Effects of emotion and age on performance during a think/no-think memory task

Increase in physiological inhibitory control results in better suppression of unwanted memories

Forgetting or suppressing a memory with unwanted content is just as important as remembering a desirable one. In addition to emphasizing the role of inhibitory control in memory suppression processes, neuropsychological studies have indicated that an intentional inhibition targeting a brain area may exert its inhibitory effects in seemingly unrelated areas through a common inhibitory network. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether the suppression of unwanted memories can be strengthened by recruiting an inhibitory task that can be simultaneously performed with a memory suppression task. Therefore, we manipulated the level of urinary urgency-induced inhibition of participants (N = 180) and test its effect on the suppression of unwanted memories using a Think/No-Think (T/NT) task. The results of our study indicated that individuals with high levels of urinary urgency demonstrated greater memory suppression compared to those with low urinary urgency. Findings and their implications are discussed within the context of cognitive and clinical perspectives, and recommendations are made for future research.

Suppression-induced forgetting: a pre-registered replication of the think/no-think paradigm

Post-traumatic stress disorder is characterised by recurring memories of a traumatic experience despite deliberate attempts to forget (i.e., suppression). The Think/No-Think (TNT) task has been used widely in the laboratory to study suppression-induced forgetting. During the task, participants learn a series of cue-target word pairs. Subsequently, they are presented with a subset of the cue words and are instructed to think (respond items) or not think about the corresponding target (suppression items). Baseline items are not shown during this phase. Successful suppression-induced forgetting is indicated by the reduced recall of suppression compared to baseline items in recall tests using either the same or different cues than originally studied (i.e., same- and independent-probe tests, respectively). The current replication was a pre-registered collaborative effort to evaluate an online experimenter-present version of the paradigm in 150 English-speaking healthy individuals (89 females; MAge = 31.14, SDAge = 7.73). Overall, we did not replicate the suppression-induced forgetting effect (same-probe: BF01 = 7.84; d = 0.03 [95% CI: -0.13; 0.20]; independent-probe: BF01 = 5.71; d = 0.06 [95% CI: -0.12; 0.24]). These null results should be considered in light of our online implementation of the paradigm. Nevertheless, our findings call into question the robustness of suppression-induced forgetting.

Task compliance predicts suppression-induced forgetting in a large sample

Suppression-induced forgetting (SIF) refers to a memory impairment resulting from repeated attempts to stop the retrieval of unwanted memory associates. SIF has become established in the literature through a growing number of reports built upon the Think/No-Think (TNT) paradigm. Not all individuals and not all reported experiments yield reliable forgetting, however. Given the reliance on task instructions to motivate participants to suppress target memories, such inconsistencies in SIF may reasonably owe to differences in compliance or expectations as to whether they will again need to retrieve those items (on, say, a final test). We tested these possibilities on a large (N = 497) sample of TNT participants. In addition to successfully replicating SIF, we found that the magnitude of the effect was significantly and negatively correlated with participants’ reported compliance during the No-Think trials. This pattern held true on both same- and independent-probe measures of forgetting, as well as when the analysis was conditionalized on initial learning. In contrast, test expectancy was not associated with SIF. Supporting previous intuition and more limited post-hoc examinations, this study provides robust evidence that a lack of compliance with No-Think instructions significantly compromises SIF. As such, it suggests that diminished effects in some studies may owe, at least in part, to non-compliance—a factor that should be carefully tracked and/or controlled. Motivated forgetting is possible, provided that one is sufficiently motivated and capable of following the task instructions.

Forgetting Unwanted Memories: Active Forgetting and Implications for the Development of Psychological Disorders

Intrusive memories are a common feature of many psychopathologies, and suppression-induced forgetting of unwanted memories appears as a critical ability to preserve mental health. In recent years, biological and cognitive studies converged in revealing that forgetting is due to active processes. Recent neurobiological studies provide evidence on the active role of main neurotransmitter systems in forgetting, suggesting that the brain actively works to suppress retrieval of unwanted memories. On the cognitive side, there is evidence that voluntary and involuntary processes (here termed "intentional" and "incidental" forgetting, respectively) contribute to active forgetting. In intentional forgetting, an inhibitory control mechanism suppresses awareness of unwanted memories at encoding or retrieval. In incidental forgetting, retrieval practice of some memories involuntarily suppresses the retrieval of other related memories. In this review we describe recent findings on deficits in active forgetting observed in psychopathologies, like post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Moreover, we report studies in which the role of neurotransmitter systems, known to be involved in the pathogenesis of mental disorders, has been investigated in active forgetting paradigms. The possibility that biological and cognitive mechanisms of active forgetting could be considered as hallmarks of the early onset of psychopathologies is also discussed.

Neural evidence that disengaging memory retrieval is modulated by stimulus valence and rumination

To remember information from our personal past we need to be in a cognitive state where we treat stimuli as cues for memory retrieval. In this study we considered whether participants could exert control and disengage from a memory state when it was no longer required for the task at hand. In particular, we examined whether this ability was affected by the valence of the stimuli and participant's rumination scores. After a study phase participants completed test blocks where the task switched every two trials between a memory task (retrieving information from the study phase) and a perceptual task. Even though there was no episodic memory requirement in the perceptual task, a well-established event-related potential (ERP) index of memory retrieval was present for both trials when the stimuli were negative valenced pictures but not for neutral pictures. Furthermore, there was a positive correlation between the magnitude of this ERP memory index in the perceptual task and rumination scores but only for neutral stimuli and not negative. Thus, in this study participants generally had difficultly suppressing memory retrieval when negative stimuli were presented. However, for neutral stimuli only ruminators were more susceptible to memory intrusions.

Retrieval of Emotional Events from Memory

The enhancing effects of emotion on memory have been well documented; emotional events are often more frequently and more vividly remembered than their neutral counterparts. Much of the prior research has emphasized the effects of emotion on encoding processes and the downstream effects of these changes at the time of retrieval. In the current review, we focus specifically on how emotional valence influences retrieval processes, examining how emotion influences the experience of remembering an event at the time of retrieval (retrieval as an end point) as well as how emotion alters the way in which remembering the event affects the underlying memory representation and subsequent retrievals (retrieval as a starting point). We suggest ways in which emotion may augment or interfere with the selective enhancement of particular memory details, using both online and offline processes, and discuss how these effects of emotion may contribute to memory distortions in affective disorders.

Aging and the prevalence of 'ironic' action errors under avoidant instruction

Action errors can put older adults at risk of injury. Our study is the first to investigate whether older adults are more prone than younger adults to making 'ironic' motor errors (i.e., actions they have been instructed not to perform), or over-compensatory motor errors (e.g., moving more to the right when instructed not to move to the left). We also investigated whether error patterns change under cognitive load, and assessed whether age effects in the ability to inhibit a prohibited action are comparable to the age decrements found in the ability to inhibit a natural perception-action coupling in the Simon task. Sixty-four older (Mean = 70.64 years, SD = 5.81) and 39 younger (Mean = 28.74 years, SD = 16.39) adults completed an avoidant instruction line-drawing task (with and without cognitive load), and the Simon task. Older adults showed significantly slower inhibition times than younger adults on the Simon task, as expected, and in line with previous research. Surprisingly, however, older adults outperformed younger adults on the avoidant instruction task, producing fewer ironic and over-compensatory errors, and they performed similarly to the younger adults under cognitive load. Age-related decrements on the Simon but not the avoidant instruction task suggests that the two different types of motor tasks involve different subtypes of inhibition which likely recruit independent cognitive processes and neural circuitry in older age. It is speculated that the older adults' superior ability to inhibit a prohibited action could be the result of age-related changes in distractibility.

What doesn't kill you makes you stronger: Psychological trauma and its relationship to enhanced memory control

Control processes engaged in halting the automatic retrieval of unwanted memories have been shown to reduce the later recallability of the targets of suppression. Like other cognitive skills that benefit from practice, we hypothesized that memory control is similarly experience dependent, such that individuals with greater real-life experience at stopping retrieval would exhibit better inhibitory control over unwanted memories. Across two experiments, we found that college students reporting a greater history of trauma exhibited more suppression-induced forgetting of both negative and neutral memories than did those in a matched group who had reported experiencing little to no trauma. The association was especially evident on a test of suppression-induced forgetting involving independent retrieval cues that are designed to better isolate the effects of inhibitory control on memory. Participants reporting more trauma demonstrated greater generalized forgetting of suppressed material. These findings raise the possibility that, given proper training, individuals can learn to better manage intrusive experiences, and are broadly consistent with the view that moderate adversity can foster resilience later in life. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

On the Very-Long-Term Effect of Managing One's Own Memory: The Intention to Forget Improves Recognition After a Year's Delay

While such factors as demand characteristics, encoding, and retrieval inhibition were shown to be significant in producing the directed forgetting effect, no attention was paid to whether the intention to manage one's own memory, per se, matters. In the present article, we addressed this important gap in the literature. To control the quality of encoding we ensured that both the to-be-remembered (TBR) and to-be-forgotten (TBF) items were genuinely learned before the manipulation. We used extremely long delays between the memory instructions and testing to release inhibition associated with the content of instructions. 98 participants demonstrated flawless recall of 12 Russian - made up language word pairs. They then viewed each Russian word from a pair once, with randomized instructions "Forget", "Remember", "Repeat", or a short cognitive task. Self-reports on the mnemonic strategies were collected. Free recall and recognition tests were administered three times - 45 minutes, a month and a year (N = 58) later. Despite a strong incentive to recall all word pairs, fewer TBF pairs were recalled in comparison with TBR pairs, both after 45 minutes and after one month's delay. Recognition among all conditions was equally high. A year later free recall was close to zero. In contrast, the TBR and TBF pairs were recognized equally better than pairs presented in "Repeat" and "Task" conditions. Thus, our results show that the intention to manage one's own memory enhances the accessibility of memories at a very long time delay, no matter what type of instruction is issued.

Successfully controlling intrusive memories is harder when control must be sustained

After unpleasant events, people often experience intrusive memories that undermine their peace of mind. In response, they often suppress these unwanted memories from awareness. Such efforts may fail, however, when inhibitory control demands are high due to the need to sustain control, or when fatigue compromises inhibitory capacity. Here we examined how sustained inhibitory demand affected intrusive memories in the Think/No-Think paradigm. To isolate intrusions, participants reported, trial-by-trial, whether their preceding attempt to suppress retrieval had triggered retrieval of the memory they intended to suppress. Such counter-intentional retrievals provide a laboratory model of the sort of involuntary retrieval that may underlie intrusive memories. Using this method, we found that longer duration trials increased the probability of an intrusion. Moreover, on later No-Think trials, control over intrusions suddenly declined, with longer trial durations triggering more relapses of items that had been previously been purged. Thus, the challenges of controlling retrieval appear to cause a decline in control over time, due to a change in state, such as fatigue. These findings raise the possibility that characteristics often true of people with psychiatric disorders - such as compromised sleep, and increased demand on control - may contribute to difficulties in suppressing intrusive memories.

Successful Goal-Directed Memory Suppression is Associated With Increased Inter-Hemispheric Coordination Between Right and Left Frontoparietal Control Networks

The neural basis of suppressing conscious access to one’s own memories has recently received considerable attention, with several studies suggesting this process engages frontal-parietal cognitive control regions. However, researchers to date have not examined the way right and left hemisphere cognitive control networks coordinate with one another to accomplish this. We had 48 participants (25 female) complete a Think/No Think (T/NT) task for memories of emotionally unpleasant visual scenes while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. We used generalized psychophysiologic interaction analyses to examine functional connectivity between right and left hemisphere frontal-parietal regions during memory suppression. Participants who were better at memory suppression, as assessed by greater numbers of forgotten memories in the NT than T conditions, also showed greater functional connectivity between multiple right and left hemisphere control regions. This suggests that individual differences in memory suppression ability may be partially explained by differences in task-specific inter-hemispheric coordination.

Parallel Regulation of Memory and Emotion Supports the Suppression of Intrusive Memories

Intrusive memories often take the form of distressing images that emerge into a person's awareness, unbidden. A fundamental goal of clinical neuroscience is to understand the mechanisms allowing people to control these memory intrusions and reduce their emotional impact. Mnemonic control engages a right frontoparietal network that interrupts episodic retrieval by modulating hippocampal activity; less is known, however, about how this mechanism contributes to affect regulation. Here we report evidence in humans (males and females) that stopping episodic retrieval to suppress an unpleasant image triggers parallel inhibition of mnemonic and emotional content. Using fMRI, we found that regulation of both mnemonic and emotional content was driven by a shared frontoparietal inhibitory network and was predicted by a common profile of medial temporal lobe downregulation involving the anterior hippocampus and the amygdala. Critically, effective connectivity analysis confirmed that reduced amygdala activity was not merely an indirect consequence of hippocampal suppression; rather, both the hippocampus and the amygdala were targeted by a top-down inhibitory control signal originating from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This negative coupling was greater when unwanted memories intruded into awareness and needed to be purged. Together, these findings support the broad principle that retrieval suppression is achieved by regulating hippocampal processes in tandem with domain-specific brain regions involved in reinstating specific content, in an activity-dependent fashion.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Upsetting events sometimes trigger intrusive images that cause distress and that may contribute to psychiatric disorders. People often respond to intrusions by suppressing their retrieval, excluding them from awareness. Here we examined whether suppressing aversive images might also alter emotional responses to them, and the mechanisms underlying such changes. We found that the better people were at suppressing intrusions, the more it reduced their emotional responses to suppressed images. These dual effects on memory and emotion originated from a common right prefrontal cortical mechanism that downregulated the hippocampus and amygdala in parallel. Thus, suppressing intrusions affected emotional content. Importantly, participants who did not suppress intrusions well showed increased negative affect, suggesting that suppression deficits render people vulnerable to psychiatric disorders.

Visual Acuity does not Moderate Effect Sizes of Higher-Level Cognitive Tasks

BACKGROUND/STUDY CONTEXT

Declining visual capacities in older adults have been posited as a driving force behind adult age differences in higher-order cognitive functions (e.g., the "common cause" hypothesis of Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994, Psychology and Aging, 9, 339-355). McGowan, Patterson, and Jordan (2013, Experimental Aging Research, 39, 70-79) also found that a surprisingly large number of published cognitive aging studies failed to include adequate measures of visual acuity. However, a recent meta-analysis of three studies (La Fleur and Salthouse, 2014, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, 1202-1208) failed to find evidence that visual acuity moderated or mediated age differences in higher-level cognitive processes. In order to provide a more extensive test of whether visual acuity moderates age differences in higher-level cognitive processes, we conducted a more extensive meta-analysis of topic.

METHODS

Using results from 456 studies, we calculated effect sizes for the main effect of age across four cognitive domains (attention, executive function, memory, and perception/language) separately for five levels of visual acuity criteria (no criteria, undisclosed criteria, self-reported acuity, 20/80-20/31, and 20/30 or better).

RESULTS

As expected, age had a significant effect on each cognitive domain. However, these age effects did not further differ as a function of visual acuity criteria.

CONCLUSION

The current meta-analytic, cross-sectional results suggest that visual acuity is not significantly related to age group differences in higher-level cognitive performance-thereby replicating La Fleur and Salthouse (2014). Further efforts are needed to determine whether other measures of visual functioning (e.g., contrast sensitivity, luminance) affect age differences in cognitive functioning.

No evidence for age-related differences in item-method directed forgetting of emotional words

Research indicates that people can intentionally forget, but it is less clear how ageing and emotion interact with this ability. The present research investigated item-method directed forgetting of negative, neutral, and positive words in young (20-35 years), young-old (60-74 years), and old-old (75-89 years) adults. Although old-old adults showed overall reduced memory compared to young and young-old adults, all three age groups showed intentional forgetting. Moreover, intentional forgetting was not affected by the valence of the word in any of the three age groups. These findings suggest that younger and older adults can intentionally forget information that is neutral or emotional in nature. The present study's results extend previous research by showing that this ability is preserved in very old age.

The representational consequences of intentional forgetting: Impairments to both the probability and fidelity of long-term memory

We investigated whether intentional forgetting impacts only the likelihood of later retrieval from long-term memory or whether it also impacts the fidelity of those representations that are successfully retrieved. We accomplished this by combining an item-method directed forgetting task with a testing procedure and modeling approach inspired by the delayed-estimation paradigm used in the study of visual short-term memory (STM). Abstract or concrete colored images were each followed by a remember (R) or forget (F) instruction and sometimes by a visual probe requiring a speeded detection response (E1-E3). Memory was tested using an old-new (E1-E2) or remember-know-no (E3) recognition task followed by a continuous color judgment task (E2-E3); a final experiment included only the color judgment task (E4). Replicating the existing literature, more "old" or "remember" responses were made to R than F items and RTs to postinstruction visual probes were longer following F than R instructions. Color judgments were more accurate for successfully recognized or recollected R than F items (E2-E3); a mixture model confirmed a decrease to both the probability of retrieving the F items as well as the fidelity of the representation of those F items that were retrieved (E4). We conclude that intentional forgetting is an effortful process that not only reduces the likelihood of successfully encoding an item for later retrieval, but also produces an impoverished memory trace even when those items are retrieved; these findings draw a parallel between the control of memory representations within working and long-term memory.

Older adults can suppress unwanted memories when given an appropriate strategy

Memory suppression refers to the ability to exclude distracting memories from conscious awareness, and this ability can be assessed with the think/no-think paradigm. Recent research with older adults has provided evidence suggesting both intact and deficient memory suppression. The present studies seek to understand the conditions contributing to older adults' ability to suppress memories voluntarily. We report 2 experiments indicating that the specificity of the think/no-think task instructions contributes to older adults' suppression success: When older adults receive open-ended instructions that require them to develop a retrieval suppression strategy on their own, they show diminished memory suppression compared with younger adults. Conversely, when older adults receive focused instructions directing them to a strategy thought to better isolate inhibitory control, they show suppression-induced forgetting similar to that exhibited by younger adults. Younger adults demonstrate memory suppression regardless of the specificity of the instructions given, suggesting that the ability to select a successful suppression strategy spontaneously may be compromised in older adults. If so, this deficit may be associated with diminished control over unwanted memories in naturalistic settings if impeded strategy development reduces the successful deployment of inhibitory control.

Neural mechanisms of motivated forgetting

•

Motivated forgetting of unwanted memories shapes what we retain of our personal past.

•

Motivated forgetting is achieved in part by inhibitory control over encoding or retrieval.

•

Prefrontal cortex reduces hippocampal and cortical activity to suppress memories.

•

Electrophysiological activity during motivated forgetting implicates active inhibition.

•

A neurobiological model of memory control can inform disordered control over memory.

Not all memories are equally welcome in awareness. People limit the time they spend thinking about unpleasant experiences, a process that begins during encoding, but that continues when cues later remind someone of the memory. Here, we review the emerging behavioural and neuroimaging evidence that suppressing awareness of an unwelcome memory, at encoding or retrieval, is achieved by inhibitory control processes mediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex. These mechanisms interact with neural structures that represent experiences in memory, disrupting traces that support retention. Thus, mechanisms engaged to regulate momentary awareness introduce lasting biases in which experiences remain accessible. We argue that theories of forgetting that neglect the motivated control of awareness omit a powerful force shaping the retention of our past.

Memory suppression can help people "unlearn" behavioral responses--but only for nonemotional memories

When encountering reminders of memories that we prefer not to think about, we often try to exclude those memories from awareness. Past studies have revealed that such suppression attempts can reduce the subsequent recollection of unwanted memories. In the present study, we examined whether the inhibitory effects extend even to associated behavioral responses. Participants learned cue-target pairs for emotional and nonemotional targets and were additionally trained in behavioral responses for each cue. Afterward, they were shown the cues and instructed either to think or to avoid thinking about the targets without performing any behaviors. In a final test phase, behavioral performance was tested for all of the cues. When the targets were neutral, participants' attempts to avoid retrieval reduced accuracy and increased reaction times in generating behavioral responses associated with cues. By contrast, behavioral performance was not affected by suppression attempts when the targets were emotional. These results indicate that controlling unwanted recollection is powerful enough to inhibit associated behavioral responses-but only for nonemotional memories.

Emotions shape memory suppression in trait anxiety

The question that motivated this study was to investigate the relation between trait anxiety, emotions and memory control. To this aim, memory suppression was explored in high and low trait anxiety individuals with the Think/No-think paradigm. After learning associations between neutral words and emotional scenes (negative, positive, and neutral), participants were shown a word and were requested either to think about the associated scene or to block it out from mind. Finally, in a test phase, participants were again shown each word and asked to recall the paired scene. The results show that memory control is influenced by high trait anxiety and emotions. Low trait anxiety individuals showed a memory suppression effect, whereas there was a lack of memory suppression in high trait anxious individuals, especially for emotionally negative scenes. Thus, we suggest that individuals with anxiety may have difficulty exerting cognitive control over memories with a negative valence. These findings provide evidence that memory suppression can be impaired by anxiety thus highlighting the crucial relation between cognitive control, emotions, and individual differences in regulating emotions.

Mood and Self-Efficacy

The relationship between an individuals’ mood and perceived self-efficacy (SE) has been of fundamental interest for organizational researchers. However, the causality of this relationship has not been agreed upon in existing research. While one set of studies propose that mood influences SE the contrasting view contends that this relationship is not significant. The article presents a conceptual model on the relationship between mood and SE, positioning hedonic and utilitarian motivation as moderators of this relationship. The literature concerning these constructs is reviewed and linkages between them are examined. A four-quadrant framework delineating the impact of hedonic and utilitarian motivation on the relationship between mood and SE is proposed. Propositions are built around this framework and implications for human resource development are discussed.

Strength of Coupling within a mnemonic control network differentiates those who can and cannot suppress memory retrieval

The ability to direct our thought processes influences not only what we do, but also what we remember later. Here we sought to identify the brain network that supports the ability to control memory retrieval and to understand the neural basis of age-related changes and individual differences in the capacity for mnemonic control. To this end, we collected functional MRI data from 43 children and young adults while they attempted to retrieve or suppress retrieval of previously learned associations. Seed-based functional connectivity analyses revealed a largely right-lateralized dorsolateral prefrontal cortex-cingulate-parietal-hippocampal network that exhibited strongly correlated activity during retrieval suppression. Regardless of age, individuals who were able to suppress memory retrieval exhibited tighter coupling between key nodes in this dorsolateral prefrontal cortex-cingulate-parietal-hippocampal network than individuals who did not. Further, only those capable of mnemonic control exhibited tighter coupling during successful retrieval suppression (intentional forgetting) than during unsuccessful retrieval (unintentional forgetting). Across both children and adults, individual differences in retrieval suppression were best explained by the strength of these network interactions.

Emotional and non-emotional memories are suppressible under direct suppression instructions

Research on retrieval suppression has produced varying results concerning whether negatively valenced memories are more or less suppressible than neutral memories. This variability may arise if, across studies, participants adopt different approaches to memory control. Cognitive and neurobiological research points to two mechanisms that achieve retrieval suppression: thought-substitution and direct suppression (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergström, de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2009). Using the Think/No-think paradigm, this study examined whether participants can inhibit neutral and negatively valenced memories, using a uniform direct suppression strategy. Importantly, when strategy was controlled, negative and neutral items were comparably inhibited. Participants reported high compliance with direct suppression instructions, and success at controlling awareness predicted forgetting. These findings provide the first evidence that direct suppression can impair negatively valenced events, and suggest that variability in forgetting negative memories in prior studies is unlikely to arise from difficulty using direct suppression to control emotionally negative experiences.

Towards a cognitive and neurobiological model of motivated forgetting

Historically, research on forgetting has been dominated by the assumption that forgetting is passive, reflecting decay, interference, and changes in context. This emphasis arises from the pervasive assumption that forgetting is a negative outcome. Here, we present a functional view of forgetting in which the fate of experience in memory is determined as much by motivational forces that dictate the focus of attention as it is by passive factors. A central tool of motivated forgetting is retrieval suppression, a process whereby people shut down episodic retrieval to control awareness. We review behavioral, neurobiological, and clinical research and show that retrieval suppression leads us to forget suppressed experiences. We discuss key questions necessary to address to develop this model, relationships to other forgetting phenomena, and the implications of this research for understanding recovered memories. This work provides a foundation for understanding how motivational forces influence what we remember of life experience.