Do Pictures of Faces, and Which Ones, Capture Attention in the Inattentional-Blindness Paradigm?

A limited visual search advantage for illusory faces

The human visual system is very sensitive to the presence of faces in the environment, so much so that it can produce the perception of illusory faces in everyday objects. Growing research suggests that illusory faces and real faces are processed by similar perceptual and neural mechanisms, but whether this similarity extends to visual attention is less clear. A visual search study showed that illusory faces have a search advantage over objects when the types of objects vary to match the objects in the illusory faces (e.g., chair, pepper, clock) (Keys et al., 2021). Here, we examine whether the search advantage for illusory faces over objects remains when compared against objects that belong to a single category (flowers). In three experiments, we compared visual search of illusory faces, real faces, variable objects, and uniform objects (flowers). Search for real faces was best compared with all other types of targets. In contrast, search for illusory faces was only better than search for variable objects, not uniform objects. This result shows a limited visual search advantage for illusory faces and suggests that illusory faces may not be processed like real faces in visual attention.

Are Familiar Objects More Likely to Be Noticed in an Inattentional Blindness Task?

People often fail to notice the presence of unexpected objects when their attention is engaged elsewhere. In dichotic listening tasks, for example, people often fail to notice unexpected content in the ignored speech stream even though they occasionally do notice highly familiar stimuli like their own name (the "cocktail party" effect). Some of the first studies of inattentional blindness were designed as a visual analog of such dichotic listening studies, but relatively few inattentional blindness studies have examined how familiarity affects noticing. We conducted four preregistered inattentional blindness experiments (total N = 1700) to examine whether people are more likely to notice a familiar unexpected object than an unfamiliar one. Experiment 1 replicated evidence for greater noticing of upright schematic faces than inverted or scrambled ones. Experiments 2-4 tested whether participants from different pairs of countries would be more likely to notice their own nation's flag or petrol company logo than those of another country. These experiments repeatedly found little or no evidence that familiarity affects noticing rates for unexpected objects. Frequently encountered and highly familiar stimuli do not appear to overcome inattentional blindness.

Infrequent faces bias social attention differently in manual and oculomotor measures

Although attention is thought to be spontaneously biased by social cues like faces and eyes, recent data have demonstrated that when extraneous content, context, and task factors are controlled, attentional biasing is abolished in manual responses while still occurring sparingly in oculomotor measures. Here, we investigated how social attentional biasing was affected by face novelty by measuring responses to frequently presented (i.e., those with lower novelty) and infrequently presented (i.e., those with higher novelty) face identities. Using a dot-probe task, participants viewed either the same face and house identity that was frequently presented on half of the trials or sixteen different face and house identities that were infrequently presented on the other half of the trials. A response target occurred with equal probability at the previous location of the eyes or mouth of the face or the top or bottom of the house. Experiment 1 measured manual responses to the target while participants maintained central fixation. Experiment 2 additionally measured participants' natural oculomotor behaviour when their eye movements were not restricted. Across both experiments, no evidence of social attentional biasing was found in manual data. However, in Experiment 2, there was a reliable oculomotor bias towards the eyes of infrequently presented upright faces. Together, these findings suggest that face novelty does not facilitate manual measures of social attention, but it appears to promote spontaneous oculomotor biasing towards the eyes of infrequently presented novel faces.

“In-emotional blindness”? Lower detection rates for unexpected stimuli in negative compared to positive emotions

Determining how emotional experience influences attention is a long standing goal of cognitive psychologists. Emotion is often broken down into two main dimensions, arousal and valence. While many theories focus more on the influence of one dimension than the other, the systematic investigation of the independent influences of the two dimensions of emotion on attention has been slow. In order to examine the relevance of both aspects of emotion, and their interplay on attention simultaneously, in the current experiment we induced low (satisfaction) and high (happiness) arousal positive emotions and low (sadness) and high (anger) arousal negative emotions in subjects before having them complete an inattentional blindness (IB) test. In line with theories that focus on the role of valence, we found that negative emotions led to more IB than positive emotions, and that arousal did not influence attention. Implications of the results for the theoretical contributions of the dimensions of emotion to visual attention are discussed.

Visual adaptation and 7T fMRI reveal facial identity processing in the human brain under shallow interocular suppression

Face identity is represented at a high level of the visual hierarchy. Whether the human brain can process facial identity information in the absence of visual awareness remains unclear. In this study, we investigated potential face identity representation through face-identity adaptation with the adapting faces interocularly suppressed by Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) noise, a modified binocular rivalry paradigm. The strength of interocular suppression was manipulated by varying the contrast of CFS noise. While obeservers reported the face images subjectively unperceived and the face identity objectively unrecognizable, a significant face identity aftereffect was observed under low but not high contrast CFS noise. In addition, the identity of face images under shallow interocular suppression can be decoded from multi-voxel patterns in the right fusiform face area (FFA) obtained with high-resolution 7T fMRI. Thus the comined evidence from visual adaptation and 7T fMRI suggest that face identity can be represented in the human brain without explicit perceptual recognition. The processing of interocularly suppressed faces could occur at different levels depending on how "deep" the information is suppressed.

From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach

The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.

Faces are not always special for attention: Effects of response-relevance and identity

Research over the past 25 years indicates that stimulus processing is diminished when attention is engaged in a perceptually demanding task of high 'perceptual load'. These results have generalized across a variety of stimulus categories, but a controversy evolved over the question of whether perception of distractor faces (or other categories of perceptual expertise) can proceed irrespective of the level of perceptual load in the attended task. Here we identify task-relevance, and in particular identity-relevance, as a potentially important factor in explaining prior inconsistencies. In four experiments, we tested whether perceptual load in an attended letter or word task modulates the processing of famous face distractors, while varying their task-relevance. Distractor interference effects on task RTs was reduced by perceptual load not only when the faces were entirely task-irrelevant, but also when the face gender was task relevant, within a name gender classification response-competition task, using famous female or male distractor faces. However, when the identity associated with the famous faces was primed by the task using their names, as in prior demonstrations that face distractors are immune to the effects of perceptual load, we were able to replicate these prior findings. Our findings demonstrate a role for identity-priming by the relevant task in determining attentional capture by faces under high perceptual load. Our results also highlight the importance of considering even relatively subtle forms of task-relevance in selective attention research.

Does hunger promote the detection of foods? The effect of value on inattentional blindness

Although human perception has evolved into a potent and efficient system, we still fall prey to astonishing failures of awareness as we miss an unexpected object in our direct view when our attention is engaged elsewhere (inattentional blindness). While specific types of value of the unexpected object have been identified to modulate the likelihood of this failure of awareness, it is not clear whether the effect of value on inattentional blindness can be generalized. We hypothesized that the combination of hunger and food-stimuli might increase a more general type of value so that food stimuli have a higher probability to be noticed by hungry participants than by satiated participants. In total, 240 participants were assigned towards a hungry (16 h of fasting) or satiated (no fasting) manipulation and performed afterward a static inattentional blindness task. However, we did not find any effect of value on inattentional blindness based on hunger and food stimuli. We speculate that different underlying mechanisms are involved for different types of value and that value manipulations need to be strong enough to ensure certain value strengths.

The effect of emotional valence and age of faces on adults and children's inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness (IB) refers to the nature of an individual being unaware of an unexpected stimulus when focusing on an attentional task. Investigation into IB provides an innovative approach for the research of attentional bias that is connected with an individual's immediate attentional capture. This study explored the effect of emotional valence and age of faces on the IB rates of children and adults. We employed a between-subject experimental design with a 2 (age of participants: child, adult) × 2 (age of face: child face, adult face) × 2 (emotional valence: positive, negative) method and used the classic IB task of cross judgment. The participants included 79 adults (54.63 ± 8.192 years old) and 78 children (10.62 ± 2.32 years old). The results showed that: (1) The IB rates of the two groups differed significantly. Children performed better than adults in detecting the faces appearing unexpectedly. (2) The effect of emotional valence only emerged on adult participants' IB. Adults were significantly more likely to detect the positive-emotional faces than the negative-emotional ones. (3) The age of a face was not a significant factor to predict participants' IB. Neither children nor adults showed a preference for the faces of a specific age (e.g., their own age). These findings revealed the distinct characteristics of attentional capture of children and adults when confronting unexpected facial stimuli.

The self-face captures attention without consciousness: Evidence from the N2pc ERP component analysis

It is well established that stimuli representing or associated with ourselves, like our own name or an image of our own face, benefit from preferential processing. However, two key questions concerning the self-prioritization mechanism remain to be addressed. First, does it operate in an automatic manner during the early processing, or rather in a more controlled fashion at later processing stages? Second, is it specific to the self-related stimuli, or can it be activated also by other stimuli that are familiar or salient? We conducted a dot-probe experiment to investigate the mechanism behind the attentional prioritization of the self-face image and to tackle both questions. The former, by employing a backwards masking procedure to isolate the early and preconscious processing stages. The latter, by investigating whether a face that becomes visually familiar due to repeated presentations is able to capture attention in a similar manner as the self-face. Analysis of the N2pc ERP component revealed that the self-face image automatically captures attention, both when processed consciously and unconsciously. In contrast, the visually familiar face did not attract attention, neither in the conscious, nor in the unconscious condition. We conclude that the self-prioritization mechanism is early and automatic, and is not triggered by mere visual familiarity. More generally, our results provide further evidence for efficient unconscious processing of faces, and for dissociation between attention and consciousness.

Clarifying the effect of facial emotional expression on inattentional blindness

Conscious perception often fails when an object appears unexpectedly and our attention is focused elsewhere (inattentional blindness). While various factors have been identified as determinants of inattentional blindness, the influence of an unexpected object́s semantic value remains ambiguous. This is also true for the supposedly evolutionary meaning of faces; some studies found higher detection rates for faces while others did not or used control conditions that differed in physical aspects of the stimulus as well. In the proposed studies we aim to replicate and clarify the effect of the semantic value of faces on inattentional blindness in a controlled and systematic manner.

Occipital Magnocellular VEP Non-linearities Show a Short Latency Interaction Between Contrast and Facial Emotion

The magnocellular system has been implicated in the rapid processing of facial emotions, such as fear. Of the various anatomical possibilities, the retino-colliculo-pulvinar route to the amygdala is currently favored. However, it is not clear whether and when amygdala arousal activates the primary visual cortex (V1). Non-linear visual evoked potentials provide a well-accepted technique for examining temporal processing in the magnocellular and parvocellular pathways in the visual cortex. Here, we investigated the relationship between facial emotion processing and the separable magnocellular (K2.1) and parvocellular (K2.2) components of the second-order non-linear multifocal visual evoked potential responses recorded from the occipital scalp (O_Z). Stimuli comprised pseudorandom brightening/darkening of fearful, happy, neutral faces (or no face) with surround patches decorrelated from the central face-bearing patch. For the central patch, the spatial contrast of the faces was 30% while the modulation of the per-pixel brightening/darkening was uniformly 10% or 70%. From 14 neurotypical young adults, we found a significant interaction between emotion and contrast in the magnocellularly driven K2.1 peak amplitudes, with greater K2.1 amplitudes for fearful (vs. happy) faces at 70% temporal contrast condition. Taken together, our findings suggest that facial emotional information is present in early V1 processing as conveyed by the M pathway, and more activated for fearful as opposed to happy and neutral faces. An explanation is offered in terms of the contest between feedback and response gain modulation models.

Contextually-Based Social Attention Diverges across Covert and Overt Measures

Humans spontaneously attend to social cues like faces and eyes. However, recent data show that this behavior is significantly weakened when visual content, such as luminance and configuration of internal features, as well as visual context, such as background and facial expression, are controlled. Here, we investigated attentional biasing elicited in response to information presented within appropriate background contexts. Using a dot-probe task, participants were presented with a face-house cue pair, with a person sitting in a room and a house positioned within a picture hanging on a wall. A response target occurred at the previous location of the eyes, mouth, top of the house, or bottom of the house. Experiment 1 measured covert attention by assessing manual responses while participants maintained central fixation. Experiment 2 measured overt attention by assessing eye movements using an eye tracker. The data from both experiments indicated no evidence of spontaneous attentional biasing towards faces or facial features in manual responses; however, an infrequent, though reliable, overt bias towards the eyes of faces emerged. Together, these findings suggest that contextually-based social information does not determine spontaneous social attentional biasing in manual measures, although it may act to facilitate oculomotor behavior.

The eyes do not have it after all? Attention is not automatically biased towards faces and eyes

It is commonly accepted that attention is spontaneously biased towards faces and eyes. However, the role of stimulus features and task settings in this finding has not yet been systematically investigated. Here, we tested if faces and facial features bias attention spontaneously when stimulus factors, task properties, response conditions, and eye movements are controlled. In three experiments, participants viewed face, house, and control scrambled face-house images in an upright and inverted orientation. The task was to discriminate a target that appeared with equal probability at the previous location of the face, house, or the control image. In all experiments, our data indicated no spontaneous biasing of attention for targets occurring at the previous location of the face. Experiment 3, which measured oculomotor biasing, suggested a reliable but infrequent saccadic bias towards the eye region of upright faces. Importantly, these results did not reflect our specific laboratory settings, as in Experiment 4, we present a full replication of a classic finding in the literature demonstrating reliable social attention bias. Together, these data suggest that attentional biasing for social information is task and context mediated, and less robust than originally thought.

The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for 'no-report' paradigms

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent 'no-report' paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

I Thought I Saw "Zorro": An Inattentional Blindness Study

Objective

Inattentional blindness (IB) refers to an observer's failure to notice unexpected stimulus. The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of the priming type (perceptual, conceptual, and no priming) and emotional context (positive, negative, neutral) on IB with behavioral (IB, non-IB) and eye tracking measurements (latency of first fixation, total fixation time, and total fixation count in response to unexpected stimuli).

Methods

A total of 193 volunteered male university students were invited in the study. Three thematic videos (positive, negative, and neutral) were created to capture the IB. In the first stage, five pictures (a model dressed in different costumes Zorro as an unexpected stimulus, Vendetta, a judge, a doctor, and a worker) were shown to the participants for priming. In the second stage, a distractor task which involved 30 simple arithmetic operations were given. In the third stage, one of the thematic IB videos were shown to the participants, and then they answered the questions about those videos. Participants were assigned randomly to 9 different experimental conditions according to a 3 (Priming Type: Perceptual, Conceptual, No Priming) x 3 (Emotional Context: Positive, Negative, Neutral) factorial design. Finally, behavioral and eye tracking measurements were collected.

Results

Main and interaction effects of priming type and emotional contexts were not significant in terms of the behavioral measures. In addition, there were no significant differences between types of priming for eye tracking measures. However, there were significant differences between types of emotional contexts in all eye tracking measurements. In the negative context, participants made less total fixation, and looked shorter to unexpected stimulus than positive and neutral contexts. In addition, non-notifiers made less total fixation, and looked at unexpected stimulus for a shorter time compared to notifiers.

Conclusion

The fact of "looking without seeing" was again demonstrated experimentally. Priming and emotional context did not affect behavioral data, but eye movements were affected from the emotional context. Current findings showed a relation between emotion and attention.

Age-Related Effects of Stimulus Type and Congruency on Inattentional Blindness

Background: Most of the previous inattentional blindness (IB) studies focused on the factors that contributed to the detection of unattended stimuli. The age-related changes on IB have rarely been investigated across all age groups. In the current study, by using the dual-task IB paradigm, we aimed to explore the age-related effects of attended stimuli type and congruency between attended and unattended stimuli on IB. Methods: The current study recruited 111 participants (30 adolescents, 48 young adults, and 33 middle-aged adults) in the baseline recognition experiments and 341 participants (135 adolescents, 135 young adults, and 71 middle-aged adults) in the IB experiment. We applied the superimposed picture and word streams experimental paradigm to explore the age-related effects of attended stimuli type and congruency between attended and unattended stimuli on IB. An ANOVA was performed to analyze the results. Results: Participants across all age groups presented significantly lower recognition scores for both pictures and words in comparison with baseline recognition. Participants presented decreased recognition for unattended pictures or words from adolescents to young adults and middle-aged adults. When the pictures and words are congruent, all the participants showed significantly higher recognition scores for unattended stimuli in comparison with incongruent condition. Adolescents and young adults did not show recognition differences when primary tasks were attending pictures or words. Conclusion: The current findings showed that all participants presented better recognition scores for attended stimuli in comparison with unattended stimuli, and the recognition scores decreased from the adolescents to young and middle-aged adults. The findings partly supported the attention capacity models of IB.

I before U: Temporal order judgements reveal bias for self-owned objects

A multitude of studies demonstrate that self-relevant stimuli influence attention. Self-owned objects are a special class of self-relevant stimuli. If a self-owned object can indeed be characterised as a self-relevant stimulus then, consistent with theoretical predictions, a behavioural effect of ownership on attention should be present. To test this prediction, a task was selected that is known to be particularly sensitive measure of the prioritisation of visual information: the temporal order judgement. Participants completed temporal order judgements with pictures of "own" and "experimenter" owned objects (mugs) presented on either side of a central fixation cross. There was a variable onset delay between each picture, ranging between 0 ms and 105 ms, and participants were asked to indicate which mug appeared first. The results indicated a reliable change in the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) in favour of their own mug. Such a change in the PSS was not observed for two groups of participants who were exposed to a mug but did not keep the mug. A further experiment indicated that the source of the bias in PSS was more consistent with a criterion shift or top-down attentional prioritisation rather than a perceptual bias. These findings suggest that ownership, beyond mere-touch, mere-choice, or familiarity, leads to prioritised processing and responses, but the mechanism underlying the effect is not likely to be perceptual in nature.

What's past is past: Neither perceptual preactivation nor prior motivational relevance decrease subsequent inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness-the phenomenon that clearly visible, yet currently unexpected objects go unnoticed when our attention is focused elsewhere-is an ecologically valid failure of awareness. It is currently subject to debate whether previous events and experiences determine whether or not inattentional blindness occurs. Using a simple two-phase paradigm in the present study, we found that the likelihood of missing an unexpected object due to inattention did not change when its defining characteristic (its color) was perceptually preactivated (Experiment 1; N = 188). Likewise, noticing rates were not significantly reduced if the object's color was previously motivationally relevant during an unrelated detection task (Experiment 2; N = 184). These results corroborate and extend recent findings questioning the influence of previous experience on subsequent inattentional blindness. This has implications for possible countermeasures intended to thwart the potentially harmful effects of inattention.

Inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial: Are we throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

When attention is otherwise engaged, observers may experience inattentional blindness, failing to notice objects or events that are presented in plain sight. In an inattentional blindness experiment, an unexpectedstimulus ispresented alongside primary-task stimuli, and its detection is probed. We evaluate a criterion that is commonly used to exclude observers from the data analysis. On the final experimental trial, observers do not perform the primary task, but instead look for anything new. Observers who fail to report the unexpected stimulus on thisfull-attention trialare excluded. On the basis of 4 hypothetical experiments and a review of 128 actual experiments from the literature, we demonstrate some potentially problematic consequences of implementing the full-attention-trial exclusion criterion. Excluded observers may cluster in experimental conditions and the exclusion criterion may lead researchers to understate the pervasiveness of inattentional blindness. It may even render usblindto inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial.

Self-bias modulates saccadic control

We present novel data on the role of attention in eliciting enhanced processing of stimuli associated with self. Participants were required to make pro- or anti-saccades according to whether learned shape–label pairings matched or mismatched. When stimuli matched participants were required to make an anti-saccade, and when the stimuli mismatched a pro-saccade was required. We found that anti-saccades were difficult to make to stimuli associated with self when compared to stimuli associated with a friend and a stranger. In contrast, anti-saccades to friend-stimuli were easier to make than anti-saccades to stranger-stimuli. In addition, a correct anti-saccade to a self-associated stimulus disrupted subsequent pro-saccade trials, relative to when the preceding anti-saccade was made to other stimuli. The data indicate that self-associated stimuli provide a strong cue for explicit shifts of attention to them, and that correct anti-saccades to such stimuli demand high levels of inhibition (which carries over to subsequent pro-saccade trials). The self exerts an automatic draw on attention.

Ich sehe was, was du nicht siehst

Zusammenfassung. Wenn wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit einer Aufgabe zuwenden, nehmen wir Dinge, die währenddessen unerwartet auftauchen, häufig nicht bewusst wahr – obwohl sie unmittelbar in unserem Blickfeld erscheinen. Dieses Phänomen, das als Inattentional Blindness bezeichnet wird, kann fatale Konsequenzen in alltäglichen Situationen und auch einen ernstzunehmenden Einfluss auf sportliche Leistungen haben. In Ergänzung zu vorheriger Forschung zeigen meine eigenen Ergebnisse, dass eine Vielzahl situativer Faktoren die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der Inattentional Blindness auftritt, beeinflussen können. Dazu zählen unter anderem bestimmte Eigenschaften des unerwarteten Objekts sowie Kontextfaktoren. Im Gegensatz dazu scheinen interindividuelle Unterschiede über die situativen Einflüsse hinaus kaum (oder zumindest nicht reliabel) vorherzusagen, ob Inattentional Blindness auftritt oder nicht. Während es also eine feste Wahrscheinlichkeit über alle Personen hinweg gibt, dass ein unerwartetes Objekt bemerkt wird (deterministischer Aspekt), kann anhand der Persönlichkeitsstruktur und der kognitiven Fähigkeiten dieser Personen nicht vorhergesagt werden, wer von ihnen das unerwartete Objekt entdecken wird und wer nicht (stochastischer Aspekt).

Attention allocation towards own face is pronounced during middle adolescence: an eye-tracking study

Increased interest in the self has long been deemed to be one of the most peculiar characteristics of adolescence. On the basis of this, we conjectured that attentiveness towards self-relevant information, especially one's own face, becomes more pronounced during the middle adolescence. The present study tested this hypothesis by comparing the pattern of visuospatial attention allocation to their own face among early, middle and late adolescent males using an eye-tracking methodology. The results have shown a clear pattern of increased attention allocation towards their own face over a close friend's and a stranger's face in middle adolescents, but fixation durations on their own and a friend's face did not differ from each other in early and late adolescents. In addition, middle adolescents showed higher public self-consciousness and a lower level of self-esteem than early and late adolescents, respectively. These results indicate that attention allocation towards one's own face is more pronounced during middle adolescence, and is associated with increased interest in their own attributes.

The Effect of Self-Referential Expectation on Emotional Face Processing

The role of self-relevance has been somewhat neglected in static face processing paradigms but may be important in understanding how emotional faces impact on attention, cognition and affect. The aim of the current study was to investigate the effect of self-relevant primes on processing emotional composite faces. Sentence primes created an expectation of the emotion of the face before sad, happy, neutral or composite face photos were viewed. Eye movements were recorded and subsequent responses measured the cognitive and affective impact of the emotion expressed. Results indicated that primes did not guide attention, but impacted on judgments of valence intensity and self-esteem ratings. Negative self-relevant primes led to the most negative self-esteem ratings, although the effect of the prime was qualified by salient facial features. Self-relevant expectations about the emotion of a face and subsequent attention to a face that is congruent with these expectations strengthened the affective impact of viewing the face.

Does semantic preactivation reduce inattentional blindness?

We are susceptible to failures of awareness if a stimulus occurs unexpectedly and our attention is focused elsewhere. Such inattentional blindness is modulated by various parameters, including stimulus attributes, the observer's cognitive resources, and the observer's attentional set regarding the primary task. In three behavioral experiments with a total of 360 participants, we investigated whether mere semantic preactivation of the color of an unexpected object can reduce inattentional blindness. Neither explicitly mentioning the color several times before the occurrence of the unexpected stimulus nor priming the color more implicitly via color-related concepts could significantly reduce the susceptibility to inattentional blindness. Even putting the specific color concept in the main focus of the primary task did not lead to reduced inattentional blindness. Thus, we have shown that the failure to consciously perceive unexpected objects was not moderated by semantic preactivation of the objects' most prominent feature: its color. We suggest that this finding reflects the rather general principle that preactivations that are not motivationally relevant for one's current selection goals do not suffice to make an unexpected object overcome the threshold of awareness.

Do I have my attention? Speed of processing advantages for the self-face are not driven by automatic attention capture

We respond more quickly to our own face than to other faces, but there is debate over whether this is connected to attention-grabbing properties of the self-face. In two experiments, we investigate whether the self-face selectively captures attention, and the attentional conditions under which this might occur. In both experiments, we examined whether different types of face (self, friend, stranger) provide differential levels of distraction when processing self, friend and stranger names. In Experiment 1, an image of a distractor face appeared centrally - inside the focus of attention - behind a target name, with the faces either upright or inverted. In Experiment 2, distractor faces appeared peripherally - outside the focus of attention - in the left or right visual field, or bilaterally. In both experiments, self-name recognition was faster than other name recognition, suggesting a self-referential processing advantage. The presence of the self-face did not cause more distraction in the naming task compared to other types of face, either when presented inside (Experiment 1) or outside (Experiment 2) the focus of attention. Distractor faces had different effects across the two experiments: when presented inside the focus of attention (Experiment 1), self and friend images facilitated self and friend naming, respectively. This was not true for stranger stimuli, suggesting that faces must be robustly represented to facilitate name recognition. When presented outside the focus of attention (Experiment 2), no facilitation occurred. Instead, we report an interesting distraction effect caused by friend faces when processing strangers' names. We interpret this as a "social importance" effect, whereby we may be tuned to pick out and pay attention to familiar friend faces in a crowd. We conclude that any speed of processing advantages observed in the self-face processing literature are not driven by automatic attention capture.

Attentional processing of faces in ASD: a Dot-Probe study

The present study used the Dot-Probe paradigm to explore attentional allocation to faces compared with non-social images in high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing controls. There was no evidence of attentional bias in either group when stimuli were presented at individually calculated sub-threshold levels. However, at supra-threshold presentation (200 ms), a face bias was found for control participants but not for those with ASD. These results add to evidence of reduced social interest in ASD, relative to controls, and further demonstrate when atypical social processing arises in the attentional time course.

Neural bases for individual differences in the subjective experience of short durations (less than 2 seconds)

The current research was designed to establish whether individual differences in timing performance predict neural activation in the areas that subserve the perception of short durations ranging between 400 and 1600 milliseconds. Seventeen participants completed both a temporal bisection task and a control task, in a mixed fMRI design. In keeping with previous research, there was increased activation in a network of regions typically active during time perception including the right supplementary motor area (SMA) and right pre-SMA and basal ganglia (including the putamen and right pallidum). Furthermore, correlations between neural activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus and SMA and timing performance corroborate the results of a recent meta-analysis and are further evidence that the SMA forms part of a neural clock that is responsible for the accumulation of temporal information. Specifically, subjective lengthening of the perceived duration were associated with increased activation in both the right SMA (and right pre-SMA) and right inferior frontal gyrus.

Attentional differences in driving judgments for country and city scenes: Semantic congruency in inattentional blindness

'Looked-but-failed-to-see' vehicle collisions occur when a driver gives all indications of having responsibly evaluated the driving situation yet still fails to see a hazard that is clearly in view. The experience maps well onto the psychological phenomenon called inattentional blindness (IB). IB occurs when a viewer fails to see an unexpected object that is clearly visible, particularly if they are concentrating on an additional primary task. In this study, a driving-related IB task was used to explore whether an unexpected stimulus (US) such as a pedestrian or animal, is more likely to be seen in country or city-related driving scenarios if it is congruent or incongruent with the semantic context of the scenes, and thus congruent or incongruent with the attentional set of the viewer. Overall, participants were more likely to see the US in the City scenarios, which also demonstrated a borderline effect of congruency, with incongruent stimuli less likely to be seen than congruent stimuli. Analyses suggested that driver experience was related to detection of the US in City scenarios but not Country scenarios. However, analyses also revealed that participants generally tended to drive in city rather than country environments, thus prompting speculation that the results may reflect attentional requirements for familiar and unfamiliar driving scenarios. Thus we suggest that the analysis of the driving situation, and the attentional set that we develop to filter information, change when the driving situation is more familiar.

Oculomotor guidance and capture by irrelevant faces

Even though it is generally agreed that face stimuli constitute a special class of stimuli, which are treated preferentially by our visual system, it remains unclear whether faces can capture attention in a stimulus-driven manner. Moreover, there is a long-standing debate regarding the mechanism underlying the preferential bias of selecting faces. Some claim that faces constitute a set of special low-level features to which our visual system is tuned; others claim that the visual system is capable of extracting the meaning of faces very rapidly, driving attentional selection. Those debates continue because many studies contain methodological peculiarities and manipulations that prevent a definitive conclusion. Here, we present a new visual search task in which observers had to make a saccade to a uniquely colored circle while completely irrelevant objects were also present in the visual field. The results indicate that faces capture and guide the eyes more than other animated objects and that our visual system is not only tuned to the low-level features that make up a face but also to its meaning.

Visual Processing of Contour Patterns under Conditions of Inattentional Blindness

An inattentional blindness paradigm was adapted to measure ERPs elicited by visual contour patterns that were or were not consciously perceived. In the first phase of the experiment, subjects performed an attentionally demanding task while task-irrelevant line segments formed square-shaped patterns or random configurations. After the square patterns had been presented 240 times, subjects' awareness of these patterns was assessed. More than half of all subjects, when queried, failed to notice the square patterns and were thus considered inattentionally blind during this first phase. In the second phase of the experiment, the task and stimuli were the same, but following this phase, all of the subjects reported having seen the patterns. ERPs recorded over the occipital pole differed in amplitude from 220 to 260 msec for the pattern stimuli compared with the random arrays regardless of whether subjects were aware of the patterns. At subsequent latencies (300–340 msec) however, ERPs over bilateral occipital-parietal areas differed between patterns and random arrays only when subjects were aware of the patterns. Finally, in a third phase of the experiment, subjects viewed the same stimuli, but the task was altered so that the patterns became task relevant. Here, the same two difference components were evident but were followed by a series of additional components that were absent in the first two phases of the experiment. We hypothesize that the ERP difference at 220–260 msec reflects neural activity associated with automatic contour integration whereas the difference at 300–340 msec reflects visual awareness, both of which are dissociable from task-related postperceptual processing.

A short-lived face alert during inhibition of return

In the present study, we explored the role of faces in oculomotor inhibition of return (IOR) using a tightly controlled spatial cuing paradigm. We measured saccadic response latency to targets following peripheral cues that were either faces or objects of lesser sociobiological salience. A recurring influence from cue content was observed across numerous methodological variations. Faces versus other object cues briefly reduced saccade latencies toward subsequently presented targets, independently of attentional allocation and IOR. The results suggest a short-lived priming effect or social facilitation effect from the mere presence of a face. In the present study, we further showed that saccadic responses were unaffected by face versus nonface objects in double-cue presentations. Our findings indicate that peripheral face cues do not influence attentional orienting processes involved in IOR any differently from other objects in a tightly controlled oculomotor IOR paradigm.

Famous faces demand attention due to reduced inhibitory processing

People have particular difficulty ignoring distractors that depict faces. This phenomenon has been attributed to the high level of biological significance that faces carry. The current study aimed to elucidate the mechanism by which faces gain processing priority. We used a focused attention paradigm that tracks the influence of a distractor over time and provides a measure of inhibitory processing. Upright famous faces served as test stimuli and inverted versions of the faces as well as upright non-face objects served as control stimuli. The results revealed that although all of the stimuli elicited similar levels of distraction, only inverted distractor faces and non-face objects elicited inhibitory effects. The lack of inhibitory effects for upright famous faces provides novel evidence that reduced inhibitory processing underlies the mandatory nature of face processing.

Surprise-induced blindness: a stimulus-driven attentional limit to conscious perception

The cost of attending to a visual event can be the failure to consciously detect other events. This processing limitation is well illustrated by the attentional blink paradigm, in which searching for and attending to a target presented in a rapid serial visual presentation stream of distractors can impair one's ability to detect a second target presented soon thereafter. The attentional blink critically depends on 'top-down' attentional settings, for it does not occur if participants are asked to ignore the first target. Here we show that 'bottom-up' attention can also lead to a profound but ephemeral deficit in conscious perception: Presentation of a novel, unexpected, and task-irrelevant stimulus virtually abolishes conscious detection of a target presented within half a second after the 'Surprise' stimulus, but only for its earliest occurrences (generally 1 to 2 presentations). This powerful but short-lived deficit contrasts with a milder but more enduring form of attentional capture that accompanies singleton presentations in rapid serial visual presentations. We conclude that the capture of stimulus-driven attention alone can limit explicit perception.