Evidence for cognition without grammar from causal reasoning and 'theory of mind' in an agrammatic aphasic patient

The language network as a natural kind within the broader landscape of the human brain

Language behaviour is complex, but neuroscientific evidence disentangles it into distinct components supported by dedicated brain areas or networks. In this Review, we describe the 'core' language network, which includes left-hemisphere frontal and temporal areas, and show that it is strongly interconnected, independent of input and output modalities, causally important for language and language-selective. We discuss evidence that this language network plausibly stores language knowledge and supports core linguistic computations related to accessing words and constructions from memory and combining them to interpret (decode) or generate (encode) linguistic messages. We emphasize that the language network works closely with, but is distinct from, both lower-level - perceptual and motor - mechanisms and higher-level systems of knowledge and reasoning. The perceptual and motor mechanisms process linguistic signals, but, in contrast to the language network, are sensitive only to these signals' surface properties, not their meanings; the systems of knowledge and reasoning (such as the system that supports social reasoning) are sometimes engaged during language use but are not language-selective. This Review lays a foundation both for in-depth investigations of these different components of the language processing pipeline and for probing inter-component interactions.

The neural basis of naturalistic semantic and social cognition

Decoding social environments and engaging meaningfully with other people are critical aspects of human cognition. Multiple cognitive systems, including social and semantic cognition, work alongside each other to support these processes. This study investigated shared processing between social and semantic systems using neuroimaging data collected during movie-viewing, which captures the multimodal environment in which social knowledge is exchanged. Semantic and social content from movie events (event-level) and movie transcripts (word-level) were used in parametric modulation analyses to test (1) the degree to which semantic and social information is processed within each respective network and (2) engagement of the same cross-network regions or the same domain-general hub located within the semantic network during semantic and social processing. Semantic word and event-level content engaged the same fronto-temporo-parietal network and a portion of the semantic hub in the anterior temporal lobe (ATL). Social word and event-level content engaged the supplementary motor area and right angular gyrus within the social network, but only social words engaged the domain-general semantic hub in left ATL. There was evidence of shared processing between the social and semantic systems in the dorsolateral portion of right ATL which was engaged by word and event-level semantic and social content. Overlap between the semantic and social word and event results was highly variable within and across participants, with the most consistent loci of overlap occurring in left inferior frontal, bilateral precentral and supramarginal gyri for social and semantic words and in bilateral superior temporal gyrus extending from ATL posteriorly into supramarginal gyri for social and semantic events. These results indicate a complex pattern of shared and distinct regions for social and semantic cognition during naturalistic processing. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on October 11, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/ACWQY .

The language network is not engaged in object categorization

The relationship between language and thought is the subject of long-standing debate. One claim states that language facilitates categorization of objects based on a certain feature (e.g. color) through the use of category labels that reduce interference from other, irrelevant features. Therefore, language impairment is expected to affect categorization of items grouped by a single feature (low-dimensional categories, e.g. "Yellow Things") more than categorization of items that share many features (high-dimensional categories, e.g. "Animals"). To test this account, we conducted two behavioral studies with individuals with aphasia and an fMRI experiment with healthy adults. The aphasia studies showed that selective low-dimensional categorization impairment was present in some, but not all, individuals with severe anomia and was not characteristic of aphasia in general. fMRI results revealed little activity in language-responsive brain regions during both low- and high-dimensional categorization; instead, categorization recruited the domain-general multiple-demand network (involved in wide-ranging cognitive tasks). Combined, results demonstrate that the language system is not implicated in object categorization. Instead, selective low-dimensional categorization impairment might be caused by damage to brain regions responsible for cognitive control. Our work adds to the growing evidence of the dissociation between the language system and many cognitive tasks in adults.

Constructed languages are processed by the same brain mechanisms as natural languages

What constitutes a language? Natural languages share some features with other domains: from math, to music, to gesture. However, the brain mechanisms that process linguistic input are highly specialized, showing little or no response to diverse non-linguistic tasks. Here, we examine constructed languages (conlangs) to ask whether they draw on the same neural mechanisms as natural languages, or whether they instead pattern with domains like math and logic. Using individual-subject fMRI analyses, we show that understanding conlangs recruits the same brain areas as natural language comprehension. This result holds for Esperanto (n=19 speakers)- created to resemble natural languages-and fictional conlangs (Klingon (n=10), Na'vi (n=9), High Valyrian (n=3), and Dothraki (n=3)), created to differ from natural languages, and suggests that conlangs and natural languages share critical features and that the notable differences between conlangs and natural language are not consequential for the cognitive and neural mechanisms that they engage.

Mary has a little chair: Eliciting noun-modifier phrases in individuals with acute post-stroke aphasia

Background

Aphasia assessment primarily examines an individual's syntax, nouns, and verbs. However, modifiers, such as adjectives and number words, and bound morphemes can be the subject of considerable difficulty for individuals with aphasia. The Morphosyntactic Generation (MorGen) targets nouns, modifiers, and bound inflectional morphemes in two-word phrases among people with aphasia.

Aims

The purpose of this work is to provide the first report of the MorGen in hyperacute-acute aphasia. In doing so, we aim to (1) examine the MorGen's concurrent validity with common assessments of aphasia; (2) describe performance in modifiers by people with acute aphasia; and (3) associate MorGen performance with extent of lesioned vascular territories in acute stroke.

Methods & Procedures

62 adult English speakers within the first 14 days of left hemisphere ischemic stroke and 61 healthy control participants completed the MorGen. In addition to receiving the MorGen, participants with stroke received the Western Aphasia Battery (WAB), Boston Naming Test, and Hopkins Action Naming Assessment. Clinical MRIs were analyzed for the extent of lesion in the vascular territory of the left anterior, medial, and posterior cerebral artery, as well as the left posterior choroidal and thalamoperforator arteries.

Outcomes & Results

Aim 1: Performance on the MorGen demonstrated consistently high, significant correlations with that on the WAB, Boston Naming Test, and Hopkins Action Naming Assessment. Aim 2: Individuals who had a stroke but were within functional limits (WFL) on the WAB performed significantly worse than healthy controls on the MorGen, driven by differences in adjective performance. When controlling for aphasia severity, those with fluent aphasia performed significantly better in their production of nouns, plurals, number, size, and color than those who had non-fluent aphasia, but both groups were similarly inclined to omit genitive marking. Aim 3: Lesions in the territory of the temporal branch of the posterior cerebral artery were associated with poorer performance in nouns, size, and color. Lesions in the territory of the anterior cerebral artery were associated with poorer performance in numbers.

Conclusions

This work highlights the value of the MorGen as a tool for post-stroke language evaluation that complements the skills captured in more widely-used assessments such as the WAB and BNT.

The human language system, including its inferior frontal component in "Broca's area," does not support music perception

Language and music are two human-unique capacities whose relationship remains debated. Some have argued for overlap in processing mechanisms, especially for structure processing. Such claims often concern the inferior frontal component of the language system located within "Broca's area." However, others have failed to find overlap. Using a robust individual-subject fMRI approach, we examined the responses of language brain regions to music stimuli, and probed the musical abilities of individuals with severe aphasia. Across 4 experiments, we obtained a clear answer: music perception does not engage the language system, and judgments about music structure are possible even in the presence of severe damage to the language network. In particular, the language regions' responses to music are generally low, often below the fixation baseline, and never exceed responses elicited by nonmusic auditory conditions, like animal sounds. Furthermore, the language regions are not sensitive to music structure: they show low responses to both intact and structure-scrambled music, and to melodies with vs. without structural violations. Finally, in line with past patient investigations, individuals with aphasia, who cannot judge sentence grammaticality, perform well on melody well-formedness judgments. Thus, the mechanisms that process structure in language do not appear to process music, including music syntax.

Beyond speaking: neurocognitive perspectives on language production in social interaction

The human faculty to speak has evolved, so has been argued, for communicating with others and for engaging in social interactions. Hence the human cognitive system should be equipped to address the demands that social interaction places on the language production system. These demands include the need to coordinate speaking with listening, the need to integrate own (verbal) actions with the interlocutor's actions, and the need to adapt language flexibly to the interlocutor and the social context. In order to meet these demands, core processes of language production are supported by cognitive processes that enable interpersonal coordination and social cognition. To fully understand the cognitive architecture and its neural implementation enabling humans to speak in social interaction, our understanding of how humans produce language needs to be connected to our understanding of how humans gain insights into other people's mental states and coordinate in social interaction. This article reviews theories and neurocognitive experiments that make this connection and can contribute to advancing our understanding of speaking in social interaction. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Face2face: advancing the science of social interaction'.

Causal Contributions of the Domain-General (Multiple Demand) and the Language-Selective Brain Networks to Perceptual and Semantic Challenges in Speech Comprehension

Listening to spoken language engages domain-general multiple demand (MD; frontoparietal) regions of the human brain, in addition to domain-selective (frontotemporal) language regions, particularly when comprehension is challenging. However, there is limited evidence that the MD network makes a functional contribution to core aspects of understanding language. In a behavioural study of volunteers (n = 19) with chronic brain lesions, but without aphasia, we assessed the causal role of these networks in perceiving, comprehending, and adapting to spoken sentences made more challenging by acoustic-degradation or lexico-semantic ambiguity. We measured perception of and adaptation to acoustically degraded (noise-vocoded) sentences with a word report task before and after training. Participants with greater damage to MD but not language regions required more vocoder channels to achieve 50% word report, indicating impaired perception. Perception improved following training, reflecting adaptation to acoustic degradation, but adaptation was unrelated to lesion location or extent. Comprehension of spoken sentences with semantically ambiguous words was measured with a sentence coherence judgement task. Accuracy was high and unaffected by lesion location or extent. Adaptation to semantic ambiguity was measured in a subsequent word association task, which showed that availability of lower-frequency meanings of ambiguous words increased following their comprehension (word-meaning priming). Word-meaning priming was reduced for participants with greater damage to language but not MD regions. Language and MD networks make dissociable contributions to challenging speech comprehension: Using recent experience to update word meaning preferences depends on language-selective regions, whereas the domain-general MD network plays a causal role in reporting words from degraded speech.

Verbal interference paradigms: A systematic review investigating the role of language in cognition

This paper presents a systematic review of the empirical literature that uses dual-task interference methods for investigating the on-line involvement of language in various cognitive tasks. In these studies, participants perform some primary task X putatively recruiting linguistic resources while also engaging in a secondary, concurrent task. If performance on the primary task decreases under interference, there is evidence for language involvement in the primary task. We assessed studies (N = 101) reporting at least one experiment with verbal interference and at least one control task (either primary or secondary). We excluded papers with an explicitly clinical, neurological, or developmental focus. The primary tasks identified include categorization, memory, mental arithmetic, motor control, reasoning (verbal and visuospatial), task switching, theory of mind, visual change, and visuospatial integration and wayfinding. Overall, the present review found that covert language is likely to play a facilitative role in memory and categorization when items to be remembered or categorized have readily available labels, when inner speech can act as a form of behavioral self-cuing (inhibitory control, task set reminders, verbal strategy), and when inner speech is plausibly useful as "workspace," for example, for mental arithmetic. There is less evidence for the role of covert language in cross-modal integration, reasoning relying on a high degree of visual detail or items low on nameability, and theory of mind. We discuss potential pitfalls and suggestions for streamlining and improving the methodology.

Differential Tracking of Linguistic vs. Mental State Content in Naturalistic Stimuli by Language and Theory of Mind (ToM) Brain Networks

Language and social cognition, especially the ability to reason about mental states, known as theory of mind (ToM), are deeply related in development and everyday use. However, whether these cognitive faculties rely on distinct, overlapping, or the same mechanisms remains debated. Some evidence suggests that, by adulthood, language and ToM draw on largely distinct-though plausibly interacting-cortical networks. However, the broad topography of these networks is similar, and some have emphasized the importance of social content / communicative intent in the linguistic signal for eliciting responses in the language areas. Here, we combine the power of individual-subject functional localization with the naturalistic-cognition inter-subject correlation approach to illuminate the language-ToM relationship. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we recorded neural activity as participants (n = 43) listened to stories and dialogues with mental state content (+linguistic, +ToM), viewed silent animations and live action films with mental state content but no language (-linguistic, +ToM), or listened to an expository text (+linguistic, -ToM). The ToM network robustly tracked stimuli rich in mental state information regardless of whether mental states were conveyed linguistically or non-linguistically, while tracking a +linguistic / -ToM stimulus only weakly. In contrast, the language network tracked linguistic stimuli more strongly than (a) non-linguistic stimuli, and than (b) the ToM network, and showed reliable tracking even for the linguistic condition devoid of mental state content. These findings suggest that in spite of their indisputably close links, language and ToM dissociate robustly in their neural substrates-and thus plausibly cognitive mechanisms-including during the processing of rich naturalistic materials.

A case-study of language-specific executive disorder

Executive control is recruited for language processing, particularly in complex linguistic tasks. Although the issue of the existence of an executive control specific to language is still an open issue, there is much evidence that executively-demanding language tasks rely on domain-general rather than language-specific executive resources. Here, we addressed this issue by assessing verbal and non-verbal executive capacities in LG, an aphasic patient after a stroke. First, we showed that LG's performance was spared in all non-verbal tasks regardless of the executive demands. Second, by contrasting conditions of high and low executive demand in verbal tasks, we showed that LG was only impaired in verbal task with high executive demand. The performance dissociation between low and high executive demand conditions in the verbal domain, not observed in the non-verbal domain, shows that verbal executive control partly dissociates from non-verbal executive control. This language-specific executive disorder suggests that some executive processes might be language-specific.

The novel cognitive flexibility in aphasia therapy (CFAT): A combined treatment of aphasia and executive functions to improve communicative success

PURPOSE

Over and above language deficits, persons with aphasia can present with impairments in executive functions, including deficits in cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility constitutes the ability to update behaviour quickly and flexibly in a changing environment. Its deficits can restrict communicative ability, e. g. the ability to change a topic. To date, these deficits have been neglected in aphasia therapy, even though their consideration regarding language treatment may be beneficial for the persons affected. The present study aimed to evaluate whether aphasia therapy including cognitive flexibility leads to more improvement than conventional aphasia therapy.

METHOD

A pilot group study with ten patients was conducted. The patients received both the novel Cognitive Flexibility in Aphasia Therapy (CFAT) and conventional aphasia therapy in a cross-over design. Each therapy method was delivered for 20 sessions within two weeks. An assessment battery was applied five times, including language skills, communicative ability and verbal/nonverbal cognitive flexibility.

RESULT

Patients profited from CFAT regarding language skills, communicative ability and verbal cognitive flexibility. Furthermore, compared to conventional therapy, CFAT was more effective for verbal cognitive flexibility.

CONCLUSION

This pilot study indicates that CFAT offers a novel opportunity to directly train cognitive flexibility in communicative settings and complements conventional therapy for optimal patient outcome.

The Language Network Is Recruited but Not Required for Nonverbal Event Semantics

The ability to combine individual concepts of objects, properties, and actions into complex representations of the world is often associated with language. Yet combinatorial event-level representations can also be constructed from nonverbal input, such as visual scenes. Here, we test whether the language network in the human brain is involved in and necessary for semantic processing of events presented nonverbally. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants with fMRI while they performed a semantic plausibility judgment task versus a difficult perceptual control task on sentences and line drawings that describe/depict simple agent-patient interactions. We found that the language network responded robustly during the semantic task performed on both sentences and pictures (although its response to sentences was stronger). Thus, language regions in healthy adults are engaged during a semantic task performed on pictorial depictions of events. But is this engagement necessary? In Experiment 2, we tested two individuals with global aphasia, who have sustained massive damage to perisylvian language areas and display severe language difficulties, against a group of age-matched control participants. Individuals with aphasia were severely impaired on the task of matching sentences to pictures. However, they performed close to controls in assessing the plausibility of pictorial depictions of agent-patient interactions. Overall, our results indicate that the left frontotemporal language network is recruited but not necessary for semantic processing of nonverbally presented events.

Assessing abstract thought and its relation to language with a new nonverbal paradigm: Evidence from aphasia

In recent years, language has been shown to play a number of important cognitive roles over and above the communication of thoughts. One hypothesis gaining support is that language facilitates thought about abstract categories, such as democracy or prediction. To test this proposal, a novel set of semantic memory task trials, designed for assessing abstract thought non-linguistically, were normed for levels of abstractness. The trials were rated as more or less abstract to the degree that answering them required the participant to abstract away from both perceptual features and common setting associations corresponding to the target image. The normed materials were then used with a population of people with aphasia to assess the relationship of abstract thought to language. While the language-impaired group with aphasia showed lower overall accuracy and longer response times than controls in general, of special note is that their response times were significantly longer as a function of a trial's degree of abstractness. Further, the aphasia group's response times in reporting their degree of confidence (a separate, metacognitive measure) were negatively correlated with their language production abilities, with lower language scores predicting longer metacognitive response times. These results provide some support for the hypothesis that language is an important aid to abstract thought and to metacognition about abstract thought.

Comprehension of computer code relies primarily on domain-general executive brain regions

Computer programming is a novel cognitive tool that has transformed modern society. What cognitive and neural mechanisms support this skill? Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate two candidate brain systems: the multiple demand (MD) system, typically recruited during math, logic, problem solving, and executive tasks, and the language system, typically recruited during linguistic processing. We examined MD and language system responses to code written in Python, a text-based programming language (Experiment 1) and in ScratchJr, a graphical programming language (Experiment 2); for both, we contrasted responses to code problems with responses to content-matched sentence problems. We found that the MD system exhibited strong bilateral responses to code in both experiments, whereas the language system responded strongly to sentence problems, but weakly or not at all to code problems. Thus, the MD system supports the use of novel cognitive tools even when the input is structurally similar to natural language.

Theory of Mind, Executive Functions, and Syntax in Bilingual Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM) are a core feature of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). ToM may be enhanced by various factors, including bilingualism, executive functions (EF), and complex syntax. This work investigates the language-cognition interface in ASD by exploring whether ToM can be enhanced by bilingualism, whether such ToM boosts would be due to EF or syntax, and whether routes to mentalizing would differ between bilinguals and monolinguals on the spectrum. Twenty-seven monolingual Greek-speaking and twenty-nine bilingual Albanian-Greek children with ASD were tested on ToM reasoning in verbal and low-verbal ToM tasks, an executive function 2-back task, and a sentence repetition task. Results revealed that bilingual children with ASD performed better than monolinguals with ASD in the low-verbal ToM and the 2-back tasks. In the sentence repetition task, bilinguals scored higher than monolinguals in complex sentences, and specifically in adverbials and relatives. Regarding the relations between ToM, EF, and sentence repetition, the monolingual group’s performance in the verbal ToM tasks was associated with complement syntax, whereas, for the bilingual children with ASD, performance in both verbal and low-verbal ToM tasks was associated with EF and adverbial clause repetition. The overall pattern of results suggests that mentalizing may follow distinct pathways across the two groups.

Electrophysiological dynamics of false belief understanding and complementation syntax in school-aged children: Oscillatory brain activity and event-related potentials

A large body of research in developmental psychology has been devoted to the ongoing debate over which aspects of language are fundamental to false belief understanding (FBU). A key proposal from de Villiers and colleagues proposes the essential role of complementation syntax in FBU development. The current study, using scalp electroencephalography (EEG), addressed one opposing hypothesis purporting that complementation is redundant to FBU by characterizing the electrophysiological correlates of FBU and complementation syntax in school-age children. Time-frequency decomposition showed robust parieto-occipital low beta (12-16 Hz) power reduction in the belief versus complementation conditions. This divergence was also supported by event-related potentials (ERPs), with parieto-occipital late slow waves around 600 to 900 ms distinguishing belief and complementation conditions. The false belief condition generated the lowest behavioral response accuracy, suggesting that it is the most challenging condition. Together, the current findings provide evidence showing that complementation is not redundant to FBU.

Broca's Area Is Not a Natural Kind

Theories of human cognition prominently feature 'Broca's area', which causally contributes to a myriad of mental functions. However, Broca's area is not a monolithic, multipurpose unit - it is structurally and functionally heterogeneous. Some functions engaging (subsets of) this area share neurocognitive resources, whereas others rely on separable circuits. A decade of converging evidence has now illuminated a fundamental distinction between two subregions of Broca's area that likely play computationally distinct roles in cognition: one belongs to the domain-specific 'language network', the other to the domain-general 'multiple-demand (MD) network'. Claims about Broca's area should be (re)cast in terms of these (and other, as yet undetermined) functional components, to establish a cumulative research enterprise where empirical findings can be replicated and theoretical proposals can be meaningfully compared and falsified.

Challenges to the Modularity Thesis Under the Bayesian Brain Models

Modularity assumption is central to most theoretical and empirical approaches in cognitive science. The Bayesian Brain (BB) models are a class of neuro-computational models that aim to ground perception, cognition, and action under a single computational principle of prediction-error minimization. It is argued that the proposals of BB models contradict the modular nature of mind as the modularity assumption entails computational separation of individual modules. This review examines how BB models address the assumption of modularity. Empirical evidences of top-down influence on early sensory processes is often cited as a case against the modularity thesis. In the modularity thesis, such top-down effects are attributed to attentional modulation of the output of an early impenetrable stage of sensory processing. The attentional-mediation argument defends the modularity thesis. We analyse this argument using the novel conception of attention in the BB models. We attempt to reconcile classical bottom-up vs. top-down dichotomy of information processing, within the information passing scheme of the BB models. Theoretical considerations and empirical findings associated with BB models that address the modularity assumption is reviewed. Further, we examine the modularity of perceptual and motor systems.

Comprehension of Embedded Clauses in Schizophrenia With and Without Formal Thought Disorder

Formal thought disorder (FTD) in schizophrenia (SZ) is clinically manifested primarily through language production, where linguistic studies have reported numerous anomalies including lesser use of embedded clauses. Here, we explored whether problems of language may extend to comprehension and clause embedding in particular. A sentence-picture matching task was designed with two conditions in which embedded clauses were presupposed as either true (factive) or not. Performance across these two conditions was compared in people with SZ and moderate-to-severe FTD (SZ + FTD), SZ with minimal FTD (SZ-FTD), first-degree relatives of people with SZ, and neurotypical controls. The SZ + FTD group performed significantly worse than all others in both conditions, and worse in the nonfactive than in the factive one. These results demonstrate language dysfunction in comprehension specific to FTD is a critical aspect of grammatical complexity and its associated meaning, which has been independently known to be cognitively significant as well.

Functionally distinct language and Theory of Mind networks are synchronized at rest and during language comprehension

Communication requires the abilities to generate and interpret utterances and to infer the beliefs, desires, and goals of others ("Theory of Mind"; ToM). These two abilities have been shown to dissociate: individuals with aphasia retain the ability to think about others' mental states; and individuals with autism are impaired in social reasoning, but their basic language processing is often intact. In line with this evidence from brain disorders, functional MRI (fMRI) studies have shown that linguistic and ToM abilities recruit distinct sets of brain regions. And yet, language is a social tool that allows us to share thoughts with one another. Thus, the language and ToM brain networks must share information despite being implemented in distinct neural circuits. Here, we investigated potential interactions between these networks during naturalistic cognition using functional correlations in fMRI. The networks were functionally defined in individual participants, in terms of preference for sentences over nonwords for language, and for belief inference over physical-event processing for ToM, with both a verbal and a nonverbal paradigm. Although, across experiments, interregion correlations within each network were higher than between-network correlations, we also observed above-baseline synchronization of blood oxygenation level-dependent signal fluctuations between the two networks during rest and story comprehension. This synchronization was functionally specific: neither network was synchronized with the executive control network (functionally defined in terms of preference for a harder over easier version of an executive task). Thus, coordination between the language and ToM networks appears to be an inherent and specific characteristic of their functional architecture. NEW & NOTEWORTHY Humans differ from nonhuman primates in their abilities to communicate linguistically and to infer others' mental states. Although linguistic and social abilities appear to be interlinked onto- and phylogenetically, they are dissociated in the adult human brain. Yet successful communication requires language and social reasoning to work in concert. Using functional MRI, we show that language regions are synchronized with social regions during rest and language comprehension, pointing to a possible mechanism for internetwork interaction.

Is Language Required to Represent Others' Mental States? Evidence From Beliefs and Other Representations

An important part of our Theory of Mind-the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states-is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering the belief and either the photo or text false. At the same time, participants performed either a concurrent verbal interference task (rehearsing strings of digits) or a visual interference task (remembering a visual pattern). Results showed that performance on false belief trials did not decline under verbal interference relative to visual interference. We interpret these findings as further support for the view that language does not form an essential part of the process of reasoning online ("in the moment") about false beliefs.

Role of Two Types of Syntactic Embedding in Belief Attribution in Adults with or without Asperger Syndrome

The role of syntax in belief attribution (BA) is not completely understood in healthy adults and understudied in adults with autism spectrum disorder. Embedded syntax could be useful either for the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) (Emergence account) or more generally over the lifespan (Reasoning account). Two hypotheses have been explored, one suggesting that embedding itself (Relatives and Complement sentences and Metarepresentation account) is important for ToM and another one considering that the embedding of a false proposition into a true one (Complement sentences and Misrepresentation account) is important. The goals of this study were to evaluate (1) the role of syntax in ToM (Emergence vs. Reasoning account), (2) the type of syntax implied in ToM (Metarepresentation vs. Misrepresentation account), and (3) the verbally mediated strategies which compensate for ToM deficits in adults with Asperger Syndrome (AS). Fifty NeuroTypical (NT) adults and 22 adults with AS were involved in a forced-choice task including ±ToM tasks (BA and a control task, physical causation, PC) under four Interference conditions (silence, syllable repetition, relative sentences repetition, and complement sentences repetition). The non-significant ±ToM × Interference interaction effect in the NT group did not support the Reasoning account and thus suggests that syntax is useful only for ToM development (i.e., Emergence account). Results also indicated that repeating complement clauses put NT participants in a dual task whereas repeating relative clauses did not, suggesting that repeating relatives is easier for NT than repeating complements. This could be an argument in favor of the Misrepresentation account. However, this result should be interpreted with caution because our results did not support the Reasoning account. Moreover, AS participants (but not NT participants) were more disrupted by ±ToM tasks when asked to repeat complement sentences compared to relative clause sentences. This result is in favor of the Misrepresentation account and indirectly suggests verbally mediated strategies for ToM in AS. To summarize, our results are in favor of the Emergence account in NT and of Reasoning and Misrepresentation accounts in adults with AS. Overall, this suggests that adults with AS use complement syntax to compensate for ToM deficits.

Thinking While Talking

This experiment tested the ability of 81 adult subjects to make a decision on a simple nonverbal false-belief reasoning task while concurrently either shadowing prerecorded spoken dialogue or tapping along with a rhythmic shadowing track. Our results showed that the verbal task, but not tapping, significantly disrupted false-belief reasoning, suggesting that language plays a key role in working theory of mind in adults, even when the false-belief reasoning is nonverbal.

Neuronal interactions between mentalising and action systems during indirect request processing

Human communication relies on the ability to process linguistic structure and to map words and utterances onto our environment. Furthermore, as what we communicate is often not directly encoded in our language (e.g. in the case of irony, jokes or indirect requests), we need to extract additional cues to infer the beliefs and desires of our conversational partners. Although the functional interplay between language and the ability to mentalise has been discussed in theoretical accounts in the past, the neurobiological underpinnings of these dynamics are currently not well understood. Here, we address this issue using functional imaging (fMRI). Participants listened to question-reply dialogues. In these dialogues, a reply is interpreted as a direct reply, an indirect reply or a request for action, depending on the question. We show that inferring meaning from indirect replies engages parts of the mentalising network (mPFC) while requests for action also activate the cortical motor system (IPL). Subsequent connectivity analysis using Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) revealed that this pattern of activation is best explained by an increase in effective connectivity from the mentalising network (mPFC) to the action system (IPL). These results are an important step towards a more integrative understanding of the neurobiological basis of indirect speech processing.

Language and thought are not the same thing: evidence from neuroimaging and neurological patients

Is thought possible without language? Individuals with global aphasia, who have almost no ability to understand or produce language, provide a powerful opportunity to find out. Surprisingly, despite their near-total loss of language, these individuals are nonetheless able to add and subtract, solve logic problems, think about another person's thoughts, appreciate music, and successfully navigate their environments. Further, neuroimaging studies show that healthy adults strongly engage the brain's language areas when they understand a sentence, but not when they perform other nonlinguistic tasks such as arithmetic, storing information in working memory, inhibiting prepotent responses, or listening to music. Together, these two complementary lines of evidence provide a clear answer: many aspects of thought engage distinct brain regions from, and do not depend on, language.

Cognitive grammar and aphasic discourse

In cognitive grammar (CG), there is no clear division between language and other cognitive processes; all linguistic form is conceptually meaningful. In this pilot study, a CG approach was applied to investigate whether people with aphasia (PWA) have cognitive linguistic difficulty not predicted from traditional, componential models of aphasia. Narrative samples from 22 PWA (6 fluent, 16 non-fluent) were compared with samples from 10 participants without aphasia. Between-group differences were tested statistically. PWA had significant difficulty with temporal sequencing, suggesting problems that are not uniquely linguistic. For some, these problems were doubly dissociated with naming, used as a general measure of severity, which indicates that cognitive linguistic difficulties are not linked with more widespread brain damage. Further investigation may lead to a richer account of aphasia in line with contemporary linguistics and cognitive science approaches.

Impaired reasoning and problem-solving in individuals with language impairment due to aphasia or language delay

The precise nature of the relationship between language and thought is an intriguing and challenging area of inquiry for scientists across many disciplines. In the realm of neuropsychology, research has investigated the inter-dependence of language and thought by testing individuals with compromised language abilities and observing whether performance in other cognitive domains is diminished. One group of such individuals is patients with aphasia who have an impairment in speech and language arising from a brain injury, such as a stroke. Our previous research has shown that the degree of language impairment in these individuals is strongly associated with the degree of impairment on complex reasoning tasks, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) and Raven’s Matrices. In the current study, we present new data from a large group of individuals with aphasia that show a dissociation in performance between putatively non-verbal tasks on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) that require differing degrees of reasoning (Picture Completion vs. Picture Arrangement tasks). We also present an update and replication of our previous findings with the WCST showing that individuals with the most profound core language deficits (i.e., impaired comprehension and disordered language output) are particularly impaired on problem-solving tasks. In the second part of the paper, we present findings from a neurologically intact individual known as “Chelsea” who was not exposed to language due to an unaddressed hearing loss that was present since birth. At the age of 32, she was fitted with hearing aids and exposed to spoken and signed language for the first time, but she was only able to acquire a limited language capacity. Chelsea was tested on a series of standardized neuropsychological measures, including reasoning and problem-solving tasks. She was able to perform well on a number of visuospatial tasks but was disproportionately impaired on tasks that required reasoning, such as Raven’s Matrices and the WAIS Picture Arrangement task. Together, these findings suggest that language supports complex reasoning, possibly due to the facilitative role of verbal working memory and inner speech in higher mental processes.

Language as grist to the mill of cognition

There is a growing consensus that natural language plays a significant role in our cognitive lives. However, this role of language is not adequately characterised. In this paper, I investigate the relationship between natural language and thinking and argue that thinking operates largely according to associationistic rules. Furthermore, I show that language is neither restricted to interfacing between a 'Language of Thought' and the conscious level, nor is it constitutively involved in thinking. Unlike available alternatives, the suggested view predicts and accommodates a large battery of empirical evidence. Furthermore, it avoids problems that associationistic views traditionally faced, e.g. problems of propositional thinking and compositionality of thought.

Imaging deductive reasoning and the new paradigm

There has been a great expansion of research into human reasoning at all of Marr’s explanatory levels. There is a tendency for this work to progress within a level largely ignoring the others which can lead to slippage between levels (Chater et al., 2003). It is argued that recent brain imaging research on deductive reasoning—implementational level—has largely ignored the new paradigm in reasoning—computational level (Over, 2009). Consequently, recent imaging results are reviewed with the focus on how they relate to the new paradigm. The imaging results are drawn primarily from a recent meta-analysis by Prado et al. (2011) but further imaging results are also reviewed where relevant. Three main observations are made. First, the main function of the core brain region identified is most likely elaborative, defeasible reasoning not deductive reasoning. Second, the subtraction methodology and the meta-analytic approach may remove all traces of content specific System 1 processes thought to underpin much human reasoning. Third, interpreting the function of the brain regions activated by a task depends on theories of the function that a task engages. When there are multiple interpretations of that function, interpreting what an active brain region is doing is not clear cut. It is concluded that there is a need to more tightly connect brain activation to function, which could be achieved using formalized computational level models and a parametric variation approach.

Specialized mechanisms for theory of mind: are mental representations special because they are mental or because they are representations?

Does theory of mind depend on a capacity to reason about representations generally or on mechanisms selective for the processing of mental state representations? In four experiments, participants reasoned about beliefs (mental representations) and notes (non-mental, linguistic representations), which according to two prominent theories are closely matched representations because both are represented propositionally. Reaction times were faster and accuracies higher when participants endorsed or rejected statements about false beliefs than about false notes (Experiment 1), even when statements emphasized representational format (Experiment 2), which should have favored the activation of representation concepts. Experiments 3 and 4 ruled out a counterhypothesis that differences in task demands were responsible for the advantage in belief processing. These results demonstrate for the first time that understanding of mental and linguistic representations can be dissociated even though both may carry propositional content, supporting the theory that mechanisms governing theory of mind reasoning are narrowly specialized to process mental states, not representations more broadly. Extending this theory, we discuss whether less efficient processing of non-mental representations may be a by-product of mechanisms specialized for processing mental states.

The forgotten grammatical category: Adjective use in agrammatic aphasia

BACKGROUND

In contrast to nouns and verbs, the use of adjectives in agrammatic aphasia has not been systematically studied. However, because of the linguistic and psycholinguistic attributes of adjectives, some of which overlap with nouns and some with verbs, analysis of adjective production is important for testing theories of word class production deficits in agrammatism.

AIMS

The objective of the current study was to compare adjective use in agrammatic and healthy individuals, focusing on three factors: overall adjective production rate, production of predicative and attributive adjectives, and production of adjectives with complex argument structure.

METHOD & PROCEDURES

Narratives elicited from 14 agrammatic and 14 control participants were coded for open class grammatical category production (i.e., nouns, verbs, adjectives), with each adjective also coded for its syntactic environment (attributive/predicative) and argument structure.

OUTCOMES & RESULTS

Overall, agrammatic speakers used adjectives in proportions similar to that of cognitively healthy speakers. However, they exhibited a greater proportion of predicative adjectives and a lesser proportion of attributive adjectives, compared to controls. Additionally, agrammatic participants produced adjectives with less complex argument structure than controls.

CONCLUSIONS

The overall normal-like frequency of adjectives produced by agrammatic speakers suggests that agrammatism does not involve an inherent difficulty with adjectives as a word class or with predication, or that it entails a deficit in processing low imageability words. However, agrammatic individuals' reduced production of attributive adjectives and adjectives with complements extends previous findings of an adjunction deficit and of impairment in complex argument structure processing, respectively, to the adjectival domain. The results suggest that these deficits are not tied to a specific grammatical category.

A functional dissociation between language and multiple-demand systems revealed in patterns of BOLD signal fluctuations

What is the relationship between language and other high-level cognitive functions? Neuroimaging studies have begun to illuminate this question, revealing that some brain regions are quite selectively engaged during language processing, whereas other "multiple-demand" (MD) regions are broadly engaged by diverse cognitive tasks. Nonetheless, the functional dissociation between the language and MD systems remains controversial. Here, we tackle this question with a synergistic combination of functional MRI methods: we first define candidate language-specific and MD regions in each subject individually (using functional localizers) and then measure blood oxygen level-dependent signal fluctuations in these regions during two naturalistic conditions ("rest" and story-comprehension). In both conditions, signal fluctuations strongly correlate among language regions as well as among MD regions, but correlations across systems are weak or negative. Moreover, data-driven clustering analyses based on these inter-region correlations consistently recover two clusters corresponding to the language and MD systems. Thus although each system forms an internally integrated whole, the two systems dissociate sharply from each other. This independent recruitment of the language and MD systems during cognitive processing is consistent with the hypothesis that these two systems support distinct cognitive functions.

Differentiating core and co-opted mechanisms in calculation: the neuroimaging of calculation in aphasia

The role of language in exact calculation is the subject of debate. Some behavioral and functional neuroimaging investigations of healthy participants suggest that calculation requires language resources. However, there are also reports of individuals with severe aphasic language impairment who retain calculation ability. One possibility in resolving these discordant findings is that the neural basis of calculation has undergone significant reorganization in aphasic calculators. Using fMRI, we examined brain activations associated with exact addition and subtraction in two patients with severe agrammatic aphasia and retained calculation ability. Behavior and brain activations during two-digit addition and subtraction were compared to those of a group of 11 healthy, age-matched controls. Behavioral results confirmed that both patients retained calculation ability. Imaging findings revealed individual differences in processing, but also a similar activation pattern across patients and controls in bilateral parietal cortices. Patients differed from controls in small areas of increased activation in peri-lesional regions, a shift from left fronto-temporal activation to the contralateral region, and increased activations in bilateral superior parietal regions. Our results suggest that bilateral parietal cortex represents the core of the calculation network and, while healthy controls may recruit language resources to support calculation, these mechanisms are not mandatory in adult cognition.

Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false-belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.

Language in calculation: a core mechanism?

Although there is evidence that exact calculation recruits left hemisphere perisylvian language systems, recent work has shown that exact calculation can be retained despite severe damage to these networks. In this study, we sought to identify a "core" network for calculation and hence to determine the extent to which left hemisphere language areas are part of this network. We examined performance on addition and subtraction problems in two modalities: one using conventional two-digit problems that can be easily encoded into language; the other using novel shape representations. With regard to numerical problems, our results revealed increased left fronto-temporal activity in addition, and increased parietal activity in subtraction, potentially reflecting retrieval of linguistically encoded information during addition. The shape problems elicited activations of occipital, parietal and dorsal temporal regions, reflecting visual reasoning processes. A core activation common to both calculation types involved the superior parietal lobule bilaterally, right temporal sub-gyral area, and left lateralized activations in inferior parietal (BA 40), frontal (BA 6/8/32) and occipital (BA 18) regions. The large bilateral parietal activation could be attributed to visuo-spatial processing in calculation. The inferior parietal region, and particularly the left angular gyrus, was part of the core calculation network. However, given its activation in both shape and number tasks, its role is unlikely to reflect linguistic processing per se. A possibility is that it serves to integrate right hemisphere visuo-spatial and left hemisphere linguistic and executive processing in calculation.

Communicating without a functioning language system: implications for the role of language in mentalizing

A debated issue in the relationship between language and thought is how our linguistic abilities are involved in understanding the intentions of others ('mentalizing'). The results of both theoretical and empirical work have been used to argue that linguistic, and more specifically, grammatical, abilities are crucial in representing the mental states of others. Here we contribute to this debate by investigating how damage to the language system influences the generation and understanding of intentional communicative behaviors. Four patients with pervasive language difficulties (severe global or agrammatic aphasia) engaged in an experimentally controlled non-verbal communication paradigm, which required signaling and understanding a communicative message. Despite their profound language problems they were able to engage in recipient design as well as intention recognition, showing similar indicators of mentalizing as have been observed in the neurologically healthy population. Our results show that aspects of the ability to communicate remain present even when core capacities of the language system are dysfunctional.

Logic, language and the brain

What is the role of language in human cognition? Within the domain of deductive reasoning, the issue has been the focus of numerous investigations without the emergence of a consensus view. Here we consider some of the reasons why neuroimaging studies of deductive reasoning have generated mixed results. We then review recent evidence suggesting that the role of language in deductive reasoning is confined to an initial stage in which verbally presented information is encoded as non-verbal representations. These representations are then manipulated by mental operations that are not based on the neural mechanisms of natural language. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled "The Cognitive Neuroscience".

Neural Insights into the Relation between Language and Communication

The human capacity to communicate has been hypothesized to be causally dependent upon language. Intuitively this seems plausible since most communication relies on language. Moreover, intention recognition abilities (as a necessary prerequisite for communication) and language development seem to co-develop. Here we review evidence from neuroimaging as well as from neuropsychology to evaluate the relationship between communicative and linguistic abilities. Our review indicates that communicative abilities are best considered as neurally distinct from language abilities. This conclusion is based upon evidence showing that humans rely on different cortical systems when designing a communicative message for someone else as compared to when performing core linguistic tasks, as well as upon observations of individuals with severe language loss after extensive lesions to the language system, who are still able to perform tasks involving intention understanding.

Linguistic effects on the neural basis of theory of mind

"Theory of mind" (ToM) has been described as the ability to attribute and understand other people's desires and intentions as distinct from one's own. There has been a debate about the extent to which language influences ToM development. Although very few studies directly examined linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM, results from these studies indicate at least moderate influence of language on ToM. In this review both behavioral and neurological studies that examined the relationship between language and ToM are selectively discussed. This review focuses on cross-linguistic / cultural studies (especially Japanese vs. American / English) since my colleagues and I found evidence of significant linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM through a series of functional brain imaging experiments. Evidence from both behavioral and neurological studies of ToM (including ours) suggests that the pragmatic (not the constitutive) aspects of language influence ToM understanding more significantly.

A dissociation between linguistic and communicative abilities in the human brain

Although language is an effective vehicle for communication, it is unclear how linguistic and communicative abilities relate to each other. Some researchers have argued that communicative message generation involves perspective taking (mentalizing), and-crucially-that mentalizing depends on language. We employed a verbal communication paradigm to directly test whether the generation of a communicative action relies on mentalizing and whether the cerebral bases of communicative message generation are distinct from parts of cortex sensitive to linguistic variables. We found that dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, a brain area consistently associated with mentalizing, was sensitive to the communicative intent of utterances, irrespective of linguistic difficulty. In contrast, left inferior frontal cortex, an area known to be involved in language, was sensitive to the linguistic demands of utterances, but not to communicative intent. These findings show that communicative and linguistic abilities rely on cerebrally (and computationally) distinct mechanisms.