Rhinal cortex ablations fail to disrupt reinforcer devaluation effects in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

The visual prefrontal cortex of anthropoids: interaction with temporal cortex in decision making and its role in the making of "visual animals"

The ventral prefrontal cortex (PFC) of primates-a region strongly implicated in decision making-receives highly processed visual sensory inputs from the inferior temporal cortex (ITC) and perirhinal cortex (PRC) and can therefore be considered visual PFC. Usually, the functions of temporal cortex and visual PFC have been discussed in separate literatures. By considering them together, we aim to clarify the ways in which fronto-temporal networks guide decision making. After discussing the ways in which visual PFC interacts with temporal cortex to promote decision making, we offer specific predictions about the selective roles of the ITC- and PRC-based fronto-temporal networks. Finally, we suggest that an increased reliance on visual PFC in anthropoid primates led to our emergence as 'visual' animals.

Neural estimates of imagined outcomes in the orbitofrontal cortex drive behavior and learning

Imagination, defined as the ability to interpret reality in ways that diverge from past experience, is fundamental to adaptive behavior. This can be seen at a simple level in our capacity to predict novel outcomes in new situations. The ability to anticipate outcomes never before received can also influence learning if those imagined outcomes are not received. The orbitofrontal cortex is a key candidate for where the process of imagining likely outcomes occurs; however, its precise role in generating these estimates and applying them to learning remain open questions. Here we address these questions by showing that single-unit activity in the orbitofrontal cortex reflects novel outcome estimates. The strength of these neural correlates predicted both behavior and learning, learning that was abolished by temporally specific inhibition of orbitofrontal neurons. These results are consistent with the proposal that the orbitofrontal cortex is critical for integrating information to imagine future outcomes.

Interaction between orbital prefrontal and rhinal cortex is required for normal estimates of expected value

Predicting and valuing potential rewards requires integrating sensory, associative, and contextual information with subjective reward preferences. Previous work has identified regions in the prefrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe believed to be important for each of these functions. For example, activity in the orbital prefrontal cortex (PFo) encodes the specific sensory properties of and preferences for rewards, while activity in the rhinal cortex (Rh) encodes stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-reward associations. Lesions of either structure impair the ability to use visual cues or the history of previous reinforcement to value expected rewards. These areas are linked via reciprocal connections, suggesting it might be their interaction that is critical for estimating expected value. To test this hypothesis, we interrupted direct, intra-hemispheric PFo-Rh interaction in monkeys by performing crossed unilateral ablations of these regions (functional disconnection). We asked whether this circuit is crucial primarily for cue-reward association or for estimating expected value per se, by testing these monkeys, as well as intact controls, on tasks in which expected value was either visually cued or had to be inferred from block-wise changes in reward size in uncued trials. Functional disconnection significantly affected performance in both tasks. Specifically, monkeys with functional disconnection showed less of a difference in error rates and reaction times across reward sizes, in some cases behaving as if they expected rewards to be of equal magnitude. These results support a model whereby information about rewards signaled in PFo is combined with associative and contextual information signaled within Rh to estimate expected value.

Behavioral outcomes of late-onset or early-onset orbital frontal cortex (areas 11/13) lesions in rhesus monkeys

The orbital frontal cortex (OFC) has been implicated in a number of psychiatric disorders, including depression, anxiety, phobia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Thus, a better understanding of its functions will likely provide critical information to understand the specific behavioral and cognitive processes affected in these human disorders. In recent years, a growing number of studies have provided evidence for anatomical and functional differentiation within the OFC. Here we discuss the effects of selective OFC (areas 11/13) lesions on social behavior, emotional regulation, and behavioral adaptation. Damage to these specific OFC subfields in adult monkeys resulted in profound changes in the flexible modulation of responses guided by reward value that could explain the poor fear regulation and disturbed social interactions observed in the same animals. A similar pattern of results was found when the OFC lesions were done in infancy. Thus, in monkeys, self-regulation abilities mediated by OFC areas 11/13 emerge from midinfancy through adolescence.

A visual, position-independent instrumental reinforcer devaluation task for rats

Flexible goal-directed behavior has been studied across species using reinforcer devaluation tasks, in which subjects form associations between specific stimuli (cues) and specific reinforcer(s). The reinforcer is subsequently devalued by selective satiation or taste aversion. Following devaluation, subjects adjust their responding to the cues reflecting the new value of the reinforcer. Tasks currently used in rats differ in several ways from tasks used in monkeys and this may explain contrasting results between the two species. To address one of the differences, we developed a rat task independent of spatial cues. It employs two visual cues presented simultaneously, changing left and right positions pseudorandomly. Each cue predicts one of two food reinforcers. Rats were trained to lever press in response to the two visual cues. Subsequently, they were satiated on one of the foods followed by an extinction test where in each trial they could choose to respond to one of the two cues, one predicting the devalued reinforcer and the other the non-devalued. This procedure was repeated later with the alternative food devalued. The rats adjusted their responding by choosing the cue predicting the devalued food significantly less (p<0.05) than the alternative cue. These results show that rats can discriminate two visual stimuli presented simultaneously, devalue two different foods by selective satiation, and transfer the new value to the visual cues. Discrimination of the visual cues is not aided by spatial cues, thereby eliminating a major difference between the instrumental tasks used in rats and the task used in monkeys.

The neurocognitive bases of human multimodal food perception: consciousness

This review explores how we become aware of the (integrated) flavor of food. In recent years, progress has been made understanding the neural correlates of consciousness. Experimental and computational data have been largely based on the visual system. Contemporary neurobiological frameworks of consciousness are reviewed, concluding that neural reverberation among forward- and back-projecting neural ensembles across brain areas is a common theme. In an attempt to extrapolate these concepts to the oral-sensory and olfactory systems involved with multimodal flavor perception, the integration of the sensory information of which into a flavor gestalt has been reviewed elsewhere (Verhagen, J.V., Engelen, L., 2006. The neurocognitive bases of human multimodal food perception: Sensory integration. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 30(5): 613_650), I reconceptualize the flavor-sensory system by integrating it into a larger neural system termed the Homeostatic Interoceptive System (HIS). This system consists of an oral (taste, oral touch, etc.) and non-oral part (non oral-thermosensation, pain, etc.) which are anatomically and functionally highly similar. Consistent with this new concept and with a large volume of experimental data, I propose that awareness of intraoral food is related to the concomitant reverberant self-sustained activation of a coalition of neuronal subsets in agranular insula and orbitofrontal cortex (affect, hedonics) and agranular insula and perirhinal cortex (food identity), as well as the amygdala (affect and identity) in humans. I further discuss the functional anatomy in relation essential nodes. These formulations are by necessity to some extent speculative.

GABAA-mediated inhibition of basolateral amygdala blocks reward devaluation in macaques

Amygdala ablation disrupts reinforcer "devaluation" in monkeys (Malkova et al., 1997). Here, we tested the hypothesis that transient inactivation of amygdala by the GABA(A) agonist muscimol (MUS), specifically during the period of reward satiation, would have a similar effect. Six pigtail macaques were trained on a visual object discrimination task in which 60 objects were associated with one of two specific food rewards. Subsequently, we evaluated the selective satiation-induced change (devaluation) in object preference in probe sessions. We also examined the effect of the amygdala inactivation during the probe sessions to determine whether the inactivation limited to the testing period (and not during the satiation period) is sufficient to impair the expression of reinforcer devaluation. MUS infusions were aimed at basolateral amygdala (BLA) in a pseudorandomized design; each monkey received MUS or saline either before or after selective satiation with each of the two food rewards (six infusions total). Under the control (saline) condition, the monkeys significantly shifted their preference from objects representing the sated food rewards to those representing the nonsated rewards (30% change). When BLA was inactivated during selective satiation (i.e., MUS infused before satiation), this devaluation effect was blocked. In contrast, MUS infusion after satiation, so that it was present just during the testing period, did not impair the shift in object preference (27% change). Thus, BLA is necessary for the appropriate registration of the change in the reinforcer value but not for the subsequent expression of the devaluation involving its transfer to secondary reinforcers.