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Roth A. Justice for women/gestators: superior personhood or plain old feminism? JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2023; 50:22-23. [PMID: 37845014 DOI: 10.1136/jme-2023-109492] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/09/2023] [Accepted: 09/29/2023] [Indexed: 10/18/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Amanda Roth
- Philosophy, SUNY Geneseo, Geneseo, New York, USA
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Campo-Engelstein L, Andaya E. Clinicians' criteria for fetal moral status: viability and relationality, not sentience. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2022:medethics-2022-108392. [PMID: 36347605 DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108392] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/05/2022] [Accepted: 10/18/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
The antiabortion movement is increasingly using ostensibly scientific measurements such as 'fetal heartbeat' and 'fetal pain' to provide 'objective' evidence of the moral status of fetuses. However, there is little knowledge on how clinicians conceptualise and operationalise the moral status of fetuses. We interviewed obstetrician/gynaecologists and neonatologists on this topic since their practice regularly includes clinical management of entities of the same gestational age. Contrary to our expectations, there was consensus among clinicians about conceptions of moral status regardless of specialty. First, clinicians tended to take a gradualist approach to moral status during pregnancy as they developed and viewed viability, the ability to live outside of the uterus, as morally significant. Second, in contrast to 'fetal pain' laws and philosophical discussions about the ethical salience of sentience, the clinicians in our study did not consider the ability to feel pain as a morally relevant factor in moral status determinations. Third, during previability and perviability, clinicians viewed moral status as a personal value decision, which should be made by pregnant people and parents of neonates.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Elise Andaya
- Department of Anthropology, University at Albany, Albany, New York, USA
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Begović D, Romanis EC, Verweij EJ. Twin pregnancy reduction is not an 'all or nothing' problem: a response to Räsänen. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2022; 48:139-141. [PMID: 34183460 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2021-107363] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2021] [Accepted: 05/14/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
In his paper, 'Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the 'all or nothing problem', Räsänen sets out to apply Horton's 'all or nothing' problem to the ethics of multifetal pregnancy reduction from a twin to a singleton pregnancy (2-to-1 MFPR). Horton's problem involves the following scenario: imagine that two children are about to be crushed by a collapsing building. An observer would have three options: do nothing, save one child by allowing their arms to be crushed, or save both by allowing their arms to be crushed. Horton offers two intuitively plausible claims: (1) it is morally permissible not to save either child and (2) it is morally impermissible to save only one of the children, which taken together lead to the problematic conclusion that (3) if an observer does not save both children, then it is better to save neither than save only one. Räsänen applies this problem to the case of 2-to-1 MFPR, arguing ultimately that, in cases where there is no medical reason to reduce, the woman ought to bring both fetuses to term. We will argue that Räsänen does not provide adequate support for the claim, crucial to his argument, that aborting only one of the fetuses in a twin pregnancy is wrong, so the 'all or nothing' problem does not arise in this context. Furthermore, we argue that the scenario Räsänen presents is highly unrealistic because of the clinical realities of 2-to-1 MFPR, making his argument of limited use for real-life decision making in this area.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dunja Begović
- Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
| | | | - E J Verweij
- Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Division of Foetal Therapy, Leiden University Medical Center, Leiden, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands
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Räsänen J. Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the 'all or nothing problem'. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2022; 48:101-105. [PMID: 33443129 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2020-106938] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2020] [Revised: 10/29/2020] [Accepted: 11/08/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Fetal reduction is the practice of reducing the number of fetuses in a multiple pregnancy, such as quadruplets, to a twin or singleton pregnancy. Use of assisted reproductive technologies increases the likelihood of multiple pregnancies, and many fetal reductions are done after in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer, either because of social or health-related reasons. In this paper, I apply Joe Horton's all or nothing problem to the ethics of fetal reduction in the case of a twin pregnancy. I argue that in the case of a twin pregnancy, there are two intuitively plausible claims: (1) abortion is morally permissible, and (2) it is morally wrong to abort just one of the fetuses. But since we should choose morally permissible acts rather than impermissible ones, the two claims lead to another highly implausible claim: the woman ought to abort both fetuses rather than only one. Yet, this does not seem right. A plausible moral theory cannot advocate such a pro-death view. Or can it? I suggest ways to solve this problem and draw implications for each solution.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joona Räsänen
- Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
- Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
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Mason K. Postpartum Maternal Tethering: A Bioethics of Early Motherhood. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 2021; 14:49-72. [PMID: 35991863 PMCID: PMC9390069 DOI: 10.3138/ijfab-14.1.03] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
This article proposes a new way of conceptualizing the ethical relationship between postpartum mothers and their newborn babies. I suggest that the intertwinement of mother and baby - and the tensions that this intertwinement produces - do not disappear with birth, but rather persist throughout the postpartum period in the form of postpartum maternal tethering. I draw upon three years of ethnographic fieldwork and training in the US and China to argue that the dependency associated with postpartum maternal tethering makes it extremely difficult for postpartum mothers to act autonomously, even in the relational sense. I then examine how breaches in the postpartum maternal tether can open up new possibilities for thinking about the bioethics of vulnerability, dependency and care, by denaturalizing and de-sanctifying the mother-baby relationship and diversifying newborn care.
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Affiliation(s)
- Katherine Mason
- Vartan Gregorian Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Brown University, Box 1921, 128 Hope St., Providence, RI 02912
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Shahvisi A. Towards responsible ejaculations: the moral imperative for male contraceptive responsibility. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2020; 46:328-336. [PMID: 32220866 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105800] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2019] [Revised: 02/20/2020] [Accepted: 02/24/2020] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that men should take primary responsibility for protecting against pregnancy. Male long-acting reversible contraceptives are currently in development, and, once approved, should be used as the standard method for avoiding pregnancy. Since women assume the risk of pregnancy when they engage in penis-in-vagina sex, men should do their utmost to ensure that their ejaculations are responsible, otherwise women shoulder a double burden of pregnancy risk plus contraceptive responsibility. Changing the expectations regarding responsibility for contraception would render penis-in-vagina sex more equitable, and could lead to a shift in the discourse around abortion access. I describe the sex asymmetries of contraceptive responsibility and of pregnancy-related risk, and offer arguments in favour of men taking primary responsibility for contraception. My arguments centre on: (1) analogies between contraception and vaccination, and unwanted pregnancy and disease; (2) a veil-of-ignorance approach, in which I contend that if a person were not told their sex, they would find a society in which men were expected to acquire and use effective contraceptives the fairest arrangement for everyone.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arianne Shahvisi
- Ethics, Brighton and Sussex Medical School, Brighton BN1 9PX, UK
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Persad G. Authority without identity: defending advance directives via posthumous rights over one's body. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2019; 45:249-256. [PMID: 30580321 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2018-104971] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/30/2018] [Revised: 09/03/2018] [Accepted: 10/27/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
This paper takes a novel approach to the active bioethical debate over whether advance medical directives have moral authority in dementia cases. Many have assumed that advance directives would lack moral authority if dementia truly produced a complete discontinuity in personal identity, such that the predementia individual is a separate individual from the postdementia individual. I argue that even if dementia were to undermine personal identity, the continuity of the body and the predementia individual's rights over that body can support the moral authority of advance directives. I propose that the predementia individual retains posthumous rights over her body that she acquired through historical embodiment in that body, and further argue that claims grounded in historical embodiment can sometimes override or exclude moral claims grounded in current embodiment. I close by considering how advance directives grounded in historical embodiment might be employed in practice and what they would and would not justify.
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Hershenov DB, Hershenov RJ. If Abortion, then Infanticide. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2017; 38:387-409. [PMID: 28766249 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-017-9419-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Our contention is that all of the major arguments for abortion are also arguments for permitting infanticide. One cannot distinguish the fetus from the infant in terms of a morally significant intrinsic property, nor are they morally discernible in terms of standing in different relationships to others. The logic of our position is that if such arguments justify abortion, then they also justify infanticide. If we are right that infanticide is not justified, then such arguments will fail to justify abortion. We respond to those philosophers who accept infanticide by putting forth a novel account of how the mindless can be wronged which serves to distinguish morally significant potential from morally irrelevant potential. This allows our account to avoid the standard objection that many entities possess a potential for personhood which we are intuitively under no obligation to further or protect.
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Affiliation(s)
- David B Hershenov
- Philosophy Department, University at Buffalo, 135 Park Hall, Buffalo, NY, 14260, USA.
| | - Rose J Hershenov
- Niagara University, 5795 Lewiston Road, Lewiston, NY, 14109, USA
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Rieder TN. Saving or Creating: Which Are We Doing When We Resuscitate Extremely Preterm Infants? THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS : AJOB 2017; 17:4-12. [PMID: 28768134 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2017.1340988] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Neonatal intensive care units represent simultaneously one of the great success stories of modern medicine, and one of its most controversial developments. One particularly controversial issue is the resuscitation of extremely preterm infants. Physicians in the United States generally accept that they are required to resuscitate infants born as early as 25 weeks and that it is permissible to resuscitate as early as 22 weeks. In this article, I question the moral pressure to resuscitate by criticizing the idea that resuscitation in this context "saves" a human life. Our radical medical advancements have allowed us to intervene in the life of a human before it makes sense to say that such an intervention "saves" someone; rather, what the physician does in resuscitating and treating an extremely preterm infant is to take over creating it. This matters, I argue, because "rescues" are much more morally urgent than "creations."
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When Hypothetical Vulnerability Becomes Actual: Research Participation and the Autonomy of Pregnant Women. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2017. [DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-26512-4_9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/13/2023]
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Browne V. Feminist Philosophy and Prenatal Death: Relationality and the Ethics of Intimacy. SIGNS 2016. [DOI: 10.1086/682923] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
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Porter L. Why and How to Prefer a Causal Account of Parenthood. JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 2014; 45:182-202. [PMID: 25821255 PMCID: PMC4373177 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12059] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
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Wilkinson JP, Lyerly AD, Masenga G, Hayat SK, Prabhu M. Ethical dilemmas in women's health in under-resourced settings. Int J Gynaecol Obstet 2011; 113:25-7. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ijgo.2010.10.022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2010] [Revised: 10/25/2010] [Accepted: 12/16/2010] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
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Abstract
In professional settings, people often have diverse and competing conceptions of responsibility and of when it is fair to hold someone responsible. This may lead to undesirable gaps in the distribution of responsibilities. In this paper, a procedural model is developed for alleviating the tension between diverging responsibility conceptions. The model is based on the Rawlsian approach of wide reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. The model is applied to a technological project, which concerned the development of an in-house monitoring system based on ambient technology. The development of this innovative technology raised questions among the technological researchers about its social acceptance and the way issues related to privacy and security should be addressed. The case is analyzed in terms of two procedural norms (reflective learning and inclusiveness), which are based on literature on policy and innovation networks. Analysis of the case shows that, in a pluralist setting, a procedural approach can be useful for encouraging discussion on the legitimacy of different responsibility conceptions and the question what a fair responsibility distribution amounts to.
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Affiliation(s)
- Neelke Doorn
- Department of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, 3TU, Centre for Ethics and Technology, PO Box 5015, 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands
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Abstract
This paper addresses the likely impact on women of being denied emergency contraception (EC) by pharmacists who conscientiously refuse to provide it. A common view-defended by Elizabeth Fenton and Loren Lomasky, among others-is that these refusals inconvenience rather than harm women so long as the women can easily get EC somewhere else close by. I argue from a feminist perspective that the refusals harm women even when they can easily get EC somewhere else close by.
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Lyerly AD, Mahowald MB. Maternal-fetal surgery: the fallacy of abstraction and the problem of equipoise. HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 2001; 9:151-65. [PMID: 11561994 DOI: 10.1023/a:1011326119701] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022]
Abstract
When surgery is performed on pregnant women for the sake of the fetus (MFS or maternal fetal surgery). it is often discussed in terms of the fetus alone. This usage exemplifies what philosophers call the fallacy of abstraction: considering a concept as if it were separable from another concept whose meaning is essentially related to it. In light of their potential separability, research on pregnant women raises the possibility of conflicts between the interests of the woman and those of the fetus. Such research should meet the requirement of equipoise. i.e., a state of genuine uncertainty about the risks and benefits of alternative interventions or noninterventions. While illustrating the fallacy of abstraction in discussions of MFS, we review the rationale for explicit acknowledgment of the essential tie between fetus and pregnant woman. Next we examine whether it is possible to meet the requirement of equipoise in research on MFS, focusing on a fetal condition called myelomeningocele. We show how issues related to equipoise in nonpregnant populations appear also in debates regarding MFS. We also examine evidence in support of claims that the requirement of equipoise has been satisfied with respect to "the fetal patient" while considering risks and benefits to gestating women only marginally or not at all. After delineating challenges and possibilities for equipoise in MFS research, we conclude with a suggestion for avoiding the fallacy of abstraction and achieving equipoise so that research on MFS may be ethically conducted.
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Affiliation(s)
- A D Lyerly
- The Bioethics Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA.
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