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Gagné-Julien AM. Beyond Conceptual Analysis: Social Objectivity and Conceptual Engineering to Define Disease. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2024; 49:147-159. [PMID: 38422236 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/02/2024] Open
Abstract
In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of "disease" should be reoriented from the question "what is disease" to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis is not the right method to define disease and that conceptual engineering should be the preferred method and (2) that the method of conceptual engineering should be implemented following the principles of Alexandrova's account of social objectivity in the context of the definition of disease.
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Zagaria A, Zennaro A. A close look at sociality in DSM criteria. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 2024; 59:475-492. [PMID: 37932472 PMCID: PMC10944442 DOI: 10.1007/s00127-023-02568-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2022] [Accepted: 09/28/2023] [Indexed: 11/08/2023]
Abstract
PURPOSE The importance of sociality in psychology and psychotherapy is quite undisputed; however, this construct risks being underestimated in psychiatric nosography. The aim of the review was to assess the relevance of sociality in DSM 5 criteria. METHOD Sociality-laden criteria of 192 selected DSM categories have been identified through a textual grid. Second, the criteria have been classified into 6 categories, i.e., (1) Affiliation and Attachment (AA), (2) Social Communication (SC), (3) Perception and Understanding of Others (PUO), (4) Culture, (5) Clinical Significance Criterion (CSC) (6), and No Specific Construct (NSC). RESULTS 13% of all mental disorders mention AA in their criteria. 8.8% of all mental disorders mention SC; 8.8% of all mental disorders mention PUO in their criteria. 15% of all mental disorders mention culture in their criteria (exclusively ex negativo though). 40% of mental disorders mention non-specific sociality (NSC) in their criteria. CSC is mentioned in 85% of mental disorders. Personality disorders have the highest "concentration" of sociality mentions throughout the DSM categories. CONCLUSIONS The overall results suggest that DSM criteria offer a confused account of sociality. We believe that the descriptive approach is the underlying reason. We suggest that in the long run a theory-laden approach to sociality, informed by evolutionary insights about motivations, could be of help.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Zagaria
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Corso Bettini, 31, 38068, Rovereto, TN, Italy.
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Wakefield JC. Klerman's "credo" reconsidered: neo-Kraepelinianism, Spitzer's views, and what we can learn from the past. World Psychiatry 2022; 21:4-25. [PMID: 35015356 PMCID: PMC8751581 DOI: 10.1002/wps.20942] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/28/2022] Open
Abstract
In 1978, G. Klerman published an essay in which he named the then-nascent "neo-Kraepelinian" movement and formulated a "credo" of nine propositions expressing the movement's essential claims and aspirations. Klerman's essay appeared on the eve of the triumph of neo-Kraepelinian ideas in the DSM-III. However, this diagnostic system has subsequently come under attack, opening the way for competing proposals for the future of psychiatric nosology. To better understand what is at stake, in this paper I provide a close reading and consideration of Klerman's credo in light of the past forty years of research and reflection. The credo is placed in the context of two equally seminal publications in the same year, one by S. Guze, the leading neo-Kraepelinian theorist, and the other by R. Spitzer and J. Endicott, defining mental disorder. The divergences between Spitzer and standard neo-Kraepelinianism are highlighted and argued to be much more important than is generally realized. The analysis of Klerman's credo is also argued to have implications for how to satisfactorily resolve the current nosological ferment in psychiatry. In addition to issues such as creating descriptive syndromal diagnostic criteria, overthrowing psychoanalytic dominance of psychiatry, and making psychiatry more scientific, neo-Kraepelinians were deeply concerned with the conceptual issue of the nature of mental disorder and the defense of psychiatry's medical legitimacy in response to antipsychiatric criticisms. These issues cannot be ignored, and I argue that proposals currently on offer to replace the neo-Kraepelinian system, especially popular proposals to replace it with dimensional measures, fail to adequately address them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- Center for Bioethics, School of Global Public Health, and Silver School of Social Work, New York University, New York, NY, USA
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Dussault AC. Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder and the problem of defining harm to nonsentient organisms. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2021; 42:211-231. [PMID: 35201564 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-022-09559-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/07/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
This paper criticizes Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of disorder by arguing that the conceptual linkage it establishes between the medical concepts of health and disorder and the prudential notions of well-being and harm makes the account inapplicable to nonsentient organisms, such as plants, fungi, and many invertebrate animals. Drawing on a previous formulation of this criticism by Christopher Boorse, and noting that Wakefield could avoid it if he adopted a partly biofunction-based account of interests like that often advocated in the field of environmental ethics, I argue that integrating such an account of interests into the HDA would generate serious concerns. Specifically, it would make dysfunction sufficient for disorder and so reestablish between dysfunction and disorder precisely the kind of sufficiency relation that harm-requiring accounts of disorder strive to avoid; blur the line between the HDA's dysfunction and harm components and, in so doing, deprive the HDA of its alleged main advantage over monistic dysfunction-based accounts of disorders like Boorse's; and tie the HDA to an understanding of harm that is in itself problematic. I argue that these three concerns, and the dilemmas they generate, rob the HDA of much of its prima facie appeal, ultimately indicating that a satisfactory account of disorder should most likely eschew all references to prudential notions of well-being and harm.
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Affiliation(s)
- Antoine C Dussault
- Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche sur la Science et la Technologie (CIRST), Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Quebec, Canada.
- Département de philosophie, Collège Lionel-Groulx, Quebec, Canada.
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Dussault AC. The harmful-dysfunction account of disorder, individual versus social values, and the interpersonal variability of harm challenge. MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND PHILOSOPHY 2021; 24:453-467. [PMID: 33966154 DOI: 10.1007/s11019-021-10021-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/01/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
This paper presents the interpersonal variability of harm challenge to Jerome Wakefield's harmful-dysfunction account (HDA) of disorder. This challenge stems from the seeming fact that what promotes well-being or is harmful to someone varies much more across individuals than what is intuitively healthy or disordered. This makes it at least prima facie difficult to see how judgments about health and disorder could, as harm-requiring accounts of disorder like the HDA maintain, be based on, or closely linked to, judgments about well-being and harm. This interpersonal variability of harm challenge is made salient by the difficulty faced by harm-requiring accounts of disorder in dealing satisfactorily with cases of intuitively disordered conditions that seem harmless because they do not deprive the individuals that they affect of anything that they value (e.g., desired infertility). I argue that this challenge is made more serious for the HDA by some clarifications Wakefield has recently made on harm. In recent publications, Wakefield dissociates himself from the sheer cultural-relativist view of harm attributed to him by some critics based on his linkage of harm to social values, and adopts a more qualified social-values-based view of harm that leaves room for criticism of the values endorsed by members of a cultural group at a given time. I show how Wakefield's qualified view makes it more difficult for the HDA to deal with the interpersonal variability of harm challenge, at least when applied to a Western cultural context where a high value is placed on autonomy and individual choice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Antoine C Dussault
- Collège Lionel-Groulx, 100 Rue Duquet, Sainte-Thérèse, Québec, J7E 3G6, Canada.
- Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur la science et la technologie (CIRST), Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 8888, succ. Centre-ville, Montréal, Québec, H3C 3P8, Canada.
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Wakefield JC, Conrad JA. Harm as a Necessary Component of the Concept of Medical Disorder: Reply to Muckler and Taylor. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2021; 45:350-370. [PMID: 32437578 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhaa008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis asserts that the concept of medical disorder includes a naturalistic component of dysfunction (failure of biologically designed functioning) and a value (harm) component, both of which are required for disorder attributions. Muckler and Taylor, defending a purely naturalist, value-free understanding of disorder, argue that harm is not necessary for disorder. They provide three examples of dysfunctions that, they claim, are considered disorders but are entirely harmless: mild mononucleosis, cowpox that prevents smallpox, and minor perceptual deficits. They also reject the proposal that dysfunctions need only be typically harmful to qualify as disorders. We argue that the proposed counterexamples are, in fact, considered harmful; thus, they fail to disconfirm the harm requirement: incapacity for exertion is inherently harmful, whether or not exertion occurs, cowpox is directly harmful irrespective of indirect benefits, and colorblindness and anosmia are considered harmful by those who consider them disorders. We also defend the typicality qualifier as viably addressing some apparently harmless disorders and argue that a dysfunction's harmfulness is best understood in dispositional terms.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Jordan A Conrad
- Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, BE, and New York University, New York, USA
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Andrews PW, Maslej MM, Thomson Jr. JA, Hollon SD. Disordered doctors or rational rats? Testing adaptationist and disorder hypotheses for melancholic depression and their relevance for clinical psychology. Clin Psychol Rev 2020; 82:101927. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cpr.2020.101927] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2019] [Revised: 09/26/2020] [Accepted: 09/30/2020] [Indexed: 01/13/2023]
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Wakefield JC. Addiction from the harmful dysfunction perspective: How there can be a mental disorder in a normal brain. Behav Brain Res 2020; 389:112665. [PMID: 32348870 DOI: 10.1016/j.bbr.2020.112665] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/24/2019] [Revised: 01/29/2020] [Accepted: 04/21/2020] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Abstract
Is addiction a medical disorder, and if so, what kind of disorder is it? Addiction is considered a brain disease by NIDA, based on observed brain changes in addicts that are interpreted as brain damage. Critics argue that the brain changes result instead from normal neuroplasticity and learning in response to the intense rewards provided by addictive substances, thus addiction is not a disorder but rather a series of normal-range if problematic choices. Relying on the harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder to evaluate disorder versus nondisorder status, I argue that even if one accepts the critics' reinterpretation of NIDA's brain evidence and rejects the brain disease account, the critics' conclusion that addiction is not a medical disorder but is rather a matter of problematic nondisordered choice does not follow. This is because there is a further possible account of addiction, the evolutionary "hijack" view, that holds that addiction is due to the availability of substances and stimuli that were unavailable during human species evolution and that coopt certain brain areas concerned with human motivation, creating biologically undesigned peremptory desires. I argue that if the hijack theory is correct, then it opens up the possibility that addiction could be a true motivational medical disorder for which there is no underlying neurological-level dysfunction. Finally, I explore the implications of this account for how we see the social responsibility for addiction and how we attempt to control it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- Silver School of Social Work, Department of Psychiatry, and Center for Bioethics, New York University, 1 Washington Square North, New York, NY 10025, United States.
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Affiliation(s)
- Colin G. DeYoung
- Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
| | - Robert F. Krueger
- Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
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Wakefield JC, Lorenzo-Luaces L, Lee JJ. Taking People as They Are: Evolutionary Psychopathology, Uncomplicated Depression, and Distinction between Normal and Disordered Sadness. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 2017. [DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-60576-0_2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
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Wakefield JC. Addiction and the Concept of Disorder, Part 2: Is every Mental Disorder a Brain Disorder? NEUROETHICS-NETH 2016. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-016-9301-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/23/2022]
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Wakefield JC. Diagnostic Issues and Controversies in DSM-5: Return of the False Positives Problem. Annu Rev Clin Psychol 2016; 12:105-32. [PMID: 26772207 DOI: 10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032814-112800] [Citation(s) in RCA: 78] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
The fifth revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was the most controversial in the manual's history. This review selectively surveys some of the most important changes in DSM-5, including structural/organizational changes, modifications of diagnostic criteria, and newly introduced categories. It analyzes why these changes led to such heated controversies, which included objections to the revision's process, its goals, and the content of altered criteria and new categories. The central focus is on disputes concerning the false positives problem of setting a valid boundary between disorder and normal variation. Finally, this review highlights key problems and issues that currently remain unresolved and need to be addressed in the future, including systematically identifying false positive weaknesses in criteria, distinguishing risk from disorder, including context in diagnostic criteria, clarifying how to handle fuzzy boundaries, and improving the guidelines for "other specified" diagnosis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- NYU Silver School of Social Work, New York University, New York, NY 10003.,Department of Psychiatry, NYU School of Medicine, New York University, New York, NY 10016;
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Abstract
This essay replies to critics since 1995 of my "biostatistical theory" (BST) of health. According to the BST, a pathological condition is a state of statistically species-subnormal biological part-functional ability, relative to sex and age. Theoretical health, the total absence of pathological conditions, is then a value-free scientific notion. Recent critics offer a mixture of old and new objections to this analysis. Some new ones relate to choice of reference class, situation-specificity of function, common diseases and healthy populations, improvements in population health, the practice of pathologists, "Cambridge changes" in health status, and comparative vs. absolute health concepts. I make no changes in doctrine, except to consider treating "normal aging" as pathological by taking young adults as the standard for all adults.
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Almeida JJRLD. Psiquiatria e nomeação. REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE PSICOPATOLOGIA FUNDAMENTAL 2015. [DOI: 10.1590/1415-4714.2015v18n2p352.12] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Quanto mais intensas as discussões sobre as classificações psiquiátricas, mais exigente se torna a necessidade de uma atenção cuidadosa sobre a lógica pela qual se enquadra e se desenvolve a clínica dos transtornos mentais. Seus problemas específicos de nomeação deveriam ser resolvidos pelo instrumento de trabalho mais adequado para este tipo de tarefa, que deveria ser, considerando a sua natureza, uma lógica plurivalente. Em vista disso, discuto aspectos lógicos da proposta de Peter Zachar conhecida como nominalismo instrumental.
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Wakefield JC, Schmitz MF. The harmful dysfunction model of alcohol use disorder: revised criteria to improve the validity of diagnosis and prevalence estimates. Addiction 2015; 110:931-42. [PMID: 25622535 DOI: 10.1111/add.12859] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2014] [Revised: 10/31/2014] [Accepted: 01/14/2015] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
AIMS To formulate harmful dysfunction (HD) diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder (AUD) and test whether they increase validity relative to standard DSM criteria, as evidenced by lowered prevalence, increased validator levels including service use, severity and family history and enhanced specificity. DESIGN DSM-IV AUD, DSM-IV dependence, DSM-5 AUD and HD AUD definitions were compared on eight validity related tests using nationally representative community data. SETTING United States. PARTICIPANTS National Epidemiologic Survey of Alcoholism and Related Conditions (NESARC) respondents, aged 18-54 years (wave 1, n = 29 673; wave 2, n = 24 244). MEASURES NESARC DSM-IV and DSM-5 criteria were taken from published studies. Whereas DSM-5 diagnosis requires any two AUD symptoms, HD criteria were constructed from NESARC items to require symptoms of both impaired-control dysfunction [withdrawal, drink to prevent/stop withdrawal, cannot stop/reduce drinking, or craving (wave 2 only)] and harm (sacrificed important activities, problems caring for home/family, job/school problems, health problems, psychological problems or problems with family/friends). Validators included service use, severity and family history, among others. Specificity was tested using a teen transient drinker criterion group. FINDINGS Compared with DSM-5 AUD (DSM-IV results were similar), HD criteria yielded lower prevalence (95% confidence intervals): HD life-time 6.7% (6.2, 7.2%), 1-year 2.3% (2.0, 2.5%); and DSM-5 life-time 38.2% (36.5, 39.9%), 1-year 12.4% (11.7, 13.1%). HD AUD was higher than DSM-5 on pathology validators, including: life-time alcohol-related service use: HD 41.0% (38.1, 43.9%), DSM-5 11.5% (10.7, 12.3%); severity (number of life-time alcohol symptoms): HD 20.8 (20.4, 21.2), DSM-5 10.6 (10.4, 10.8); and family history of alcohol problems: HD 50.1% (47.3, 52.9), DSM-5 32.8% (31.6, 34.0). HD criteria eliminated 83% of a DSM-5 teen transient drinker false-positives criterion group. CONCLUSIONS Prevalence estimates of alcohol use disorder are lowered and diagnostic validity improved when using 'harmful dysfunction' diagnostic criteria compared with standard DSM criteria, partly by reducing misdiagnosis of teenage transient drinkers.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- School of Social Work and Department of Psychiatry, New York University, New York, NY,, USA
| | - Mark F Schmitz
- School of Social Work, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA,, USA
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Abstract
The revision effort leading to the publication of the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was flawed in process, goals and outcome. The revision process suffered from lack of an adequate public record of the rationale for changes, thus shortchanging future scholarship. The goals, such as dimensionalising diagnosis, incorporating biomarkers and separating impairment from diagnosis, were ill-considered and mostly abandoned. However, DSM-5's greatest problem, and the target of the most vigorous and sustained criticism, was its failure to take seriously the false positives problem. By expanding diagnosis beyond plausible boundaries in ways inconsistent with DSM-5's own definition of disorder, DSM-5 threatened the validity of psychiatric research, including especially psychiatric epidemiology. I present four examples: increasing the symptom options while decreasing the diagnostic threshold for substance use disorder, elimination of the bereavement exclusion from major depression, allowing verbal arguments as evidence of intermittent explosive disorder and expanding attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder to adults before addressing its manifest false positives problems.
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Kingma E. Naturalism about health and disease: adding nuance for progress. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2014; 39:590-608. [PMID: 25376497 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhu037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 50] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The literature on health and diseases is usually presented as an opposition between naturalism and normativism. This article argues that such a picture is too simplistic: there is not one opposition between naturalism and normativism, but many. I distinguish four different domains where naturalist and normativist claims can be contrasted: (1) ordinary usage, (2) conceptually clean versions of "health" and "disease," (3) the operationalization of dysfunction, and (4) the justification for that operationalization. In the process I present new arguments in response to Schwartz (2007) and Hausman (2012) and expose a link between the arguments made by Schwartz (2007) and Kingma (2010). Distinguishing naturalist claims at these four domains will allow us to make progress by (1) providing more nuanced, intermediate positions about a possible role for values in health and disease; and (2) assisting in the addressing of relativistic worries about the value-ladenness of health and disease.
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Wakefield JC. The biostatistical theory versus the harmful dysfunction analysis, part 1: is part-dysfunction a sufficient condition for medical disorder? THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2014; 39:648-82. [PMID: 25336733 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhu038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Christopher Boorse's biostatistical theory of medical disorder claims that biological part-dysfunction (i.e., failure of an internal mechanism to perform its biological function), a factual criterion, is both necessary and sufficient for disorder. Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder agrees that part-dysfunction is necessary but rejects the sufficiency claim, maintaining that disorder also requires that the part-dysfunction causes harm to the individual, a value criterion. In this paper, I present two considerations against the sufficiency claim. First, I analyze Boorse's central argument for the sufficiency claim, the "pathologist argument," which takes pathologists' intuitions about pathology as determinative of medical disorder and conclude that it begs the question and fails to support the sufficiency claim. Second, I present four counterexamples from the medical literature in which salient part-dysfunctions are considered nondisorders, including healthy disease carriers, HIV-positive status, benign mutations, and situs inversus totalis, thus falsifying the sufficiency claim and supporting the harm criterion.
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Ghaemi SN, Dalley S, Catania C, Barroilhet S. Bipolar or borderline: a clinical overview. Acta Psychiatr Scand 2014; 130:99-108. [PMID: 24571137 DOI: 10.1111/acps.12257] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/23/2014] [Indexed: 01/01/2023]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE To examine the empirical literature on diagnostic validators in borderline personality and bipolar illness. METHOD Using principles of evidence-based medicine, the highest levels of evidence were emphasized in interpretation of similarities or differences between bipolar illness and borderline personality on the five standard diagnostic validators in psychiatric nosology: symptoms, course, genetics, treatment response, and neurobiology. RESULTS Bipolar illness and borderline personality were found to be similar in the nosological validator of symptoms of mood lability and impulsivity, but differed notably on all other diagnostic validators, especially the course validator of past sexual abuse and the genetic validator of a bipolar family history. They also differ notably in the symptom validator of parasuicidal self-harm. Treatment response and neurobiological differences were also present and consistent. CONCLUSION This review of the literature indicates that these two conditions, bipolar illness and borderline personality, are different and can be distinguished. The much stronger biological and genetic evidence for bipolar illness in particular suggests that the two conditions can be reasonably seen as different kinds of clinical entities, namely a biological disease versus a psychosocially caused clinical picture. If this interpretation is correct, similarities between the two conditions, such as mood lability and impulsivity, are superficial, while differences are profound. Further, true comorbidity may be much less common than often presumed.
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Affiliation(s)
- S N Ghaemi
- Mood Disorders Program, Department of Psychiatry, Tufts Medical Center, Boston, MA, USA; Tufts University School of Medicine, Boston, MA, USA
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First MB, Wakefield JC. Diagnostic criteria as dysfunction indicators: bridging the chasm between the definition of mental disorder and diagnostic criteria for specific disorders. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY. REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHIATRIE 2013; 58:663-9. [PMID: 24331285 DOI: 10.1177/070674371305801203] [Citation(s) in RCA: 67] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
According to the introduction to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Fifth Edition, each disorder must satisfy the definition of mental disorder, which requires the presence of both harm and dysfunction. Constructing criteria sets to require harm is relatively straightforward. However, establishing the presence of dysfunction is necessarily inferential because of the lack of knowledge of internal psychological and biological processes and their functions and dysfunctions. Given that virtually every psychiatric symptom characteristic of a DSM disorder can occur under some circumstances in a normally functioning person, diagnostic criteria based on symptoms must be constructed so that the symptoms indicate an internal dysfunction, and are thus inherently pathosuggestive. In this paper, we review strategies used in DSM criteria sets for increasing the pathosuggestiveness of symptoms to ensure that the disorder meets the requirements of the definition of mental disorder. Strategies include the following: requiring a minimum duration and persistence; requiring that the frequency or intensity of a symptom exceed that seen in normal people; requiring disproportionality of symptoms, given the context; requiring pervasiveness of symptom expression across contexts; adding specific exclusions for contextual scenarios in which symptoms are best understood as normal reactions; combining symptoms to increase cumulative pathosuggestiveness; and requiring enough symptoms from an overall syndrome to meet a minimum threshold of pathosuggestiveness. We propose that future revisions of the DSM consider systematic implementation of these strategies in the construction and revision of criteria sets, with the goal of maximizing the pathosuggestiveness of diagnostic criteria to reduce the potential for diagnostic false positives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael B First
- Professor of Clinical Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York, New York; Research Psychiatrist, Division of Clinical Phenomenology, New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, New York
| | - Jerome C Wakefield
- Professor of Social Work, Silver School of Social Work, New York University, New York, New York; Professor of Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, New York University, New York, New York
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Hubbeling D. Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.681867] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
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Wakefield JC, First MB. Clarifying the boundary between normality and disorder: a fundamental conceptual challenge for psychiatry. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY. REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHIATRIE 2013; 58:603-5. [PMID: 24246429 DOI: 10.1177/070674371305801104] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- Professor of Social Work, Silver School of Social Work, New York University, New York, New York; Professor of Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, New York University, New York, New York
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The DSM-5 debate over the bereavement exclusion: Psychiatric diagnosis and the future of empirically supported treatment. Clin Psychol Rev 2013; 33:825-45. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cpr.2013.03.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2013] [Revised: 03/29/2013] [Accepted: 03/29/2013] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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Rashed MA. Psychiatric judgments across cultural contexts: relativist, clinical-ethnographic, and universalist-scientific perspectives. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2013; 38:128-48. [PMID: 23459177 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jht003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Psychiatrists encounter persons from diverse cultures who profess experiences (e.g., communicating with spirits) that evoke intuitions of abnormality. This view might not be shared with the person or her/his cultural peers, raising questions concerning the justification of such intuitions. This article explores three positions relevant to the process of justification. The relativist position transfers powers of judgment to the subject's peers yet neglects individual values and operates with a discredited holistic view of culture. The clinical-ethnographic position remedies this by suspending judgment subject to understanding the individual in a sociocultural context yet finds objections with the universalist-scientific position: objective standards exist and could justify intuitions of abnormality cross-culturally. This article argues that the claim to objectivity is value-laden, reflecting instead a brand of normality and relationship to reality further upheld through epistemological utility and valued technological progress. In conclusion, it is suggested that the clinical-ethnographic position takes personal values and context seriously, both of which are crucial for responsible clinical practice.
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Rind B, Yuill R. Hebephilia as mental disorder? A historical, cross-cultural, sociological, cross-species, non-clinical empirical, and evolutionary review. ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 2012; 41:797-829. [PMID: 22739816 DOI: 10.1007/s10508-012-9982-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2009] [Revised: 08/24/2011] [Accepted: 08/24/2011] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
Abstract
Blanchard et al. (2009) demonstrated that hebephilia is a genuine sexual preference, but then proposed, without argument or evidence, that it should be designated as a mental disorder in the DSM-5. A series of Letters-to-the-Editor criticized this proposal as a non sequitur. Blanchard (2009), in rebuttal, reaffirmed his position, but without adequately addressing some central criticisms. In this article, we examine hebephilia-as-disorder in full detail. Unlike Blanchard et al., we discuss definitions of mental disorder, examine extensive evidence from a broad range of sources, and consider alternative (i.e., non-pathological) explanations for hebephilia. We employed Wakefield's (1992b) harmful dysfunction approach to disorder, which holds that a condition only counts as a disorder when it is a failure of a naturally selected mechanism to function as designed, which is harmful to the individual in the current environment. We also considered a harmful-for-others approach to disorder (Brülde, 2007). Examination of historical, cross-cultural, sociological, cross-species, non-clinical empirical, and evolutionary evidence and perspectives indicated that hebephilic interest is an evolved capacity and hebephilic preference an expectable distributional variant, both of which were adaptively neutral or functional, not dysfunctional, in earlier human environments. Hebephilia's conflict with modern society makes it an evolutionary mismatch, not a genuine disorder. Though it should not be classified as a disorder, it could be entered in the DSM's V-code [corrected] section, used for non-disordered conditions that create significant problems in present-day society.
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Wakefield JC. DSM-5 proposed diagnostic criteria for sexual paraphilias: tensions between diagnostic validity and forensic utility. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 2011; 34:195-209. [PMID: 21531463 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2011.04.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/30/2023]
Abstract
In order to prevent sexual crimes, "sexual predator" laws now allow indefinite preventive civil commitment of criminals who have completed their prison sentences but are judged to have a paraphilic mental disorder that makes them likely to commit another crime. Such proceedings can bypass the usual protections of criminal law as long as the basis for incarceration is the attribution of a mental disorder. Thus, the difficult conceptual distinction between deviant sexual desires that are mental disorders versus those that are normal variations in sexual preference (even if they are eccentric, repugnant, or illegal if acted upon) has attained critical forensic significance. Yet, the concept of paraphilic disorders - called "perversions" in earlier times - is inherently fuzzy and controversial and thus open to conceptual abuse for social control purposes. Consequently, the criteria used in diagnosing paraphilic disorders deserve careful scrutiny. The DSM-5 sexual disorders work group is proposing substantial revisions to the paraphilia diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 nosology. It is claimed that the new criteria provide a reconceptualization that clarifies the distinction between normal variation and paraphilic disorder in a way relevant to forensic settings. In this article, after considering the logic of the concept of a paraphilic disorder, I examine each of the proposed changes to the DSM-5 paraphilia criteria and assess their conceptual validity. I argue that the DSM-5 proposals, while containing a kernel of an advance in distinguishing paraphilias from paraphilic disorders, nonetheless would yield criteria for paraphilic disorders that are conceptually invalid in ways open to serious forensic abuse.
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Varga S. Defining mental disorder. Exploring the 'natural function' approach. Philos Ethics Humanit Med 2011; 6:1. [PMID: 21255405 PMCID: PMC3031189 DOI: 10.1186/1747-5341-6-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2010] [Accepted: 01/21/2011] [Indexed: 05/12/2023] Open
Abstract
Due to several socio-political factors, to many psychiatrists only a strictly objective definition of mental disorder, free of value components, seems really acceptable. In this paper, I will explore a variant of such an objectivist approach to defining metal disorder, natural function objectivism. Proponents of this approach make recourse to the notion of natural function in order to reach a value-free definition of mental disorder. The exploration of Christopher Boorse's 'biostatistical' account of natural function (1) will be followed an investigation of the 'hybrid naturalism' approach to natural functions by Jerome Wakefield (2). In the third part, I will explore two proposals that call into question the whole attempt to define mental disorder (3). I will conclude that while 'natural function objectivism' accounts fail to provide the backdrop for a reliable definition of mental disorder, there is no compelling reason to conclude that a definition cannot be achieved.
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Affiliation(s)
- Somogy Varga
- Institute of Cognitive Science University of Osnabrueck, Germany.
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Wakefield JC. Misdiagnosing normality: Psychiatry's failure to address the problem of false positive diagnoses of mental disorder in a changing professional environment. J Ment Health 2010; 19:337-51. [PMID: 20636114 DOI: 10.3109/09638237.2010.492418] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND In psychiatry's transformation from primarily an asylum-based profession to a community-oriented profession, false positive diagnoses that mistakenly classify normal intense reactions to stress as mental disorders became a major challenge to the validity of psychiatric diagnosis. The shift to symptom-based operationalized diagnostic criteria in DSM-III further exacerbated this difficulty because of the contextually based nature of the distinction between normal distress and mental disorder, which often display similar symptoms. The problem has particular urgency because the DSM's symptom-based criteria are often applied in studies and screening instruments outside of the clinical context and by non-mental-health professionals. AIMS To consider, through selected examples, the degree of concern, systematicity and thoroughness - and the degree of success - with which recent revisions of the DSM have attended to the challenge of avoiding false positive diagnoses. METHOD Conceptual analysis of selected criteria sets, with a focus on possible counterexamples to the claim that DSM criteria imply disorder. RESULTS Psychiatry has so far failed to systematically adjust its diagnostic practices to confront the problem of false positives. Flaws in criteria, which can be recognized immediately by lay people, remain unaddressed or are addressed on a hit-or-miss random basis years after the flaw has been introduced, even though the issue is purely conceptual and is not sensitive to any new research information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- Silver School of Social Work and Department of Psychiatry, New York University, New York, NY 10025, USA.
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Abstract
The pivotal problem of comorbidity research lies in the psychometric foundation it rests on, that is, latent variable theory, in which a mental disorder is viewed as a latent variable that causes a constellation of symptoms. From this perspective, comorbidity is a (bi)directional relationship between multiple latent variables. We argue that such a latent variable perspective encounters serious problems in the study of comorbidity, and offer a radically different conceptualization in terms of a network approach, where comorbidity is hypothesized to arise from direct relations between symptoms of multiple disorders. We propose a method to visualize comorbidity networks and, based on an empirical network for major depression and generalized anxiety, we argue that this approach generates realistic hypotheses about pathways to comorbidity, overlapping symptoms, and diagnostic boundaries, that are not naturally accommodated by latent variable models: Some pathways to comorbidity through the symptom space are more likely than others; those pathways generally have the same direction (i.e., from symptoms of one disorder to symptoms of the other); overlapping symptoms play an important role in comorbidity; and boundaries between diagnostic categories are necessarily fuzzy.
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Wakefield JC. False positives in psychiatric diagnosis: implications for human freedom. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2010; 31:5-17. [PMID: 20232254 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-010-9132-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/28/2023]
Abstract
Current symptom-based DSM and ICD diagnostic criteria for mental disorders are prone to yielding false positives because they ignore the context of symptoms. This is often seen as a benign flaw because problems of living and emotional suffering, even if not true disorders, may benefit from support and treatment. However, diagnosis of a disorder in our society has many ramifications not only for treatment choice but for broader social reactions to the diagnosed individual. In particular, mental disorders impose a sick role on individuals and place a burden upon them to change; thus, disorders decrease the level of respect and acceptance generally accorded to those with even annoying normal variations in traits and features. Thus, minimizing false positives is important to a pluralistic society. The harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder is used to diagnose the sources of likely false positives, and propose potential remedies to the current weaknesses in the validity of diagnostic criteria.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- Silver School of Social Work and Department of Psychiatry, New York University, 1 Washington Square North, New York, NY, 10003, USA.
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Abstract
AbstractThe commentaries raise a host of challenging issues and reflect a broad range of views. Some commentators doubt that there is any convincing evidence for adaptive misbelief, and remain (in our view, unduly) wedded to our “default presumption” that misbelief is maladaptive. Others think that the evidence for adaptive misbelief is so obvious, and so widespread, that the label “default presumption” is disingenuous. We try to chart a careful course between these opposing perspectives.
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Leising D, Rogers K, Ostner J. The Undisordered Personality: Normative Assumptions Underlying Personality Disorder Diagnoses. REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 2009. [DOI: 10.1037/a0017139] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Clinical diagnoses are impossible without referring to normative assumptions about what is desirable functioning. In this paper, the authors explicate the implicit normative assumptions that seem to have guided the formulation of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ( DSM–IV) personality disorder (PD) criteria. Then the authors discuss various conceptual reference frames in which such assumptions may be grounded: (1) a given diagnostician's personal value system, (2) the expectations of the culture in which a person currently lives, (3) the expectations of the culture in which a person was raised, (4) models of “natural” personality functioning that are rooted in evolution theory, and (5) the presence of distress and/or impairment. In accordance with Wakefield (1992a , 2006 ), the authors argue that PD diagnoses necessarily involve both an evolutionary and a cultural component. If PDs were defined completely in cultural terms, investigating their biological underpinnings would be nonsensical. In addition, the values of any specific culture should not be given too much weight, because cultural expectations may themselves be harmful. Future editions of DSM should define personality pathology in less culture-relative terms, and address the inevitable issue of values more explicitly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Leising
- Department of Psychology, University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany
| | | | - Julia Ostner
- Courant Research Center “Evolution of Social Behaviour,” University of Göttingen, Germany
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Abstract
Because of their high prevalence and their negative long-term consequences, child anxiety disorders have become an important focus of interest. Whether pathological anxiety and normal fear are similar processes continues to be controversial. Comparative studies of child anxiety disorders are scarce, but there is some support for the current classification of anxiety disorders in children and adolescents, except for generalized anxiety disorder. The greatly differing rates of anxiety disorders in child population studies, and of specific disorders in clinical samples, inconsistent findings regarding course, and disparate placebo response rates all suggest a need for more precise, validated, criteria for symptoms, distress, and impairment. Several treatments have documented efficacy, and promising prevention efforts are encouraging.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rachel G Klein
- New York University Child Study Center, 215 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10016, USA.
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Rosen GM, Lilienfeld SO. Posttraumatic stress disorder: An empirical evaluation of core assumptions. Clin Psychol Rev 2008; 28:837-68. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cpr.2007.12.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 135] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/02/2007] [Revised: 12/15/2007] [Accepted: 12/17/2007] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
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Baptista T, Aldana E, Angeles F, Beaulieu S. Evolution theory: an overview of its applications in psychiatry. Psychopathology 2008; 41:17-27. [PMID: 17952017 DOI: 10.1159/000109951] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/23/2007] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVES (1) Describe the concept, mechanisms and outcome of evolution; (2) review the current topics in research and clinical psychiatry where evolutionary concepts are explicitly applied. METHODS The authors reviewed relevant textbooks of evolution, evolutionary psychiatry/psychology and articles in scientific journals, and discussed these topics in a college course at McGill University School of Medicine, Montreal, Canada. RESULTS (1) Most natural scientists agree that evolution has occurred in all living beings. However, the mechanisms and outcomes of evolution are controversial. (2) In the first three quarters of the 20th century, several authors provided theories about human psychology based on ethological concepts. The so-called evolutionary psychology/psychiatry developed more recently, and it explores the adaptive/nonadaptive features of psychopathology and mental disorders. In the 1990 s a concept of mental disorder (as a harmful dysfunction) based on evolutionary theory has been developed. CONCLUSIONS Evolution is a pivotal concept in biology with relevant applications in psychiatry. We suggest encouraging the interaction between psychiatric educators and researchers in evolutionary psychiatry and biology in order to improve the education of psychiatric residents in this subject.
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Affiliation(s)
- Trino Baptista
- Department of Physiology, Los Andes University Medical School, Mérida, Venezuela.
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Abstract
The Five-factor model (FFM) provides a viable dimensional model of personality disorder assessment. Advantages of the FFM include the provision of a precise yet comprehensive description of both normal and abnormal personality functioning, the avoidance of the many limitations and problems inherent to the categorical diagnostic system, and the incorporation of basic science research on general personality structure and functioning into clinicians' description and understanding of personality disorders. We discuss three alternative instruments for the assessment of personality disorder from the perspective of the FFM. We also provide a method for diagnosing personality disorders and illustrate its application through a case study.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas A Widiger
- Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0044, USA.
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Pérez-Álvarez M, García-Montes JM. The Charcot Effect: The Invention of Mental Illnesses. JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTIVIST PSYCHOLOGY 2007. [DOI: 10.1080/10720530701503843] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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The myth of open concepts: Meehl’s analysis of construct meaning versus black box essentialism. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2004. [DOI: 10.1016/j.appsy.2004.02.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
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Abstract
The harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis holds that disorder, mental or physical, requires harm, a value criterion, and dysfunction, a factual criterion referring to failure of a mechanism to perform a naturally selected function. Houts' arguments that the HD analysis does not offer an adequate factual account of dysfunction are examined and shown to be invalid. For example, his claim that the HD analysis confuses function with purpose, a value concept, ignores the analysis'account of function in terms of the value-free notion of effect-explanation; and his argument that functions imply norms (e.g., what mechanisms are 'supposed to' do) falsely assumes that such norms are evaluative. The HD analysis of function is analogous in logical structure to the functional analyst's factual behavioral notion of function. Houts' value account of disorder is inconsistent with people's classificatory judgments, as his own examples demonstrate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jerome C Wakefield
- Institute for Health, Health Care Policy and Aging Research, Rutgers--The State University of New Jersey, 30 College Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ 08903, USA.
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Houts AC. Harmful dysfunction and the search for value neutrality in the definition of mental disorder: response to Wakefield, part 2. Behav Res Ther 2001; 39:1099-132. [PMID: 11520014 DOI: 10.1016/s0005-7967(01)00053-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Wakefield's claims to have identified and objective scientific component of mental disorders in the concept of dysfunction are examined in light of previous attempts to state a value free concept of mental disorders. The harmful dysfunction concept of dysfunction is not value free because it confounds cause and purpose in a specious use of evolutionary theory and because evolutionary theory cannot reliably supply standards for when a function is broken. Harmful dysfunction analysis collapses into a value-laden concept of mental disorders and serves the untoward goal of promoting the status quo in the modern DSMs. If the concept of dysfunction were taken seriously and rigorously defined, then it might be possible to separate what is medical from what is not in the domain of mental disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
- A C Houts
- University of Memphis, Department of Psychology, TN 38152 6400, USA.
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Wakefield JC. Evolutionary history versus current causal role in the definition of disorder: reply to McNally. Behav Res Ther 2001; 39:347-66. [PMID: 11227814 DOI: 10.1016/s0005-7967(00)00070-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
The harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis (Wakefield, American Psychologist 47 (1992a) 373) asserts that "disorder" means "harmful dysfunction", where "harm" is a value concept anchored in social values and "dysfunction" is a factual concept referring to failure of a mechanism to perform a natural function. Additionally, the HD analysis claims that a mechanism's natural functions are its naturally selected effects. McNally (Behaviour Research and Therapy (2000) pp. 309-314) argues to the contrary that "dysfunction" is a value concept referring to negative failures of function, that "function" refers to current causal roles and not evolutionarily designed causal roles, and that "disorder" consequently means "harmful failure of a mechanism to perform a valued current causal role." I reply by showing that McNally's proposals lack the HD analysis's power to explain common judgments about function, dysfunction, and disorder. "Dysfunction" cannot be a negative value concept because many dysfunctions are positive or neutral; "function" cannot refer to current causal roles because many current causal roles are not functions and some functions are not current causal roles; and "disorder" cannot refer to harmful failures of current causal roles because that definition allows almost any negative condition whatever to be a disorder and thus fails to explain the distinctions we make between disorder and non-disorder.
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