitive processes can be generalized to other contexts. As the study by Johnson et al. (2008) fills this gap by investigating deception regarding attitudes, we tried to replicate it. Participants (N = 99) were instructed to lie or tell the truth about their attitudes. We obtained the same results as Johnson et al. (2008): lies were accompanied by enhanced medial frontal negativities (MFN) and suppressed late positive components (LPCs) indicating that lying relied on stronger cognitive control processes and response conflicts than being honest. The amplitudes of pre-response positivities (PRP) were reduced for lies implying that lies about attitudes were accompanied by strategic monitoring. MFN amplitudes increased and LPC amplitudes decreased for lies about positively valued items revealing that lying about positively valued items is cognitively more challenging than lying about negatively valued items. As a new finding, MFN, LPC and PRP components were neither moderated by Machiavellianism nor by changes in the attitude ratings. The results indicate that LPC, MFN and PRP components are reliable indicators of the cognitive processes used during deception and that it is worthwhile to investigate them in further deception contexts.

Contribution of self- and other-regarding motives to (dis)honesty

Why would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or distinctly contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes-valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.

Neural mechanisms of deception in a social context: an fMRI replication study

Deception is a form of manipulation aimed at misleading another person by conveying false or truthful messages. Manipulative truthful statements could be considered as sophisticated deception and elicit an increased cognitive load. However, only one fMRI study reported its neural correlates. To provide independent evidence for sophisticated deception, we carried out an fMRI study replicating the experimental paradigm and Bayesian statistical approach utilized in that study. During the experiment, participants played a game against an opponent by sending deliberate deceptive or honest messages. Compared to truth-telling, deceptive intentions, regardless of how they were fulfilled, were associated with increased BOLD signals in the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left precuneus, and right superior temporal sulcus (STS). The right TPJ participates in the attribution of mental states, acting in a social context, and moral behaviour. Moreover, the other revealed brain areas have been considered nodes in the theory of mind brain neural system. Therefore, the obtained results reflect an increased demand for socio‑cognitive processes associated with deceptive intentions. We replicated the original study showing the involvement of the right TPJ and expanded upon it by revealing the involvement of the left TPJ, left precuneus and right STS in actions with deceptive intentions.

The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging Field of Neurolaw†

In the past five years, we have witnessed extraordinary growth in the amount of legal scholarship, legal practice, and public policy at the intersection of law and neuroscience. For instance, in 2010 the first Daubert hearing was held on the admissibility of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) lie detection evidence; a Florida court was the first in the nation to admit quantitative encephalography (qEEG) evidence; and a Supreme Court decision on life imprisonment for minors cited brain development research. In France, the Prime Minister established the first Neuroscience and Public Policy program within the France Ministry for Social Affairs, and in the United States, multiple state legislators proposed bills related to neuroscience and law. Academics, too, have taken notice, with a number of symposia being offered around the country over the past few years.

Sophisticated Deception in Junior Middle School Students: An ERP Study

Sophisticated deception refers to the deception of others based on inferences of their mental states (e.g., answering honestly when inferring that the other will not believe their answer). Studying the brain mechanism of sophisticated deception in junior middle school students can provide physiological evidence for deception detection and deceptive ability measurement. Sixteen junior middle school students were asked to engage in different trial types (i.e., instructed truth/lie and chosen truth/lie), during which we recorded their response times (RT) along with electroencephalographic data to calculate event-related potentials (ERPs). We observed significant differences in amplitude [N2, P3, N450, and medial frontal negativity (MFN)] between chosen reactions (sophisticated deception and simple deception) and instructed reactions (instructed truth and instructed lie) in both the stimulus presentation and feedback stages. In the former, the task scores of participants in the chosen condition were significantly and positively correlated with the N2 amplitude over the central brain area during sophisticated deception. In the latter, the task scores of participants in the chosen condition were negatively correlated with the MFN amplitude over the left frontal and left frontocentral regions. Overall, deception intention, rather than simply making counterfactual statements, appears to underlie the increased demand for cognitive control in deceivers. This can be attributed to deceivers' need to strongly consider their opponent's mental state-the better the deceivers' deceptive ability, the more they will make conjectures about the mental state of their opponent with sophisticated deception and monitor conflict; the less conflict they experience while answering honestly with the intention to deceive, the more conflict may arise when the results of their deception are inconsistent with these conjectures.

Does Gender Make a Difference in Deception? The Effect of Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Over Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex

Neuroimaging studies have indicated a correlation between dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity and deceptive behavior. We applied a transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) device to modulate the activity of subjects’ DLPFCs. Causal evidence of the neural mechanism of deception was obtained. We used a between-subject design in a signaling framework of deception, in which only the sender knew the associated payoffs of two options. The sender could freely choose to convey the truth or not, knowing that the receiver would never know the actual payment information. We found that males were more honest than females in the sham stimulation treatment, while such gender difference disappeared in the right anodal/left cathodal stimulation treatment, because modulating the activity of the DLPFC using right anodal/left cathodal tDCS only significantly decreased female subjects’ deception.

Telling a truth to deceive: Examining executive control and reward-related processes underlying interpersonal deception

Does deception necessarily involve false statements that are incompatible with the truth? In some cases, people choose truthful statements in order to mislead others. This type of deception has been investigated less. The current study employed event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neurocognitive processes when both truthful and false statements were used to deceive others. We focused our ERP analysis on two stages: a decision making stage during which participants decided whether to tell a false or a truthful statement, and an outcome evaluation stage during which participants evaluated whether their deception had succeeded or not. Results showed that in the decision making stage, intentions to deceive elicited larger N200s and smaller P300s than an honest control condition. During the outcome evaluation stage, success/failure feedback in the deception condition elicited larger Reward positivity (RewP) and feedback-P300 than feedback after honest responses. Importantly, whether participants chose to tell false or true statements, did not further modulate executive control or reward-related processes. Taken together, these results suggest that during interpersonal deception, having deceptive intentions engages executive control and reward-related processes regardless of the veracity of statements.

Memory-Based Deception Detection: Extending the Cognitive Signature of Lying From Instructed to Self-Initiated Cheating

From a cognitive perspective, lying can be regarded as a complex cognitive process requiring the interplay of several executive functions. Meta‐analytic research on 114 studies encompassing 3,307 participants (Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van Bockstaele, Ben‐Shakhar, & Crombez, 2017) suggests that computerized paradigms can reliably assess the cognitive burden of lying, with large reaction time differences between lying and truth telling. These studies, however, lack a key ingredient of real‐life deception, namely self‐initiated behavior. Research participants have typically been instructed to commit a mock crime and conceal critical information, whereas in real life, people freely choose whether or not to engage in antisocial behavior. In this study, participants (n = 433) engaged in a trivia quiz and were provided with a monetary incentive for high accuracy performance. Participants were randomly allocated to either a condition where they were instructed to cheat on the quiz (mimicking the typical laboratory set‐up) or to a condition in which they were provided with the opportunity to cheat, yet without explicit instructions to do so. Assessments of their response times in a subsequent Concealed Information Test (CIT) revealed that both instructed cheaters (n = 107) and self‐initiated cheaters (n = 142) showed the expected RT‐slowing for concealed information. The data indicate that the cognitive signature of lying is not restricted to explicitly instructed cheating, but it can also be observed for self‐initiated cheating. These findings are highly encouraging from an ecological validity perspective.

Geven, Ben‐Shakhar, Kindt and Verschuere point out that research on deception detection usually employs instructed cheating. They experimentally demonstrate that participants show slower reaction times for concealed information than for other information, regardless of whether they are explicitly instructed to cheat or whether they can freely choose to cheat or not. Finding this ‘cognitive signature of lying’ with self‐initiated cheating too is argued by the authors to strengthen the external validity of deception detection research. [75]

Can you spot a liar? Deception, mindreading, and the case of autism spectrum disorder

Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life and might require “mindreading” (the ability to represent others’ mental states). People with diminished mindreading, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation because of lie detection difficulties. In Experiment 1, performance among 216 neurotypical adults on a realistic lie detection paradigm was significantly negatively associated with number of ASD traits, but not with mindreading ability. Bayesian analyses complemented null hypothesis significance testing and suggested the data supported the alternative hypothesis in this key respect. Cross validation of results was achieved by randomly splitting the full sample into two subsamples of 108 and rerunning analyses. The association between lie detection and ASD traits held in both subsamples, showing the reliability of findings. In Experiment 2, lie detection was significantly impaired in 27 adults with a diagnosis of ASD relative to 27 matched comparison participants. Results suggest that people with ASD (or ASD traits) may be particularly vulnerable to manipulation and may benefit from lie detection training. Autism Res2018, 11: 1129–1137. © 2018 The Authors Autism Research published by International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Lay Summary

Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life. People with diminished understanding of other minds, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation because of lie detection difficulties. We found that lie detection ability was related to how many ASD traits neurotypical people manifested and also was significantly diminished among adults with a full diagnosis of ASD.

Lie Detection Using fNIRS Monitoring of Inhibition-Related Brain Regions Discriminates Infrequent but not Frequent Liars

Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) was used to test whether monitoring inhibition-related brain regions is a feasible method for detecting both infrequent liars and frequent liars. Thirty-two participants were divided into two groups: the deceptive group (liars) and the non-deceptive group (ND group, innocents). All the participants were required to undergo a simulated interrogation by a computer. The participants from the deceptive group were instructed to tell a mix of lies and truths and those of the ND group were instructed always to tell the truth. Based on the number of deceptions, the participants of the deceptive group were further divided into a infrequently deceptive group (IFD group, infrequent liars) and a frequently deceptive group (FD group, frequent liars). The infrequent liars exhibited greater neural activities than the frequent liars and the innocents in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) when performing the deception detection tasks. While performing deception detection tasks, infrequent liars showed significantly greater neural activation in the left MFG than the baseline, but frequent liars and innocents did not exhibit this pattern of neural activation in any area of inhibition-related brain regions. The results of individual analysis showed an acceptable accuracy of detecting infrequent liars, but an unacceptable accuracy of detecting frequent liars. These results suggest that using fNIRS monitoring of inhibition-related brain regions is feasible for detecting infrequent liars, for whom deception may be more effortful and therefore more physiologically marked, but not frequent liars.

Neural correlates of deception: lying about past events and personal beliefs

Although a growing body of literature suggests that cognitive control processes are involved in deception, much about the neural correlates of lying remains unknown. In this study, we tested whether brain activation associated with deception, as measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), can be detected either in preparation for or during the execution of a lie, and whether they depend on the content of the lie. We scanned participants while they lied or told the truth about either their personal experiences (episodic memories) or personal beliefs. Regions in the frontal and parietal cortex showed higher activation when participants lied compared with when they were telling the truth, regardless of whether they were asked about their past experiences or opinions. In contrast, lie-related activation in the right temporal pole, precuneus and the right amygdala differed by the content of the lie. Preparing to lie activated parietal and frontal brain regions that were distinct from those activated while participants executed lies. Our findings concur with previous reports on the involvement of frontal and parietal regions in deception, but specify brain regions involved in the preparation vs execution of deception, and those involved in deceiving about experiences vs opinions.

Delta plots do not reveal response inhibition in lying

The role of response inhibition in lying is debated. By using the delta-plot method applied to the Sheffield Lie Test, Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, De Schryver, and Verschuere (2015) provided evidence supporting the role of inhibition in lying. In the study of Debey et al., inhibitory skill was measured in terms of the size of the lie effect. However, to provide convincing evidence that delta plots highlight the role of response inhibition in lying, inhibitory ability must be evaluated independently from the size of the lie effect. After replicating original findings, this article shows that a delta plot analysis does not differentiate individuals with different inhibitory abilities, when inhibitory skill is measured by means of the Stop Signal Task, instead of the size of the lie effect. This suggests that researchers should be cautious when making conclusions about cognitive mechanisms based on the sole analysis of delta plots.

Functional neural networks of honesty and dishonesty in children: Evidence from graph theory analysis

The present study examined how different brain regions interact with each other during spontaneous honest vs. dishonest communication. More specifically, we took a complex network approach based on the graph-theory to analyze neural response data when children are spontaneously engaged in honest or dishonest acts. Fifty-nine right-handed children between 7 and 12 years of age participated in the study. They lied or told the truth out of their own volition. We found that lying decreased both the global and local efficiencies of children’s functional neural network. This finding, for the first time, suggests that lying disrupts the efficiency of children’s cortical network functioning. Further, it suggests that the graph theory based network analysis is a viable approach to study the neural development of deception.

Gender difference in spontaneous deception: A hyperscanning study using functional near-infrared spectroscopy

Previous studies have demonstrated that the neural basis of deception involves a network of regions including the medial frontal cortex (MFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), etc. However, to test the actual activity of the brain in the act of deceptive practice itself, existing studies have mainly adopted paradigms of passive deception, where participants are told to lie in certain conditions, and have focused on intra-brain mechanisms in single participants. In order to examine the neural substrates underlying more natural, spontaneous deception in real social interactions, the present study employed a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) hyperscanning technique to simultaneously measure pairs of participants' fronto-temporal activations in a two-person gambling card-game. We demonstrated higher TPJ activation in deceptive compared to honest acts. Analysis of participants' inter-brain correlation further revealed that the STS is uniquely involved in deception but not in honesty, especially in females. These results suggest that the STS may play a critical role in spontaneous deception due to mentalizing requirements relating to modulating opponents' thoughts. To our knowledge, this study was the first to investigate such inter-brain correlates of deception in real face-to-face interactions, and thus is hoped to provide a new path for future complex social behavior research.

Electric stimulation of the right temporo-parietal junction induces a task-specific effect in deceptive behaviors

How the brain generates a lie is an important and unsolved issue in neuroscience. Previous studies indicated that mentalizing, the ability to understand and manipulate the mental states of others, plays a critical role in successful deception. Accordingly, recent neuroimaging studies reported deception-related activity in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), a brain region closely related to the mentalizing ability. Detailed functions of rTPJ in deception, however, remain unclear. In the present study, we investigated a causal relationship between rTPJ and deception using transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS). Subjects received anodal tDCS to their rTPJ or V1 (control) and then performed three tasks in which they aimed to deceive another participant to get monetary rewards. In one of the three tasks, we found a significant decrease in a rate of successful deception when rTPJ was stimulated, indicating that neural enhancement of rTPJ caused poorer (not better) deceptive performances. Our results suggest that, in some tasks involving selfish (money-motivated) lying, neural processing in rTPJ does not contribute to successful deception through the metalizing ability. Rather, it would be related to the self-monitoring of morally-unacceptable behaviors (lying). The neural enhancement of rTPJ therefore increased the psychological resistance to lying, resulting in poorer deceptive performances.

Are individuals with higher psychopathic traits better learners at lying? Behavioural and neural evidence

High psychopathy is characterized by untruthfulness and manipulativeness. However, existing evidence on higher propensity or capacity to lie among non-incarcerated high-psychopathic individuals is equivocal. Of particular importance, no research has investigated whether greater psychopathic tendency is associated with better 'trainability' of lying. An understanding of whether the neurobehavioral processes of lying are modifiable through practice offers significant theoretical and practical implications. By employing a longitudinal design involving university students with varying degrees of psychopathic traits, we successfully demonstrate that the performance speed of lying about face familiarity significantly improved following two sessions of practice, which occurred only among those with higher, but not lower, levels of psychopathic traits. Furthermore, this behavioural improvement associated with higher psychopathic tendency was predicted by a reduction in lying-related neural signals and by functional connectivity changes in the frontoparietal and cerebellum networks. Our findings provide novel and pivotal evidence suggesting that psychopathic traits are the key modulating factors of the plasticity of both behavioural and neural processes underpinning lying. These findings broadly support conceptualization of high-functioning individuals with higher psychopathic traits as having preserved, or arguably superior, functioning in neural networks implicated in cognitive executive processing, but deficiencies in affective neural processes, from a neuroplasticity perspective.

Increasing honesty in humans with noninvasive brain stimulation

Honesty plays a key role in social and economic interactions and is crucial for societal functioning. However, breaches of honesty are pervasive and cause significant societal and economic problems that can affect entire nations. Despite its importance, remarkably little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms supporting honest behavior. We demonstrate that honesty can be increased in humans with transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Participants (n = 145) completed a die-rolling task where they could misreport their outcomes to increase their earnings, thereby pitting honest behavior against personal financial gain. Cheating was substantial in a control condition but decreased dramatically when neural excitability was enhanced with tDCS. This increase in honesty could not be explained by changes in material self-interest or moral beliefs and was dissociated from participants' impulsivity, willingness to take risks, and mood. A follow-up experiment (n = 156) showed that tDCS only reduced cheating when dishonest behavior benefited the participants themselves rather than another person, suggesting that the stimulated neural process specifically resolves conflicts between honesty and material self-interest. Our results demonstrate that honesty can be strengthened by noninvasive interventions and concur with theories proposing that the human brain has evolved mechanisms dedicated to control complex social behaviors.

Perceived warmth and competence of others shape voluntary deceptive behaviour in a morally relevant setting

The temptation to deceive others compares to a moral dilemma: it involves a conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit and the desire to conform to personal and social moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences. Thus, people might feel different levels of emotional and moral conflict depending on the target of the deception. Here we explored, in a morally relevant setting, how social judgements based on two fundamental dimensions of human social cognition - 'warmth' and 'competence' - impact on the decision to deceive others. Results revealed independent effects for warmth and competence. Specifically, while people are less inclined to deceive for self-gain those individuals they perceive as warm, they also tend to lie more to highly competent others. Furthermore, the perceived warmth and competence modulated the general tendency to reduce deceptive behaviour when there was a risk of disclosure compared to when the lying was anonymous, highlighting the importance of these judgements in social evaluation processes. Together, our results demonstrate that the emotional costs and personal moral standards that inhibit engagement in deceptive behaviour are not stable but rather malleable according to the target and the consequences of the deception.

Cognitive neuroscience of honesty and deception: A signaling framework

Understanding the neural basis of human honesty and deception has enormous potential scientific and practical value. However, past approaches, largely developed out of studies with forensic applications in mind, are increasingly recognized as having serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Here we propose to address these challenges by drawing on so-called signaling games widely used in game theory and ethology to study behavioral and evolutionary consequences of information transmission and distortion. In particular, by separating and capturing distinct adaptive problems facing signal senders and receivers, signaling games provide a framework to organize the complex set of cognitive processes associated with honest and deceptive behavior. Furthermore, this framework provides novel insights into feasibility and practical challenges of neuroimaging-based lie detection.

Prefrontal connections express individual differences in intrinsic resistance to trading off honesty values against economic benefits

Individuals differ profoundly when they decide whether to tell the truth or to be dishonest, particularly in situations where moral motives clash with economic motives, i.e., when truthfulness comes at a monetary cost. These differences should be expressed in the decision network, particularly in prefrontal cortex. However, the interactions between the core players of the decision network during honesty-related decisions involving trade-offs with economic costs remain poorly understood. To investigate brain connectivity patterns associated with individual differences in responding to economic costs of truthfulness, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and measured brain activations, while participants made decisions concerning honesty. We found that in participants who valued honesty highly, dorsolateral and dorsomedial parts of prefrontal cortex were more tightly coupled with the inferior frontal cortex when economic costs were high compared to when they were low. Finer-grained analysis revealed that information flow from the inferior frontal cortex to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bidirectional information flow between the inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was associated with a reduced tendency to trade off honesty for economic benefits. Our findings provide a novel account of the neural circuitry that underlies honest decisions in the face of economic temptations.

Psychopathic Traits and Their Relationship with the Cognitive Costs and Compulsive Nature of Lying in Offenders

The cognitive view on deception holds that lying typically requires additional mental effort as compared to truth telling. Psychopathy, however, has been associated with swift and even compulsive lying, leading us to explore the ease and compulsive nature of lying in psychopathic offenders. We explored the costs of instructed lying versus truth telling through RTs and error rates in 52 violent male offenders, who were assessed with the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory (YPI). Our deception paradigm also included trials with the free choice to lie or tell the truth. By coupling monetary loss to slow and erroneous responding, we hypothesized that the frequency of lying despite likely negative consequences, would provide an index of compulsive lying. Offenders were slower and erred more often when lying than when telling the truth, and there was no robust association between psychopathy and the cognitive cost of lying. From an applied perspective, this suggests that psychopathy may not threaten the validity of computerized cognition-based lie detection. In the face of probable negative consequences, high grandiose-manipulative offenders chose to lie three times as often as low grandiose-manipulative offenders. Our new lying frequency index is a first attempt to create a much needed tool to empirically examine compulsive lying, and provides preliminary support for the compulsive nature of lying in grandiose-manipulative offenders. Alternative interpretation of the findings are discussed.

Catching a Deceiver in the Act: Processes Underlying Deception in an Interactive Interview Setting

Lying is known to evoke stress and cognitive load. Both form cues to deception and lead to an increase in sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activity. But in reality, deceivers stick to the truth most the time and only lie occasionally. The present study therefore examined in an interactive suspect interview setting, whether deceivers still have clearly diverging cognitive and emotional processes from truth tellers when only having the intention to lie incidentally. We found that deceivers who lied constantly diverge from truth tellers in SNS activity, self-reported cognitive load and stress. Across all interviews, SNS activity correlated stronger with self-reports of cognitive load than stress, which supports the cognitive load approach. Furthermore, deceivers who told the truth and lied on only one crucial question, particularly diverged in self-reported stress from truth-tellers. In terms of SNS activity and self-reported cognitive load, no differences were found. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Interviewing Suspects with Avatars: Avatars Are More Effective When Perceived as Human

It has been consistently demonstrated that deceivers generally can be discriminated from truth tellers by monitoring an increase in their physiological response. But is this still the case when deceivers interact with a virtual avatar? The present research investigated whether the mere “belief” that the virtual avatar is computer or human operated forms a crucial factor for eliciting physiological cues to deception. Participants were interviewed about a transgression they had been seduced to commit, by a human-like virtual avatar. In a between-subject design, participants either deceived or told the truth about this transgression. During the interviews, we measured the physiological responses assessing participants' electrodermal activity (EDA). In line with our hypothesis, EDA differences between deceivers and truth tellers only were significant for participants who believed they interacted with a human operated (compared to a computer operated) avatar. These results have theoretical as well as practical implications which we will discuss.