Dissecting the neurofunctional bases of intentional action

A modified neural circuit framework for semantic memory retrieval with implications for circuit modulation to treat verbal retrieval deficits

Word finding difficulty is a frequent complaint in older age and disease states, but treatment options are lacking for such verbal retrieval deficits. Better understanding of the neurophysiological and neuroanatomical basis of verbal retrieval function may inform effective interventions. In this article, we review the current evidence of a neural retrieval circuit central to verbal production, including words and semantic memory, that involves the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), striatum (particularly caudate nucleus), and thalamus. We aim to offer a modified neural circuit framework expanded upon a memory retrieval model proposed in 2013 by Hart et al., as evidence from electrophysiological, functional brain imaging, and noninvasive electrical brain stimulation studies have provided additional pieces of information that converge on a shared neural circuit for retrieval of memory and words. We propose that both the left inferior frontal gyrus and fronto-polar regions should be included in the expanded circuit. All these regions have their respective functional roles during verbal retrieval, such as selection and inhibition during search, initiation and termination of search, maintenance of co-activation across cortical regions, as well as final activation of the retrieved information. We will also highlight the structural connectivity from and to the pre-SMA (e.g., frontal aslant tract and fronto-striatal tract) that facilitates communication between the regions within this circuit. Finally, we will discuss how this circuit and its correlated activity may be affected by disease states and how this circuit may serve as a novel target engagement for neuromodulatory treatment of verbal retrieval deficits.

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

1. We reveal a mechanism for slow-ramping signals before spontaneous voluntary movements. 2. Slow synapses stabilize spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural network. 3. We validate model predictions in human frontal cortical single-neuron recordings. 4. The model recreates the readiness potential in an EEG proxy signal. 5. Neurons that ramp together had correlated activity before ramping onset. The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ∼2 seconds before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Neural correlates of an illusionary sense of agency caused by virtual reality

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation that self-actions lead to ensuing perceptual consequences. The prospective mechanism emphasizes that SoA arises from motor prediction and its comparison with actual action outcomes, while the reconstructive mechanism stresses that SoA emerges from retrospective causal processing about the action outcomes. Consistent with the prospective mechanism, motor planning regions were identified by neuroimaging studies using the temporal binding (TB) effect, a behavioral measure often linked to implicit SoA. Yet, TB also occurs during passive observation of another's action, lending support to the reconstructive mechanism, but its neural correlates remain unexplored. Here, we employed virtual reality (VR) to modulate such observation-based SoA and examined it with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). After manipulating an avatar hand in VR, participants passively observed an avatar's "action" and showed a significant increase in TB. The binding effect was associated with the right angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, which are critical nodes for inferential and agency processing. These results suggest that the experience of controlling an avatar may potentiate inferential processing within the right inferior parietal cortex and give rise to the illusionary SoA without voluntary action.

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

Development and Validation of the Body Cognition Assessment System

Body awareness, which comprises the sense of body possession and action ownership, is essential for the adaptive movement of humans in response to external environments. However, existing body cognition assessments include many overt elements of cognitive functional activity, but no assessment captures the latent body cognition necessary for exercise and daily life activities. Therefore, this study aimed to devise a body cognition assessment system (BCAS) to examine the functional basis of body cognition in healthy participants and investigate its usefulness. The BCAS was used to assess body cognition on three occasions, and BCAS values were calculated from the results of the assessment. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used to determine reproducibility. Neural activity in the brain during somatocognition assessment while conducting the BCAS was measured by electroencephalogram. Moreover, the functional basis for somatocognition with the BCAS was also investigated. The results demonstrated that the BCAS values varied across the three administrations (ICC (1.3) = 0.372), and changes in the state of neural activity in the brain were observed. The results suggest that assessment using the BCAS may be a new indicator of ever-changing body cognition.

Gradient Organization of Space, Time, and Numbers in the Brain: A Meta-analysis of Neuroimaging Studies

In this study, we ran a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies to pinpoint the neural regions that are commonly activated across space, time, and numerosity, and we tested the existence of gradient transitions among these magnitude representations in the brain. Following PRISMA guidelines, we included in the meta-analysis 112 experiments (for space domain), 114 experiments (time domain), and 115 experiments (numerosity domain), and we used the activation likelihood estimation method. We found a system of brain regions that was commonly recruited in all the three magnitudes, which included bilateral insula, the supplementary motor area (SMA), the right inferior frontal gyrus, and bilateral intraparietal sulci. Gradiental transitions between different magnitudes were found along all these regions but insulae, with space and numbers leading to gradients mainly over parietal regions (and SMA) whereas time and numbers mainly over frontal regions. These findings provide evidence for the GradiATOM theory (Gradient Theory of Magnitude), suggesting that spatial proximity given by overlapping activations and gradients is a key aspect for efficient interactions and integrations among magnitudes.

Task-based functional connectivity identifies two segregated networks underlying intentional action

While much of motor behavior is automatic, intentional action is necessary for the selection and initiation of controlled motor acts and is thus an essential part of goal-directed behavior. Neuroimaging studies have shown that self-generated action implicates several dorsal and ventral frontoparietal areas. However, knowledge of the functional coupling between these brain regions during intentional action remains limited. We here studied brain activations and functional connectivity (FC) of thirty right-handed healthy participants performing a finger pressing task instructed to use a specific finger (externally-triggered action) or to select one of four fingers randomly (internally-generated action). Participants performed the task in alternating order either with their dominant right hand or the left hand. Consistent with previous studies, we observed stronger involvement of posterior parietal cortex and premotor regions when contrasting internally-generated with externally-triggered action. Interestingly, this contrast also revealed significant engagement of medial occipitotemporal regions including the left lingual and right fusiform gyrus. Task-based FC analysis identified increased functional coupling among frontoparietal regions as well as increased and decreased coupling between occipitotemporal regions, thus differentiating between two segregated networks. When comparing results of the dominant and nondominant hand we found less activation, but stronger connectivity for the former, suggesting increased neural efficiency when participants use their dominant hand. Taken together, our results reveal that two segregated networks that encompass the frontoparietal and occipitotemporal cortex contribute independently to intentional action.

Motor awareness: a model based on neurological syndromes

Motor awareness is a complex, multifaceted construct involving the awareness of both (i) one's motor state while executing a movement or remaining still and (ii) one's motor abilities. The analysis of neurological syndromes associated with motor disorders suggests the existence of various different components which are, however, integrated into a model of motor awareness. These components are: (i) motor intention, namely, a conscious desire to perform an action; (ii) motor monitoring and error recognition, that is, the capacity to check the execution of the action and identify motor errors; and (iii) a general awareness of one's own motor abilities and deficits, that is, the capacity to recognize the general state of one's motor abilities about the performance of specific actions and the potential consequences of motor impairment. Neuroanatomical correlates involving the parietal and insular cortices, the medial and lateral frontal regions, and subcortical structures (basal ganglia and limbic system) support this multi-component model. Specific damage (or disconnections) to these structures results in a number of different disorders in motor awareness, such as anosognosia for hemiplegia and apraxia, and a number of symptoms which are specific to motor intention disorders (e.g., the Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Tourette's Syndrome) or motor monitoring (e.g., Parkinson's and Huntington's diseases). All of these clinical conditions are discussed in the light of a motor awareness model.

Neural structural abnormalities behind altered brain activation in obesity: Evidence from meta-analyses of brain activation and morphometric data

Obesity represents a risk factor for disability with a major bearing on life expectancy. Neuroimaging techniques are contributing to clarify its neurobiological underpinnings. Here, we explored whether structural brain abnormalities might accompany altered brain activations in obesity. We combined and compared data from brain activation studies for food stimuli and the data reported in structural voxel-based morphometry studies. We found that obese individuals have reduced grey matter density and functional activations in the thalamus and midbrain. A functional connectivity analysis based on these two clusters and its quantitative decoding showed that these regions are part of the reward system functional brain network. Moreover, we found specific grey matter hypo-densities in prefrontal cortex for the obese subjects, regions involved in controlled behaviour. These results support theories of obesity that point to reduced bottom-up reward processes (i.e., the Reward Deficit Theory), but also top-down theories postulating a deficit in cognitive control (i.e., the Inhibitory Control Deficit Theory). The same results also warrant a more systematic exploration of obesity whereby the reward of food and the intentional control over consummatory behaviour is manipulated.

A new model for freedom of movement using connectomic analysis

The problem of whether we can execute free acts or not is central in philosophical thought, and it has been studied by numerous scholars throughout the centuries. Recently, neurosciences have entered this topic contributing new data and insights into the neuroanatomical basis of cognitive processes. With the advent of connectomics, a more refined landscape of brain connectivity can be analysed at an unprecedented level of detail. Here, we identify the connectivity network involved in the movement process from a connectomics point of view, from its motivation through its execution until the sense of agency develops. We constructed a "volitional network" using data derived from the Brainnetome Atlas database considering areas involved in volitional processes as known in the literature. We divided this process into eight processes and used Graph Theory to measure several structural properties of the network. Our results show that the volitional network is small-world and that it contains four communities. Nodes of the right hemisphere are contained in three of these communities whereas nodes of the left hemisphere only in two. Centrality measures indicate the nucleus accumbens is one of the most connected nodes in the network. Extensive connectivity is observed in all processes except in Decision (to move) and modulation of Agency, which might correlate with a mismatch mechanism for perception of Agency.

Dorsal visual stream is preferentially engaged during externally guided action selection in Parkinson Disease

OBJECTIVE

In patients with Parkinson Disease (PD), self-imitated or internally cued (IC) actions are thought to be compromised by the disease process, as exemplified by impairments in action initiation. In contrast, externally-cued (EC) actions which are made in response to sensory prompts can restore a remarkable degree of movement capability in PD, particularly alleviating freezing-of-gait. This study investigates the electrophysiological underpinnings of movement facilitation in PD through visuospatial cuing, with particular attention to the dynamics within the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and lateral premotor cortex (LPMC) axis of the dorsal visual stream.

METHODS

Invasive cortical recordings over the PPC and LPMC were obtained during deep brain stimulation lead implantation surgery. Thirteen PD subjects performed an action selection task, which was constituted by left or right joystick movement with directional visual cuing in the EC condition and internally generated direction selection in the IC condition. Time-resolved neural activities within and between the PPC and LPMC were compared between EC and IC conditions.

RESULTS

Reaction times (RT) were significantly faster in the EC condition relative to the IC condition (paired t-test, p = 0.0015). PPC-LPMC inter-site phase synchrony within the β-band (13-35 Hz) was significantly greater in the EC relative to the IC condition. Greater PPC-LPMC β debiased phase lag index (dwPLI) prior to movement onset was correlated with faster reaction times only in the EC condition. Multivariate granger causality (GC) was greater in the EC condition relative to the IC condition, prior to and during movement.

CONCLUSION

Relative to IC actions, we report relative increase in inter-site phase synchrony and directional PPC to LPMC connectivity in the β-band during preparation and execution of EC actions. Furthermore, increased strength of connectivity is predictive of faster RT, which are pathologically slow in PD patients. Stronger engagement of the PPC-LPMC cortical network by an EC specifically through the channel of β-modulation is implicated in correcting the pathological slowing of action initiation seen in Parkinson's patients.

SIGNIFICANCE

These findings shed light on the electrophysiological mechanisms that underlie motor facilitation in PD patients through visuospatial cuing.

Identification of a Brain Network Underlying the Execution of Freely Chosen Movements

Action selection refers to the decision regarding which action to perform in order to reach a desired goal, that is, the "what" component of intention. Whether the action is freely chosen or externally instructed involves different brain networks during the selection phase, but it is assumed that the way an action is selected should not influence the subsequent execution phase of the same movement. Here, we aim to test this hypothesis by investigating whether the modality of movement selection influences the brain networks involved during the execution phase of the movement. Twenty healthy volunteers performed a delayed response task in an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging design to compare freely chosen and instructed unimanual or bimanual movements during the execution phase. Using activation analyses, we found that the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) and the parietal and cerebellar areas were more activated during the execution phase of freely chosen as compared to instructed movements. Connectivity analysis showed an increase of information flow between the right posterior parietal cortex and the cerebellum for freely chosen compared to instructed movements. We suggest that the parieto-cerebellar network is particularly engaged during freely chosen movement to monitor the congruence between the intentional content of our actions and their outcome.

Functional localization and categorization of intentional decisions in humans: A meta-analysis of brain imaging studies

Brain-imaging research on intentional decision-making often employs a "free-choice" paradigm, in which participants choose among options with identical values or outcomes. Although the medial prefrontal cortex has commonly been associated with choices, there is no consensus on the wider network that underlies diverse intentional decisions and behaviours. Our systematic literature search identified 35 fMRI/PET experiments using various free-choice paradigms, with appropriate control conditions using external instructions. An Activation Likelihood Estimate (ALE) meta-analysis showed that, compared with external instructions, intentional decisions consistently activate the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the left insula and the inferior parietal lobule. We then categorized the studies into four different types according to their experimental designs: reactive motor intention, perceptual intention, inhibitory intention, and cognitive intention. We conducted conjunction and contrast meta-analyses to identify consistent and selective spatial convergence of brain activation within each specific category of intentional decision. Finally, we used meta-analytic decoding to probe cognitive processes underlying free choices. Our findings suggest that the neurocognitive process underlying intentional decision incorporates anatomically separated components subserving distinct cognitive and computational roles.

Frontoparietal, Cerebellum Network Codes for Accurate Intention Prediction in Altered Perceptual Conditions

Integrating and predicting the intentions and actions of others are critical components of social interactions, but the behavioral and neural bases of such mechanisms under altered perceptual conditions are poorly understood. In the present study, we recruited expert violinists and age-matched controls with no musical training and asked them to evaluate simplified dynamic stimuli of violinists playing in a piano or forte communicative intent while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. We show that expertise is needed to successfully understand and evaluate communicative intentions in spatially and temporally altered visual representations of musical performance. Frontoparietal regions-such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobule and sulcus-and various subregions of the cerebellum-such as cerebellar lobules I-IV, V, VI, VIIb, VIIIa, X-a re recruited in the process. Functional connectivity between these brain areas reveals widespread organization, particularly in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal sulcus, and in the cerebellum. This network may be essential to successfully assess communicative intent in ambiguous or complex visual scenes.

Dorsal and ventral striatal functional connectivity shifts play a potential role in internet gaming disorder

Animal models suggest transitions from non-addictive to addictive behavioral engagement are associated with ventral-to-dorsal striatal shifts. However, few studies have examined such features in humans, especially in internet gaming disorder (IGD), a proposed behavioral addiction. We recruited 418 subjects (174 with IGD; 244 with recreational game use (RGU)). Resting-state fMRI data were collected and functional connectivity analyses were performed based on ventral and dorsal striatal seeds. Correlations and follow-up spectrum dynamic causal model (spDCM) analyses were performed to examine relationships between the ventral/dorsal striatum and middle frontal gyrus (MFG). Longitudinal data were also analysed to investigate changes over time. IGD relative to RGU subjects showed lower ventral-striatum-to-MFG (mostly involving supplementary motor area (SMA)) and higher dorsal-striatum-to-MFG functional connectivity. spDCM revealed that left dorsal-striatum-to-MFG connectivity was correlated with IGD severity. Longitudinal data within IGD and RGU groups found greater dorsal striatal connectivity with the MFG in IGD versus RGU subjects. These findings suggest similar ventral-to-dorsal striatal shifts may operate in IGD and traditional addictions.

In order to shed light on the underlying neural mechanisms of internet gaming disorder (IGD), Dong et al collected longitudinal resting-state fMRI data from participants with IGD or those who partake in recreational game use. They demonstrated that, consistent with animal models of addiction, dorsal and ventral striatal functional connectivity shifts appeared to play a potential mechanistic role in IGD.

Inferior parietal lobule involved in representation of "what" in a delayed-action Libet task

Intentional motor action is typically characterized by the decision about the timing, and the selection of the action variant, known as the "what" component. We compared free action selection with instructed action, where the movement type was externally cued, in order to investigate the action selection and action representation in a Libet's task. Temporal and spatial locus of these processes was examined using the combination of high-density electroencephalography, topographic analysis of variance, and source reconstruction. Instructed action, engaging representation of the response movement, was associated with distinct negativity at the parietal and centro-parietal channels starting around 750 ms before the movement, which has a source particularly in the bilateral inferior parietal lobule. This suggests that in delayed-action tasks, the process of action representation in the inferior parietal lobule may play an important part in the larger parieto-frontal activity responsible for movement selection.

Moderate acute alcohol use impairs intentional inhibition rather than stimulus-driven inhibition

Moderate alcohol intake may impair stimulus-driven inhibition of motor actions in go/no-go and stop-signal tasks. Exposure to alcohol-related cues has been found to exacerbate this impairment. By contrast, the effect of alcohol use on intentional inhibition, or the capacity to voluntarily suspend an action, has rarely been investigated. We examined whether and how moderate alcohol intake affects stimulus-driven inhibition (stop-signal task) and intentional inhibition (chasing bottles task), during exposure to alcohol-related stimuli. One hundred and eleven participants were randomly assigned to an alcohol (male: 0.55 g/kg, female: 0.45 g/kg), placebo, or control group. For the stop-signal task, ANOVAs were performed on stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) and go RT with Pharmacological and Expectancy Effects of Alcohol, Stimulus Category (alcohol-related or neutral), and Sex as factors. For the chasing bottles task, multilevel survival analysis was performed to predict whether and when intentional inhibition was initiated, with the same factors. For the stop-signal task, Sex moderated the Pharmacological Effect of Alcohol on SSRT: only for females, alcohol consumption shortened SSRT. In the non-alcohol groups, males had shorter SSRT than females. Concerning intentional inhibition, the alcohol group initiated intentional inhibition less often, especially when stimuli were non-alcohol related. These findings indicate that (1) stimulus-driven inhibition and intentional inhibition reflect different aspects of response inhibition; (2) moderate alcohol intake negatively affects intentional inhibition (but not stimulus-driven inhibition). Speculatively, the observed impairment in intentional inhibition might underlie the lack of control over alcohol drinking behavior after a priming dose. This study highlights the potential role of intentional inhibition in the development of addiction.

How Beat Perception Co-opts Motor Neurophysiology

Beat perception offers cognitive scientists an exciting opportunity to explore how cognition and action are intertwined in the brain even in the absence of movement. Many believe the motor system predicts the timing of beats, yet current models of beat perception do not specify how this is neurally implemented. Drawing on recent insights into the neurocomputational properties of the motor system, we propose that beat anticipation relies on action-like processes consisting of precisely patterned neural time-keeping activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA), orchestrated and sequenced by activity in the dorsal striatum. In addition to synthesizing recent advances in cognitive science and motor neuroscience, our framework provides testable predictions to guide future work.

Decoding the neural dynamics of free choice in humans

How do we choose a particular action among equally valid alternatives? Nonhuman primate findings have shown that decision-making implicates modulations in unit firing rates and local field potentials (LFPs) across frontal and parietal cortices. Yet the electrophysiological brain mechanisms that underlie free choice in humans remain ill defined. Here, we address this question using rare intracerebral electroencephalography (EEG) recordings in surgical epilepsy patients performing a delayed oculomotor decision task. We find that the temporal dynamics of high-gamma (HG, 60-140 Hz) neural activity in distinct frontal and parietal brain areas robustly discriminate free choice from instructed saccade planning at the level of single trials. Classification analysis was applied to the LFP signals to isolate decision-related activity from sensory and motor planning processes. Compared with instructed saccades, free-choice trials exhibited delayed and longer-lasting HG activity during the delay period. The temporal dynamics of the decision-specific sustained HG activity indexed the unfolding of a deliberation process, rather than memory maintenance. Taken together, these findings provide the first direct electrophysiological evidence in humans for the role of sustained high-frequency neural activation in frontoparietal cortex in mediating the intrinsically driven process of freely choosing among competing behavioral alternatives.

Altered sense of agency in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome: behavioural, clinical and functional magnetic resonance imaging findings

Current neurocognitive models of motor control postulate that accurate action monitoring is crucial for a normal experience of agency-the ability to attribute the authorship of our actions and their consequences to ourselves. Recent studies demonstrated that action monitoring is impaired in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, a movement disorder characterized by motor and vocal tics. It follows that Tourette syndrome patients may suffer from a perturbed sense of agency, the hypothesis tested in this study. To this end, we recruited 25 Tourette syndrome patients and 25 matched healthy controls in a case-control behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging study. As an implicit index of the sense of agency, we measured the intentional binding phenomenon, i.e., the perceived temporal compression between voluntary movements and their external consequences. We found evidence of an impaired sense of agency in Tourette syndrome patients who, as a group, did not show a significant intentional binding. The more reduced was the individual intentional binding, the more severe were the motor symptoms. Specific differences between the two groups were also observed in terms of brain activation patterns. In the healthy controls group, the magnitude of the intentional binding was associated with the activity of a premotor-parietal-cerebellar network. This relationship was not present in the Tourette syndrome group, suggesting an altered activation of the agency brain network for self-generated acts. We conclude that the less accurate action monitoring described in Tourette syndrome also involves the assessment of the consequences of actions in the outside world. We discuss that this may lead to difficulties in distinguishing external consequences produced by their own actions from the ones caused by others in Tourette syndrome patients.

Predicting the Sensory Consequences of Self-Generated Actions: Pre-Supplementary Motor Area as Supra-Modal Hub in the Sense of Agency Experience

Sense of agency refers to the feeling that one's self-generated action caused an external environment event. In a previous study, we suggested that the supplementary motor area (SMA), in its anterior portion (pre-SMA), is a key structure for attributing the sense of agency for the visual consequences of self-generated movements. However, real-life actions can lead to outcomes in different sensory modalities, raising the question of whether SMA represents a supra-modal hub for the sense of agency. Here, we compared the agency experience for visual and auditory outcomes by taking advantage of the intentional binding effect (IB). We observed discrete time-windows for the agency manifestation across different sensory modalities: While there was an IB at 200 ms delay between the action and the visual outcome, a time compression was observed when the auditory outcome followed the action by 400 ms. The magnitude of the IB was mirrored by meaningful brain activity in the pre-SMA but only at the specific delay when a sizeable IB was seen. We conclude that attributing consequences of self-generated movements to one's action is based on similar mechanisms across sensory modalities and that those mechanisms are related to the functioning of the motor system.

The Readiness Potential reflects planning-based expectation, not uncertainty, in the timing of action

Actions are guided by a combination of external cues, internal intentions, and stored knowledge. Self-initiated voluntary actions, produced without immediate external cues, may be preceded by a slow EEG Readiness Potential (RP) that progressively increases prior to action. The cognitive significance of this neural event is controversial. Some accounts link the RP to the fact that timing of voluntary actions is generated endogenously, without external constraints. Others link it to the unique role of a planning process, and therefore of temporal expectation, in voluntary actions. In many previous experiments, actions are unconstrained by external cues, but also potentially involve preplanning and anticipation. To separate these factors, we developed a reinforcement learning paradigm where participants learned, through trial and error, the optimal time to act. If the RP reflects freedom from external constraint, its amplitude should be greater early in learning, when participants do not yet know when to act. Conversely, if the RP reflects planning, it should be greater later on, when participants have learned, and plan in advance, the time of action. We found that RP amplitudes grew with learning, suggesting that this neural activity reflects planning and anticipation for the forthcoming action, rather than freedom from external constraint.

How the effects of actions become our own

Every day, we do things that cause effects in the outside world with little doubt about who caused what. To some, this sense of agency derives from a post hoc reconstruction of a likely causal relationship between an event and our preceding movements; others propose that the sense of agency originates from prospective comparisons of motor programs and their effects. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that the sense of agency is associated with a brain network including the pre-supplementary motor area (SMA) and dorsal parietal cortex. Transcranial magnetic stimulation affected the sense of agency only when delivered over the pre-SMA and specifically when time-locked to action planning, rather than when the physical consequences of the actions appeared. These findings make a prospective theory of the sense of agency more likely.

Decoding Changes of Mind in Voluntary Action-Dynamics of Intentional Choice Representations

Voluntary actions rely on appropriate flexibility of intentions. Usually, we should pursue our goals, but sometimes we should change goals if they become too costly to achieve. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated the neural dynamics underlying the capacity to change one's mind based on new information after action onset. Multivariate pattern analyses revealed that in visual areas, neural representations of intentional choice between 2 visual stimuli were unchanged by additional decision-relevant information. However, in fronto-parietal cortex, representations changed dynamically as decisions evolved. Precuneus, angular gyrus, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encoded new externally cued rewards/costs that guided subsequent changes of mind. Activity in medial frontal cortex predicted changes of mind when participants detached from externally cued evidence, suggesting a role in endogenous decision updates. Finally, trials with changes of mind were associated with an increase in functional connectivity between fronto-parietal areas, allowing for integration of various endogenous and exogenous decision components to generate a distributed consensus about whether to pursue or abandon an initial intention. In conclusion, local and global dynamics of choice representations in fronto-parietal cortex allow agents to maintain the balance between adapting to changing environments versus pursuing internal goals.

Neurofunctional correlates of body-ownership and sense of agency: A meta-analytical account of self-consciousness

Self-consciousness consists of several dissociable experiences, including the sense of ownership of one's body and the sense of agency over one's action consequences. The relationship between body-ownership and the sense of agency has been described by different neurocognitive models, each providing specific neurofunctional predictions. According to an "additive" model, the sense of agency entails body-ownership, while an alternative "independence" hypothesis suggests that they represent two qualitatively different processes, underpinned by distinct brain systems. We propose a third "interactive" model, arguing the interdependence between body-ownership and the sense of agency: these constructs might represent different experiences with specific and exclusive brain correlates, but they also could partly overlap at the neurofunctional level. Here we test these three neurocognitive models by reviewing the available neurofunctional literature of body-ownership and the sense of agency, with a quantitative meta-analytical approach that allowed us to compare their neural correlates statistically. We identified (i) a body-ownership-specific network including the left inferior parietal lobule and the left extra-striate body area, (ii) a sense-of-agency-specific network including the left SMA, the left posterior insula, the right postcentral gyrus, and the right superior temporal lobe and (iii) a shared network in the left middle insula. These results provide support for the interactive neurocognitive model of body-ownership and the sense of agency. Body-ownership involves a sensory network in which multisensory inputs are integrated to be self-attributed. On the other hand, the sense of agency is specifically associated with premotor and sensory-motor areas, typically involved in generating motor predictions and in action monitoring. Finally, body-ownership and the sense of agency interact at the level of the left middle insula, a high-level multisensory hub engaged in body and action awareness in general.

Neural Foundations of Ayres Sensory Integration®

Sensory integration, now trademarked as Ayres Sensory Integration^® or ASI, is based on principles of neuroscience and provides a framework for understanding the contributions of the sensory and motor foundations of human behavior. The theory and practice of ASI continues to evolve as greater understanding of the neurobiology of human behavior emerges. In this paper we examine core constructs of ASI identified in the seminal work of Dr. Jean Ayres, and present current neuroscience research that underlies the main patterns of sensory integration function and dysfunction. We consider how current research verifies and clarifies Ayres’ propositions by describing functions of the vestibular, proprioceptive, and tactile sensory systems, and exploring their relationships to ocular, postural, bilateral integration, praxis, and sensory modulation. We close by proposing neuroplasticity as the mechanisms underlying change as a result of ASI intervention.

The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency

At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, "this action is due to my own will") have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, "this body is mine") might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, "this willed action is being realized by my own body") requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body.

Exposure to violence affects the development of moral impressions and trust behavior in incarcerated males

Individuals exposed to community violence are more likely to engage in antisocial behavior, resulting in a dramatic increase in contact with justice and social service systems. Theoretical accounts suggest that disruptions in learning underlie the link between exposure to violence and maladaptive behaviors. However, empirical evidence specifying these processes is sparse. Here, in a sample of incarcerated males, we investigated how exposure to violence affects the ability to learn about the harmfulness of others and use this information to adaptively modulate trust behavior. Exposure to violence does not impact the ability to accurately develop beliefs about agents' harm preferences and predict their choices. However, exposure to violence disrupts the ability to form moral impressions that dissociate between agents with distinguishable harm preferences, and subsequently, the ability to adjust trust behavior towards different agents. These findings reveal a process that may explain the association between exposure to violence and maladaptive behavior.

The Brain in (Willed) Action: A Meta-Analytical Comparison of Imaging Studies on Motor Intentionality and Sense of Agency

Voluntary actions can be fractionated in different phenomena: from the emergence of intentions and the ensuing motor plans and actions, to the anticipation and monitoring of their outcomes, to the appreciation of their congruency with intentions and to the eventual emergence of a sense of agency. It follows that motor intention and the sense of agency should occur at different stages in the normal generation of willed actions. Both these processes have been associated with a fronto-parietal motor network, but no study has investigated to what extent the two experiences can be dissociated for the brain regions involved. To this end, we assessed the PET/fMRI literature on agency and intentionality using a meta-analytic technique based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. Beside a shared brain network involving the meso-frontal and prefrontal regions, the middle insula and subcortical structures, we found that motor intention and the sense of agency are functionally underpinned by separable sets of brain regions: an “intentionality network,” involving the rostral area of the mesial frontal cortex (middle cingulum and pre-supplementary motor area), the anterior insula and the parietal lobules, and a “self-agency network,” which involves the posterior areas of the mesial frontal cortex (the SMA proper), the posterior insula, the occipital lobe and the cerebellum. We were then able to confirm this functional organization by a subsequent seed-based fMRI resting-state functional connectivity analysis, with seeds derived from the intentionality/sense of agency specific clusters of the medial wall of the frontal lobe. Our results suggest the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the mesial frontal cortex, with the more anterior regions linked to the concept of motor intentionality and the brain areas located more posteriorly associated with the direct monitoring between the action and its outcome. This suggestion is reinforced by the association between the sense of agency and the activation of the occipital lobes, to suggest a direct comparison between the movement and its external (e.g., visual) consequences. The shared network may be important for the integration of intentionality and agency in a coherent appreciation of self-generated actions.

The Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition

Volition refers to a capacity for endogenous action, particularly goal-directed endogenous action, shared by humans and some other animals. It has long been controversial whether a specific set of cognitive processes for volition exist in the human brain, and much scientific thinking on the topic continues to revolve around traditional metaphysical debates about free will. At its origins, scientific psychology had a strong engagement with volition. This was followed by a period of disenchantment, or even outright hostility, during the second half of the twentieth century. In this review, I aim to reinvigorate the scientific approach to volition by, first, proposing a range of different features that constitute a new, neurocognitively realistic working definition of volition. I then focus on three core features of human volition: its generativity (the capacity to trigger actions), its subjectivity (the conscious experiences associated with initiating voluntary actions), and its teleology (the goal-directed quality of some voluntary actions). I conclude that volition is a neurocognitive process of enormous societal importance and susceptible to scientific investigation.