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Bell TM, Facemire P, Bearss JJ, Raymond JL, Chapman J, Zeng X, Shamblin JD, Williams JA, Grosenbach DW, Hruby DE, Damon IK, Goff AJ, Mucker EM. Smallpox lesion characterization in placebo-treated and tecovirimat-treated macaques using traditional and novel methods. PLoS Pathog 2024; 20:e1012007. [PMID: 38386661 PMCID: PMC10883539 DOI: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1012007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2023] [Accepted: 01/26/2024] [Indexed: 02/24/2024] Open
Abstract
Smallpox was the most rampant infectious disease killer of the 20th century, yet much remains unknown about the pathogenesis of the variola virus. Using archived tissue from a study conducted at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention we characterized pathology in 18 cynomolgus macaques intravenously infected with the Harper strain of variola virus. Six macaques were placebo-treated controls, six were tecovirimat-treated beginning at 2 days post-infection, and six were tecovirimat-treated beginning at 4 days post-infection. All macaques were treated daily until day 17. Archived tissues were interrogated using immunohistochemistry, in situ hybridization, immunofluorescence, and electron microscopy. Gross lesions in three placebo-treated animals that succumbed to infection primarily consisted of cutaneous vesicles, pustules, or crusts with lymphadenopathy. The only gross lesions noted at the conclusion of the study in the three surviving placebo-treated and the Day 4 treated animals consisted of resolving cutaneous pox lesions. No gross lesions attributable to poxviral infection were present in the Day 2 treated macaques. Histologic lesions in three placebo-treated macaques that succumbed to infection consisted of proliferative and necrotizing dermatitis with intracytoplasmic inclusion bodies and lymphoid depletion. The only notable histologic lesion in the Day 4 treated macaques was resolving dermatitis; no notable lesions were seen in the Day 2 treated macaques. Variola virus was detected in all three placebo-treated animals that succumbed to infection prior to the study's conclusion by all utilized methods (IHC, ISH, IFA, EM). None of the three placebo-treated animals that survived to the end of the study nor the animals in the two tecovirimat treatment groups showed evidence of variola virus by these methods. Our findings further characterize variola lesions in the macaque model and describe new molecular methods for variola detection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Todd M. Bell
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Paul Facemire
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Jeremy J. Bearss
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Jo Lynne Raymond
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Jennifer Chapman
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Xiankun Zeng
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Joshua D. Shamblin
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Janice A. Williams
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | | | - Dennis E. Hruby
- SIGA Technologies, Inc., Corvallis, Oregon, United States of America
| | - Inger K. Damon
- Poxvirus and Rabies Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Arthur J. Goff
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Eric M. Mucker
- U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
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Medina PB, Kealy J, Kozlakidis Z. Integrating research infrastructures into infectious diseases surveillance operations: Focus on biobanks. BIOSAFETY AND HEALTH 2022; 4:410-413. [PMID: 36533123 PMCID: PMC9750893 DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.10.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2022] [Revised: 09/12/2022] [Accepted: 10/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/06/2022] Open
Abstract
Technological advances in the first two decades of the 21st century have profoundly impacted medical research in many ways, with large population cohorts, biological sample collections and datasets through biobanks becoming valued global resources to guide biomedical research, drug development, and medical practice. However, in order for biobanks to maximize their impact and scientific reach of their resources, they would need to act within a complex network of infrastructures and activities. Therefore, different ways have emerged in which biobanks, including those for infectious diseases, can emerge as (part of) infrastructures, integrate within existing ones, or become an independent, yet an interoperable component of the existing infrastructural landscape. However, there has been a limited understanding and study of such mechanisms to date. This perspective aims to address this knowledge gap and illustrates these three high-level ways in which such infrastructures could integrate their activities and identifies the necessary key pre-conditions for doing so, while drawing from specific examples.
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Affiliation(s)
- Plebeian B. Medina
- Research Institute for Tropical Medicine – Department of Health, Manila, Philippines
| | - Jennifer Kealy
- London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
| | - Zisis Kozlakidis
- International Agency for Research on Cancer/World Health Organization, 150 Cours Albert Thomas, 69372 Lyon CEDEX 08, France
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Cross RW, Longini IM, Becker S, Bok K, Boucher D, Carroll MW, Díaz JV, Dowling WE, Draghia-Akli R, Duworko JT, Dye JM, Egan MA, Fast P, Finan A, Finch C, Fleming TR, Fusco J, Geisbert TW, Griffiths A, Günther S, Hensley LE, Honko A, Hunegnaw R, Jakubik J, Ledgerwood J, Luhn K, Matassov D, Meshulam J, Nelson EV, Parks CL, Rustomjee R, Safronetz D, Schwartz LM, Smith D, Smock P, Sow Y, Spiropoulou CF, Sullivan NJ, Warfield KL, Wolfe D, Woolsey C, Zahn R, Henao-Restrepo AM, Muñoz-Fontela C, Marzi A. An introduction to the Marburg virus vaccine consortium, MARVAC. PLoS Pathog 2022; 18:e1010805. [PMID: 36227853 PMCID: PMC9560149 DOI: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1010805] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/24/2023] Open
Abstract
The emergence of Marburg virus (MARV) in Guinea and Ghana triggered the assembly of the MARV vaccine "MARVAC" consortium representing leaders in the field of vaccine research and development aiming to facilitate a rapid response to this infectious disease threat. Here, we discuss current progress, challenges, and future directions for MARV vaccines.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert W. Cross
- Galveston National Laboratory, and Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas, United States of America
| | - Ira M. Longini
- Department of Biostatistics, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | - Stephan Becker
- Institute for Virology, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Marburg, Germany
| | - Karin Bok
- Vaccine Research Center, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America
| | - David Boucher
- U.S. COVID-19 Response at U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, United States of America
| | - Miles W. Carroll
- Pandemic Sciences Institute, Nuffield Department of Medicine, Oxford University, United Kingdom
| | | | - William E. Dowling
- Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Washington, Washington, DC, United States of America
| | - Ruxandra Draghia-Akli
- Johnson & Johnson—Global Public Health Research and Development, Spring House, Pennsylvania, United States of America
| | - James T. Duworko
- Partnership for Research on Infectious Diseases in Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia
| | - John M. Dye
- Virology Division, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Michael A. Egan
- Auro Vaccines, Pearl River, New York, United States of America
| | | | - Amy Finan
- Sabin vaccine Institute, Washington, DC, United States of America
| | - Courtney Finch
- Sabin vaccine Institute, Washington, DC, United States of America
| | - Thomas R. Fleming
- University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, United States of America
| | - Joan Fusco
- Public Health Vaccines, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Thomas W. Geisbert
- Galveston National Laboratory, and Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas, United States of America
| | - Anthony Griffiths
- National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Stephan Günther
- Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Lisa E. Hensley
- Integrated Research Facility, Division of Clinical Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Frederick, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Anna Honko
- National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Ruth Hunegnaw
- Immune Biology of Retroviral Infection Section, Vaccine Branch, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Jocelyn Jakubik
- Sabin vaccine Institute, Washington, DC, United States of America
| | - Julie Ledgerwood
- Vaccine Research Center, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Kerstin Luhn
- Janssen Vaccines & Prevention, Leiden, the Netherlands
| | | | | | - Emily V. Nelson
- Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine, Hamburg, Germany
| | | | - Roxana Rustomjee
- Sabin vaccine Institute, Washington, DC, United States of America
| | - David Safronetz
- Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
| | | | - Dean Smith
- Bacterial and Combination Vaccines, Public Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
| | - Paul Smock
- Sabin vaccine Institute, Washington, DC, United States of America
| | - Ydrissa Sow
- Collaborative Clinical Research Branch, Division of Clinical Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Rockville, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Christina F. Spiropoulou
- Viral Special Pathogens Branch, Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Nancy J. Sullivan
- Vaccine Research Center, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Kelly L. Warfield
- Emergent BioSolutions, Gaithersburg, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Daniel Wolfe
- Bacterial and Combination Vaccines, Public Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
| | - Courtney Woolsey
- Galveston National Laboratory, and Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas, United States of America
| | - Roland Zahn
- Janssen Vaccines & Prevention, Leiden, the Netherlands
| | | | | | - Andrea Marzi
- Laboratory of Virology, Division of Intramural Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Hamilton, Montana, United States of America
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Du Y, Yan Z, Song K, Jin J, Xiao L, Sun Z, Tan Y, Zhang P, Du Z, Yang R, Zhao Y, Song Y. Development and evaluation of a multiplex droplet digital polymerase chain reaction method for simultaneous detection of five biothreat pathogens. Front Microbiol 2022; 13:970973. [PMID: 35966705 PMCID: PMC9366144 DOI: 10.3389/fmicb.2022.970973] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2022] [Accepted: 07/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Biothreat agents pose a huge threat to human and public health, necessitating the development of rapid and highly sensitive detection approaches. This study establishes a multiplex droplet digital polymerase chain reaction (ddPCR) method for simultaneously detecting five high-risk bacterial biothreats: Yersinia pestis, Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia pseudomallei, and Francisella tularensis. Unlike conventional multiplex real-time PCR (qPCR) methods, the multiplex ddPCR assay was developed using two types of probe fluorophores, allowing the assay to perform with a common two-color ddPCR system. After optimization, the assay performance was evaluated, showing a lower limit of detection (LOD) (0.1–1.0 pg/μL) and good selectivity for the five bacteria targets. The multiplex assay’s ability to simultaneously detect two or more kinds of targets in a sample was also demonstrated. The assay showed strong sample tolerance when testing simulated soil samples; the LOD for bacteria in soil was 2 × 102–2 × 103 colony-forming unit (CFU)/100 mg soil (around 5–50 CFU/reaction), which was 10-fold lower than that of the single-target qPCR method. When testing simulated soil samples at bacterial concentrations of 2 × 103–2 × 104 CFU/100 mg soil, the assay presented a higher sensitivity (100%, 35/35) than that of the qPCR method (65.71%, 23/35) and a good specificity (100%, 15/15). These results suggest that the developed 5-plex ddPCR method is more sensitive than conventional qPCR methods and is potentially suitable for rapidly detecting or screening the five selected bacterial biothreats in suspicious samples.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yipu Du
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
- The First Department, General Hospital of Northern Theater Command, Shenyang, China
| | - Ziheng Yan
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
| | - Kai Song
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
| | - Junyan Jin
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
| | - Liting Xiao
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
- School of Basic Medical Sciences, Anhui Medical University, Hefei, China
| | - Zhulin Sun
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
- College of Veterinary Medicine, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou, China
| | - Yafang Tan
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
| | - Pingping Zhang
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
| | - Zongmin Du
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
| | - Ruifu Yang
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
| | - Yong Zhao
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
- *Correspondence: Yong Zhao,
| | - Yajun Song
- State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), Beijing, China
- Yajun Song,
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Biggs AT, Littlejohn LF. A Hierarchy of Medical Countermeasures Against Biological Threats. Mil Med 2022; 187:830-836. [PMID: 35348745 DOI: 10.1093/milmed/usac077] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2022] [Revised: 03/07/2022] [Accepted: 03/11/2022] [Indexed: 12/21/2022] Open
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Emerging biological threats represent a serious challenge for force health protection (FHP). Against a novel biological threat, medical countermeasures are the first line of defense. However, as exposed by global pandemic conditions, there are significant complications when administering medical countermeasures against novel threats. One such limitation involved the lack of any guiding structure to discuss and deliberate upon the relative value of employing different countermeasures either alone or in tandem. For example, both personal protective equipment and prophylactic medication can provide some protection, but how are individual protections weighed against operational capabilities and FHP initiatives? The goal of this review is to provide a hierarchical organizing structure to the different medical countermeasures available in response to emerging biological threats. MATERIALS AND METHODS This review used no explicit inclusion or exclusion criteria for its literature review. References are provided for illustrative purposes to represent different components of the medical hierarchy. DISCUSSION The hierarchy presented here is organized around a resource-durability structure that functions as a push-pull mechanism. Specifically, lower levels of the hierarchy require more resources to sustain FHP conditions while also providing less durable protection. These countermeasures require continual reapplication, and so resources become conceived as much in time and effort to apply as in exhaustible supplies. Higher-order countermeasures require less resources investment as a single application can provide weeks, months, or years of protection. Moreover, higher-order protections are less likely to interfere with military operational capabilities, which further support their classification as superior countermeasures to sustain FHP. The five levels of the hierarchy are presented here as follows, organized from lowest to highest value as a medical countermeasure: (1) Sanitization, (2) personal protective equipment, (3) prophylaxis, (4) vaccines, and (5) optimized immune system. Rationale and descriptions identify how each higher-order countermeasure is superior to its lower-order counterparts while noting that optimizing FHP will likely require employing multiple countermeasures at different levels. The discussion concludes with an overview as to how different countermeasures were employed to various degrees during a novel global pandemic. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE USES Identifying medical countermeasures is important to optimizing FHP. Different countermeasures have different advantages, and the hierarchy distinguishes between inferior and superior countermeasures through the push-pull style mechanism of resource-durability assessment. Future deployment and development should focus on superior countermeasures to maximize medical protections and operational readiness while understanding the relative value and complications inherent with different countermeasures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam T Biggs
- The Force Medical Office, Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, CA 92155, USA
| | - Lanny F Littlejohn
- The Force Medical Office, Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, CA 92155, USA
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Biodefence research: what to fund now? THE LANCET. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2021; 21:1487-1488. [PMID: 34717800 DOI: 10.1016/s1473-3099(21)00622-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/27/2021] [Accepted: 09/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
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Q Fever Vaccine Development: Current Strategies and Future Considerations. Pathogens 2021; 10:pathogens10101223. [PMID: 34684172 PMCID: PMC8539696 DOI: 10.3390/pathogens10101223] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2021] [Revised: 09/14/2021] [Accepted: 09/15/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Q fever is a zoonotic disease caused by the intracellular pathogen Coxiella burnetii. This disease typically manifests as a self-limiting, febrile illness known as acute Q fever. Due to the aerosol transmissibility, environmental persistence, and infectivity of C. burnetii, this pathogen is a notable bioterrorism threat. Despite extensive efforts to develop next-generation human Q fever vaccines, only one vaccine, Q-Vax®, is commercially available. Q-Vax® is a phase I whole-cell vaccine, and its licensed use is limited to Australia, presumably due to the potential for a post-vaccination hypersensitivity response. Pre-clinical Q fever vaccine development is a major area of interest, and diverse approaches have been undertaken to develop an improved Q fever vaccine. Following a brief history of Q fever vaccine development, current approaches will be discussed along with future considerations for an improved Q fever vaccine.
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