Decoding internally generated transitions of conscious contents in the prefrontal cortex without subjective reports

Reveal the mechanism of brain function with fluorescence microscopy at single-cell resolution: from neural decoding to encoding

As a key pathway for understanding behavior, cognition, and emotion, neural decoding and encoding provide effective tools to bridge the gap between neural mechanisms and imaging recordings, especially at single-cell resolution. While neural decoding aims to establish an interpretable theory of how complex biological behaviors are represented in neural activities, neural encoding focuses on manipulating behaviors through the stimulation of specific neurons. We thoroughly analyze the application of fluorescence imaging techniques, particularly two-photon fluorescence imaging, in decoding neural activities, showcasing the theoretical analysis and technological advancements from imaging recording to behavioral manipulation. For decoding models, we compared linear and nonlinear methods, including independent component analysis, random forests, and support vector machines, highlighting their capabilities to reveal the intricate mapping between neural activity and behavior. By employing synthetic stimuli via optogenetics, fundamental principles of neural encoding are further explored. We elucidate various encoding types based on different stimulus paradigms-quantity encoding, spatial encoding, temporal encoding, and frequency encoding-enhancing our understanding of how the brain represents and processes information. We believe that fluorescence imaging-based neural decoding and encoding techniques have deepened our understanding of the brain, and hold great potential in paving the way for future neuroscience research and clinical applications.

The Administration of Ketamine Is Associated with Dose-Dependent Stabilization of Cortical Dynamics in Humans

During wakefulness, external stimuli elicit conscious experiences. In contrast, dreams and drug-induced dissociated states are characterized by vivid internally generated conscious experiences and reduced ability to perceive external stimuli. Understanding the physiological distinctions between normal wakefulness and dissociated states may therefore disambiguate signatures of responsiveness to external stimuli from those that underlie conscious experience. The hypothesis that conscious experiences are associated with brain criticality has received considerable theoretical and experimental support. Consistent with this hypothesis, statistical signatures of criticality are similar in normal wakefulness and dissociative states but are abolished in dreamless sleep and under anesthesia. Thus, while statistical measures of criticality are associated with the ability to have conscious experience, they do not readily distinguish between perception of the external world from internally generated percepts. Here, we investigate distinct, dynamical, signatures of criticality during escalating ketamine doses in high-density EEG in human male volunteers. We show that during normal wakefulness, EEG is found at a critical point between damped and exploding oscillations. With increasing doses of ketamine, as dissociative symptoms intensify, activity is progressively stabilized-most prominently at higher frequencies. We also show that stabilization is a more reliable marker of the effects of ketamine than conventional measures such as power spectra. These findings suggest that stabilization of cortical dynamics correlates with decreased ability to respond to and perceive external stimuli rather than the ability to have conscious experiences per se. Altogether, these results suggest that combining statistical and dynamical criticality measures may distinguish wakefulness, dissociation, and unconsciousness.

Conscious tactile perception entails distinct neural dynamics within somatosensory areas

Distilling the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) in humans is challenging due to limitations in the spatiotemporal resolution of recording techniques and confounds related to pre- and post-perceptual processes. In this study, we leveraged the detailed insights provided by human intracortical recordings to elucidate how somatosensory responses to simple tactile stimuli vary across different stimulus intensities and reporting conditions. Among the various spatiotemporal components of somatosensory processing, we observed tonic responses in posterior perisylvian regions that exhibited all the key characteristics of somatosensory NCCs. These responses remained invariant regardless of reporting, displayed an all-or-nothing pattern at the verge of the sensory threshold, and showed the most pronounced divergence between perceived and non-perceived stimuli. Overall, our findings indicate that conscious perception of simple tactile stimuli depends on higher-order somatosensory regions and that sustained neural dynamics in these areas may serve as an organizational principle of somatosensory awareness.

Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness

Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity1,2. These theories have independently accrued evidence, but have not been directly compared3. Here we present an open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposing integrated information theory (IIT)4,5 and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT)6-10 via a theory-neutral consortium11-13. The theory proponents and the consortium developed and preregistered the experimental design, divergent predictions, expected outcomes and interpretation thereof12. Human participants (n = 256) viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography. We found information about conscious content in visual, ventrotemporal and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results align with some predictions of IIT and GNWT, while substantially challenging key tenets of both theories. For IIT, a lack of sustained synchronization within the posterior cortex contradicts the claim that network connectivity specifies consciousness. GNWT is challenged by the general lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited representation of certain conscious dimensions in the prefrontal cortex. These challenges extend to other theories of consciousness that share some of the predictions tested here14-17. Beyond challenging the theories, we present an alternative approach to advance cognitive neuroscience through principled, theory-driven, collaborative research and highlight the need for a quantitative framework for systematic theory testing and building.

A dynamic bifurcation mechanism explains cortex-wide neural correlates of conscious access

Conscious access is suggested to involve "ignition," an all-or-none activation across cortical areas. To elucidate this phenomenon, we carry out computer simulations of a detection task using a mesoscale connectome-based model for the multiregional macaque cortex. The model uncovers a dynamic bifurcation mechanism that gives rise to ignition in a network of associative regions. A hierarchical N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)/α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) receptor gradient plays a critical role: fast AMPA receptors drive feedforward signal propagation, while slow NMDA receptors in feedback pathways shape and sustain the ignited network. Intriguingly, the model suggests higher NMDA-to-AMPA receptor ratios in sensory areas compared to association areas, a prediction supported by in vitro autoradiography data. Furthermore, the model accounts for diverse behavioral and physiological phenomena linked to consciousness. This work sheds light on how receptor gradients along the cortical hierarchy enable distributed cognitive functions and provides a biologically constrained computational framework for investigating the neurophysiological basis of conscious access.

Unpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections

As the field of consciousness science matures, the research agenda has expanded from an initial focus on the neural correlates of consciousness, to developing and testing theories of consciousness. Several theories have been put forward, each aiming to elucidate the relationship between consciousness and brain function. However, there is an ongoing, intense debate regarding whether these theories examine the same phenomenon. And, despite ongoing research efforts, it seems like the field has so far failed to converge around any single theory, and instead exhibits significant polarization. To advance this discussion, proponents of five prominent theories of consciousness-Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), Higher-Order Theories (HOT), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), and Predictive Processing (PP)-engaged in a public debate in 2022, as part of the annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC). They were invited to clarify the explananda of their theories, articulate the core mechanisms underpinning the corresponding explanations, and outline their foundational premises. This was followed by an open discussion that delved into the testability of these theories, potential evidence that could refute them, and areas of consensus and disagreement. Most importantly, the debate demonstrated that at this stage, there is more controversy than agreement between the theories, pertaining to the most basic questions of what consciousness is, how to identify conscious states, and what is required from any theory of consciousness. Addressing these core questions is crucial for advancing the field towards a deeper understanding and comparison of competing theories.

Neural signatures of visual awareness independent of postperceptual processing

What are the neural processes associated with perceptual awareness that are distinct from preconscious sensory encoding and postperceptual processes such as reporting an experience? Using electroencephalography and a no-report visual masking paradigm, we manipulated stimulus visibility by varying the time between stimuli and masks in linear steps (17, 33, 50, 67, and 83 ms). Awareness increased nonlinearly, with stimuli never seen at the two shortest intervals, always seen at the two longest, and 50% seen at the intermediate interval. Separate report and no-report conditions were used to isolate awareness from task performance. Our results revealed a neural signal closely linked to perceptual awareness, independent of the task: a fronto-central event-related potential that we refer to as the N2 (~250 to 300 ms). Earlier event-related potential signals reflected the linear manipulation of stimulus strength, while later signals like P3b and temporal generalization of decoding were tied to task performance, appearing only in the report condition. Taken together, these findings inform current debates regarding theories of consciousness and offer new avenues for exploring the neural mechanisms supporting conscious processing.

Propofol-mediated loss of consciousness disrupts predictive routing and local field phase modulation of neural activity

Predictive coding is a fundamental function of the cortex. The predictive routing model proposes a neurophysiological implementation for predictive coding. Predictions are fed back from the deep-layer cortex via alpha/beta (8 to 30 Hz) oscillations. They inhibit the gamma (40 to 100 Hz) and spiking that feed sensory inputs forward. Unpredicted inputs arrive in circuits unprepared by alpha/beta, resulting in enhanced gamma and spiking. To test the predictive routing model and its role in consciousness, we collected data from intracranial recordings of macaque monkeys during passive presentation of auditory oddballs before and after propofol-mediated loss of consciousness (LOC). In line with the predictive routing model, alpha/beta oscillations in the awake state served to inhibit the processing of predictable stimuli. Propofol-mediated LOC eliminated alpha/beta modulation by a predictable stimulus in the sensory cortex and alpha/beta coherence between sensory and frontal areas. As a result, oddball stimuli evoked enhanced gamma power, late period (>200 ms from stimulus onset) spiking, and superficial layer sinks in the sensory cortex. LOC also resulted in diminished decodability of pattern-level prediction error signals in the higher-order cortex. Therefore, the auditory cortex was in a disinhibited state during propofol-mediated LOC. However, despite these enhanced feedforward responses in the auditory cortex, there was a loss of differential spiking to oddballs in the higher-order cortex. This may be a consequence of a loss of within-area and interareal spike-field coupling in the alpha/beta and gamma frequency bands. These results provide strong constraints for current theories of consciousness.

Quality space computations for consciousness

The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts.

What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?

Disputes between rival theories of consciousness have often centered on whether perceptual contents can be decoded from the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Failures to decode from the PFC are taken to challenge 'cognitive' theories of consciousness such as the global workspace theory and higher-order monitoring theories, and decoding successes have been taken to confirm these theories. However, PFC decoding shows both too much and too little. Too much because cognitive theories of consciousness do not need PFC rerepresentation of perceptual contents since pointers to perceptual representations suffice. Too little because there is evidence that PFC decoding of perceptual content reflects postperceptual cognitive representation, such as thoughts that have those perceptual contents rather than conscious percepts.

Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain

After more than 30 years of extensive investigation, impressive progress has been made in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). However, the functional role of spatiotemporally distinct consciousness-related neural activity in conscious perception is debated. An influential framework proposed that consciousness-related neural activities could be dissociated into two distinct processes: phenomenal and access consciousness. However, though hotly debated, its authenticity has not been examined in a single paradigm with more informative intracranial recordings. In the present study, we employed a visual awareness task and recorded the local field potential (LFP) of patients with electrodes implanted in cortical and subcortical regions. Overall, we found that the latency of visual awareness-related activity exhibited a bimodal distribution, and the recording sites with short and long latencies were largely separated in location, except in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC). The mixture of short and long latencies in the lPFC indicates that it plays a critical role in linking phenomenal and access consciousness. However, the division between the two is not as simple as the central sulcus, as proposed previously. Moreover, in 4 patients with electrodes implanted in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, early awareness-related activity was confined to the contralateral side, while late awareness-related activity appeared on both sides. Finally, Granger causality analysis showed that awareness-related information flowed from the early sites to the late sites. These results provide the first LFP evidence of neural correlates of phenomenal and access consciousness, which sheds light on the spatiotemporal dynamics of NCC in the human brain.

Unconscious multisensory integration: behavioral and neural evidence from subliminal stimuli

Introduction

The prevailing theories of consciousness consider the integration of different sensory stimuli as a key component for this phenomenon to rise on the brain level. Despite many theories and models have been proposed for multisensory integration between supraliminal stimuli (e.g., the optimal integration model), we do not know if multisensory integration occurs also for subliminal stimuli and what psychophysical mechanisms it follows.

Methods

To investigate this, subjects were exposed to visual (Virtual Reality) and/or haptic stimuli (Electro-Cutaneous Stimulation) above or below their perceptual threshold. They had to discriminate, in a two-Alternative Forced Choice Task, the intensity of unimodal and/or bimodal stimuli. They were then asked to discriminate the sensory modality while recording their EEG responses.

Results

We found evidence of multisensory integration for supraliminal condition, following the classical optimal model. Importantly, even for subliminal trials participant's performances in the bimodal condition were significantly more accurate when discriminating the intensity of the stimulation. Moreover, significant differences emerged between unimodal and bimodal activity templates in parieto-temporal areas known for their integrative role.

Discussion

These converging evidences - even if preliminary and needing confirmation from the collection of further data - suggest that subliminal multimodal stimuli can be integrated, thus filling a meaningful gap in the debate about the relationship between consciousness and multisensory integration.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness

Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.

Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness

In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces of sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of the data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness and then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions.

An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

The cognitive reality monitoring network and theories of consciousness

Theories of consciousness abound. However, it is difficult to arbitrate reliably among competing theories because they target different levels of neural and cognitive processing or anatomical loci, and only some were developed with computational models in mind. In particular, theories of consciousness need to fully address the three levels of understanding of the brain proposed by David Marr: computational theory, algorithms and hardware. Most major theories refer to only one or two levels, often indirectly. The cognitive reality monitoring network (CRMN) model is derived from computational theories of mixture-of-experts architecture, hierarchical reinforcement learning and generative/inference computing modules, addressing all three levels of understanding. A central feature of the CRMN is the mapping of a gating network onto the prefrontal cortex, making it a prime coding circuit involved in monitoring the accuracy of one's mental states and distinguishing them from external reality. Because the CRMN builds on the hierarchical and layer structure of the cerebral cortex, it may connect research and findings across species, further enabling concrete computational models of consciousness with new, explicitly testable hypotheses. In sum, we discuss how the CRMN model can help further our understanding of the nature and function of consciousness.

Spontaneously emerging internal models of visual sequences combine abstract and event-specific information in the prefrontal cortex

When exposed to sensory sequences, do macaque monkeys spontaneously form abstract internal models that generalize to novel experiences? Here, we show that neuronal populations in macaque ventrolateral prefrontal cortex jointly encode visual sequences by separate codes for the specific pictures presented and for their abstract sequential structure. We recorded prefrontal neurons while macaque monkeys passively viewed visual sequences and sequence mismatches in the local-global paradigm. Even without any overt task or response requirements, prefrontal populations spontaneously form representations of sequence structure, serial order, and image identity within distinct but superimposed neuronal subspaces. Representations of sequence structure rapidly update following single exposure to a mismatch sequence, while distinct populations represent mismatches for sequences of different complexity. Finally, those representations generalize across sequences following the same repetition structure but comprising different images. These results suggest that prefrontal populations spontaneously encode rich internal models of visual sequences reflecting both content-specific and abstract information.

Where is the ghost in the shell?

The neurobiology of conscious experience is one of the fundamental mysteries in science. New evidence suggests that transcranial magnetic stimulation of the parietal cortex does not modulate bistable perception. What does this mean for the neural correlates of consciousness, and how should we search for them?

Parietal theta burst TMS does not modulate bistable perception

The role of the parietal cortex in perceptual awareness and in resolving perceptual ambiguity is unsettled. Early influential transcranial magnetic stimulation studies have revealed differences in conscious perception following parietal stimulation, fuelling the notion that parietal cortex causally contributes to resolving perceptual ambiguity. However, central to this conclusion is the reliability of the method employed. Several prior studies have revealed opposing effects, such as shortening, lengthening, or no effect on multistable perceptual transitions following parietal stimulation. Here we addressed the reliability of continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) on parietal cortex on the perception of bistable stimuli. We conducted three cTBS experiments that were matched to prior experiments in terms of stimuli, stimulation protocol, and target site, and used a higher number of participants. None of our cTBS experiments replicated prior cTBS results. The only experiment using individual functional localizers led to weak effects, while the two others led to null results. Individual variability of motor cortex cTBS did not predict parietal cTBS effects. In view of recent reports of highly variable cTBS effects over motor cortex, our results suggest that cTBS is particularly unreliable in modulating bistable perception when applied over parietal cortex.

Conscious Experience of Stimulus Presence and Absence Is Actively Encoded by Neurons in the Crow Brain

The emergence of consciousness from brain activity constitutes one of the great riddles in biology. It is commonly assumed that only the conscious perception of the presence of a stimulus elicits neuronal activation to signify a "neural correlate of consciousness," whereas the subjective experience of the absence of a stimulus is associated with a neuronal resting state. Here, we demonstrate that the two subjective states "stimulus present" and "stimulus absent" are represented by two specialized neuron populations in crows, corvid birds. We recorded single-neuron activity from the nidopallium caudolaterale of crows trained to report the presence or absence of images presented near the visual threshold. Because of the task design, neuronal activity tracking the conscious "present" versus "absent" percept was dissociated from that involved in planning a motor response. Distinct neuron populations signaled the subjective percepts of "present" and "absent" by increases in activation. The response selectivity of these two neuron populations was similar in strength and time course. This suggests a balanced code for subjective "presence" versus "absence" experiences, which might be beneficial when both conscious states need to be maintained active in the service of goal-directed behavior.

Sequential neuronal processing of number values, abstract decision, and action in the primate prefrontal cortex

Decision-making requires processing of sensory information, comparing the gathered evidence to make a judgment, and performing the action to communicate it. How neuronal representations transform during this cascade of representations remains a matter of debate. Here, we studied the succession of neuronal representations in the primate prefrontal cortex (PFC). We trained monkeys to judge whether a pair of sequentially presented displays had the same number of items. We used a combination of single neuron and population-level analyses and discovered a sequential transformation of represented information with trial progression. While numerical values were initially represented with high precision and in conjunction with detailed information such as order, the decision was encoded in a low-dimensional subspace of neural activity. This decision encoding was invariant to both retrospective numerical values and prospective motor plans, representing only the binary judgment of "same number" versus "different number," thus facilitating the generalization of decisions to novel number pairs. We conclude that this transformation of neuronal codes within the prefrontal cortex supports cognitive flexibility and generalizability of decisions to new conditions.

The involvement of the human prefrontal cortex in the emergence of visual awareness

Exploring the neural mechanisms of awareness is a fundamental task of cognitive neuroscience. There is an ongoing dispute regarding the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the emergence of awareness, which is partially raised by the confound between report- and awareness-related activity. To address this problem, we designed a visual awareness task that can minimize report-related motor confounding. Our results show that saccadic latency is significantly shorter in the aware trials than in the unaware trials. Local field potential (LFP) data from six patients consistently show early (200-300ms) awareness-related activity in the PFC, including event-related potential and high-gamma activity. Moreover, the awareness state can be reliably decoded by the neural activity in the PFC since the early stage, and the neural pattern is dynamically changed rather than being stable during the representation of awareness. Furthermore, the enhancement of dynamic functional connectivity, through the phase modulation at low frequency, between the PFC and other brain regions in the early stage of the awareness trials may explain the mechanism of conscious access. These results indicate that the PFC is critically involved in the emergence of awareness.

A construct-first approach to consciousness science

We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.

Does V1 response suppression initiate binocular rivalry?

During binocular rivalry (BR) only one eye's view is perceived. Neural underpinnings of BR are debated. Recent studies suggest that primary visual cortex (V1) initiates BR. One trigger might be response suppression across most V1 neurons at the onset of BR. Here, we utilize a variant of BR called binocular rivalry flash suppression (BRFS) to test this hypothesis. BRFS is identical to BR, except stimuli are shown with a ∼1s delay. If V1 response suppression was required to initiate BR, it should occur during BRFS as well. To test this, we compared V1 spiking in two macaques observing BRFS. We found that BRFS resulted in response facilitation rather than response suppression across V1 neurons. However, BRFS still reduces responses in a subset of V1 neurons due to the adaptive effects of asynchronous stimulus presentation. We argue that this selective response suppression could serve as an alternate initiator of BR.

Distinct ventral stream and prefrontal cortex representational dynamics during sustained conscious visual perception

Instances of sustained stationary sensory input are ubiquitous. However, previous work focused almost exclusively on transient onset responses. This presents a critical challenge for neural theories of consciousness, which should account for the full temporal extent of experience. To address this question, we use intracranial recordings from ten human patients with epilepsy to view diverse images of multiple durations. We reveal that, in sensory regions, despite dramatic changes in activation magnitude, the distributed representation of categories and exemplars remains sustained and stable. In contrast, in frontoparietal regions, we find transient content representation at stimulus onset. Our results highlight the connection between the anatomical and temporal correlates of experience. To the extent perception is sustained, it may rely on sensory representations and to the extent perception is discrete, centered on perceptual updating, it may rely on frontoparietal representations.

Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.

Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials

There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.

Bistability of prefrontal states gates access to consciousness

Access of sensory information to consciousness has been linked to the ignition of content-specific representations in association cortices. How does ignition interact with intrinsic cortical state fluctuations to give rise to conscious perception? We addressed this question in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) by combining multi-electrode recordings with a binocular rivalry (BR) paradigm inducing spontaneously driven changes in the content of consciousness, inferred from the reflexive optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) pattern. We find that fluctuations between low-frequency (LF, 1-9 Hz) and beta (∼20-40 Hz) local field potentials (LFPs) reflect competition between spontaneous updates and stability of conscious contents, respectively. Both LF and beta events were locally modulated. The phase of the former locked differentially to the competing populations just before a spontaneous transition while the latter synchronized the neuronal ensemble coding the consciously perceived content. These results suggest that prefrontal state fluctuations gate conscious perception by mediating internal states that facilitate perceptual update and stability.

Illusory object recognition is either perceptual or cognitive in origin depending on decision confidence

We occasionally misinterpret ambiguous sensory input or report a stimulus when none is presented. It is unknown whether such errors have a sensory origin and reflect true perceptual illusions, or whether they have a more cognitive origin (e.g., are due to guessing), or both. When participants performed an error-prone and challenging face/house discrimination task, multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) analyses revealed that during decision errors (e.g., mistaking a face for a house), sensory stages of visual information processing initially represent the presented stimulus category. Crucially however, when participants were confident in their erroneous decision, so when the illusion was strongest, this neural representation flipped later in time and reflected the incorrectly reported percept. This flip in neural pattern was absent for decisions that were made with low confidence. This work demonstrates that decision confidence arbitrates between perceptual decision errors, which reflect true illusions of perception, and cognitive decision errors, which do not.

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency

The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory

The relationship between conscious experience and brain activity has intrigued scientists and philosophers for centuries. In the last decades, several theories have suggested different accounts for these relationships. These theories have developed in parallel, with little to no cross-talk among them. To advance research on consciousness, we established an adversarial collaboration between proponents of two of the major theories in the field, Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory. Together, we devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions of these theories concerning the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness, which have been endorsed by the theories' proponents. Predicted outcomes should either support, refute, or challenge these theories. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol specified here, using three complementary methods: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Magneto-Electroencephalography (M-EEG), and intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG). The study protocol will include built-in replications, both between labs and within datasets. Through this ambitious undertaking, we hope to provide decisive evidence in favor or against the two theories and clarify the footprints of conscious visual perception in the human brain, while also providing an innovative model of large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.

Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness

Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.

InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me): A novel method to measure perceptual multistability dynamics using continuous data tracking and validated estimates of visual introspection

Perceptual multistability, e.g. Binocular Rivalry, has been intensively used as a tool to study visual consciousness. Current methods to assess multistability do not capture all potentially occurring perceptual states, provide no estimate of introspection, and lack continuous, high-temporal resolution to resolve perceptual changes between states and within mixed perceptual states. We introduce InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me), a four-phase method that (1) trains a participant to self-generate estimates of perceptual introspection-maps that are (2) validated during a physical mimic task, (3) gathers perceptual multistability data, and (4) confirms their validity during a physical replay. 28 condition-blinded adults performed InFoRM while experiencing binocular rivalry evoked with orthogonal sinusoidal gratings. A 60 Hz joystick (3600 data samples/minute) was used to indicate continuously changes across six perceptual states within each 1 min trial. A polarized monitor system was used to present the stimuli dichoptically. Three contrast conditions were investigated: low vs low, high vs high, and low vs high. InFoRM replicates standard outcome measures, i.e. alternation rate, mean and relative proportions of perception, and distribution of exclusive percepts that are well fitted with gamma functions. Furthermore, InFoRM generates novel outcomes that deliver new insights in visual cognition via estimates of introspection maps, in ocular dominance via perceptual-state-specific dominance scores, in transitory dynamics between and within perceptual states, via techniques adopted from eye-tracking, and in rivalry-zone-size estimates utilizing InFoRM's ability to simulate piecemeal perception. The replay phase (physical replay of perceptual rivalry) confirmed good overall agreement (73% ±5 standard deviation). InFoRM can be applied to other multistable paradigms and can be used to study visual consciousness in typical and neuro-atypical populations.

Reciprocal relationships between sleep and smell

Despite major anatomical differences with other mammalian sensory systems, olfaction shares with those systems a modulation by sleep/wake states. Sleep modulates odor sensitivity and serves as an important regulator of both perceptual and associative odor memory. In addition, however, olfaction also has an important modulatory impact on sleep. Odors can affect the latency to sleep onset, as well as the quality and duration of sleep. Olfactory modulation of sleep may be mediated by direct synaptic interaction between the olfactory system and sleep control nuclei, and/or indirectly through odor modulation of arousal and respiration. This reciprocal interaction between sleep and olfaction presents novel opportunities for sleep related modulation of memory and perception, as well as development of non-pharmacological olfactory treatments of simple sleep disorders.

Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm

Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.

Prefrontal cortex as a key node in arousal circuitry

The role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the mechanism of consciousness is a matter of active debate. Most theoretical and empirical investigations have focused on whether the PFC is critical for the content of consciousness (i.e., the qualitative aspects of conscious experience). However, there is emerging evidence that, in addition to its well-established roles in cognition, the PFC is a key regulator of the level of consciousness (i.e., the global state of arousal). In this opinion article we review recent data supporting the hypothesis that the medial PFC is a critical node in arousal-promoting networks.

Building a decoder of perceptual decisions from microsaccades and pupil size

Many studies have reported neural correlates of visual awareness across several brain regions, including the sensory, parietal, and frontal areas. In most of these studies, participants were instructed to explicitly report their perceptual experience through a button press or verbal report. It is conceivable, however, that explicit reporting itself may trigger specific neural responses that can confound the direct examination of the neural correlates of visual awareness. This suggests the need to assess visual awareness without explicit reporting. One way to achieve this is to develop a technique to predict the visual awareness of participants based on their peripheral responses. Here, we used eye movements and pupil sizes to decode trial-by-trial changes in the awareness of a stimulus whose visibility was deteriorated due to adaptation-induced blindness (AIB). In the experiment, participants judged whether they perceived a target stimulus and rated the confidence they had in their perceptual judgment, while their eye movements and pupil sizes were recorded. We found that not only perceptual decision but also perceptual confidence can be separately decoded from the eye movement and pupil size. We discuss the potential of this technique with regard to assessing visual awareness in future neuroimaging experiments.

Multistability, perceptual value, and internal foraging

Substantial experimental, theoretical, and computational insights into sensory processing have been derived from the phenomena of perceptual multistability-when two or more percepts alternate or switch in response to a single sensory input. Here, we review a range of findings suggesting that alternations can be seen as internal choices by the brain responding to values. We discuss how elements of external, experimenter-controlled values and internal, uncertainty- and aesthetics-dependent values influence multistability. We then consider the implications for the involvement in switching of regions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex, which are more conventionally tied to value-dependent operations such as cognitive control and foraging.

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals - neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons' reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

Theories of consciousness

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.