The neural bases for timing of durations

Common neural mechanisms supporting time judgements in humans and monkeys

There has been an increasing interest in identifying the biological underpinnings of human time perception, for which purpose research in non-human primates (NHP) is common. Although previous work, based on behaviour, suggests that similar mechanisms support time perception across species, the neural correlates of time estimation in humans and NHP have not been directly compared. In this study, we assess whether brain evoked responses during a time categorization task are similar across species. Specifically, we assess putative differences in post-interval evoked potentials as a function of perceived duration in human EEG (N = 24) and local field potential (LFP) and spike recordings in pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) of one monkey. Event-related potentials (ERPs) differed significantly after the presentation of the temporal interval between "short" and "long" perceived durations in both species, even when the objective duration of the stimuli was the same. Interestingly, the polarity of the reported ERPs was reversed for incorrect trials (i.e., the ERP of a "long" stimulus looked like the ERP of a "short" stimulus when a time categorization error was made). Hence, our results show that post-interval potentials reflect the perceived (rather than the objective) duration of the presented time interval in both NHP and humans. In addition, firing rates in monkey's pre-SMA also differed significantly between short and long perceived durations and were reversed in incorrect trials. Together, our results show that common neural mechanisms support time categorization in NHP and humans, thereby suggesting that NHP are a good model for investigating human time perception.

Measuring the perception and metacognition of time

The ability of humans to identify and reproduce short time intervals (in the region of a second) may be affected by many factors ranging from the gender and personality of the individual observer, through the attentional state, to the precise spatiotemporal structure of the stimulus. The relative roles of these very different factors are a challenge to describe and define; several methodological approaches have been used to achieve this to varying degrees of success. Here we describe and model the results of a paradigm affording not only a first-order measurement of the perceived duration of an interval but also a second-order metacognitive judgement of perceived time. This approach, we argue, expands the form of the data generally collected in duration-judgements and allows more detailed comparison of psychophysical behavior to the underlying theory. We also describe a hierarchical Bayesian measurement model that performs a quantitative analysis of the trial-by-trial data calculating the variability of the temporal estimates and the metacognitive judgments allowing direct comparison between an actual and an ideal observer. We fit the model to data collected for judgements of 750 ms (bisecting 1500 ms) and 1500 ms (bisecting 3000 ms) intervals across three stimulus modalities (visual, audio, and audiovisual). This enhanced form of data on a given interval judgement and the ability to track its progression on a trial-by-trial basis offers a way of looking at the different roles that subject-based, task-based and stimulus-based factors have on the perception of time.

Direct contribution of the sensory cortex to the judgment of stimulus duration

Decision making frequently depends on monitoring the duration of sensory events. To determine whether, and how, the perception of elapsed time derives from the neuronal representation of the stimulus itself, we recorded and optogenetically modulated vibrissal somatosensory cortical activity as male rats judged vibration duration. Perceived duration was dilated by optogenetic excitation. A second set of rats judged vibration intensity; here, optogenetic excitation amplified the intensity percept, demonstrating sensory cortex to be the common gateway both to time and to stimulus feature processing. A model beginning with the membrane currents evoked by vibrissal and optogenetic drive and culminating in the representation of perceived time successfully replicated rats' choices. Time perception is thus as deeply intermeshed within the sensory processing pathway as is the sense of touch itself, suggesting that the experience of time may be further investigated with the toolbox of sensory coding.

Learned response dynamics reflect stimulus timing and encode temporal expectation violations in superficial layers of mouse V1

The ability to recognize ordered event sequences is a fundamental component of sensory cognition and underlies the capacity to generate temporally specific expectations of future events based on previous experience. Various lines of evidence suggest that the primary visual cortex participates in some form of predictive processing, but many details remain ambiguous. Here we use two-photon calcium imaging in layer 2/3 (L2/3) of the mouse primary visual cortex (V1) to study changes to neural activity under a multi-day sequence learning paradigm with respect to prediction error responses, stimulus encoding, and time. We find increased neural activity at the time an expected, but omitted, stimulus would have occurred but no significant prediction error responses following an unexpected stimulus substitution. Sequence representations became sparser and less correlated with training, although these changes had no effect on decoding accuracy of stimulus identity or timing. Additionally, we find that experience modifies the temporal structure of stimulus responses to produce a bias towards predictive stimulus-locked activity. Finally, we find significant temporal structure during intersequence rest periods that was largely unchanged by training.

Multiplexing of temporal and spatial information in the lateral entorhinal cortex

Episodic memory involves the processing of spatial and temporal aspects of personal experiences. The lateral entorhinal cortex (LEC) plays an essential role in subserving memory. However, the specific mechanism by which LEC integrates spatial and temporal information remains elusive. Here, we recorded LEC neurons while rats performed foraging and shuttling behaviors on one-dimensional, linear or circular tracks. Unlike open-field foraging tasks, many LEC cells displayed spatial firing fields in these tasks and demonstrated selectivity for traveling directions. Furthermore, some LEC neurons displayed changes in the firing rates of their spatial rate maps during a session, a phenomenon referred to as rate remapping. Importantly, this temporal modulation was consistent across sessions, even when the spatial environment was altered. Notably, the strength of temporal modulation was found to be greater in LEC compared to other brain regions, such as the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC), CA1, and CA3. Thus, the spatial rate mapping observed in LEC neurons may serve as a coding mechanism for temporal context, allowing for flexible multiplexing of spatial and temporal information.

Distinctive features of experiential time: Duration, speed and event density

William James's use of "time in passing" and "stream of thoughts" may be two sides of the same coin that emerge from the brain segmenting the continuous flow of information into discrete events. Herein, we investigated how the density of events affects two temporal experiences: the felt duration and speed of time. Using a temporal bisection task, participants classified seconds-long videos of naturalistic scenes as short or long (duration), or slow or fast (passage of time). Videos contained a varying number and type of events. We found that a large number of events lengthened subjective duration and accelerated the felt passage of time. Surprisingly, participants were also faster at estimating their felt passage of time compared to duration. The perception of duration scaled with duration and event density, whereas the felt passage of time scaled with the rate of change. Altogether, our results suggest that distinct mechanisms underlie these two experiential times.

Neural mechanisms of sequential dependence in time perception: the impact of prior task and memory processing

Our perception and decision-making are susceptible to prior context. Such sequential dependence has been extensively studied in the visual domain, but less is known about its impact on time perception. Moreover, there are ongoing debates about whether these sequential biases occur at the perceptual stage or during subsequent post-perceptual processing. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated neural mechanisms underlying temporal sequential dependence and the role of action in time judgments across trials. Participants performed a timing task where they had to remember the duration of green coherent motion and were cued to either actively reproduce its duration or simply view it passively. We found that sequential biases in time perception were only evident when the preceding task involved active duration reproduction. Merely encoding a prior duration without reproduction failed to induce such biases. Neurally, we observed activation in networks associated with timing, such as striato-thalamo-cortical circuits, and performance monitoring networks, particularly when a "Response" trial was anticipated. Importantly, the hippocampus showed sensitivity to these sequential biases, and its activation negatively correlated with the individual's sequential bias following active reproduction trials. These findings highlight the significant role of memory networks in shaping time-related sequential biases at the post-perceptual stages.

Core clock gene, Bmal1, is required for optimal second-level interval production

Perception and production of second-level temporal intervals are critical in several behavioral and cognitive processes, including adaptive anticipation, motor control, and social communication. These processes are impaired in several neurological and psychological disorders, such as Parkinson's disease and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. Although evidence indicates that second-level interval timing exhibit circadian patterns, it remains unclear whether the core clock machinery controls the circadian pattern of interval timing. To investigate the role of core clock molecules in interval timing capacity, we devised a behavioral assay called the interval timing task to examine prospective motor interval timing ability. In this task, the mouse produces two separate nose pokes in a pretrained second-level interval to obtain a sucrose solution as a reward. We discovered that interval perception in wild-type mice displayed a circadian pattern, with the best performance observed during the late active phase. To investigate whether the core molecular clock is involved in the circadian control of interval timing, we employed Bmal1 knockout mice (BKO) in the interval timing task. The interval production of BKO did not display any difference between early and late active phase, without reaching the optimal interval production level observed in wild-type. In summary, we report that the core clock gene Bmal1 is required for the optimal performance of prospective motor timing typically observed during the late part of the active period.

Multi-timescale reinforcement learning in the brain

To thrive in complex environments, animals and artificial agents must learn to act adaptively to maximize fitness and rewards. Such adaptive behavior can be learned through reinforcement learning1, a class of algorithms that has been successful at training artificial agents2-6 and at characterizing the firing of dopamine neurons in the midbrain7-9. In classical reinforcement learning, agents discount future rewards exponentially according to a single time scale, controlled by the discount factor. Here, we explore the presence of multiple timescales in biological reinforcement learning. We first show that reinforcement agents learning at a multitude of timescales possess distinct computational benefits. Next, we report that dopamine neurons in mice performing two behavioral tasks encode reward prediction error with a diversity of discount time constants. Our model explains the heterogeneity of temporal discounting in both cue-evoked transient responses and slower timescale fluctuations known as dopamine ramps. Crucially, the measured discount factor of individual neurons is correlated across the two tasks suggesting that it is a cell-specific property. Together, our results provide a new paradigm to understand functional heterogeneity in dopamine neurons, a mechanistic basis for the empirical observation that humans and animals use non-exponential discounts in many situations10-14, and open new avenues for the design of more efficient reinforcement learning algorithms.

Time for Memories

The ability to store information about the past to dynamically predict and prepare for the future is among the most fundamental tasks the brain performs. To date, the problems of understanding how the brain stores and organizes information about the past (memory) and how the brain represents and processes temporal information for adaptive behavior have generally been studied as distinct cognitive functions. This Symposium explores the inherent link between memory and temporal cognition, as well as the potential shared neural mechanisms between them. We suggest that working memory and implicit timing are interconnected and may share overlapping neural mechanisms. Additionally, we explore how temporal structure is encoded in associative and episodic memory and, conversely, the influences of episodic memory on subsequent temporal anticipation and the perception of time. We suggest that neural sequences provide a general computational motif that contributes to timing and working memory, as well as the spatiotemporal coding and recall of episodes.

Time processing in neurological and psychiatric conditions

A central question in understanding cognition and pathology-related cognitive changes is how we process time. However, time processing difficulties across several neurological and psychiatric conditions remain seldom investigated. The aim of this review is to develop a unifying taxonomy of time processing, and a neuropsychological perspective on temporal difficulties. Four main temporal judgments are discussed: duration processing, simultaneity and synchrony, passage of time, and mental time travel. We present an integrated theoretical framework of timing difficulties across psychiatric and neurological conditions based on selected patient populations. This framework provides new mechanistic insights on both (a) the processes involved in each temporal judgement, and (b) temporal difficulties across pathologies. By identifying underlying transdiagnostic time-processing mechanisms, this framework opens fruitful avenues for future research.

Spontaneous α Brain Dynamics Track the Episodic "When"

Across species, neurons track time over the course of seconds to minutes, which may feed the sense of time passing. Here, we asked whether neural signatures of time-tracking could be found in humans. Participants stayed quietly awake for a few minutes while being recorded with magnetoencephalography (MEG). They were unaware they would be asked how long the recording lasted (retrospective time) or instructed beforehand to estimate how long it will last (prospective timing). At rest, rhythmic brain activity is nonstationary and displays bursts of activity in the alpha range (α: 7-14 Hz). When participants were not instructed to attend to time, the relative duration of α bursts linearly predicted individuals' retrospective estimates of how long their quiet wakefulness lasted. The relative duration of α bursts was a better predictor than α power or burst amplitude. No other rhythmic or arrhythmic activity predicted retrospective duration. However, when participants timed prospectively, the relative duration of α bursts failed to predict their duration estimates. Consistent with this, the amount of α bursts was discriminant between prospective and retrospective timing. Last, with a control experiment, we demonstrate that the relation between α bursts and retrospective time is preserved even when participants are engaged in a visual counting task. Thus, at the time scale of minutes, we report that the relative time of spontaneous α burstiness predicts conscious retrospective time. We conclude that in the absence of overt attention to time, α bursts embody discrete states of awareness constitutive of episodic timing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The feeling that time passes is a core component of consciousness and episodic memory. A century ago, brain rhythms called "α" were hypothesized to embody an internal clock. However, rhythmic brain activity is nonstationary and displays on-and-off oscillatory bursts, which would serve irregular ticks to the hypothetical clock. Here, we discovered that in a given lapse of time, the relative bursting time of α rhythms is a good indicator of how much time an individual will report to have elapsed. Remarkably, this relation only holds true when the individual does not attend to time and vanishes when attending to it. Our observations suggest that at the scale of minutes, α brain activity tracks episodic time.

Context-specific and context-invariant computations of interval timing

Introduction

An accurate sense of time is crucial in flexible sensorimotor control and other cognitive functions. However, it remains unknown how multiple timing computations in different contexts interact to shape our behavior.

Methods

We asked 41 healthy human subjects to perform timing tasks that differed in the sensorimotor domain (sensory timing vs. motor timing) and effector (hand vs. saccadic eye movement). To understand how these different behavioral contexts contribute to timing behavior, we applied a three-stage Bayesian model to behavioral data.

Results

Our results demonstrate that the Bayesian model for each effector could not describe bias in the other effector. Similarly, in each task the model-predicted data could not describe bias in the other task. These findings suggest that the measurement stage of interval timing is context-specific in the sensorimotor and effector domains. We also showed that temporal precision is context-invariant in the effector domain, unlike temporal accuracy.

Discussion

This combination of context-specific and context-invariant computations across sensorimotor and effector domains suggests overlapping and distributed computations as the underlying mechanism of timing in different contexts.

Perceived time expands and contracts within each heartbeat

Perception of passing time can be distorted.¹ Emotional experiences, particularly arousal, can contract or expand experienced duration via their interactions with attentional and sensory processing mechanisms.^2,3 Current models suggest that perceived duration can be encoded from accumulation processes^4,5 and from temporally evolving neural dynamics.^6,7 Yet all neural dynamics and information processing ensue at the backdrop of continuous interoceptive signals originating from within the body. Indeed, phasic fluctuations within the cardiac cycle impact neural and information processing.^{8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15} Here, we show that these momentary cardiac fluctuations distort experienced time and that their effect interacts with subjectively experienced arousal. In a temporal bisection task, durations (200-400 ms) of an emotionally neutral visual shape or auditory tone (experiment 1) or of an image displaying happy or fearful facial expressions (experiment 2) were categorized as short or long.¹⁶ Across both experiments, stimulus presentation was time-locked to systole, when the heart contracts and baroreceptors fire signals to the brain, and to diastole, when the heart relaxes, and baroreceptors are quiescent. When participants judged the duration of emotionally neural stimuli (experiment 1), systole led to temporal contraction, whereas diastole led to temporal expansion. Such cardiac-led distortions were further modulated by the arousal ratings of the perceived facial expressions (experiment 2). At low arousal, systole contracted while diastole expanded time, but as arousal increased, this cardiac-led time distortion disappeared, shifting duration perception toward contraction. Thus, experienced time contracts and expands within each heartbeat-a balance that is disrupted under heightened arousal.

Intrinsic hippocampal connectivity is associated with individual differences in retrospective duration processing

The estimation of incidentally encoded durations of time intervals (retrospective duration processing) is thought to rely on the retrieval of contextual information associated with a sequence of events, automatically encoded in medial temporal lobe regions. "Time cells" have been described in the hippocampus (HC), encoding the temporal progression of events and their duration. However, whether the HC supports explicit retrospective duration judgments in humans, and which neural dynamics are involved, is still poorly understood. Here we used resting-state fMRI to test the relation between variations in intrinsic connectivity patterns of the HC, and individual differences in retrospective duration processing, assessed using a novel task involving the presentation of ecological stimuli. Results showed that retrospective duration discrimination performance predicted variations in the intrinsic connectivity of the bilateral HC with the right precentral gyrus; follow-up exploratory analyses suggested a role of the CA1 and CA4/DG subfields in driving the observed pattern. Findings provide insights on neural networks associated with implicit processing of durations in the second range.

Probing the nature of episodic memory in rodents

Episodic memory (EM) specifies the experience of retrieving information of an event at the place and time of occurrence. Whether non-human animals are capable of EM remains debated, whereas evidence suggests that they have a memory system akin to EM. We here trace the development of various behavioral paradigms designed to study EM in non-human animals, in particular the rat. We provide an in-depth description of the available behavioral tests which combine three spontaneous object exploration paradigms, namely novel object preference (for measuring memory for "what"), novel location preference (for measuring memory for "where") and temporal order memory (memory for "when"), into a single trial to gauge a memory akin to EM. Most important, we describe a variation of such a test in which each memory component interacts with the others, demonstrating an integration of diverse mnemonic information. We discuss why a behavioral model of EM must be able to assess the ability to integrate "what", "where" and "when" information into a single experience. We attempt an interpretation of the various tests and review the studies that have applied them in areas such as pharmacology, neuroanatomy, circuit analysis, and sleep. Finally, we anticipate future directions in the search for neural mechanisms of EM in the rat and outline model experiments and methodologies in this pursuit.