Ownership Matters: People Possess a Naïve Theory of Ownership

People Have Systematically Different Ownership Intuitions in Seemingly Simple Cases

Our understanding of ownership influences how we interact with objects and with each other. Here, we studied people's intuitions about ownership transfer using a set of simple, parametrically varied events. We found that people (N = 120 U.S. adults) had similar intuitions about ownership for some events but sharply opposing intuitions for others (Experiment 1). People (N = 120 U.S. adults) were unaware of these conflicts and overestimated ownership consensus (Experiment 2). Moreover, differences in people's ownership intuitions predicted their intuitions about the acceptability of using, altering, controlling, and destroying the owned object (N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 3), even when ownership was not explicitly mentioned (N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 4). Subject-level analyses suggest that these disagreements reflect at least two underlying intuitive theories, one in which intentions are central to ownership and another in which physical possession is prioritized.

Ownership-attributing intuitions are cross-culturally shared

This study tested intuitions about ownership in children of Dani people, an indigenous Papuan society (N = 79, Mage = 7, 49.4% females). The results show that similar to studies with children from Western societies, children infer ownership from (1) control of permission, (2) ownership of the territory the object is located in, and (3) manmade versus natural origins of the object. By contrast, they did not (4) infer ownership from the first observed possession of an object. Additionally, Papuan children showed (5) an absolute first possession heuristic, whereby they assigned ownership to a person who achieved a goal, in contrast to a person who was first to pursue this goal but failed to be the first to claim it.

The curious origins of ownership

What are the origins of ownership as a conceptual domain? By combining experimental evidence from cognitive science, a theoretical proposal from developmental psychology, and the computational framework of reinforcement learning, I argue that ownership concepts can develop as a by-product of our curiosity-based exploration and become grounded via our experience of control in physical and social environments.

Development, history, and a minimalist model of ownership psychology

Boyer's minimalist model is a compelling account of ownership psychology that is more efficient than previous models. However, it is unclear whether the two simple systems that make up this model - acquisitiveness and cooperation - are sufficient to both explain the nuanced development of ownership concepts and to account for the prominent influence that history has on ownership psychology.

Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences

Commentators discussed the coherence and validity of a minimalist approach to ownership intuitions, in ways that make it possible to clarify the model, re-evaluate its cognitive underpinnings, and sketch some of its implications. This response summarizes the model; addresses issues concerning the need for a special technical lexicon when describing cognitive semantics; the psychology involved in contexts of competitive acquisition and their consequences for possession and use of rival resources; the role of cooperative expectations in creating mutually beneficial allocation of resources; the consequences of ownership psychology for social interaction and the production of social norms of property; and the relations between psychological processes and legal institutions in the domain, before proposing some final thoughts.

Not by intuitions alone: Institutions shape our ownership behaviour

Every day, people make decisions about who owns what. What cognitive processes produce this? The target article emphasises the role of biologically evolved intuitions about competition and cooperation. We elaborate the role of cultural evolutionary processes for solving coordination problems. A model based fully on biological evolution misses important insights for explaining the arbitrariness and historical contingency in ownership beliefs.

On intuitive versus institutional accounts of ownership

We contrast Boyer's intuitive account of ownership with formal legal accounts based on institutions of ownership. Boyer's emphasis on social aspects of ownership intuitions may have a bearing on recent arguments that property institutions are justified by their capacity to promote human flourishing. Moreover, Boyer's account of property intuitions facilitates the study of acquisition and mental representation of formal ownership concepts.

Ownership and willingness to compete for resources

Boyer proposes that ownership intuitions depend on tracking cues predictive of agents' motivations to compete for resources. However, the account may mis-predict people's intuitions about ownership, and it may also be too cognitively costly to be feasible. Even so, alternative accounts could benefit by taking inspiration from how the account handles thorny issues in the psychology of ownership.

Why Children Believe They Are Owned

Owners decide what happens to their property, and so adults typically view autonomous beings as non-owned. If children likewise consider autonomy when judging what is owned, this may have implications for how they view themselves. If children believe that parents have power over them, that they themselves lack autonomy, and that only the autonomous cannot be owned, this may lead them to believe that they are owned by their parents. Across three experiments, we found that 4- to 7-year-old children (N = 206) consistently affirm that children are owned by their parents. In Experiment 1, children judged that children and domesticated animals are owned, but denied this for adults and wild animals. In Experiment 2, children were more likely to see children as owned by their parents than by their teachers, and also denied that children own either kind of adult. Finally, in Experiment 3, children were less likely to view a child who makes decisions against parental authority as owned. These judgments are unlikely to mirror what children have been told. Instead, they likely result from children spontaneously using autonomy principles, and possibly other principles of ownership, in reasoning about the ownership of living entities.

Collective psychological ownership as a new angle for understanding group dynamics

Even without legal ownership, groups can experience objects, places, and ideas as belonging to them ('ours'). This state of mind-collective psychological ownership-is understudied in social psychology, yet it is central to many intergroup conflicts and stewardship behaviour. We discuss our research on the psychological processes and social-psychological implications of collective psychological ownership. We studied territorial ownership, in different parts of the world and at different geographical levels, offering not only a cross-national but also conceptual replication of the processes. Our findings show that collective psychological ownership is inferred based on primo-occupancy, investment, and formation. Further, we demonstrate that collective psychological ownership can have positive intragroup and negative intergroup outcomes, which are guided by perceived group responsibility and exclusive determination right. We then discuss ownership threat (losing what is 'ours'), and we consider the role of group identification in ownership-related processes. We conclude by providing directions for future research.

Objects in a social world: Infants' object representational capacity limits are shaped by objects' social relevance

Several decades of research have revealed consistent signature limits on infants' ability to represent objects. However, these signature representational limits were established with methods that often removed objects from their most common context. In infants' everyday lives, objects are very often social artifacts: they are the targets of agents' goal-directed actions, communications, and beliefs, and may have social content or relevance themselves. In this chapter, we explore the relationship between infants' object representational capacity limits and their processing of the social world. We review evidence that the social content and context of objects can shift infants' object representational limits. We discuss how taking the social world into account can yield more robust and ecologically valid estimates of infants' early representational capacities.

The development of digital ownership in children

The current study examined whether, for children and adults, behaviors that are considered violations of property rights in the case of physical property are likewise viewed as violations in the case of digital property. In this preregistered study (N = 156), 5- to 10-year-old children and adults heard a story about a person who downloaded a digital file (e.g., an e-book that she did not own) onto her personal computer (digital) versus a person who put a physical item (e.g., a book that she did not own) into her bag (physical). Participants were asked to evaluate how okay each behavior is. We found that from 5 years of age children evaluated taking a physical object more negatively than downloading a digital file, which was also the pattern observed in adults. Furthermore, by 9 years of age children were equivalent to adults in their evaluation of downloading digital files. The current study has implications for the development of ownership in children.

Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirely ad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as "this is hers," "that is not mine." This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand "cultural appropriation" and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free of ad hoc stipulations.

Phenomenological Origins of Psychological Ownership

Motivated by a set of converging empirical findings and theoretical suggestions pertaining to the construct of ownership, we survey literature from multiple disciplines and present an extensive theoretical account linking the inception of a foundational naïve theory of ownership to principles governing the sense of (body) ownership. The first part of the account examines the emergence of the non-conceptual sense of ownership in terms of the minimal self and the body schema—a dynamic mental model of the body that functions as an instrument of directed action. A remarkable feature of the body schema is that it expands to incorporate objects that are objectively controlled by the person. Moreover, this embodiment of extracorporeal objects is accompanied by the phenomenological feeling of ownership towards the embodied objects. In fact, we argue that the sense of agency and ownership are inextricably linked, and that predictable control over an object can engender the sense of ownership. This relation between objective agency and the sense of ownership is moderated by gestalt-like principles. In the second part, we posit that these early emerging principles and experiences lead to the formation of a naïve theory of ownership rooted in notions of agential involvement.

The extended development of mapping spatial demonstratives onto space

Spatial demonstratives (this and that in English) convey distance relative to speaker (within reach vs. out of reach) and object characteristics such as ownership. Previous studies indicate that object characteristics affect adult demonstrative choice, for example, greater use of this for owned objects. Here, production of spatial demonstratives was studied developmentally to identify when demonstrative production is sensitive to both distance and ownership. In two experiments, 7-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults completed an object location memory task, and a language task eliciting this or that to indicate an object. Results indicate that adult-like demonstrative production starts around 7 years of age and continues to develop beyond 11 years. Nonlinguistic spatial memory did not vary significantly across age groups. Spatial demonstratives encode both semantic and spatial object characteristics throughout development, revealing the fundamental importance of semantic factors for demonstrative production.

Mere Ownership Effect Is Equally Pronounced in Material and Immaterial Objects

Abstract. The mere ownership effect is an increase in the subjective value of owned objects compared to identical but non-owned objects. We tested whether the effect differs in magnitude between material and immaterial objects (e.g., information). Three hundred participants played an incentivized detective game in which they had to connect clues to identify a murderer. Their task was to evaluate the usefulness of the clues they or their partners were endowed with. Despite the fact that the immaterial clues were rated as more useful than the material ones, we found the mere ownership effect to be similarly strong for the material and the immaterial clues.

The Roles of Privacy and Trust in Children's Evaluations and Explanations of Digital Tracking

A "digital revolution" has introduced new privacy violations concerning access to information stored on electronic devices. The present two studies assessed how U.S. children ages 5-17 and adults (N = 416; 55% female; 67% white) evaluated those accessing digital information belonging to someone else, either location data (Study 1) or digital photos (Study 2). The trustworthiness of the tracker (Studies 1 and 2) and the privacy of the information (Study 2) were manipulated. At all ages, evaluations were more negative when the tracker was less trustworthy, and when information was private. However, younger children were substantially more positive overall about digital tracking than older participants. These results, yielding primarily medium-to-large effect sizes, suggest that with age, children increasingly appreciate digital privacy considerations.

Human infants can override possessive tendencies to share valued items with others

Possessiveness toward objects and sharing are competing tendencies that influence dyadic and group interactions within the primate lineage. A distinctive form of sharing in adult Homo sapiens involves active giving of high-valued possessions to others, without an immediate reciprocal benefit. In two Experiments with 19-month-old human infants (N = 96), we found that despite measurable possessive behavior toward their own personal objects (favorite toy, bottle), infants spontaneously gave these items to a begging stranger. Moreover, human infants exhibited this behavior across different types of objects that are relevant to theory (personal objects, sweet food, and common objects)-showing flexible generalizability not evidenced in non-human primates. We combined these data with a previous dataset, yielding a large sample of infants (N = 192), and identified sociocultural factors that may calibrate young infants' sharing of objects with others. The current findings show a proclivity that is rare or absent in our closest living relatives-the capacity to override possessive behavior toward personally valued objects by sharing those same desired objects with others.

The Privacy Mismatch: Evolved Intuitions in a Digital World

Although people report grave concern over their data privacy, they take little care to protect it. We suggest that this privacy paradox can be understood in part as the consequence of an evolutionary mismatch: Privacy intuitions evolved in an environment that was radically different from the one found online. This evolved privacy psychology leaves people disconnected from the consequence of online privacy threats.

A Dollar Is a Dollar Is a Dollar, or Is It? Insights From Children's Reasoning About "Dirty Money"

Money can take many forms-a coin or a bill, a payment for an automobile or a prize for an award, a piece from the 1989 series or the 2019 series, and so on-but despite this, money is designed to represent an amount and only that. Thus, a dollar is a dollar, in the sense that money is fungible. But when adults ordinarily think about money, they think about it in terms of its source, and in particular, its moral source (e.g., dirty money). Here we investigate the development of the belief that money carries traces of its moral history. We study children ages 5-6 and 8-9, who are sensitive to both object history and morality, and thus possess the component pieces needed to think that a dollar may not be like any other. Across three principal studies (and three additional studies in Appendix S1; N = 327; 219 five- and six-year-olds; 108 eight- and nine-year-olds), we find that children are less likely to want money with negative moral history, a pattern that was stronger and more consistent among 8- and 9-year-olds than 5- and 6-year-olds. These findings highlight pressing directions for future research that could help shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to the belief that money carries traces of its moral history.

Witnessing, Remembering, and Testifying: Why the Past Is Special for Human Beings

The past is undeniably special for human beings. To a large extent, both individuals and collectives define themselves through history. Moreover, humans seem to have a special way of cognitively representing the past: episodic memory. As opposed to other ways of representing knowledge, remembering the past in episodic memory brings with it the ability to become a witness. Episodic memory allows us to determine what of our knowledge about the past comes from our own experience and thereby what parts of the past we can give testimony about. In this article, we aim to give an account of the special status of the past by asking why humans have developed the ability to give testimony about it. We argue that the past is special for human beings because it is regularly, and often principally, the only thing that can determine present social realities such as commitments, entitlements, and obligations. Because the social effects of the past often do not leave physical traces behind, remembering the past and the ability to bear testimony it brings is necessary for coordinating social realities with other individuals.