Global gain modulation generates time-dependent urgency during perceptual choice in humans

Evidence from pupillometry, fMRI, and RNN modelling shows that gain neuromodulation mediates task-relevant perceptual switches

Perceptual updating has been hypothesised to rely on a network reset modulated by bursts of ascending neuromodulatory neurotransmitters, such as noradrenaline, abruptly altering the brain's susceptibility to changing sensory activity. To test this hypothesis at a large-scale, we analysed an ambiguous figures task using pupillometry and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Behaviourally, qualitative shifts in the perceptual interpretation of an ambiguous image were associated with peaks in pupil diameter, an indirect readout of phasic bursts in neuromodulatory tone. We further hypothesised that stimulus ambiguity drives neuromodulatory tone, leading to heightened neural gain, hastening perceptual switches. To explore this hypothesis computationally, we trained a recurrent neural network (RNN) on an analogous perceptual categorisation task, allowing gain to change dynamically with classification uncertainty. As predicted, higher gain accelerated perceptual switching by transiently destabilising the network's dynamical regime in periods of maximal uncertainty. We leveraged a low-dimensional readout of the RNN dynamics to develop two novel macroscale predictions: perceptual switches should occur with peaks in low-dimensional brain state velocity and with a flattened egocentric energy landscape. Using fMRI, we confirmed these predictions, highlighting the role of the neuromodulatory system in the large-scale network reconfigurations mediating adaptive perceptual updates.

Transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation boosts accuracy during perceptual decision-making

BACKGROUND

The locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system is a well-established regulator of behavior, yet its precise role remains unclear. Animal studies predominantly support a "gain" hypothesis, suggesting that the LC-NE system enhances sensory processing. In contrast, human studies have proposed an alternative "urgency" hypothesis, postulating that LC-NE primarily accelerates responses.

METHOD

To address this discrepancy, we administered transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation (tVNS) in two experiments. In the first experiment (n = 22), we showed that 4-s tVNS trains reliably induced greater pupil dilation compared to SHAM condition, indicating increased LC-NE activity. In the second experiment (n = 21), we applied tVNS during a random dot motion task to assess its impact on perceptual decision-making.

RESULT

tVNS improved accuracy without affecting reaction times, which appears inconsistent with the "urgency" hypothesis. Exploratory drift-diffusion model analyses further support the "gain" hypothesis, revealing that tVNS increased the drift rate, indicative of enhanced evidence accumulation. Both accuracy and drift-rate improvements were most prominent following errors and especially pronounced in participants who exhibited post-error declines in these measures under SHAM.

CONCLUSION

Our findings align with the "gain" hypothesis, with tentative evidence suggesting that the impact of LC-NE activity adapts to task demands. Accordingly, tVNS showed the strongest effects in contexts prone to accuracy declines, possibly reflecting attentional disengagement, which points to a role of LC in mitigating lapses of attention.

Disentangling sources of variability in decision-making

Even the most highly-trained observers presented with identical choice-relevant stimuli will reliably exhibit substantial trial-to-trial variability in the timing and accuracy of their choices. Despite being a pervasive feature of choice behaviour and a prominent phenotype for numerous clinical disorders, the capability to disentangle the sources of such intra-individual variability (IIV) remains limited. In principle, computational models of decision-making offer a means of parsing and estimating these sources, but methodological limitations have prevented this potential from being fully realized in practice. In this Review, we first discuss current limitations of algorithmic models for understanding variability in decision-making behaviour. We then highlight recent advances in behavioural paradigm design, novel analyses of cross-trial behavioural and neural dynamics, and the development of neurally grounded computational models that are now making it possible to link distinct components of IIV to well-defined neural processes. Taken together, we demonstrate how these methods are opening up new avenues for systematically analysing the neural origins of IIV, paving the way for a more refined, holistic understanding of decision-making in health and disease.

Subcortical nuclei of the human ascending arousal system encode anticipated reward but do not predict subsequent memory

Subcortical nuclei of the ascending arousal system (AAS) play an important role in regulating brain and cognition. However, functional MRI (fMRI) of these nuclei in humans involves unique challenges due to their size and location deep within the brain. Here, we used ultra-high-field MRI and other methodological advances to investigate the activity of 6 subcortical nuclei during reward anticipation and memory encoding: the locus coeruleus (LC), basal forebrain, median and dorsal raphe nuclei, substantia nigra, and ventral tegmental area. Participants performed a monetary incentive delay task, which successfully induced a state of reward anticipation, and a 24-h delayed surprise memory test. Region-of-interest analyses revealed that activity in all subcortical nuclei increased in anticipation of potential rewards as opposed to neutral outcomes. In contrast, activity in none of the nuclei predicted memory performance 24 h later. These findings provide new insights into the cognitive functions that are supported by the human AAS.

Neural mechanisms of metacognitive improvement under speed pressure

The ability to accurately monitor the quality of one's choices, or metacognition, improves under speed pressure, possibly due to changes in post-decisional evidence processing. Here, we investigate the neural processes that regulate decision-making and metacognition under speed pressure using time-resolved analyses of brain activity recorded using electroencephalography. Participants performed a motion discrimination task under short and long response deadlines and provided a metacognitive rating following each response. Behaviourally, participants were faster, less accurate, and showed superior metacognition with short deadlines. These effects were accompanied by a larger centro-parietal positivity (CPP), a neural correlate of evidence accumulation. Crucially, post-decisional CPP amplitude was more strongly associated with participants' metacognitive ratings following errors under short relative to long response deadlines. Our results suggest that superior metacognition under speed pressure may stem from enhanced metacognitive readout of post-decisional evidence.

Dissociable Effects of Urgency and Evidence Accumulation during Reaching Revealed by Dynamic Multisensory Integration

When making perceptual decisions, humans combine information across sensory modalities dependent on their respective uncertainties. However, it remains unknown how the brain integrates multisensory feedback during movement and which factors besides sensory uncertainty influence sensory contributions. We performed two reaching experiments on healthy adults to investigate whether movement corrections to combined visual and mechanical perturbations scale with visual uncertainty. To describe the dynamics of multimodal feedback responses, we further varied movement time and visual feedback duration during the movement. The results of our first experiment show that the contribution of visual feedback decreased with uncertainty. Additionally, we observed a transient phase during which visual feedback responses were stronger during faster movements. In a follow-up experiment, we found that the contribution of vision increased more quickly during slow movements when we presented the visual feedback for a longer time. Muscle activity corresponding to these visual responses exhibited modulations with sensory uncertainty and movement speed ca. 100 ms following the onset of the visual feedback. Using an optimal feedback control model, we show that the increased response to visual feedback during fast movements can be explained by an urgency-dependent increase in control gains. Further, the fact that a longer viewing duration increased the visual contributions suggests that the brain accumulates sensory information over time to estimate the state of the arm during reaching. Our results provide additional evidence concerning the link between reaching control and decision-making, both of which appear to be influenced by sensory evidence accumulation and response urgency.

Task goals shape the relationship between decision and movement speed

The speed at which we move is linked to the speed at which we decide to make these movements. Yet the principles guiding such relationship remain unclear: whereas some studies point toward a shared invigoration process boosting decision and movement speed jointly, others rather indicate a trade-off between both levels of control, with slower movements accompanying faster decisions. Here, we aimed 1) at further investigating the existence of a shared invigoration process linking decision and movement and 2) at testing the hypothesis that such a link is masked when detrimental to the reward rate. To this aim, we tested 62 subjects who performed the Tokens task in two experiments (separate sessions): experiment 1 evaluated how changing decision speed affects movement speed, whereas experiment 2 assessed how changing movement speed affects decision speed. In the latter experiment, subjects were encouraged to favor either decision speed (fast decision group) or decision accuracy (slow decision group). Various mixed model analyses revealed a coregulation of decision (urgency) and movement speed in experiment 1 and in the fast decision group of experiment 2 but not in the slow decision group, despite the fact that these same subjects displayed a coregulation effect in experiment 1. Altogether, our findings support the idea that coregulation occurs as a default mode but that this form of control is diminished or supplanted by a trade-off relationship, contingent on reward rate maximization. Drawing from these behavioral observations, we propose that multiple processes contribute to shaping the speed of decisions and movements.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The principles guiding the relationship between decision and movement speed are still unclear. In the present behavioral study involving two experiments conducted with 62 human subjects, we report findings indicating a relationship that varies as a function of the task goals. Coregulation emerges as a default mode of control that fades when detrimental to the reward rate, possibly because of the influence of other processes that can selectively shape the speed of our decisions or movements.

Evidence for interacting but decoupled controls of decisions and movements in nonhuman primates

Many recent studies indicate that control of decisions and actions is integrated during interactive behavior. Among these, several carried out in humans and monkeys conclude that there is a coregulation of choices and movements. Another perspective, based on human data only, proposes a decoupled control of decision duration and movement speed, allowing, for instance, trading decision duration for movement duration when time pressure increases. Crucially, it is not currently known whether this ability to flexibly dissociate decision duration from movement speed is specific to humans, whether it can vary depending on the context in which a task is performed, and whether it is stable over time. These are important questions to address, especially to rely on monkey electrophysiology to infer the neural mechanisms of decision-action coordination in humans. To do so, we trained two macaque monkeys in a perceptual decision-making task and analyzed data collected over multiple behavioral sessions. Our findings reveal a strong and complex relationship between decision duration and movement vigor. Decision duration and action duration can covary but also "compensate" each other. Such integrated but decoupled control of decisions and actions aligns with recent studies in humans, validating the monkey model in electrophysiology as a means of inferring neural mechanisms in humans. Crucially, we demonstrate for the first time that this control can evolve with experience, in an adapted manner. Together, the present findings contribute to deepening our understanding of the integrated control of decisions and actions during interactive behavior.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The mechanism by which the integrated control of decisions and actions occurs, coupled or interactive but decoupled, is debated. In the present study, we show in monkeys that decisions and actions influence each other in a decoupled way. For the first time, we also demonstrate that this control can evolve depending the subject's experience, allowing the trade of movement time for decision time and limiting the temporal discounting of reward value.

Pupillary responses to directional uncertainty while intercepting a moving target

Pupillary responses serve as sensitive indicators of cognitive processes, attentional shifts and decision-making dynamics. Our study investigates how directional uncertainty and target speed (V T) influence pupillary responses in a foveal tracking task involving the interception of a moving dot. Directional uncertainty, reflecting the unpredictability of the target's direction changes, was manipulated by altering the angular range (AR) from which random directions for the moving dot were extracted. Higher AR values were associated with reduced pupillary diameters, indicating that heightened uncertainty led to smaller pupil sizes. Additionally, an inverse U-shaped relationship between V T and pupillary responses suggested maximal diameters at intermediate speeds. Analysis of saccade-triggered responses showed a negative correlation between pupil diameter and directional uncertainty. Dynamic linear modelling revealed the influence of past successful collisions and other behavioural parameters on pupillary responses, emphasizing the intricate interaction between task variables and cognitive processing. Our results highlight the dynamic interplay between the directional uncertainty of a single moving target, V T and pupillary responses, with implications for understanding attentional mechanisms, decision-making processes and potential applications in emerging technologies.

The gated cascade diffusion model: An integrated theory of decision making, motor preparation, and motor execution

This article introduces an integrated and biologically inspired theory of decision making, motor preparation, and motor execution. The theory is formalized as an extension of the diffusion model, in which diffusive accumulated evidence from the decision-making process is continuously conveyed to motor areas of the brain that prepare the response, where it is smoothed by a mechanism that approximates a Kalman-Bucy filter. The resulting motor preparation variable is gated prior to reaching agonist muscles until it exceeds a particular level of activation. We tested this gated cascade diffusion model by continuously probing the electrical activity of the response agonists through electromyography in four choice tasks that span a variety of domains in cognitive sciences, namely motion perception, numerical cognition, recognition memory, and lexical knowledge. The model provided a good quantitative account of behavioral and electromyographic data and systematically outperformed previous models. This work represents an advance in the integration of processes involved in simple decisions and sheds new light on the interplay between decision and motor systems. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Prioritized neural processing of social threats during perceptual decision-making

Emotional signals, notably those signaling threat, benefit from prioritized processing in the human brain. Yet, it remains unclear whether perceptual decisions about the emotional, threat-related aspects of stimuli involve specific or similar neural computations compared to decisions about their non-threatening/non-emotional components. We developed a novel behavioral paradigm in which participants performed two different detection tasks (emotion vs. color) on the same, two-dimensional visual stimuli. First, electroencephalographic (EEG) activity in a cluster of central electrodes reflected the amount of perceptual evidence around 100 ms following stimulus onset, when the decision concerned emotion, not color. Second, participants' choice could be predicted earlier for emotion (240 ms) than for color (380 ms) by the mu (10 Hz) rhythm, which reflects motor preparation. Taken together, these findings indicate that perceptual decisions about threat-signaling dimensions of facial displays are associated with prioritized neural coding in action-related brain regions, supporting the motivational value of socially relevant signals.

Neural mechanisms of information seeking

We ubiquitously seek information to make better decisions. Particularly in the modern age, when more information is available at our fingertips than ever, the information we choose to collect determines the quality of our decisions. Decision neuroscience has long adopted empirical approaches where the information available to decision-makers is fully controlled by the researchers, leaving neural mechanisms of information seeking less understood. Although information seeking has long been studied in the context of the exploration-exploitation trade-off, recent studies have widened the scope to investigate more overt information seeking in a way distinct from other decision processes. Insights gained from these studies, accumulated over the last few years, raise the possibility that information seeking is driven by the reward system signaling the subjective value of information. In this piece, we review findings from the recent studies, highlighting the conceptual and empirical relationships between distinct literatures, and discuss future research directions necessary to establish a more comprehensive understanding of how individuals seek information as a part of value-based decision-making.

Graded decisions in the human brain

Decision-makers objectively commit to a definitive choice, yet at the subjective level, human decisions appear to be associated with a degree of uncertainty. Whether decisions are definitive (i.e., concluding in all-or-none choices), or whether the underlying representations are graded, remains unclear. To answer this question, we recorded intracranial neural signals directly from the brain while human subjects made perceptual decisions. The recordings revealed that broadband gamma activity reflecting each individual's decision-making process, ramped up gradually while being graded by the accumulated decision evidence. Crucially, this grading effect persisted throughout the decision process without ever reaching a definite bound at the time of choice. This effect was most prominent in the parietal cortex, a brain region traditionally implicated in decision-making. These results provide neural evidence for a graded decision process in humans and an analog framework for flexible choice behavior.

Internal attention modulates the functional state of novel stimulus-response associations in working memory

Information in working memory (WM) is crucial for guiding behavior. However, not all WM representations are equally relevant simultaneously. Current theoretical frameworks propose a functional dissociation between 'latent' and 'active' states, in which relevant representations are prioritized into an optimal (active) state to face current demands, while relevant information that is not immediately needed is maintained in a dormant (latent) state. In this context, task demands can induce rapid and flexible prioritization of information from latent to active state. Critically, these functional states have been primarily studied using simple visual memories, with attention selecting and prioritizing relevant representations to serve as templates to guide subsequent behavior. It remains unclear whether more complex WM representations, such as novel stimulus-response associations, can also be prioritized into different functional states depending on their task relevance, and if so how these different formats relate to each other. In the present study, we investigated whether novel WM-guided actions can be brought into different functional states depending on current task demands. Our results reveal that planned actions can be flexibly prioritized when needed and show how their functional state modulates their influence on ongoing behavior. Moreover, they suggest the representations of novel actions of different functional states are maintained in WM via a non-orthogonal coding scheme, thus are prone to interference.

Intracranial electroencephalography reveals effector-independent evidence accumulation dynamics in multiple human brain regions

Neural representations of perceptual decision formation that are abstracted from specific motor requirements have previously been identified in humans using non-invasive electrophysiology; however, it is currently unclear where these originate in the brain. Here we capitalized on the high spatiotemporal precision of intracranial EEG to localize such abstract decision signals. Participants undergoing invasive electrophysiological monitoring for epilepsy were asked to judge the direction of random-dot stimuli and respond either with a speeded button press (N = 24), or vocally, after a randomized delay (N = 12). We found a widely distributed motor-independent network of regions where high-frequency activity exhibited key characteristics consistent with evidence accumulation, including a gradual buildup that was modulated by the strength of the sensory evidence, and an amplitude that predicted participants' choice accuracy and response time. Our findings offer a new view on the brain networks governing human decision-making.

Cortical β Power Reflects a Neural Implementation of Decision Boundary Collapse in Speeded Decisions

A prominent account of decision-making assumes that information is accumulated until a fixed response threshold is crossed. However, many decisions require weighting of information appropriately against time. Collapsing response thresholds are a mathematically optimal solution to this decision problem. However, our understanding of the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying dynamic response thresholds remains significantly incomplete. To investigate this issue, we used a multistage drift-diffusion model (DDM) and also analyzed EEG β power lateralization (BPL). The latter served as a neural proxy for decision signals. We analyzed a large dataset (n = 863; 434 females and 429 males) from a speeded flanker task and data from an independent confirmation sample (n = 119; 70 females and 49 males). We showed that a DDM with collapsing decision thresholds, a process wherein the decision boundary reduces over time, captured participants' time-dependent decision policy more accurately than a model with fixed thresholds. Previous research suggests that BPL over motor cortices reflects features of a decision signal and that its peak, coinciding with the motor response, may serve as a neural proxy for the decision threshold. We show that BPL around the response decreased with increasing RTs. Together, our findings offer compelling evidence for the existence of collapsing decision thresholds in decision-making processes.

Metric error monitoring as a component of metacognitive processing

Metacognitive processing constitutes one of the contemporary target domains in consciousness research. Error monitoring (the ability to correctly report one's own errors without feedback) is considered one of the functional outcomes of metacognitive processing. Error monitoring is traditionally investigated as part of categorical decisions where choice accuracy is a binary construct (choice is either correct or incorrect). However, recent studies revealed that this ability is characterized by metric features (i.e., direction and magnitude) in temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Here, we discuss methodological approaches to investigating metric error monitoring in both humans and non-human animals and review their findings. The potential neural substrates of metric error monitoring measures are also discussed. This new scope of metacognitive processing can help improve our current understanding of conscious processing from a new perspective. Thus, by summarizing and discussing the perspectives, findings, and common applications in the metric error monitoring literature, this paper aims to provide a guideline for future research.

Of Rodents and Primates: Time-Variant Gain in Drift-Diffusion Decision Models

Sequential sampling models of decision-making involve evidence accumulation over time and have been successful in capturing choice behaviour. A popular model is the drift-diffusion model (DDM). To capture the finer aspects of choice reaction times (RTs), time-variant gain features representing urgency signals have been implemented in DDM that can exhibit slower error RTs than correct RTs. However, time-variant gain is often implemented on both DDM's signal and noise features, with the assumption that increasing gain on the drift rate (due to urgency) is similar to DDM with collapsing decision bounds. Hence, it is unclear whether gain effects on just the signal or noise feature can lead to a different choice behaviour. This work presents an alternative DDM variant, focusing on the implications of time-variant gain mechanisms, constrained by model parsimony. Specifically, using computational modelling of choice behaviour of rats, monkeys, and humans, we systematically showed that time-variant gain only on the DDM's noise was sufficient to produce slower error RTs, as in monkeys, while time-variant gain only on drift rate leads to faster error RTs, as in rodents. We also found minimal effects of time-variant gain in humans. By highlighting these patterns, this study underscores the utility of group-level modelling in capturing general trends and effects consistent across species. Thus, time-variant gain on DDM's different components can lead to different choice behaviours, shed light on the underlying time-variant gain mechanisms for different species, and can be used for systematic data fitting.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42113-023-00194-1.

Neural mechanisms for executive control of speed-accuracy trade-off

The medial frontal cortex (MFC) plays an important but disputed role in speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT). In samples of neural spiking in the supplementary eye field (SEF) in the MFC simultaneous with the visuomotor frontal eye field and superior colliculus in macaques performing a visual search with instructed SAT, during accuracy emphasis, most SEF neurons discharge less from before stimulus presentation until response generation. Discharge rates adjust immediately and simultaneously across structures upon SAT cue changes. SEF neurons signal choice errors with stronger and earlier activity during accuracy emphasis. Other neurons signal timing errors, covarying with adjusting response time. Spike correlations between neurons in the SEF and visuomotor areas did not appear, disappear, or change sign across SAT conditions or trial outcomes. These results clarify findings with noninvasive measures, complement previous neurophysiological findings, and endorse the role of the MFC as a critic for the actor instantiated in visuomotor structures.

Initial conditions combine with sensory evidence to induce decision-related dynamics in premotor cortex

We used a dynamical systems perspective to understand decision-related neural activity, a fundamentally unresolved problem. This perspective posits that time-varying neural activity is described by a state equation with an initial condition and evolves in time by combining at each time step, recurrent activity and inputs. We hypothesized various dynamical mechanisms of decisions, simulated them in models to derive predictions, and evaluated these predictions by examining firing rates of neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) of monkeys performing a perceptual decision-making task. Prestimulus neural activity (i.e., the initial condition) predicted poststimulus neural trajectories, covaried with RT and the outcome of the previous trial, but not with choice. Poststimulus dynamics depended on both the sensory evidence and initial condition, with easier stimuli and fast initial conditions leading to the fastest choice-related dynamics. Together, these results suggest that initial conditions combine with sensory evidence to induce decision-related dynamics in PMd.

Drift-diffusion modeling reveals that masked faces are preconceived as unfriendly

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of face masks has become a daily routine. Studies have shown that face masks increase the ambiguity of facial expressions which not only affects (the development of) emotion recognition, but also interferes with social interaction and judgement. To disambiguate facial expressions, we rely on perceptual (stimulus-driven) as well as preconceptual (top-down) processes. However, it is unknown which of these two mechanisms accounts for the misinterpretation of masked expressions. To investigate this, we asked participants (N = 136) to decide whether ambiguous (morphed) facial expressions, with or without a mask, were perceived as friendly or unfriendly. To test for the independent effects of perceptual and preconceptual biases we fitted a drift-diffusion model (DDM) to the behavioral data of each participant. Results show that face masks induce a clear loss of information leading to a slight perceptual bias towards friendly choices, but also a clear preconceptual bias towards unfriendly choices for masked faces. These results suggest that, although face masks can increase the perceptual friendliness of faces, people have the prior preconception to interpret masked faces as unfriendly.

Inhalation boosts perceptual awareness and decision speed

The emergence of consciousness is one of biology's biggest mysteries. During the past two decades, a major effort has been made to identify the neural correlates of consciousness, but in comparison, little is known about the physiological mechanisms underlying first-person subjective experience. Attention is considered the gateway of information to consciousness. Recent work suggests that the breathing phase (i.e., inhalation vs. exhalation) modulates attention, in such a way that attention directed toward exteroceptive information would increase during inhalation. One key hypothesis emerging from this work is that inhalation would improve perceptual awareness and near-threshold decision-making. The present study directly tested this hypothesis. We recorded the breathing rhythms of 30 humans performing a near-threshold decision-making task, in which they had to decide whether a liminal Gabor was tilted to the right or the left (objective decision task) and then to rate their perceptual awareness of the Gabor orientation (subjective decision task). In line with our hypothesis, the data revealed that, relative to exhalation, inhalation improves perceptual awareness and speeds up objective decision-making, without impairing accuracy. Overall, the present study builds on timely questions regarding the physiological mechanisms underlying consciousness and shows that breathing shapes the emergence of subjective experience and decision-making.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Breathing is a ubiquitous biological rhythm in animal life. However, little is known about its effect on consciousness and decision-making. Here, we measured the respiratory rhythm of humans performing a near-threshold discrimination experiment. We show that inhalation, compared with exhalation, improves perceptual awareness and accelerates decision-making while leaving accuracy unaffected.

Balancing true and false detection of intermittent sensory targets by adjusting the inputs to the evidence accumulation process

Decisions about noisy stimuli are widely understood to be made by accumulating evidence up to a decision bound that can be adjusted according to task demands. However, relatively little is known about how such mechanisms operate in continuous monitoring contexts requiring intermittent target detection. Here, we examined neural decision processes underlying detection of 1 s coherence targets within continuous random dot motion, and how they are adjusted across contexts with weak, strong, or randomly mixed weak/strong targets. Our prediction was that decision bounds would be set lower when weak targets are more prevalent. Behavioural hit and false alarm rate patterns were consistent with this, and were well captured by a bound-adjustable leaky accumulator model. However, beta-band EEG signatures of motor preparation contradicted this, instead indicating lower bounds in the strong-target context. We thus tested two alternative models in which decision-bound dynamics were constrained directly by beta measurements, respectively, featuring leaky accumulation with adjustable leak, and non-leaky accumulation of evidence referenced to an adjustable sensory-level criterion. We found that the latter model best explained both behaviour and neural dynamics, highlighting novel means of decision policy regulation and the value of neurally informed modelling.

Boosting Serotonin Increases Information Gathering by Reducing Subjective Cognitive Costs

Serotonin is implicated in the valuation of aversive costs, such as delay or physical effort. However, its role in governing sensitivity to cognitive effort, for example, deliberation costs during information gathering, is unclear. We show that treatment with a serotonergic antidepressant in healthy human individuals of either sex enhances a willingness to gather information when trying to maximize reward. Using computational modeling, we show this arises from a diminished sensitivity to subjective deliberation costs during the sampling process. This result is consistent with the notion that serotonin alleviates sensitivity to aversive costs in a domain-general fashion, with implications for its potential contribution to a positive impact on motivational deficits in psychiatric disorders.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Gathering information about the world is essential for successfully navigating it. However, sampling information is costly, and we need to balance between gathering too little and too much information. The neurocomputational mechanisms underlying this arbitration between a putative gain, such as reward, and the associated costs, such as allocation of cognitive resources, remain unclear. In this study, we show that week-long daily treatment with a serotonergic antidepressant enhances a willingness to gather information when trying to maximize reward. Computational modeling indicates this arises from a reduced perception of aversive costs, rendering information gathering less cognitively effortful. This finding points to a candidate mechanism by which serotonergic treatment might help alleviate motivational deficits in a range of mental illnesses.

How honey bees make fast and accurate decisions

Honey bee ecology demands they make both rapid and accurate assessments of which flowers are most likely to offer them nectar or pollen. To understand the mechanisms of honey bee decision-making, we examined their speed and accuracy of both flower acceptance and rejection decisions. We used a controlled flight arena that varied both the likelihood of a stimulus offering reward and punishment and the quality of evidence for stimuli. We found that the sophistication of honey bee decision-making rivalled that reported for primates. Their decisions were sensitive to both the quality and reliability of evidence. Acceptance responses had higher accuracy than rejection responses and were more sensitive to changes in available evidence and reward likelihood. Fast acceptances were more likely to be correct than slower acceptances; a phenomenon also seen in primates and indicative that the evidence threshold for a decision changes dynamically with sampling time. To investigate the minimally sufficient circuitry required for these decision-making capacities, we developed a novel model of decision-making. Our model can be mapped to known pathways in the insect brain and is neurobiologically plausible. Our model proposes a system for robust autonomous decision-making with potential application in robotics.

Movement characteristics impact decision-making and vice versa

Previous studies suggest that humans are capable of coregulating the speed of decisions and movements if promoted by task incentives. It is unclear however whether such behavior is inherent to the process of translating decisional information into movements, beyond posing a valid strategy in some task contexts. Therefore, in a behavioral online study we imposed time constraints to either decision- or movement phases of a sensorimotor task, ensuring that coregulating decisions and movements was not promoted by task incentives. We found that participants indeed moved faster when fast decisions were promoted and decided faster when subsequent finger tapping movements had to be executed swiftly. These results were further supported by drift diffusion modelling and inspection of psychophysical kernels: Sensorimotor delays related to initiating the finger tapping sequence were shorter in fast-decision as compared to slow-decision blocks. Likewise, the decisional speed-accuracy tradeoff shifted in favor of faster decisions in fast-tapping as compared to slow-tapping blocks. These findings suggest that decisions not only impact movement characteristics, but that properties of movement impact the time taken to decide. We interpret these behavioral results in the context of embodied decision-making, whereby shared neural mechanisms may modulate decisions and movements in a joint fashion.

Pupillary dynamics reflect the impact of temporal expectation on detection strategy

Everyday life's perceptual decision-making is informed by experience. In particular, temporal expectation can ease the detection of relevant events in noisy sensory streams. Here, we investigated if humans can extract hidden temporal cues from the occurrences of probabilistic targets and utilize them to inform target detection in a complex acoustic stream. To understand what neural mechanisms implement temporal expectation influence on decision-making, we used pupillometry as a proxy for underlying neuromodulatory activity. We found that participants' detection strategy was influenced by the hidden temporal context and correlated with sound-evoked pupil dilation. A model of urgency fitted on false alarms predicted detection reaction time. Altogether, these findings suggest that temporal expectation informs decision-making and could be implemented through neuromodulatory-mediated urgency signals.

Perfectionism-related variations in error processing in a task with increased response selection complexity

Perfectionists strive for a flawless performance because they are intrinsically motivated to set and achieve high goals (personal standards perfectionism; PSP) and/or because they are afraid to be negatively evaluated by others (evaluative concern perfectionism; ECP). We investigated the differential relationships of these perfectionism dimensions with performance, post-response adaptation, error processing (reflected by two components of the event-related potential: error/correct negativity - Ne/c; error/correct positivity - Pe/c) and error detection. In contrast to previous studies, we employed a task with increased response selection complexity providing more room for perfectionistic dispositions to manifest themselves. Although ECP was related to indicators of increased preoccupation with errors, high-EC perfectionists made more errors than low-EC perfectionists. This observation may be explained by insufficient early error processing as indicated by a reduced Ne/c effect and a lack of post-response adaptation. PSP had a moderating effect on the relationship between ECP and early error processing. Our results provide evidence that pure-EC perfectionists may spend many of their cognitive resources on error-related contents and worrying, leaving less capacity for cognitive control and thus producing a structural lack of error processing.

Multiphasic value biases in fast-paced decisions

Perceptual decisions are biased toward higher-value options when overall gains can be improved. When stimuli demand immediate reactions, the neurophysiological decision process dynamically evolves through distinct phases of growing anticipation, detection, and discrimination, but how value biases are exerted through these phases remains unknown. Here, by parsing motor preparation dynamics in human electrophysiology, we uncovered a multiphasic pattern of countervailing biases operating in speeded decisions. Anticipatory preparation of higher-value actions began earlier, conferring a 'starting point' advantage at stimulus onset, but the delayed preparation of lower-value actions was steeper, conferring a value-opposed buildup-rate bias. This, in turn, was countered by a transient deflection toward the higher-value action evoked by stimulus detection. A neurally-constrained process model featuring anticipatory urgency, biased detection, and accumulation of growing stimulus-discriminating evidence, successfully captured both behavior and motor preparation dynamics. Thus, an intricate interplay of distinct biasing mechanisms serves to prioritise time-constrained perceptual decisions.

Computational analysis of speed-accuracy tradeoff

Speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) in the decision making of humans and animals is a well-documented phenomenon, but its underlying neuronal mechanism remains unclear. Modeling approaches have conceptualized SAT through the threshold hypothesis as adjustments to the decision threshold. However, the leading neurophysiological view is the gain modulation hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that the SAT mechanism is implemented through changes in the dynamics of the choice circuit, which increase the baseline firing rate and the speed of neuronal integration. In this paper, I investigated alternative computational mechanisms of SAT and showed that the threshold hypothesis was qualitatively consistent with the behavioral data, but the gain modulation hypothesis was not. In order to reconcile the threshold hypothesis with the neurophysiological evidence, I considered the interference of alpha oscillations with the decision process and showed that alpha oscillations could increase the discriminatory power of the decision system, although they slowed down the decision process. This suggests that the magnitude of alpha waves suppression during the event related desynchronization (ERD) of alpha oscillations depends on a SAT condition and the amplitude of alpha oscillations is lower in the speed condition. I also showed that the lower amplitude of alpha oscillations resulted in an increase in the baseline firing rate and the speed of neuronal intergration. Thus, the interference of the event related desynchronization of alpha oscillations with a SAT condition explains why an increase in the baseline firing rate and the speed of neuronal integration accompany the speed condition.

Integrated neural dynamics of sensorimotor decisions and actions

Recent theoretical models suggest that deciding about actions and executing them are not implemented by completely distinct neural mechanisms but are instead two modes of an integrated dynamical system. Here, we investigate this proposal by examining how neural activity unfolds during a dynamic decision-making task within the high-dimensional space defined by the activity of cells in monkey dorsal premotor (PMd), primary motor (M1), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) as well as the external and internal segments of the globus pallidus (GPe, GPi). Dimensionality reduction shows that the four strongest components of neural activity are functionally interpretable, reflecting a state transition between deliberation and commitment, the transformation of sensory evidence into a choice, and the baseline and slope of the rising urgency to decide. Analysis of the contribution of each population to these components shows meaningful differences between regions but no distinct clusters within each region, consistent with an integrated dynamical system. During deliberation, cortical activity unfolds on a two-dimensional "decision manifold" defined by sensory evidence and urgency and falls off this manifold at the moment of commitment into a choice-dependent trajectory leading to movement initiation. The structure of the manifold varies between regions: In PMd, it is curved; in M1, it is nearly perfectly flat; and in dlPFC, it is almost entirely confined to the sensory evidence dimension. In contrast, pallidal activity during deliberation is primarily defined by urgency. We suggest that these findings reveal the distinct functional contributions of different brain regions to an integrated dynamical system governing action selection and execution.

Motor cortical signals reflecting decision making and action preparation

Decision making often requires accumulating evidence in favour of a particular option. When choices are expressed with a motor response, these actions are preceded by reductions in the power of oscillations in the alpha and beta range in motor cortices. For unimanual movements, these reductions are greater over the hemisphere contralateral to the response side. Such lateralizations are hypothesized to be an online index of the neural state of decisions as they develop over time of processing. In contrast, the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) is considered to selectively activate a response and appears shortly before the motor output. We investigated to what extent these neural signals reflect integration of decision evidence or more motor-related action preparation. Using two different experiments, we found that lateralization of alpha and beta power (APL and BPL, respectively) rapidly emerged after stimulus presentation, even when making an overt response was not yet possible. In contrast, we show that even after prolonged stimulus presentation, no LRP was present. Instead, the LRP emerged only after an imperative cue, prompting participants to indicate their choice. Furthermore, we could show that variations in sensory evidence strength modulate APL and BPL onset times, suggesting that integration of evidence is represented in these motor cortical signals. We conclude that APL and BPL reflect higher cognitive processes rather than pure action preparation, whereas LRP is more closely tied to motor performance. APL and BPL potentially encode decision information in motor areas serving the later preparation of overt decision output.

The geometry of domain-general performance monitoring in the human medial frontal cortex

Controlling behavior to flexibly achieve desired goals depends on the ability to monitor one's own performance. It is unknown how performance monitoring can be both flexible, to support different tasks, and specialized, to perform each task well. We recorded single neurons in the human medial frontal cortex while subjects performed two tasks that involve three types of cognitive conflict. Neurons encoding conflict probability, conflict, and error in one or both tasks were intermixed, forming a representational geometry that simultaneously allowed task specialization and generalization. Neurons encoding conflict retrospectively served to update internal estimates of conflict probability. Population representations of conflict were compositional. These findings reveal how representations of evaluative signals can be both abstract and task-specific and suggest a neuronal mechanism for estimating control demand.

Temporal dynamics of decision making: A synthesis of computational and neurophysiological approaches

As interest in the temporal dynamics of decision-making has grown, researchers have increasingly turned to computational approaches such as the drift diffusion model (DDM) to identify how cognitive processes unfold during choice. At the same time, technological advances in noninvasive neurophysiological methods such as electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography now allow researchers to map the neural time course of decision making with millisecond precision. Combining these approaches can potentially yield important new insights into how choices emerge over time. Here we review recent research on the computational and neurophysiological correlates of perceptual and value-based decision making, from DDM parameters to scalp potentials and oscillatory neural activity. Starting with motor response preparation, the most well-understood aspect of the decision process, we discuss evidence that urgency signals and shifts in baseline activation, rather than shifts in the physiological value of the choice-triggering response threshold, are responsible for adjusting response times under speeded choice scenarios. Research on the neural correlates of starting point bias suggests that prestimulus activity can predict biases in motor choice behavior. Finally, studies examining the time dynamics of evidence construction and evidence accumulation have identified signals at frontocentral and centroparietal electrodes associated respectively with these processes, emerging 300-500 ms after stimulus onset. These findings can inform psychological theories of decision-making, providing empirical support for attribute weighting in value-based choice while suggesting theoretical alternatives to dual-process accounts. Further research combining computational and neurophysiological approaches holds promise for providing greater insight into the moment-by-moment evolution of the decision process. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition Economics > Individual Decision-Making.

A unified model of the task-evoked pupil response

The pupil dilates and reconstricts following task events. It is popular to model this task-evoked pupil response as a linear transformation of event-locked impulses, whose amplitudes are used as estimates of arousal. We show that this model is incorrect and propose an alternative model based on the physiological finding that a common neural input drives saccades and pupil size. The estimates of arousal from our model agreed with key predictions: Arousal scaled with task difficulty and behavioral performance but was invariant to small differences in trial duration. Moreover, the model offers a unified explanation for a wide range of phenomena: entrainment of pupil size and saccades to task timing, modulation of pupil response amplitude and noise with task difficulty, reaction time-dependent modulation of pupil response timing and amplitude, a constrictory pupil response time-locked to saccades, and task-dependent distortion of this saccade-locked pupil response.

Arousal state affects perceptual decision-making by modulating hierarchical sensory processing in a large-scale visual system model

Arousal levels strongly affect task performance. Yet, what arousal level is optimal for a task depends on its difficulty. Easy task performance peaks at higher arousal levels, whereas performance on difficult tasks displays an inverted U-shape relationship with arousal, peaking at medium arousal levels, an observation first made by Yerkes and Dodson in 1908. It is commonly proposed that the noradrenergic locus coeruleus system regulates these effects on performance through a widespread release of noradrenaline resulting in changes of cortical gain. This account, however, does not explain why performance decays with high arousal levels only in difficult, but not in simple tasks. Here, we present a mechanistic model that revisits the Yerkes-Dodson effect from a sensory perspective: a deep convolutional neural network augmented with a global gain mechanism reproduced the same interaction between arousal state and task difficulty in its performance. Investigating this model revealed that global gain states differentially modulated sensory information encoding across the processing hierarchy, which explained their differential effects on performance on simple versus difficult tasks. These findings offer a novel hierarchical sensory processing account of how, and why, arousal state affects task performance.

Hasty sensorimotor decisions rely on an overlap of broad and selective changes in motor activity

Humans and other animals are able to adjust their speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) at will depending on the urge to act, favoring either cautious or hasty decision policies in different contexts. An emerging view is that SAT regulation relies on influences exerting broad changes on the motor system, tuning its activity up globally when hastiness is at premium. The present study aimed to test this hypothesis. A total of 50 participants performed a task involving choices between left and right index fingers, in which incorrect choices led either to a high or to a low penalty in 2 contexts, inciting them to emphasize either cautious or hasty policies. We applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on multiple motor representations, eliciting motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in 9 finger and leg muscles. MEP amplitudes allowed us to probe activity changes in the corresponding finger and leg representations, while participants were deliberating about which index to choose. Our data indicate that hastiness entails a broad amplification of motor activity, although this amplification was limited to the chosen side. On top of this effect, we identified a local suppression of motor activity, surrounding the chosen index representation. Hence, a decision policy favoring speed over accuracy appears to rely on overlapping processes producing a broad (but not global) amplification and a surround suppression of motor activity. The latter effect may help to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the chosen representation, as supported by single-trial correlation analyses indicating a stronger differentiation of activity changes in finger representations in the hasty context.

Many have argued that the regulation of the speed-accuracy tradeoff relies on an urgency signal, which implements "collapsing decision thresholds" by tuning neural activity in a global manner in decision-related structures. This study indicates that the reality is more subtle, with several aspects of "urgency" being specifically targeted to particular corticospinal populations within the motor system.

Control over sampling boosts numerical evidence processing in human decisions from experience

When acquiring information about choice alternatives, decision makers may have varying levels of control over which and how much information they sample before making a choice. How does control over information acquisition affect the quality of sample-based decisions? Here, combining variants of a numerical sampling task with neural recordings, we show that control over when to stop sampling can enhance (i) behavioral choice accuracy, (ii) the build-up of parietal decision signals, and (iii) the encoding of numerical sample information in multivariate electroencephalogram patterns. None of these effects were observed when participants could only control which alternatives to sample, but not when to stop sampling. Furthermore, levels of control had no effect on early sensory signals or on the extent to which sample information leaked from memory. The results indicate that freedom to stop sampling can amplify decisional evidence processing from the outset of information acquisition and lead to more accurate choices.

Modeling evidence accumulation decision processes using integral equations: Urgency-gating and collapsing boundaries

Diffusion models of evidence accumulation have successfully accounted for the distributions of response times and choice probabilities from many experimental tasks, but recently their assumption that evidence is accumulated at a constant rate to constant decision boundaries has been challenged. One model assumes that decision-makers seek to optimize their performance by using decision boundaries that collapse over time. Another model assumes that evidence does not accumulate and is represented by a stationary distribution that is gated by an urgency signal to make a response. We present explicit, integral-equation expressions for the first-passage time distributions of the urgency-gating and collapsing-bounds models and use them to identify conditions under which the models are equivalent. We combine these expressions with a dynamic model of stimulus encoding that allows the effects of perceptual and decisional integration to be distinguished. We compare the resulting models to the standard diffusion model with variability in drift rates on data from three experimental paradigms in which stimulus information was either constant or changed over time. The standard diffusion model was the best model for tasks with constant stimulus information; the models with time-varying urgency or decision bounds performed similarly to the standard diffusion model on tasks with changing stimulus information. We found little support for the claim that evidence does not accumulate and attribute the good performance of the time-varying models on changing-stimulus tasks to their increased flexibility and not to their ability to account for systematic experimental effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The Mental Maxwell Relations: A Thermodynamic Allegory for Higher Brain Functions

The theoretical framework of classical thermodynamics unifies vastly diverse natural phenomena and captures once-elusive effects in concrete terms. Neuroscience confronts equally varied, equally ineffable phenomena in the mental realm, but has yet to unite or to apprehend them rigorously, perhaps due to an insufficient theoretical framework. The terms for mental phenomena, the mental variables, typically used in neuroscience are overly numerous and imprecise. Unlike in thermodynamics or other branches of physics, in neuroscience, there are no core mental variables from which all others formally derive and it is unclear which variables are distinct and which overlap. This may be due to the nature of mental variables themselves. Unlike the variables of physics, perhaps they cannot be interpreted as composites of a small number of axioms. However, it is well worth exploring if they can, as that would allow more parsimonious theories of higher brain function. Here we offer a theoretical exercise in the spirit of the National Institutes of Health Research Domain Criteria (NIH RDoC) Initiative and the Cognitive Atlas Project, which aim to remedy this state of affairs. Imitating classical thermodynamics, we construct a formal framework for mental variables, an extended analogy - an allegory - between mental and thermodynamic quantities. Starting with mental correlates of the physical indefinables length, time, mass or force, and charge, we pursue the allegory up to mental versions of the thermodynamic Maxwell Relations. The Maxwell Relations interrelate the thermodynamic quantities volume, pressure, temperature, and entropy and were chosen since they are easy to derive, yet capable of generating nontrivial, nonobvious predictions. Our "Mental Maxwell Relations" interlink the mental variables consciousness, salience, arousal, and distraction and make nontrivial, nonobvious statements about mental phenomena. The mental system thus constructed is internally consistent, in harmony with introspection, and respects the RDoC criteria of employing only psychologically valid constructs with some evidence of a brain basis. We briefly apply these concepts to the problem of decision-making and sketch how some of them might be tested empirically.

A Biological Inspired Cognitive Framework for Memory-Based Multi-Sensory Joint Attention in Human-Robot Interactive Tasks

One of the fundamental prerequisites for effective collaborations between interactive partners is the mutual sharing of the attentional focus on the same perceptual events. This is referred to as joint attention. In psychological, cognitive, and social sciences, its defining elements have been widely pinpointed. Also the field of human-robot interaction has extensively exploited joint attention which has been identified as a fundamental prerequisite for proficient human-robot collaborations. However, joint attention between robots and human partners is often encoded in prefixed robot behaviours that do not fully address the dynamics of interactive scenarios. We provide autonomous attentional behaviour for robotics based on a multi-sensory perception that robustly relocates the focus of attention on the same targets the human partner attends. Further, we investigated how such joint attention between a human and a robot partner improved with a new biologically-inspired memory-based attention component. We assessed the model with the humanoid robot iCub involved in performing a joint task with a human partner in a real-world unstructured scenario. The model showed a robust performance on capturing the stimulation, making a localisation decision in the right time frame, and then executing the right action. We then compared the attention performance of the robot against the human performance when stimulated from the same source across different modalities (audio-visual and audio only). The comparison showed that the model is behaving with temporal dynamics compatible with those of humans. This provides an effective solution for memory-based joint attention in real-world unstructured environments. Further, we analyzed the localisation performances (reaction time and accuracy), the results showed that the robot performed better in an audio-visual condition than an audio only condition. The performance of the robot in the audio-visual condition was relatively comparable with the behaviour of the human participants whereas it was less efficient in audio-only localisation. After a detailed analysis of the internal components of the architecture, we conclude that the differences in performance are due to egonoise which significantly affects the audio-only localisation performance.

Proactive and reactive accumulation-to-bound processes compete during perceptual decisions

Standard models of perceptual decision-making postulate that a response is triggered in reaction to stimulus presentation when the accumulated stimulus evidence reaches a decision threshold. This framework excludes however the possibility that informed responses are generated proactively at a time independent of stimulus. Here, we find that, in a free reaction time auditory task in rats, reactive and proactive responses coexist, suggesting that choice selection and motor initiation, commonly viewed as serial processes, are decoupled in general. We capture this behavior by a novel model in which proactive and reactive responses are triggered whenever either of two competing processes, respectively Action Initiation or Evidence Accumulation, reaches a bound. In both types of response, the choice is ultimately informed by the Evidence Accumulation process. The Action Initiation process readily explains premature responses, contributes to urgency effects at long reaction times and mediates the slowing of the responses as animals get satiated and tired during sessions. Moreover, it successfully predicts reaction time distributions when the stimulus was either delayed, advanced or omitted. Overall, these results fundamentally extend standard models of evidence accumulation in decision making by showing that proactive and reactive processes compete for the generation of responses.

The ascending arousal system promotes optimal performance through mesoscale network integration in a visuospatial attentional task

Previous research has shown that the autonomic nervous system provides essential constraints over ongoing cognitive function. However, there is currently a relative lack of direct empirical evidence for how this interaction manifests in the brain at the macroscale level. Here, we examine the role of ascending arousal and attentional load on large-scale network dynamics by combining pupillometry, functional MRI, and graph theoretical analysis to analyze data from a visual motion-tracking task with a parametric load manipulation. We found that attentional load effects were observable in measures of pupil diameter and in a set of brain regions that parametrically modulated their BOLD activity and mesoscale network-level integration. In addition, the regional patterns of network reconfiguration were correlated with the spatial distribution of the α2a adrenergic receptor. Our results further solidify the relationship between ascending noradrenergic activity, large-scale network integration, and cognitive task performance.

Understanding neural signals of post-decisional performance monitoring: An integrative review

Performance monitoring is a key cognitive function, allowing to detect mistakes and adapt future behavior. Post-decisional neural signals have been identified that are sensitive to decision accuracy, decision confidence and subsequent adaptation. Here, we review recent work that supports an understanding of late error/confidence signals in terms of the computational process of post-decisional evidence accumulation. We argue that the error positivity, a positive-going centro-parietal potential measured through scalp electrophysiology, reflects the post-decisional evidence accumulation process itself, which follows a boundary crossing event corresponding to initial decision commitment. This proposal provides a powerful explanation for both the morphological characteristics of the signal and its relation to various expressions of performance monitoring. Moreover, it suggests that the error positivity -a signal with thus far unique properties in cognitive neuroscience - can be leveraged to furnish key new insights into the inputs to, adaptation, and consequences of the post-decisional accumulation process.

Adaptive circuit dynamics across human cortex during evidence accumulation in changing environments

Many decisions under uncertainty entail the temporal accumulation of evidence that informs about the state of the environment. When environments are subject to hidden changes in their state, maximizing accuracy and reward requires non-linear accumulation of evidence. How this adaptive, non-linear computation is realized in the brain is unknown. We analyzed human behavior and cortical population activity (measured with magnetoencephalography) recorded during visual evidence accumulation in a changing environment. Behavior and decision-related activity in cortical regions involved in action planning exhibited hallmarks of adaptive evidence accumulation, which could also be implemented by a recurrent cortical microcircuit. Decision dynamics in action-encoding parietal and frontal regions were mirrored in a frequency-specific modulation of the state of the visual cortex that depended on pupil-linked arousal and the expected probability of change. These findings link normative decision computations to recurrent cortical circuit dynamics and highlight the adaptive nature of decision-related feedback to the sensory cortex.

Trading accuracy for speed over the course of a decision

Humans and other animals often need to balance the desire to gather sensory information (to make the best choice) with the urgency to act, facing a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Given the ubiquity of SAT across species, extensive research has been devoted to understanding the computational mechanisms allowing its regulation at different timescales, including from one context to another, and from one decision to another. However, animals must frequently change their SAT on even shorter timescales-that is, over the course of an ongoing decision-and little is known about the mechanisms that allow such rapid adaptations. The present study aimed at addressing this issue. Human subjects performed a decision task with changing evidence. In this task, subjects received rewards for correct answers but incurred penalties for mistakes. An increase or a decrease in penalty occurring halfway through the trial promoted rapid SAT shifts, favoring speeded decisions either in the early or in the late stage of the trial. Importantly, these shifts were associated with stage-specific adjustments in the accuracy criterion exploited for committing to a choice. Those subjects who decreased the most their accuracy criterion at a given decision stage exhibited the highest gain in speed, but also the highest cost in terms of performance accuracy at that time. Altogether, the current findings offer a unique extension of previous work, by suggesting that dynamic cha*nges in accuracy criterion allow the regulation of the SAT within the timescale of a single decision.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Extensive research has been devoted to understanding the mechanisms allowing the regulation of the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) from one context to another and from one decision to another. Here, we show that humans can voluntarily change their SAT on even shorter timescales-that is, over the course of a decision. These rapid SAT shifts are associated with dynamic adjustments in the accuracy criterion exploited for committing to a choice.

Evidence and Urgency Related EEG Signals during Dynamic Decision-Making in Humans

A successful class of models link decision-making to brain signals by assuming that evidence accumulates to a decision threshold. These evidence accumulation models have identified neuronal activity that appears to reflect sensory evidence and decision variables that drive behavior. More recently, an additional evidence-independent and time-variant signal, called urgency, has been hypothesized to accelerate decisions in the face of insufficient evidence. However, most decision-making paradigms tested with fMRI or EEG in humans have not been designed to disentangle evidence accumulation from urgency. Here we use a face-morphing decision-making task in combination with EEG and a hierarchical Bayesian model to identify neural signals related to sensory and decision variables, and to test the urgency-gating model. Forty females and 34 males took part (mean age, 23.4 years). We find that an evoked potential time locked to the decision, the centroparietal positivity, reflects the decision variable from the computational model. We further show that the unfolding of this signal throughout the decision process best reflects the product of sensory evidence and an evidence-independent urgency signal. Urgency varied across subjects, suggesting that it may represent an individual trait. Our results show that it is possible to use EEG to distinguish neural signals related to sensory evidence accumulation, decision variables, and urgency. These mechanisms expose principles of cognitive function in general and may have applications to the study of pathologic decision-making such as in impulse control and addictive disorders.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Perceptual decisions are often described by a class of models that assumes that sensory evidence accumulates gradually over time until a decision threshold is reached. In the present study, we demonstrate that an additional urgency signal impacts how decisions are formed. This endogenous signal encourages one to respond as time elapses. We found that neural decision signals measured by EEG reflect the product of sensory evidence and an evidence-independent urgency signal. A nuanced understanding of human decisions, and the neural mechanisms that support it, can improve decision-making in many situations and potentially ameliorate dysfunction when it has gone awry.

A neural index of inefficient evidence accumulation in dyslexia underlying slow perceptual decision making

Visual processing deficits have been widely reported in developmental dyslexia however the locus of cognitive dysfunction remains unclear. Here, we examined the neural correlates of perceptual decision-making using a dot-motion task and electroencephalography (EEG) and investigated whether presenting deficits were unique to children with dyslexia or if they were also evident in other, typically developing children with equally immature reading systems. Sixty-eight children participated: 32 with dyslexia (DD; 16 females); 21 age-matched controls (AM; 11 females) and 15 reading-matched controls (RM; 9 females). All participants completed a bilaterally presented random-dot-motion task while EEG was recorded. Neural signatures of low level sensory processing (steady state visual evoked potentials; SSVEPs), pre-target attentional bias (posterior α power), attentional orienting (N2), evidence accumulation (centro-parietal positive decision signal; CPP) and execution of a motor response (β) were obtained to dissect the temporal sequence of perceptual decision-making. Reading profile provided a score of relative lexical and sublexical skills for each participant. Although all groups performed comparably in terms of task accuracy and false alarm rate, the DD group were slower and demonstrated an earlier peak latency, reduced slope and lower amplitude of the CPP compared with both AM and RM controls. Reading profile was found to moderate the relationship between word reading ability, reaction time as well as CPP indices showing that lexical dyslexics responded more slowly and had a shallower slope, reduced amplitude and earlier latency of CPP waveforms than sublexical dyslexics. These findings suggest that children with dyslexia, particularly those with relatively poorer lexical abilities, have a reduced rate and peak of evidence accumulation as denoted by CPP markers yet remain slow in their overt response. This is in keeping with hypotheses that children with dyslexia have impairment in effectively sampling and processing evidence about visual motion stimuli.

Tracking dynamic adjustments to decision making and performance monitoring processes in conflict tasks

How we exert control over our decision-making has been investigated using conflict tasks, which involve stimuli containing elements that are either congruent or incongruent. In these tasks, participants adapt their decision-making strategies following exposure to incongruent stimuli. According to conflict monitoring accounts, conflicting stimulus features are detected in medial frontal cortex, and the extent of experienced conflict scales with response time (RT) and frontal theta-band activity in the Electroencephalogram (EEG). However, the consequent adjustments to decision processes following response conflict are not well-specified. To characterise these adjustments and their neural implementation we recorded EEG during a modified Flanker task. We traced the time-courses of performance monitoring processes (frontal theta) and multiple processes related to perceptual decision-making. In each trial participants judged which of two overlaid gratings forming a plaid stimulus (termed the S1 target) was of higher contrast. The stimulus was divided into two sections, which each contained higher contrast gratings in either congruent or incongruent directions. Shortly after responding to the S1 target, an additional S2 target was presented, which was always congruent. Our EEG results suggest enhanced sensory evidence representations in visual cortex and reduced evidence accumulation rates for S2 targets following incongruent S1 stimuli. Results of a follow-up behavioural experiment indicated that the accumulation of sensory evidence from the incongruent (i.e. distracting) stimulus element was adjusted following response conflict. Frontal theta amplitudes positively correlated with RT following S1 targets (in line with conflict monitoring accounts). Following S2 targets there was no such correlation, and theta amplitude profiles instead resembled decision evidence accumulation trajectories. Our findings provide novel insights into how cognitive control is implemented following exposure to conflicting information, which is critical for extending conflict monitoring accounts.

Pupil Dilation and the Slow Wave ERP Reflect Surprise about Choice Outcome Resulting from Intrinsic Variability in Decision Confidence

Central to human and animal cognition is the ability to learn from feedback in order to optimize future rewards. Such a learning signal might be encoded and broadcasted by the brain's arousal systems, including the noradrenergic locus coeruleus. Pupil responses and the positive slow wave component of event-related potentials reflect rapid changes in the arousal level of the brain. Here, we ask whether and how these variables may reflect surprise: the mismatch between one's expectation about being correct and the outcome of a decision, when expectations fluctuate due to internal factors (e.g., engagement). We show that during an elementary decision task in the face of uncertainty both physiological markers of phasic arousal reflect surprise. We further show that pupil responses and slow wave event-related potential are unrelated to each other and that prediction error computations depend on feedback awareness. These results further advance our understanding of the role of central arousal systems in decision-making under uncertainty.