A gene containment strategy based on a restriction-modification system

Intein-based thermoregulated meganucleases for containment of genetic material

Limiting the spread of synthetic genetic information outside of the intended use is essential for applications where biocontainment is critical. In particular, biocontainment of engineered probiotics and plasmids that are excreted from the mammalian gastrointestinal tract is needed to prevent escape and acquisition of genetic material that could confer a selective advantage to microbial communities. Here, we built a simple and lightweight biocontainment system that post-translationally activates a site-specific DNA endonuclease to degrade DNA at 18°C and not at higher temperatures. We constructed an orthogonal set of temperature-sensitive meganucleases (TSMs) by inserting the yeast VMA1 L212P temperature-sensitive intein into the coding regions of LAGLIDADG homing endonucleases. We showed that the TSMs eliminated plasmids carrying the cognate TSM target site from laboratory strains of Escherichia coli at the permissive 18°C but not at higher restrictive temperatures. Plasmid elimination is dependent on both TSM endonuclease activity and intein splicing. TSMs eliminated plasmids from E. coli Nissle 1917 after passage through the mouse gut when fecal resuspensions were incubated at 18°C but not at 37°C. Collectively, our data demonstrates the potential of thermoregulated meganucleases as a means of restricting engineered plasmids and probiotics to the mammalian gut.

Biotechnology for secure biocontainment designs in an emerging bioeconomy

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have emerged as an integral component of a sustainable bioeconomy, with an array of applications in agriculture, bioenergy, and biomedicine. However, the rapid development of GMOs and associated synthetic biology approaches raises a number of biosecurity concerns related to environmental escape of GMOs, detection thereof, and impact upon native ecosystems. A myriad of genetic safeguards have been deployed in diverse microbial hosts, ranging from classical auxotrophies to global genome recoding. However, to realize the full potential of microbes as biocatalytic platforms in the bioeconomy, a deeper understanding of the fundamental principles governing microbial responsiveness to biocontainment constraints, and interactivity of GMOs with the environment, is required. Herein, we review recent analytical biotechnological advances and strategies to assess biocontainment and microbial bioproductivity, as well as opportunities for predictive systems biodesigns towards securing a viable bioeconomy.

Controlling the Implementation of Transgenic Microbes: Are We Ready for What Synthetic Biology Has to Offer?

Synthetic biology has promised and delivered on an impressive array of applications based on genetically modified microorganisms. While novel biotechnology undoubtedly offers benefits, like all new technology, precautions should be considered during implementation to reduce the risk of both known and unknown adverse effects. To achieve containment of transgenic microorganisms, confidence to a near-scientific certainty that they cannot transfer their transgenic genes to other organisms, and that they cannot survive to propagate in unintended environments, is a priority. Here, we present an in-depth summary of biological containment systems for micro-organisms published to date, including the production of a genetic firewall through genome recoding and physical containment of microbes using auxotrophies, regulation of essential genes, and expression of toxic genes. The level of containment required to consider a transgenic organism suitable for deployment is discussed, as well as standards of practice for developing new containment systems.

Recent advances in synthetic biosafety

Synthetically engineered organisms hold promise for a broad range of medical, environmental, and industrial applications. Organisms can potentially be designed, for example, for the inexpensive and environmentally benign synthesis of pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals, for the cleanup of environmental pollutants, and potentially even for biomedical applications such as the targeting of specific diseases or tissues. However, the use of synthetically engineered organisms comes with several reasonable safety concerns, one of which is that the organisms or their genes could escape their intended habitats and cause environmental disruption. Here we review key recent developments in this emerging field of synthetic biocontainment and discuss further developments that might be necessary for the widespread use of synthetic organisms. Specifically, we discuss the history and modern development of three strategies for the containment of synthetic microbes: addiction to an exogenously supplied ligand; self-killing outside of a designated environment; and self-destroying encoded DNA circuitry outside of a designated environment.

Plasmids as Tools for Containment

Active containment systems are a major tool for reducing the uncertainty associated with the introduction of monocultures, genetically engineered or not, into target habitats for a large number of biotechnological applications (e.g., bioremediation, bioleaching, biopesticides, biofuels, biotransformations, live vaccines, etc.). While biological containment reduces the survival of the introduced organism outside the target habitat and/or upon completion of the projected task, gene containment strategies reduce the lateral spread of the key genetic determinants to indigenous microorganisms. In fundamental research, suicide circuits become relevant tools to address the role of gene transfer, mainly plasmid transfer, in evolution and how this transfer contributes to genome plasticity and to the rapid adaptation of microbial communities to environmental changes. Many lethal functions and regulatory circuits have been used and combined to design efficient containment systems. As many new genomes are being sequenced, novel lethal genes and regulatory elements are available, e.g., new toxin-antitoxin modules, and they could be used to increase further the current containment efficiencies and to expand containment to other organisms. Although the current containment systems can increase the predictability of genetically modified organisms in the environment, containment will never be absolute, due to the existence of mutations that lead to the appearance of surviving subpopulations. In this sense, orthogonal systems (xenobiology) appear to be the solution for setting a functional genetic firewall that will allow absolute containment of recombinant organisms.

Genetically modified microorganism Spingomonas paucimobilis UT26 for simultaneously degradation of methyl-parathion and γ-hexachlorocyclohexane

Bioremediation of pesticide residues by bacteria is an efficient and environmentally friendly method to deal with environmental pollution. In this study, a genetically modified microorganism (GMM) named UT26XEGM was constructed by introducing a parathion hydrolase gene into an initially γ-hexachlorocyclohexane (γ-HCH) degrading bacterium Spingomonas paucimobilis UT26. In order to reduce its potential risk of gene escaping into the environment for the public concern on biosafety, a suicide system was also designed that did not interfere with the performance of the GMM until its physiological function was activated by specific signal. The system was designed with circuiting suicide cassettes consisting of killing genes gef and ecoRIR from Escherichia coli controlled by Pm promoter and the xylS gene. The cell viability and original degradation characteristics were not affected by the insertion of exogenous genes. The novel GMM was capable of degrading methyl-parathion and γ-HCH simultaneously. In laboratory scale testing, the recombinant bacteria were successfully applied to the bioremediation of mixed pesticide residues with the activity of self-destruction after 3-methylbenzoate induction.

Preparing synthetic biology for the world

Synthetic Biology promises low-cost, exponentially scalable products and global health solutions in the form of self-replicating organisms, or “living devices.” As these promises are realized, proof-of-concept systems will gradually migrate from tightly regulated laboratory or industrial environments into private spaces as, for instance, probiotic health products, food, and even do-it-yourself bioengineered systems. What additional steps, if any, should be taken before releasing engineered self-replicating organisms into a broader user space? In this review, we explain how studies of genetically modified organisms lay groundwork for the future landscape of biosafety. Early in the design process, biological engineers are anticipating potential hazards and developing innovative tools to mitigate risk. Here, we survey lessons learned, ongoing efforts to engineer intrinsic biocontainment, and how different stakeholders in synthetic biology can act to accomplish best practices for biosafety.

Lactococcus lactis-based vaccines from laboratory bench to human use: an overview

Developing effective vaccines is an important weapon in the battle against potential pathogens and their evolving antibiotic resistance trends. Several vaccine delivery vectors have been investigated among which the generally regarded as safe (GRAS) Lactococcus lactis has a distinguished position. In this review, different factors affecting the efficacy of L. lactis-based vaccines are discussed. In addition, the issues of biological containment and pharmaceutical quality assurance of L. lactis vaccines are highlighted. These issues are critical for the success of medical translation of L. lactis-based vaccines from research laboratories to clinical use by ensuring consistent manufacturing of safe and efficacious vaccines.

Biocontainment strategies for live lactic acid bacteria vaccine vectors

Stability is an important issue when engineering bacteria for use as live vaccine vectors. For the majority of live bacterial vaccines, the antigen-encoding gene is either plasmid located or integrated into the chromosome. Regardless, several safety concerns can be raised for both instances. One concern when using plasmid-encoded antigens is the transfer of antibiotic resistance markers. Alternatively, for chromosomal integrated antigens however, the concern focuses on the spread and possible release of genetically-modified microorganisms (GMM) into the environment, which is problematic. Their recombinant nature calls for a proper bio-containment strategy to be implemented or in place before any realistic attempt at releasing a live bacterial vaccine. No examples of human bacterial vaccines causing problems among animals have been found in the literature but the possibility exists and has to be both tested and evaluated before release of a live bacterial vaccine. The ideal GMM for use in humans should therefore contain the minimal amount of foreign DNA and must not include an antibiotic resistance marker. Furthermore, the possibilities of transgene horizontal transfer must be minimized, and GMM lethality for biocontainment should be achieved in an unconfined environment.

Ecology and evolution as targets: the need for novel eco-evo drugs and strategies to fight antibiotic resistance

In recent years, the explosive spread of antibiotic resistance determinants among pathogenic, commensal, and environmental bacteria has reached a global dimension. Classical measures trying to contain or slow locally the progress of antibiotic resistance in patients on the basis of better antibiotic prescribing policies have clearly become insufficient at the global level. Urgent measures are needed to directly confront the processes influencing antibiotic resistance pollution in the microbiosphere. Recent interdisciplinary research indicates that new eco-evo drugs and strategies, which take ecology and evolution into account, have a promising role in resistance prevention, decontamination, and the eventual restoration of antibiotic susceptibility. This minireview summarizes what is known and what should be further investigated to find drugs and strategies aiming to counteract the "four P's," penetration, promiscuity, plasticity, and persistence of rapidly spreading bacterial clones, mobile genetic elements, or resistance genes. The term "drug" is used in this eco-evo perspective as a tool to fight resistance that is able to prevent, cure, or decrease potential damage caused by antibiotic resistance, not necessarily only at the individual level (the patient) but also at the ecological and evolutionary levels. This view offers a wealth of research opportunities for science and technology and also represents a large adaptive challenge for regulatory agencies and public health officers. Eco-evo drugs and interventions constitute a new avenue for research that might influence not only antibiotic resistance but the maintenance of a healthy interaction between humans and microbial systems in a rapidly changing biosphere.

Iron-regulated lysis of recombinant Escherichia coli in host releases protective antigen and confers biological containment

The use of a recombinant bacterial vector vaccine is an attractive vaccination strategy to induce an immune response to a carried protective antigen. The superiorities of live bacterial vectors include mimicry of a natural infection, intrinsic adjuvant properties, and the potential for administration by mucosal routes. Escherichia coli is a simple and efficient vector system for production of exogenous proteins. In addition, many strains are nonpathogenic and avirulent, making it a good candidate for use in recombinant vaccine design. In this study, we screened 23 different iron-regulated promoters in an E. coli BL21(DE3) vector and found one, P(viuB), with characteristics suitable for our use. We fused P(viuB) with lysis gene E, establishing an in vivo inducible lysis circuit. The resulting in vivo lysis circuit was introduced into a strain also carrying an IPTG (isopropyl-β-d-thiogalactopyranoside)-inducible P(T7)-controlled protein synthesis circuit, forming a novel E. coli-based protein delivery system. The recombinant E. coli produced a large amount of antigen in vitro and could deliver the antigen into zebrafish after vaccination via injection. The strain subsequently lysed in response to the iron-limiting signal in vivo, implementing antigen release and biological containment. The gapA gene, encoding the protective antigen GAPDH (glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase) from the fish pathogen Aeromonas hydrophila LSA34, was introduced into the E. coli-based protein delivery system, and the resultant recombinant vector vaccine was evaluated in turbot (Scophtalmus maximus). Over 80% of the vaccinated fish survived challenge with A. hydrophila LSA34, suggesting that the E. coli-based antigen delivery system has great potential in bacterial vector vaccine applications.

Plant-dependent active biological containment system for recombinant rhizobacteria

This work describes the construction of the rhizobacterium Pseudomonas putida strain CS-4, which contains an active biological containment (ABC) system that ensures bacterial suicide in the absence of proline. Maize plants exudate proline, which allows CS-4 to colonize the rhizosphere at a similar level to that of the wild-type strain. However, when the plants are removed, the CS-4 population decreased in bulk soil at a higher rate than the wild-type strain.

A dual lethal system to enhance containment of recombinant micro-organisms

Active containment systems based on the controlled expression of a lethal gene are designed to increase containment of recombinant micro-organisms used for environmental applications. A major drawback in containment is the existence of mutations that generate surviving cells that cease to respond to the toxic effect of the lethal function. In this work the authors have developed for the first time a strategy to reduce the problem of mutations and increase the efficiency of containment based on the combination of two lethal functions acting on different cellular targets of major concern in containment, DNA and RNA, and whose expression is under control of different regulatory signals. To engineer the dual gene containment circuit, two toxin–antitoxin pairs, i.e. the colicin E3–immunity E3 and theEcoRI restriction–modification systems, were combined. The genes encoding the immunity E3 and theEcoRI methyltransferase proteins (antitoxins) were stably inserted into the chromosome of the host cell, whereas the broad-host-range lethal genes encoding the colicin E3 RNase and theEcoRI restriction endonuclease (toxins) were flanking the contained trait in a plasmid. This dual lethal cassette decreased gene transfer frequencies, through killing of the recipient cells, by eight orders of magnitude, which provides experimental evidence that the anticipated containment level due to the combination of single containment systems is generally achieved. Survivors that escaped killing were analysed and the mutational events involved were characterized.

Genetically engineered probiotics

Probiotic micro-organisms have been used for many years. Originating as food supplements, they are now most often administered orally and offer an attractive alternative for treating of intestinal disorders. A better understanding of the mechanisms by which these micro-organisms act has now opened up possibilities for designing new probiotic strains. Through genetic engineering, it is possible not only to strengthen the effects of existing strains, but also to create completely new probiotics. These need not necessarily be composed only of bacterial products but can also include elements of regulatory systems or enzymes derived from a foreign-human-source. If designed carefully and with absolute attention to biological safety in its broadest sense, the development of genetically modified probiotics has the potential to revolutionize alimentary health.

Biological containment of genetically modified Lactococcus lactis for intestinal delivery of human interleukin 10

Genetically modified Lactococcus lactis secreting interleukin 10 provides a therapeutic approach for inflammatory bowel disease. However, the release of such genetically modified organisms through clinical use raises safety concerns. In an effort to address this problem, we replaced the thymidylate synthase gene thyA of L. lactis with a synthetic human IL10 gene. This thyA- hIL10+ L. lactis strain produced human IL-10 (hIL-10), and when deprived of thymidine or thymine, its viability dropped by several orders of magnitude, essentially preventing its accumulation in the environment. The biological containment system and the bacterium's capacity to secrete hIL-10 were validated in vivo in pigs. Our approach is a promising one for transgene containment because, in the unlikely event that the engineered L. lactis strain acquired an intact thyA gene from a donor such as L. lactis subsp. cremoris, the transgene would be eliminated from the genome.

Towards safer vectors for the field release of recombinant bacteria

The prospect of the deliberate environmental release of genetically manipulated microorganisms has given rise to a great deal of polemic. Amongst the rational scientific concerns are those concerned with the fate of the released bacteria, the fate of the recombinant genes that they carry, the selective pressures acting upon them in different environmental situations and the long term effects on the environment and human health. All recombinant DNA is carried by vectors (plasmids, transposons or bacteriophage or remnants of these). Thus the way in which recombinant constructions are made may itself lead to potential biosafety concerns, irrespective of the host bacterium and the recombinant DNA fragment of primary interest. The purpose of the present review is to assess progress in improved vector design aimed at eliminating risks due to the way recombinant vectors are constructed. Improved vector constructions include the avoidance of the use, or removal, of antibiotic resistance genes, the use of defective transposons rather than plasmids in order to reduce horizontal transfer and the development of conditionally lethal suicide systems. More recently, new site-specific recombination systems have permitted transposon vectors to be manipulated following strain construction, but before environmental release, so that virtually all recombinant DNA not directly involved in the release experiment is eliminated. Such bacteria are thus pseudo-wild type in that they contain no heterologous DNA other than the genes of interest.

Biodegradation of aromatic compounds by Escherichia coli

Although Escherichia coli has long been recognized as the best-understood living organism, little was known about its abilities to use aromatic compounds as sole carbon and energy sources. This review gives an extensive overview of the current knowledge of the catabolism of aromatic compounds by E. coli. After giving a general overview of the aromatic compounds that E. coli strains encounter and mineralize in the different habitats that they colonize, we provide an up-to-date status report on the genes and proteins involved in the catabolism of such compounds, namely, several aromatic acids (phenylacetic acid, 3- and 4-hydroxyphenylacetic acid, phenylpropionic acid, 3-hydroxyphenylpropionic acid, and 3-hydroxycinnamic acid) and amines (phenylethylamine, tyramine, and dopamine). Other enzymatic activities acting on aromatic compounds in E. coli are also reviewed and evaluated. The review also reflects the present impact of genomic research and how the analysis of the whole E. coli genome reveals novel aromatic catabolic functions. Moreover, evolutionary considerations derived from sequence comparisons between the aromatic catabolic clusters of E. coli and homologous clusters from an increasing number of bacteria are also discussed. The recent progress in the understanding of the fundamentals that govern the degradation of aromatic compounds in E. coli makes this bacterium a very useful model system to decipher biochemical, genetic, evolutionary, and ecological aspects of the catabolism of such compounds. In the last part of the review, we discuss strategies and concepts to metabolically engineer E. coli to suit specific needs for biodegradation and biotransformation of aromatics and we provide several examples based on selected studies. Finally, conclusions derived from this review may serve as a lead for future research and applications.

Dual system to reinforce biological containment of recombinant bacteria designed for rhizoremediation

Active biological containment (ABC) systems have been designed to control at will the survival or death of a bacterial population. These systems are based on the use of a killing gene, e.g., a porin-inducing protein such as the one encoded by the Escherichia coli gef gene, and a regulatory circuit that controls expression of the killing gene in response to the presence or absence of environmental signals. An ABC system for recombinant microorganisms that degrade a model pollutant was designed on the basis of the Pseudomonas putida TOL plasmid meta-cleavage regulatory circuit. The system consists of a fusion of the Pm promoter to lacI, whose expression is controlled by XylS with 3-methylbenzoate, and a fusion of a synthetic P(lac) promoter to gef. In the presence of the model pollutant, bacterial cells survived and degraded the target compound, whereas in the absence of the aromatic carboxylic acid cell death was induced. The system had two main drawbacks: (i) the slow death of the bacterial cells in soil versus the fast killing rate in liquid cultures in laboratory assays, and (ii) the appearance of mutants, at a rate of about 10(-8) per cell and generation, that did not die after the pollutant had been exhausted. We reinforced the ABC system by including it in a Deltaasd P. putida background. A P. putida Deltaasd mutant is viable only in complex medium supplemented with diaminopimelic acid, methionine, lysine, and threonine. We constructed a P. putida Deltaasd strain, called MCR7, with a Pm::asd fusion in the host chromosome. This strain was viable in the presence of 3-methylbenzoate because synthesis of the essential metabolites was achieved through XylS-dependent induction. In the P. putida MCR7 strain, an ABC system (Pm::lacI, xylS, P(lac)::gef) was incorporated into the host chromosome to yield strain MCR8. The number of MCR8 mutants that escaped killing was below our detection limit (<10(-9) mutants per cell and generation). The MCR8 strain survived and colonized rhizosphere soil with 3-methylbenzoate at a level similar to that of the wild-type strain. However, it disappeared in less than 20 to 25 days in soils without the pollutant, whereas an asd(+), biologically contained counterpart such as P. putida CMC4 was still detectable in soils after 100 days.