Reward-specific satiety affects subjective value signals in orbitofrontal cortex during multicomponent economic choice

Dissociation of value and confidence signals in the orbitofrontal cortex during decision-making: an intracerebral electrophysiology study in humans

Some decisions, such as selecting a food item in a novel menu, are not based on rational norms, or on trained habits, but on subjective preferences. How the human brain makes these preference-based decisions is still debated in cognitive neuroscience. Classical models focus on the comparison mechanism that achieves the selection of the option with best expected value. Recent models suggest that estimates of option values are refined until reaching sufficient confidence in the considered choice. Neuroimaging studies in humans and electrophysiology studies in animals have gathered evidence that value and confidence estimates are both represented in medial and lateral regions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Here, we took advantage of electrodes implanted within the OFC of human patients with pharmaco-resistant epilepsy (14 women, 12 men) to investigate whether value and confidence estimates can be dissociated in electrophysiology activity recorded during preference-based binary decisions. The overall value (liking ratings summed over options) and choice confidence (selection probability of the chosen option) were identified in low-frequency (4-8 Hz) OFC activity. These value and confidence signals were time-locked to the decision, showed opposite signs of correlation and were recorded in separate sites. This pattern of results is not consistent with the simulations of an attractor neural network model implementing a comparison of option values. However, it is compatible with the notion of a neural network generating sparse representations of option values and choice confidence estimates, based on which decisions can be made.Significance statement The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is known to play a critical role in decisions based on subjective preferences, such as choosing between food items in a menu. However, the information provided by the human OFC has remained elusive, due to limitations of neuroimaging techniques. Here, taking advantage of electrodes implanted in patients for clinical purposes, we present a rare dataset of electrophysiological activity recorded during preference-based decisions. Our analyses suggest that the OFC signals two distinct constructs on which decisions could be based: the subjective values of available options and the confidence in the intended choice.

Effects of reward type and previous social experience on cognitive testing outcomes of weaned dairy calves

Animal cognitive and behavioral testing often requires a reward to motivate task acquisition, yet reward perception may depend on reward type and previous experience. We first assessed the effects of reward types on initial discrimination and reversal learning ability in weaned dairy calves, with calves tested in a T-maze containing either a food, social, or exit reward. During the initial stage, success rate was greater for calves provided the social vs. food reward, whereas success in the reversal stage was greater for calves provided the exit vs. social reward. We also assessed effects of social experience in calves previously housed individually or in pairs tested with either a social or exit reward. Interactive effects of previous housing and reward type were evident during the initial discrimination stage of testing, with previously pair housed calves relatively more successful if given the exit reward and individually housed calves relatively more successful if given the social reward. During the reversal stage, success rate was greater for calves given the exit reward, particularly if previously housed individually. These results suggest that previous social experience can affect the subjective perception of different reward types, and that the subjective valuation of an exit reward may uniquely increase with repeated testing.

Effect of Painful Stimuli on PVNCRH Neurons: Implications for States of Consciousness Under Isoflurane Anesthesia

BACKGROUND

Many patients undergoing surgery experience accompanying pain symptoms preoperatively. The impact of painful stimuli on general anesthesia remains largely unknown. Corticotrophin-releasing hormone neurons in the paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus (PVNCRH neurons) are crucial central stress hubs that respond to painful stimuli. These neurons also participate in regulating processes such as sleep and anesthesia. Natural reward can inhibit PVNCRH neurons to relieve stress-induced behavioral changes, but the effect of natural reward on the anesthesia process in patients with pain is not clear. In this study, we assessed the impact of painful stimuli on isoflurane anesthesia and its potential neural mechanism. We also investigated the potential of natural reward therapy for alleviating the impact of painful stimuli on isoflurane anesthesia.

METHODS

The righting reflex test and cortical electroencephalography (EEG) were used as measures of consciousness in complete Freund's adjuvant (CFA)-injected mice during isoflurane anesthesia. EEG and burst-suppression ratios (BSR) were used to assess the depth of anesthesia. The expression of c-Fos, fiber photometry recording, and brain slice electrophysiology were used to determine neuronal activity changes in PVNCRH neurons after CFA injection or 10% sucrose treatment. Finally, chemogenetic technology was used to specifically manipulate PVNCRH neurons.

RESULTS

Compared to the saline-injected mice, the CFA-injected mice exhibited an increased the mean[SD] induction time of isoflurane anesthesia (354[48] s vs 258[30] s, P = .0001) and a reduced BSR of isoflurane anesthesia (60.1[10.3] % vs 81.5[9.76] %, P = .002). CFA injection increased PVN c-Fos expression (3667[706] vs 1735[407], P = .0002) and enhanced the population activity of PVNCRH neurons (33.4[13.6] % vs 1.23[3.57] %, P = .0009). Chemogenetic suppression of PVNCRH neurons reversed the anesthesia abnormalities in CFA-injected mice. Natural reward accelerated the induction time of isoflurane anesthesia (252[24] s vs 324[36] s, P = .003) and increased the BSR of isoflurane anesthesia (84.8[5.36] % vs 57.7[14.3] %, P = .0005). Chemogenetic activation of PVNCRH neurons reversed the effect of natural reward on isoflurane anesthesia in CFA-injected mice.

CONCLUSIONS

Painful stimuli affect the process of isoflurane anesthesia by activating PVNCRH neurons, which implies that these neurons modulate isoflurane anesthesia. Additionally, natural reward alleviates the impact of painful stimuli on isoflurane anesthesia by inhibiting PVNCRH neurons.

Characterizing Brainstem GLP-1 Control of Sensory-Specific Satiety in Male and Female Rats Across the Estrous Cycle

BACKGROUND

Meal variety promotes overconsumption by delaying sensory-specific satiety (SSS), the transient reduction in reward value of a recently consumed food. Despite its role in meal cessation, the neuroendocrine mechanisms that underlie SSS are largely unknown.

METHODS

Here, we developed a preclinical model of SSS wherein rats consume more of a different food compared with the same food presented again, leading to greater caloric intake. Using pharmacological and molecular approaches targeting the brainstem, we investigated the involvement of the satiation signal glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) in mediating SSS in male rats (n = 96) and in female rats (n = 85) across their estrous cycle. We also evaluated the sufficiency of the hormone estradiol to modulate GLP-1 and SSS.

RESULTS

In males, brainstem GLP-1 receptors (GLP-1Rs) were necessary for the SSS-induced decrease in same food intake, while agonizing brainstem GLP-1Rs was sufficient to attenuate overconsumption of the different food. Female rats showed SSS in an estrous cycle-dependent manner and did not consume more of the different food in diestrus-to-proestrus and proestrus-to-estrus. However, blockade of brainstem GLP-1Rs restored different food overconsumption. Furthermore, the brainstem's nucleus tractus solitarius and area postrema showed increased expression of the GLP-1 precursor glucagon (Gcg), during diestrus-to-proestrus and proestrus-to-estrus and greater Glp1r expression in proestrus-to-estrus. Similarly, 17β-estradiol injections in males not only increased Glp1r and Gcg expression but also reduced SSS.

CONCLUSIONS

We identified a bidirectional role for brainstem GLP-1R signaling in modulating SSS, effects that are estrous cycle dependent. Moreover, our data indicate that estradiol regulates Glp1r and Gcg expression and likely influences SSS.

Cross-species translational paradigms for assessing positive valence system as defined by the RDoC matrix

Functions associated with processing reward-related information are fundamental drivers of motivation, learning, and goal-directed behavior. Such functions have been classified as the positive valence system under the Research Domain and Criteria (RDoC) criteria and are negatively impacted across a range of psychiatric disorders and mental illnesses. The positive valence system is composed of three comprehensive categories containing related but dissociable functions that are organized into either Reward Responsiveness, Reward Learning, or Reward Valuation. The presence of overlapping behavioral dysfunction across diagnostic mental disorders is in-part what motivated the RDoC initiative, which emphasized that the study of mental illness focus on investigating relevant behavior and cognitive functions and their underlying mechanisms, rather than separating efforts on diagnostic categories (i.e., transdiagnostic). Moreover, the RDoC approach is well-suited for preclinical neuroscience research, as the rise in genetic toolboxes and associated neurotechnologies enables researchers to probe specific cellular targets with high specificity. Thus, there is an opportunity to dissect whether behaviors and cognitive functions are supported by shared or distinct neural mechanisms. For preclinical research to effectively inform our understandings of human behavior however, the cognitive and behavioral paradigms should have predictive, neurobiological, and pharmacological predictive validity to the human test. Touchscreen-based testing systems provide a further advantage for this endeavor enabling tasks to be presented to animals using the same media and task design as in humans. Here, we outline the primary categories of the positive valence system and review the work that has been done cross-species to investigate the neurobiology and neurochemistry underlying reward-related functioning. Additionally, we provide clinical tasks outlined by RDoC, along with validity and/or need for further validation for analogous rodent paradigms with a focus on implementing the touchscreen-based cognitive testing systems.

Representational spaces in orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex: task states, values, and beyond

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventromedial-prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) play a key role in decision-making and encode task states in addition to expected value. We review evidence suggesting a connection between value and state representations and argue that OFC / vmPFC integrate stimulus, context, and outcome information. Comparable encoding principles emerge in late layers of deep reinforcement learning (RL) models, where single nodes exhibit similar forms of mixed-selectivity, which enables flexible readout of relevant variables by downstream neurons. Based on these lines of evidence, we suggest that outcome-maximization leads to complex representational spaces that are insufficiently characterized by linear value signals that have been the focus of most prior research on the topic. Major outstanding questions concern the role of OFC/ vmPFC in learning across tasks, in encoding of task-irrelevant aspects, and the role of hippocampus-PFC interactions.

A Method for Evaluating Hunger and Thirst in Monkeys by Measuring Blood Ghrelin and Osmolality Levels

Hunger and thirst drive animals' consumption behavior and regulate their decision-making concerning rewards. We previously assessed the thirst states of monkeys by measuring blood osmolality under controlled water access and examined how these thirst states influenced their risk-taking behavior in decisions involving fluid rewards. However, hunger assessment in monkeys remains poorly performed. Moreover, the lack of precise measures for hunger states leads to another issue regarding how hunger and thirst states interact with each other in each individual. Thus, when controlling food access to motivate performance, it remains unclear how these two physiological needs are satisfied in captive monkeys. Here, we measured blood ghrelin and osmolality levels to respectively assess hunger and thirst in four captive macaques. Using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, we identified that the levels of blood ghrelin, a widely measured hunger-related peptide hormone in humans, were high after 20 h of no food access (with ad libitum water). This reflects a typical controlled food access condition. One hour after consuming a regular dry meal, the blood ghrelin levels in three out of four monkeys decreased to within their baseline range. Additionally, blood osmolality measured from the same blood sample, the standard hematological index of hydration status, increased after consuming the regular dry meal with no water access. Thus, ghrelin and osmolality may reflect the physiological states of individual monkeys regarding hunger and thirst, suggesting that these indices can be used as tools for monitoring hunger and thirst levels that mediate an animal's decision to consume rewards.

Dorsal raphe neurons integrate the values of reward amount, delay, and uncertainty in multi-attribute decision-making

The dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) is implicated in psychiatric disorders that feature impaired sensitivity to reward amount, impulsivity when facing reward delays, and risk-seeking when confronting reward uncertainty. However, it has been unclear whether and how DRN neurons signal reward amount, reward delay, and reward uncertainty during multi-attribute value-based decision-making, where subjects consider these attributes to make a choice. We recorded DRN neurons as monkeys chose between offers whose attributes, namely expected reward amount, reward delay, and reward uncertainty, varied independently. Many DRN neurons signaled offer attributes, and this population tended to integrate the attributes in a manner that reflected monkeys' preferences for amount, delay, and uncertainty. After decision-making, in response to post-decision feedback, these same neurons signaled signed reward prediction errors, suggesting a broader role in tracking value across task epochs and behavioral contexts. Our data illustrate how the DRN participates in value computations, guiding theories about the role of the DRN in decision-making and psychiatric disease.

Salience signaling and stimulus scaling of ventral tegmental area glutamate neuron subtypes

Ventral tegmental area (VTA) glutamatergic neurons participate in reward, aversion, drug-seeking, and stress. Subsets of VTA VGluT2+ neurons are capable of co-transmitting glutamate and GABA (VGluT2+VGaT+ neurons), transmitting glutamate without GABA (VGluT2+VGaT- neurons), or co-transmitting glutamate and dopamine (VGluT2+TH+ neurons), but whether these molecularly distinct subpopulations show behavior-related differences is not wholly understood. We identified that neuronal activity of each VGluT2+ subpopulation is sensitive to reward value but signaled this in different ways. The phasic maximum activity of VGluT2+VGaT+ neurons increased with sucrose concentration, whereas VGluT2+VGaT- neurons increased maximum and sustained activity with sucrose concentration, and VGluT2+TH+ neurons increased sustained but not maximum activity with sucrose concentration. Additionally, VGluT2+ subpopulations signaled consummatory preferences in different ways. VGluT2+VGaT- neurons and VGluT2+TH+ neurons showed a signaling preference for a behaviorally-preferred fat reward over sucrose, but in temporally-distinct ways. In contrast, VGluT2+VGaT+ neurons uniquely signaled a less behaviorally-preferred sucrose reward compared with fat. Further experiments suggested that VGluT2+VGaT+ consummatory reward-related activity was related to sweetness, partially modulated by hunger state, and not dependent on caloric content or behavioral preference. All VGluT2+ subtypes increased neuronal activity following aversive stimuli but VGluT2+VGaT+ neurons uniquely scaled their magnitude and sustained activity with footshock intensity. Optogenetic activation of VGluT2+VGaT+ neurons during low intensity footshock enhanced fear-related behavior without inducing place preference or aversion. We interpret these data such that VTA glutamatergic subpopulations signal different elements of rewarding and aversive experiences and highlight the unique role of VTA VGluT2+VGaT+ neurons in enhancing the salience of behavioral experiences.

Electrophysiological population dynamics reveal context dependencies during decision making in human frontal cortex

Evidence from monkeys and humans suggests that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encodes the subjective value of options under consideration during choice. Data from non-human primates suggests that these value signals are context-dependent, representing subjective value in a way influenced by the decision makers' recent experience. Using electrodes distributed throughout cortical and subcortical structures, human epilepsy patients performed an auction task where they repeatedly reported the subjective values they placed on snack food items. High-gamma activity in many cortical and subcortical sites including the OFC positively correlated with subjective value. Other OFC sites showed signals contextually modulated by the subjective value of previously offered goods-a context dependency predicted by theory but not previously observed in humans. These results suggest that value and value-context signals are simultaneously present but separately represented in human frontal cortical activity.

Worth the Work? Monkeys Discount Rewards by a Subjective Adapting Effort Cost

All life must solve how to allocate limited energy resources to maximize benefits from scarce opportunities. Economic theory posits decision makers optimize choice by maximizing the subjective benefit (utility) of reward minus the subjective cost (disutility) of the required effort. While successful in many settings, this model does not fully account for how experience can alter reward-effort trade-offs. Here, we test how well the subtractive model of effort disutility explains the behavior of two male nonhuman primates (Macaca mulatta) in a binary choice task in which reward quantity and physical effort to obtain were varied. Applying random utility modeling to independently estimate reward utility and effort disutility, we show the subtractive effort model better explains out-of-sample choice behavior when compared with parabolic and exponential effort discounting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that effort disutility depends on previous experience of effort: in analogy to work from behavioral labor economics, we develop a model of reference-dependent effort disutility to explain the increased willingness to expend effort following previous experience of effortful options in a session. The result of this analysis suggests that monkeys discount reward by an effort cost that is measured relative to an expected effort learned from previous trials. When this subjective cost of effort, a function of context and experience, is accounted for, trial-by-trial choices can be explained by the subtractive cost model of effort. Therefore, in searching for net utility signals that may underpin effort-based decision-making in the brain, careful measurement of subjective effort costs is an essential first step.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT All decision-makers need to consider how much effort they need to expend when evaluating potential options. Economic theories suggest that the optimal way to choose is by cost-benefit analysis of reward against effort. To be able to do this efficiently over many decision contexts, this needs to be done flexibly, with appropriate adaptation to context and experience. Therefore, in aiming to understand how this might be achieved in the brain, it is important to first carefully measure the subjective cost of effort. Here, we show monkeys make reward-effort cost-benefit decisions, subtracting the subjective cost of effort from the subjective value of rewards. Moreover, the subjective cost of effort is dependent on the monkeys' experience of effort in previous trials.

Dorsal raphe neurons signal integrated value during multi-attribute decision-making

The dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) is implicated in psychiatric disorders that feature impaired sensitivity to reward amount, impulsivity when facing reward delays, and risk-seeking when grappling with reward uncertainty. However, whether and how DRN neurons signal reward amount, reward delay, and reward uncertainty during multi-attribute value-based decision-making, where subjects consider all these attributes to make a choice, is unclear. We recorded DRN neurons as monkeys chose between offers whose attributes, namely expected reward amount, reward delay, and reward uncertainty, varied independently. Many DRN neurons signaled offer attributes. Remarkably, these neurons commonly integrated offer attributes in a manner that reflected monkeys' overall preferences for amount, delay, and uncertainty. After decision-making, in response to post-decision feedback, these same neurons signaled signed reward prediction errors, suggesting a broader role in tracking value across task epochs and behavioral contexts. Our data illustrate how DRN participates in integrated value computations, guiding theories of DRN in decision-making and psychiatric disease.

Studying neural responses for multi-component economic choices in human and non-human primates using concept-based behavioral choice experiments

Realistic, everyday rewards contain multiple components, such as taste and size. However, our reward valuations and the associated neural reward signals are single dimensional (vector to scalar transformation). Here, we present a protocol to identify these single-dimensional neural responses for multi-component choice options in humans and monkeys using concept-based behavioral choice experiments. We describe the use of stringent economic concepts to develop and implement behavioral tasks. We detail regional neuroimaging in humans and fine-grained neurophysiology in monkeys and describe approaches for data analysis. For complete details on the use and execution of this protocol, please refer to our work on humans Seak et al.1 and Pastor-Bernier et al.2 and monkeys Pastor-Bernier et al. 3, Pastor-Bernier et al.4, and Pastor-Bernier et al.5.

Preferences reveal separable valuation systems in prefrontal-limbic circuits

Individual preferences for the flavor of different foods and fluids exert a strong influence on behavior. Most current theories posit that preferences are integrated with other state variables in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which is thought to derive the relative subjective value of available options to drive choice behavior. Here we report that instead of a single integrated valuation system in OFC, another separate one is centered in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) in macaque monkeys. Specifically, we found that OFC and vlPFC preferentially represent outcome flavor and outcome probability, respectively, and that preferences are separately integrated into these two aspects of subjective valuation. In addition, vlPFC, but not OFC, represented the outcome probability for the two options separately, with the difference between these representations reflecting the degree of preference. Thus, there are at least two separable valuation systems that work in concert to guide choices and that both are biased by preferences.

Cognitive Neuroscience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Cognitive neuroscientific research has the ability to yield important insights into the complex neurobiological processes underlying obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This article provides an updated review of neuroimaging studies in seven neurocognitive domains. Findings from the literature are discussed in the context of obsessive-compulsive phenomenology and treatment. Expanding our knowledge of the neural mechanisms involved in OCD could help optimize treatment outcomes and guide the development of novel interventions.

Worth the work? Monkeys discount rewards by a subjective adapting effort cost

All life must solve how to allocate limited energy resources to maximise benefits from scarce opportunities. Economic theory posits decision makers optimise choice by maximising the subjective benefit (utility) of reward minus the subjective cost (disutility) of the required effort. While successful in many settings, this model does not fully account for how experience can alter reward-effort trade-offs. Here we test how well the subtractive model of effort disutility explains the behavior of two non-human primates ( Macaca mulatta ) in a binary choice task in which reward quantity and physical effort to obtain were varied.Applying random utility modelling to independently estimate reward utility and effort disutility, we show the subtractive effort model better explains out-of-sample choice behavior when compared to parabolic and exponential effort discounting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that effort disutility is dependent on previous experience of effort: in analogy to work from behavioral labour economics, we develop a model of reference-dependent effort disutility to explain the increased willingness to expend effort following previous experience of effortful options in a session. The result of this analysis suggests that monkeys discount reward by an effort cost that is measured relative to an expected effort learned from previous trials. When this subjective cost of effort, a function of context and experience, is accounted for, trial-by-trial choice behavior can be explained by the subtractive cost model of effort.Therefore, in searching for net utility signals that may underpin effort-based decision-making in the brain, careful measurement of subjective effort costs is an essential first step.

Significance

All decision-makers need to consider how much effort they need to expend when evaluating potential options. Economic theories suggest that the optimal way to choose is by cost-benefit analysis of reward against effort. To be able to do this efficiently over many decision contexts, this needs to be done flexibly, with appropriate adaptation to context and experience. Therefore, in aiming to understand how this might be achieved in the brain, it is important to first carefully measure the subjective cost of effort. Here we show monkeys make reward-effort cost-benefit decisions, subtracting the subjective cost of effort from the subjective value of rewards. Moreover, the subjective cost of effort is dependent on the monkeys’ experience of effort in previous trials.

Mesolimbic dopamine release conveys causal associations

Learning to predict rewards based on environmental cues is essential for survival. It is believed that animals learn to predict rewards by updating predictions whenever the outcome deviates from expectations, and that such reward prediction errors (RPEs) are signaled by the mesolimbic dopamine system-a key controller of learning. However, instead of learning prospective predictions from RPEs, animals can infer predictions by learning the retrospective cause of rewards. Hence, whether mesolimbic dopamine instead conveys a causal associative signal that sometimes resembles RPE remains unknown. We developed an algorithm for retrospective causal learning and found that mesolimbic dopamine release conveys causal associations but not RPE, thereby challenging the dominant theory of reward learning. Our results reshape the conceptual and biological framework for associative learning.

Chemogenetic Disconnection between the Orbitofrontal Cortex and the Rostromedial Caudate Nucleus Disrupts Motivational Control of Goal-Directed Action

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and its major downstream target within the basal ganglia-the rostromedial caudate nucleus (rmCD)-are involved in reward-value processing and goal-directed behavior. However, a causal contribution of the pathway linking these two structures to goal-directed behavior has not been established. Using the chemogenetic technology of designer receptors exclusively activated by designer drugs with a crossed inactivation design, we functionally and reversibly disrupted interactions between the OFC and rmCD in two male macaque monkeys. We injected an adeno-associated virus vector expressing an inhibitory designer receptor, hM4Di, into the OFC and contralateral rmCD, the expression of which was visualized in vivo by positron emission tomography and confirmed by postmortem immunohistochemistry. Functional disconnection of the OFC and rmCD resulted in a significant and reproducible loss of sensitivity to the cued reward value for goal-directed action. This decreased sensitivity was most prominent when monkeys had accumulated a certain amount of reward. These results provide causal evidence that the interaction between the OFC and the rmCD is needed for motivational control of action on the basis of the relative reward value and internal drive. This finding extends the current understanding of the physiological basis of psychiatric disorders in which goal-directed behavior is affected, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In daily life, we routinely adjust the speed and accuracy of our actions on the basis of the value of expected reward. Abnormalities in these kinds of motivational adjustments might be related to behaviors seen in psychiatric disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder. In the current study, we show that the connection from the orbitofrontal cortex to the rostromedial caudate nucleus is essential for motivational control of action in monkeys. This finding expands our knowledge about how the primate brain controls motivation and behavior and provides a particular insight into disorders like obsessive-compulsive disorder in which altered connectivity between the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum has been implicated.

Comparing utility functions between risky and riskless choice in rhesus monkeys

Decisions can be risky or riskless, depending on the outcomes of the choice. Expected utility theory describes risky choices as a utility maximization process: we choose the option with the highest subjective value (utility), which we compute considering both the option's value and its associated risk. According to the random utility maximization framework, riskless choices could also be based on a utility measure. Neuronal mechanisms of utility-based choice may thus be common to both risky and riskless choices. This assumption would require the existence of a utility function that accounts for both risky and riskless decisions. Here, we investigated whether the choice behavior of two macaque monkeys in risky and riskless decisions could be described by a common underlying utility function. We found that the utility functions elicited in the two choice scenarios were different from each other, even after taking into account the contribution of subjective probability weighting. Our results suggest that distinct utility representations exist for risky and riskless choices, which could reflect distinct neuronal representations of the utility quantities, or distinct brain mechanisms for risky and riskless choices. The different utility functions should be taken into account in neuronal investigations of utility-based choice.