1
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Block N. What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness? Trends Cogn Sci 2024:S1364-6613(24)00117-7. [PMID: 38862352 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.05.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/10/2023] [Revised: 05/12/2024] [Accepted: 05/12/2024] [Indexed: 06/13/2024]
Abstract
Disputes between rival theories of consciousness have often centered on whether perceptual contents can be decoded from the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Failures to decode from the PFC are taken to challenge 'cognitive' theories of consciousness such as the global workspace theory and higher-order monitoring theories, and decoding successes have been taken to confirm these theories. However, PFC decoding shows both too much and too little. Too much because cognitive theories of consciousness do not need PFC rerepresentation of perceptual contents since pointers to perceptual representations suffice. Too little because there is evidence that PFC decoding of perceptual content reflects postperceptual cognitive representation, such as thoughts that have those perceptual contents rather than conscious percepts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ned Block
- New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA.
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2
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Chis-Ciure R, Melloni L, Northoff G. A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 161:105670. [PMID: 38615851 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105670] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/03/2024] [Revised: 03/15/2024] [Accepted: 04/08/2024] [Indexed: 04/16/2024]
Abstract
Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert Chis-Ciure
- New York University (NYU), New York, USA; International Center for Neuroscience and Ethics (CINET), Tatiana Foundation, Madrid, Spain; Wolfram Physics Project, USA.
| | - Lucia Melloni
- Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
| | - Georg Northoff
- University of Ottawa, Institute of Mental Health Research at the Royal Ottawa Hospital, Ottawa, Canada
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3
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Panagiotaropoulos TI. An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness. Neuron 2024; 112:1626-1641. [PMID: 38754374 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.04.028] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/12/2024] [Revised: 04/16/2024] [Accepted: 04/24/2024] [Indexed: 05/18/2024]
Abstract
The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.
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4
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Whyte CJ, Redinbaugh MJ, Shine JM, Saalmann YB. Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness. Neuron 2024; 112:1611-1625. [PMID: 38754373 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.04.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/19/2024] [Revised: 04/11/2024] [Accepted: 04/17/2024] [Indexed: 05/18/2024]
Abstract
Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christopher J Whyte
- Centre for Complex Systems, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia; Brain and Mind Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | | | - James M Shine
- Centre for Complex Systems, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia; Brain and Mind Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Yuri B Saalmann
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison, WI, USA; Wisconsin National Primate Research Center, Madison, WI, USA
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5
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Mashour GA. Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness. Neuron 2024; 112:1553-1567. [PMID: 38579714 PMCID: PMC11098701 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.03.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2024] [Revised: 03/05/2024] [Accepted: 03/06/2024] [Indexed: 04/07/2024]
Abstract
In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces of sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of the data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness and then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions.
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Affiliation(s)
- George A Mashour
- Center for Consciousness Science, Department of Anesthesiology, Department of Pharmacology, Neuroscience Graduate Program, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.
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6
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Storm JF, Klink PC, Aru J, Senn W, Goebel R, Pigorini A, Avanzini P, Vanduffel W, Roelfsema PR, Massimini M, Larkum ME, Pennartz CMA. An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness. Neuron 2024; 112:1531-1552. [PMID: 38447578 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2023] [Revised: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/05/2024] [Indexed: 03/08/2024]
Abstract
How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johan F Storm
- The Brain Signaling Group, Division of Physiology, IMB, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, Domus Medica, Sognsvannsveien 9, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
| | - P Christiaan Klink
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Experimental Psychology, Helmholtz Institute, Utrecht University, 3584 CS Utrecht, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France
| | - Jaan Aru
- Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
| | - Walter Senn
- Department of Physiology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Rainer Goebel
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Oxfordlaan 55, 6229 EV Maastricht, The Netherlands
| | - Andrea Pigorini
- Department of Biomedical, Surgical and Dental Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20122, Italy
| | - Pietro Avanzini
- Istituto di Neuroscienze, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 43125 Parma, Italy
| | - Wim Vanduffel
- Department of Neurosciences, Laboratory of Neuro and Psychophysiology, KU Leuven Medical School, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Leuven Brain Institute, KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital, Charlestown, MA 02129, USA; Department of Radiology, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02144, USA
| | - Pieter R Roelfsema
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France; Department of Integrative Neurophysiology, VU University, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Department of Neurosurgery, Academisch Medisch Centrum, Postbus 22660, 1100 DD Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Marcello Massimini
- Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences "L. Sacco", Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20157, Italy; Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi, Milan 20122, Italy; Azrieli Program in Brain, Mind and Consciousness, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Matthew E Larkum
- Institute of Biology, Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Neurocure Center for Excellence, Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Cyriel M A Pennartz
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Center for Neuroscience, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Sciencepark 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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7
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Cortese A, Kawato M. The cognitive reality monitoring network and theories of consciousness. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:31-38. [PMID: 38316366 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/26/2023] [Revised: 01/17/2024] [Accepted: 01/17/2024] [Indexed: 02/07/2024]
Abstract
Theories of consciousness abound. However, it is difficult to arbitrate reliably among competing theories because they target different levels of neural and cognitive processing or anatomical loci, and only some were developed with computational models in mind. In particular, theories of consciousness need to fully address the three levels of understanding of the brain proposed by David Marr: computational theory, algorithms and hardware. Most major theories refer to only one or two levels, often indirectly. The cognitive reality monitoring network (CRMN) model is derived from computational theories of mixture-of-experts architecture, hierarchical reinforcement learning and generative/inference computing modules, addressing all three levels of understanding. A central feature of the CRMN is the mapping of a gating network onto the prefrontal cortex, making it a prime coding circuit involved in monitoring the accuracy of one's mental states and distinguishing them from external reality. Because the CRMN builds on the hierarchical and layer structure of the cerebral cortex, it may connect research and findings across species, further enabling concrete computational models of consciousness with new, explicitly testable hypotheses. In sum, we discuss how the CRMN model can help further our understanding of the nature and function of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aurelio Cortese
- Computational Neuroscience Labs, ATR Institute International, Kyoto 619-0228, Japan.
| | - Mitsuo Kawato
- Computational Neuroscience Labs, ATR Institute International, Kyoto 619-0228, Japan; XNef, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan.
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8
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Bellet ME, Gay M, Bellet J, Jarraya B, Dehaene S, van Kerkoerle T, Panagiotaropoulos TI. Spontaneously emerging internal models of visual sequences combine abstract and event-specific information in the prefrontal cortex. Cell Rep 2024; 43:113952. [PMID: 38483904 DOI: 10.1016/j.celrep.2024.113952] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/09/2022] [Revised: 06/06/2023] [Accepted: 02/27/2024] [Indexed: 04/02/2024] Open
Abstract
When exposed to sensory sequences, do macaque monkeys spontaneously form abstract internal models that generalize to novel experiences? Here, we show that neuronal populations in macaque ventrolateral prefrontal cortex jointly encode visual sequences by separate codes for the specific pictures presented and for their abstract sequential structure. We recorded prefrontal neurons while macaque monkeys passively viewed visual sequences and sequence mismatches in the local-global paradigm. Even without any overt task or response requirements, prefrontal populations spontaneously form representations of sequence structure, serial order, and image identity within distinct but superimposed neuronal subspaces. Representations of sequence structure rapidly update following single exposure to a mismatch sequence, while distinct populations represent mismatches for sequences of different complexity. Finally, those representations generalize across sequences following the same repetition structure but comprising different images. These results suggest that prefrontal populations spontaneously encode rich internal models of visual sequences reflecting both content-specific and abstract information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marie E Bellet
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
| | - Marion Gay
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
| | - Joachim Bellet
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
| | - Bechir Jarraya
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; Université Paris-Saclay, UVSQ, Versailles, France; Neuromodulation Pole, Foch Hospital, Suresnes, France
| | - Stanislas Dehaene
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; Collège de France, Université Paris-Sciences-Lettres (PSL), Paris, France
| | - Timo van Kerkoerle
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; Department of Neurophysics, Donders Center for Neuroscience, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands; Department of Neurobiology and Aging, Biomedical Primate Research Center, Rijswijk, the Netherlands
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9
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Weilnhammer V. Where is the ghost in the shell? Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae015. [PMID: 38595737 PMCID: PMC11003298 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2024] [Accepted: 03/05/2024] [Indexed: 04/11/2024] Open
Abstract
The neurobiology of conscious experience is one of the fundamental mysteries in science. New evidence suggests that transcranial magnetic stimulation of the parietal cortex does not modulate bistable perception. What does this mean for the neural correlates of consciousness, and how should we search for them?
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Affiliation(s)
- Veith Weilnhammer
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720, United States
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10
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Wagener L, Nieder A. Conscious Experience of Stimulus Presence and Absence Is Actively Encoded by Neurons in the Crow Brain. J Cogn Neurosci 2024; 36:508-521. [PMID: 38165732 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_02101] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2024]
Abstract
The emergence of consciousness from brain activity constitutes one of the great riddles in biology. It is commonly assumed that only the conscious perception of the presence of a stimulus elicits neuronal activation to signify a "neural correlate of consciousness," whereas the subjective experience of the absence of a stimulus is associated with a neuronal resting state. Here, we demonstrate that the two subjective states "stimulus present" and "stimulus absent" are represented by two specialized neuron populations in crows, corvid birds. We recorded single-neuron activity from the nidopallium caudolaterale of crows trained to report the presence or absence of images presented near the visual threshold. Because of the task design, neuronal activity tracking the conscious "present" versus "absent" percept was dissociated from that involved in planning a motor response. Distinct neuron populations signaled the subjective percepts of "present" and "absent" by increases in activation. The response selectivity of these two neuron populations was similar in strength and time course. This suggests a balanced code for subjective "presence" versus "absence" experiences, which might be beneficial when both conscious states need to be maintained active in the service of goal-directed behavior.
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11
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Viswanathan P, Stein AM, Nieder A. Sequential neuronal processing of number values, abstract decision, and action in the primate prefrontal cortex. PLoS Biol 2024; 22:e3002520. [PMID: 38364194 PMCID: PMC10871863 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3002520] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/06/2023] [Accepted: 01/25/2024] [Indexed: 02/18/2024] Open
Abstract
Decision-making requires processing of sensory information, comparing the gathered evidence to make a judgment, and performing the action to communicate it. How neuronal representations transform during this cascade of representations remains a matter of debate. Here, we studied the succession of neuronal representations in the primate prefrontal cortex (PFC). We trained monkeys to judge whether a pair of sequentially presented displays had the same number of items. We used a combination of single neuron and population-level analyses and discovered a sequential transformation of represented information with trial progression. While numerical values were initially represented with high precision and in conjunction with detailed information such as order, the decision was encoded in a low-dimensional subspace of neural activity. This decision encoding was invariant to both retrospective numerical values and prospective motor plans, representing only the binary judgment of "same number" versus "different number," thus facilitating the generalization of decisions to novel number pairs. We conclude that this transformation of neuronal codes within the prefrontal cortex supports cognitive flexibility and generalizability of decisions to new conditions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pooja Viswanathan
- Animal Physiology, Institute of Neurobiology, University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany
| | - Anna M. Stein
- Animal Physiology, Institute of Neurobiology, University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany
| | - Andreas Nieder
- Animal Physiology, Institute of Neurobiology, University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany
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12
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Fang Z, Dang Y, Ling Z, Han Y, Zhao H, Xu X, Zhang M. The involvement of the human prefrontal cortex in the emergence of visual awareness. eLife 2024; 12:RP89076. [PMID: 38265851 PMCID: PMC10945701 DOI: 10.7554/elife.89076] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/25/2024] Open
Abstract
Exploring the neural mechanisms of awareness is a fundamental task of cognitive neuroscience. There is an ongoing dispute regarding the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the emergence of awareness, which is partially raised by the confound between report- and awareness-related activity. To address this problem, we designed a visual awareness task that can minimize report-related motor confounding. Our results show that saccadic latency is significantly shorter in the aware trials than in the unaware trials. Local field potential (LFP) data from six patients consistently show early (200-300ms) awareness-related activity in the PFC, including event-related potential and high-gamma activity. Moreover, the awareness state can be reliably decoded by the neural activity in the PFC since the early stage, and the neural pattern is dynamically changed rather than being stable during the representation of awareness. Furthermore, the enhancement of dynamic functional connectivity, through the phase modulation at low frequency, between the PFC and other brain regions in the early stage of the awareness trials may explain the mechanism of conscious access. These results indicate that the PFC is critically involved in the emergence of awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zepeng Fang
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Division of Psychology, Beijing Normal UniversityBeijingChina
| | - Yuanyuan Dang
- Department of Neurosurgery, Chinese PLA General HospitalBeijingChina
| | - Zhipei Ling
- Department of Neurosurgery, Chinese PLA General HospitalBeijingChina
| | - Yongzheng Han
- Department of Anesthesiology, Peking University Third HospitalBeijingChina
| | - Hulin Zhao
- Department of Neurosurgery, Chinese PLA General HospitalBeijingChina
| | - Xin Xu
- Department of Neurosurgery, Chinese PLA General HospitalBeijingChina
| | - Mingsha Zhang
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Division of Psychology, Beijing Normal UniversityBeijingChina
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13
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Fazekas P, Cleeremans A, Overgaard M. A construct-first approach to consciousness science. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 156:105480. [PMID: 38008237 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105480] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2023] [Revised: 10/26/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 11/28/2023]
Abstract
We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter Fazekas
- Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Høegh-Guldbergs Gade 6B, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark.
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, Université Libre De Bruxelles, 50 avenue F.D. Roosevelt CP191, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
| | - Morten Overgaard
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark
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14
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Carlson BM, Mitchell BA, Dougherty K, Westerberg JA, Cox MA, Maier A. Does V1 response suppression initiate binocular rivalry? iScience 2023; 26:107359. [PMID: 37520732 PMCID: PMC10382945 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.107359] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2023] [Revised: 06/02/2023] [Accepted: 07/07/2023] [Indexed: 08/01/2023] Open
Abstract
During binocular rivalry (BR) only one eye's view is perceived. Neural underpinnings of BR are debated. Recent studies suggest that primary visual cortex (V1) initiates BR. One trigger might be response suppression across most V1 neurons at the onset of BR. Here, we utilize a variant of BR called binocular rivalry flash suppression (BRFS) to test this hypothesis. BRFS is identical to BR, except stimuli are shown with a ∼1s delay. If V1 response suppression was required to initiate BR, it should occur during BRFS as well. To test this, we compared V1 spiking in two macaques observing BRFS. We found that BRFS resulted in response facilitation rather than response suppression across V1 neurons. However, BRFS still reduces responses in a subset of V1 neurons due to the adaptive effects of asynchronous stimulus presentation. We argue that this selective response suppression could serve as an alternate initiator of BR.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brock M. Carlson
- Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt Vision Research Center, Center for Integrative and Cognitive Neuroscience, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA
| | - Blake A. Mitchell
- Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt Vision Research Center, Center for Integrative and Cognitive Neuroscience, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA
| | - Kacie Dougherty
- Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt Vision Research Center, Center for Integrative and Cognitive Neuroscience, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA
- Department of Psychology, Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
| | - Jacob A. Westerberg
- Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt Vision Research Center, Center for Integrative and Cognitive Neuroscience, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Amsterdam 1105 BA, the Netherlands
| | - Michele A. Cox
- Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt Vision Research Center, Center for Integrative and Cognitive Neuroscience, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA
- Center for Visual Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA
| | - Alexander Maier
- Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt Vision Research Center, Center for Integrative and Cognitive Neuroscience, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA
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15
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Vishne G, Gerber EM, Knight RT, Deouell LY. Distinct ventral stream and prefrontal cortex representational dynamics during sustained conscious visual perception. Cell Rep 2023; 42:112752. [PMID: 37422763 PMCID: PMC10530642 DOI: 10.1016/j.celrep.2023.112752] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2022] [Revised: 05/12/2023] [Accepted: 06/20/2023] [Indexed: 07/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Instances of sustained stationary sensory input are ubiquitous. However, previous work focused almost exclusively on transient onset responses. This presents a critical challenge for neural theories of consciousness, which should account for the full temporal extent of experience. To address this question, we use intracranial recordings from ten human patients with epilepsy to view diverse images of multiple durations. We reveal that, in sensory regions, despite dramatic changes in activation magnitude, the distributed representation of categories and exemplars remains sustained and stable. In contrast, in frontoparietal regions, we find transient content representation at stimulus onset. Our results highlight the connection between the anatomical and temporal correlates of experience. To the extent perception is sustained, it may rely on sensory representations and to the extent perception is discrete, centered on perceptual updating, it may rely on frontoparietal representations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gal Vishne
- Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190401, Israel.
| | - Edden M Gerber
- Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190401, Israel
| | - Robert T Knight
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA; Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
| | - Leon Y Deouell
- Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190401, Israel; Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel.
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16
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He BJ. Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness. Trends Cogn Sci 2023; 27:420-432. [PMID: 36842851 PMCID: PMC10101889 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2023.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/08/2022] [Revised: 02/02/2023] [Accepted: 02/03/2023] [Indexed: 02/27/2023]
Abstract
Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Biyu J He
- Neuroscience Institute, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, NY 10016, USA; Departments of Neurology, Neuroscience and Physiology, Radiology, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, NY 10016.
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17
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Sun B, Zeng X, Chen X, Zhao J, Fu S. Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials. Neuropsychologia 2023; 182:108478. [PMID: 36707025 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108478] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/14/2022] [Revised: 12/26/2022] [Accepted: 01/05/2023] [Indexed: 01/25/2023]
Abstract
There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bo Sun
- Department of Psychology and Center for Brain and Cognitive Sciences, School of Education, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China.
| | - Xianqing Zeng
- Department of Psychology and Center for Brain and Cognitive Sciences, School of Education, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China
| | - Xiaomin Chen
- Department of Psychology and Center for Brain and Cognitive Sciences, School of Education, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China
| | - Jin Zhao
- Department of Psychology and Center for Brain and Cognitive Sciences, School of Education, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China
| | - Shimin Fu
- Department of Psychology and Center for Brain and Cognitive Sciences, School of Education, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China.
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18
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Dwarakanath A, Kapoor V, Werner J, Safavi S, Fedorov LA, Logothetis NK, Panagiotaropoulos TI. Bistability of prefrontal states gates access to consciousness. Neuron 2023; 111:1666-1683.e4. [PMID: 36921603 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2023.02.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/10/2022] [Revised: 10/24/2022] [Accepted: 02/16/2023] [Indexed: 03/15/2023]
Abstract
Access of sensory information to consciousness has been linked to the ignition of content-specific representations in association cortices. How does ignition interact with intrinsic cortical state fluctuations to give rise to conscious perception? We addressed this question in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) by combining multi-electrode recordings with a binocular rivalry (BR) paradigm inducing spontaneously driven changes in the content of consciousness, inferred from the reflexive optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) pattern. We find that fluctuations between low-frequency (LF, 1-9 Hz) and beta (∼20-40 Hz) local field potentials (LFPs) reflect competition between spontaneous updates and stability of conscious contents, respectively. Both LF and beta events were locally modulated. The phase of the former locked differentially to the competing populations just before a spontaneous transition while the latter synchronized the neuronal ensemble coding the consciously perceived content. These results suggest that prefrontal state fluctuations gate conscious perception by mediating internal states that facilitate perceptual update and stability.
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Affiliation(s)
- Abhilash Dwarakanath
- Department of Physiology of Cognitive Processes, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen 72076, Germany; Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux énergies alternatives, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
| | - Vishal Kapoor
- Department of Physiology of Cognitive Processes, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen 72076, Germany; International Center for Primate Brain Research, Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (CEBSIT), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shanghai, China
| | - Joachim Werner
- Department of Physiology of Cognitive Processes, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen 72076, Germany
| | - Shervin Safavi
- Department of Physiology of Cognitive Processes, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen 72076, Germany; International Max Planck Research School, Tübingen 72076, Germany
| | - Leonid A Fedorov
- Department of Physiology of Cognitive Processes, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen 72076, Germany
| | - Nikos K Logothetis
- Department of Physiology of Cognitive Processes, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen 72076, Germany; Division of Imaging Science and Biomedical Engineering, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PT, UK; International Center for Primate Brain Research, Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (CEBSIT), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shanghai, China
| | - Theofanis I Panagiotaropoulos
- Department of Physiology of Cognitive Processes, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen 72076, Germany; Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux énergies alternatives, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
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19
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Alilović J, Lampers E, Slagter HA, van Gaal S. Illusory object recognition is either perceptual or cognitive in origin depending on decision confidence. PLoS Biol 2023; 21:e3002009. [PMID: 36862734 PMCID: PMC10013920 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3002009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/04/2022] [Revised: 03/14/2023] [Accepted: 01/20/2023] [Indexed: 03/03/2023] Open
Abstract
We occasionally misinterpret ambiguous sensory input or report a stimulus when none is presented. It is unknown whether such errors have a sensory origin and reflect true perceptual illusions, or whether they have a more cognitive origin (e.g., are due to guessing), or both. When participants performed an error-prone and challenging face/house discrimination task, multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) analyses revealed that during decision errors (e.g., mistaking a face for a house), sensory stages of visual information processing initially represent the presented stimulus category. Crucially however, when participants were confident in their erroneous decision, so when the illusion was strongest, this neural representation flipped later in time and reflected the incorrectly reported percept. This flip in neural pattern was absent for decisions that were made with low confidence. This work demonstrates that decision confidence arbitrates between perceptual decision errors, which reflect true illusions of perception, and cognitive decision errors, which do not.
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Affiliation(s)
- Josipa Alilović
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Eline Lampers
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Heleen A. Slagter
- Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Institute for Brain and Behavior, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- * E-mail:
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20
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Hobot J, Skóra Z, Wierzchoń M, Sandberg K. Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency. Neuroimage 2023; 272:119991. [PMID: 36858333 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2023.119991] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2022] [Revised: 02/04/2023] [Accepted: 02/25/2023] [Indexed: 03/03/2023] Open
Abstract
The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.
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Affiliation(s)
- Justyna Hobot
- Consciousness Lab, Psychology Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.
| | - Zuzanna Skóra
- Colourlab, Department of Computer Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Gjøvik, Norway
| | - Michał Wierzchoń
- Consciousness Lab, Psychology Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
| | - Kristian Sandberg
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus, Denmark
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21
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Melloni L, Mudrik L, Pitts M, Bendtz K, Ferrante O, Gorska U, Hirschhorn R, Khalaf A, Kozma C, Lepauvre A, Liu L, Mazumder D, Richter D, Zhou H, Blumenfeld H, Boly M, Chalmers DJ, Devore S, Fallon F, de Lange FP, Jensen O, Kreiman G, Luo H, Panagiotaropoulos TI, Dehaene S, Koch C, Tononi G. An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0268577. [PMID: 36763595 PMCID: PMC9916582 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0268577] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 23.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/16/2021] [Accepted: 05/03/2022] [Indexed: 02/11/2023] Open
Abstract
The relationship between conscious experience and brain activity has intrigued scientists and philosophers for centuries. In the last decades, several theories have suggested different accounts for these relationships. These theories have developed in parallel, with little to no cross-talk among them. To advance research on consciousness, we established an adversarial collaboration between proponents of two of the major theories in the field, Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory. Together, we devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions of these theories concerning the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness, which have been endorsed by the theories' proponents. Predicted outcomes should either support, refute, or challenge these theories. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol specified here, using three complementary methods: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Magneto-Electroencephalography (M-EEG), and intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG). The study protocol will include built-in replications, both between labs and within datasets. Through this ambitious undertaking, we hope to provide decisive evidence in favor or against the two theories and clarify the footprints of conscious visual perception in the human brain, while also providing an innovative model of large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lucia Melloni
- Neural Circuits, Consciousness and Cognition Research Group, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
- Department of Neurology, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, New York, United States of America
| | - Liad Mudrik
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Michael Pitts
- Psychology Department, Reed College, Portland, Oregon, United States of America
| | - Katarina Bendtz
- Children’s Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Oscar Ferrante
- Centre for Human Brain Health, School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
| | - Urszula Gorska
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Rony Hirschhorn
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Aya Khalaf
- Department of Neurology, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
- Biomedical Engineering and Systems, Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt
| | - Csaba Kozma
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Alex Lepauvre
- Neural Circuits, Consciousness and Cognition Research Group, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
| | - Ling Liu
- School of Psychological and Cognitive Science, Peking University, Peking, China
- IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Science at Peking University, Peking, China
| | - David Mazumder
- Children’s Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - David Richter
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Hao Zhou
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM) U992, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
- State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Science, Institute of Biophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Hal Blumenfeld
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Melanie Boly
- Department of Neurology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - David J. Chalmers
- Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, New York, United States of America
| | - Sasha Devore
- Department of Neurology, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, New York, United States of America
| | - Francis Fallon
- Philosophy Department, St. John’s University, New York, New York, United States of America
| | - Floris P. de Lange
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Ole Jensen
- Centre for Human Brain Health, School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
| | - Gabriel Kreiman
- Children’s Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Huan Luo
- School of Psychological and Cognitive Science, Peking University, Peking, China
- IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Science at Peking University, Peking, China
| | - Theofanis I. Panagiotaropoulos
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM) U992, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
| | - Stanislas Dehaene
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM) U992, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
- Collège de France, Paris, France
| | - Christof Koch
- MindScope Program, Allen Institute, Seattle, Washington, United States of America
| | - Giulio Tononi
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
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22
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Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2023; 108:103471. [PMID: 36736210 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103471] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2022] [Revised: 12/22/2022] [Accepted: 01/11/2023] [Indexed: 02/04/2023]
Abstract
Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.
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23
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Skerswetat J, Bex PJ. InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me): A novel method to measure perceptual multistability dynamics using continuous data tracking and validated estimates of visual introspection. Conscious Cogn 2023; 107:103437. [PMID: 36450218 PMCID: PMC9840704 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103437] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/23/2022] [Revised: 11/11/2022] [Accepted: 11/14/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Perceptual multistability, e.g. Binocular Rivalry, has been intensively used as a tool to study visual consciousness. Current methods to assess multistability do not capture all potentially occurring perceptual states, provide no estimate of introspection, and lack continuous, high-temporal resolution to resolve perceptual changes between states and within mixed perceptual states. We introduce InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me), a four-phase method that (1) trains a participant to self-generate estimates of perceptual introspection-maps that are (2) validated during a physical mimic task, (3) gathers perceptual multistability data, and (4) confirms their validity during a physical replay. 28 condition-blinded adults performed InFoRM while experiencing binocular rivalry evoked with orthogonal sinusoidal gratings. A 60 Hz joystick (3600 data samples/minute) was used to indicate continuously changes across six perceptual states within each 1 min trial. A polarized monitor system was used to present the stimuli dichoptically. Three contrast conditions were investigated: low vs low, high vs high, and low vs high. InFoRM replicates standard outcome measures, i.e. alternation rate, mean and relative proportions of perception, and distribution of exclusive percepts that are well fitted with gamma functions. Furthermore, InFoRM generates novel outcomes that deliver new insights in visual cognition via estimates of introspection maps, in ocular dominance via perceptual-state-specific dominance scores, in transitory dynamics between and within perceptual states, via techniques adopted from eye-tracking, and in rivalry-zone-size estimates utilizing InFoRM's ability to simulate piecemeal perception. The replay phase (physical replay of perceptual rivalry) confirmed good overall agreement (73% ±5 standard deviation). InFoRM can be applied to other multistable paradigms and can be used to study visual consciousness in typical and neuro-atypical populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jan Skerswetat
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave, Boston, MA 02115, United States.
| | - Peter J Bex
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave, Boston, MA 02115, United States
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24
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Gaeta G, Wilson DA. Reciprocal relationships between sleep and smell. Front Neural Circuits 2022; 16:1076354. [PMID: 36619661 PMCID: PMC9813672 DOI: 10.3389/fncir.2022.1076354] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2022] [Accepted: 12/08/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Despite major anatomical differences with other mammalian sensory systems, olfaction shares with those systems a modulation by sleep/wake states. Sleep modulates odor sensitivity and serves as an important regulator of both perceptual and associative odor memory. In addition, however, olfaction also has an important modulatory impact on sleep. Odors can affect the latency to sleep onset, as well as the quality and duration of sleep. Olfactory modulation of sleep may be mediated by direct synaptic interaction between the olfactory system and sleep control nuclei, and/or indirectly through odor modulation of arousal and respiration. This reciprocal interaction between sleep and olfaction presents novel opportunities for sleep related modulation of memory and perception, as well as development of non-pharmacological olfactory treatments of simple sleep disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giuliano Gaeta
- Givaudan UK Limited, Health and Well-Being Centre of Excellence, Ashford, United Kingdom,Giuliano Gaeta,
| | - Donald A. Wilson
- Emotional Brain Institute, Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Orangeburg, NY, United States,Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, NYU School of Medicine, New York University, New York, NY, United States,*Correspondence: Donald A. Wilson,
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25
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Hatamimajoumerd E, Ratan Murty NA, Pitts M, Cohen MA. Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm. Curr Biol 2022; 32:4139-4149.e4. [PMID: 35981538 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2022.07.068] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2022] [Revised: 06/16/2022] [Accepted: 07/26/2022] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Abstract
Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elaheh Hatamimajoumerd
- McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, USA; Department of Psychology and Program in Neuroscience, Amherst College, 220 South Pleasant Street, Amherst, MA, USA
| | - N Apurva Ratan Murty
- McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, USA; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, USA
| | - Michael Pitts
- Department of Psychology, Reed College, 3203 Southeast Woodstock Blvd, Portland, OR, USA
| | - Michael A Cohen
- McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, USA; Department of Psychology and Program in Neuroscience, Amherst College, 220 South Pleasant Street, Amherst, MA, USA.
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26
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Mashour GA, Pal D, Brown EN. Prefrontal cortex as a key node in arousal circuitry. Trends Neurosci 2022; 45:722-732. [PMID: 35995629 PMCID: PMC9492635 DOI: 10.1016/j.tins.2022.07.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2022] [Revised: 07/02/2022] [Accepted: 07/31/2022] [Indexed: 10/15/2022]
Abstract
The role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the mechanism of consciousness is a matter of active debate. Most theoretical and empirical investigations have focused on whether the PFC is critical for the content of consciousness (i.e., the qualitative aspects of conscious experience). However, there is emerging evidence that, in addition to its well-established roles in cognition, the PFC is a key regulator of the level of consciousness (i.e., the global state of arousal). In this opinion article we review recent data supporting the hypothesis that the medial PFC is a critical node in arousal-promoting networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- George A Mashour
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Department of Pharmacology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Michigan Neuroscience Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Neuroscience Graduate Program, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.
| | - Dinesh Pal
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Michigan Neuroscience Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Neuroscience Graduate Program, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA; Department of Molecular and Integrative Physiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Emery N Brown
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA; Picower Institute for Learning and Memory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA; Institute for Medical Engineering and Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA; Department of Anesthesia, Critical Care, and Pain Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
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27
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Nakayama R, Bardin JB, Koizumi A, Motoyoshi I, Amano K. Building a decoder of perceptual decisions from microsaccades and pupil size. Front Psychol 2022; 13:942859. [PMID: 36176801 PMCID: PMC9514321 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.942859] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 08/17/2022] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Many studies have reported neural correlates of visual awareness across several brain regions, including the sensory, parietal, and frontal areas. In most of these studies, participants were instructed to explicitly report their perceptual experience through a button press or verbal report. It is conceivable, however, that explicit reporting itself may trigger specific neural responses that can confound the direct examination of the neural correlates of visual awareness. This suggests the need to assess visual awareness without explicit reporting. One way to achieve this is to develop a technique to predict the visual awareness of participants based on their peripheral responses. Here, we used eye movements and pupil sizes to decode trial-by-trial changes in the awareness of a stimulus whose visibility was deteriorated due to adaptation-induced blindness (AIB). In the experiment, participants judged whether they perceived a target stimulus and rated the confidence they had in their perceptual judgment, while their eye movements and pupil sizes were recorded. We found that not only perceptual decision but also perceptual confidence can be separately decoded from the eye movement and pupil size. We discuss the potential of this technique with regard to assessing visual awareness in future neuroimaging experiments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryohei Nakayama
- Department of Psychology, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Osaka, Japan
| | - Jean-Baptiste Bardin
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Osaka, Japan
- École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Ai Koizumi
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Osaka, Japan
- Sony Computer Science Laboratories, Inc., Tokyo, Japan
| | - Isamu Motoyoshi
- Department of Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Kaoru Amano
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Osaka, Japan
- Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
- *Correspondence: Kaoru Amano,
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Safavi S, Dayan P. Multistability, perceptual value, and internal foraging. Neuron 2022; 110:3076-3090. [PMID: 36041434 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2022.07.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/09/2022] [Revised: 07/03/2022] [Accepted: 07/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Substantial experimental, theoretical, and computational insights into sensory processing have been derived from the phenomena of perceptual multistability-when two or more percepts alternate or switch in response to a single sensory input. Here, we review a range of findings suggesting that alternations can be seen as internal choices by the brain responding to values. We discuss how elements of external, experimenter-controlled values and internal, uncertainty- and aesthetics-dependent values influence multistability. We then consider the implications for the involvement in switching of regions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex, which are more conventionally tied to value-dependent operations such as cognitive control and foraging.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shervin Safavi
- University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany; Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen, Germany.
| | - Peter Dayan
- University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany; Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen, Germany
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Ehret G, Romand R. Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals – neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective. Front Syst Neurosci 2022; 16:941534. [PMID: 35910003 PMCID: PMC9331465 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2022.941534] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/11/2022] [Accepted: 06/29/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons’ reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.
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Affiliation(s)
- Günter Ehret
- Institute of Neurobiology, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany
- *Correspondence: Günter Ehret,
| | - Raymond Romand
- Faculty of Medicine, Institute de Génétique et de Biologie Moléculaire et Cellulaire (IGBMC), University of Strasbourg and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Strasbourg, France
- Raymond Romand,
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Abstract
Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.
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A leaky evidence accumulation process for perceptual experience. Trends Cogn Sci 2022; 26:451-461. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2021] [Revised: 03/08/2022] [Accepted: 03/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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