What's inside someone's head? Conceiving of the mind as a camera helps children with autism acquire an alternative to a theory of mind

Preserved Perspective Taking in Free Indirect Discourse in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Perspective taking has been proposed to be impaired in persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), especially when implicit processing is required. In narrative texts, language perception and interpretation is fundamentally guided by taking the perspective of a narrator. We studied perspective taking in the linguistic domain of so-called Free Indirect Discourse (FID), during which certain text segments have to be interpreted as the thoughts or utterances of a protagonist without explicitly being marked as thought or speech representations of that protagonist (as in direct or indirect discourse). Crucially, the correct interpretation of text segments as FID depends on the ability to detect which of the protagonists "stands out" against the others and is therefore identifiable as implicit thinker or speaker. This so-called "prominence" status of a protagonist is based on linguistic properties (e.g., grammatical function, referential expression), in other words, the perspective is "hidden" and has to be inferred from the text material. In order to test whether this implicit perspective taking ability that is required for the interpretation of FID is preserved in persons with ASD, we presented short texts with three sentences to adults with and without ASD. In the last sentence, the perspective was switched either to the more or the less prominent of two protagonists. Participants were asked to rate the texts regarding their naturalness. Both diagnostic groups rated sentences with FID anchored to the less prominent protagonist as less natural than sentences with FID anchored to the more prominent protagonist. Our results that the high-level perspective taking ability in written language that is required for the interpretation of FID is well preserved in persons with ASD supports the conclusion that language skills are highly elaborated in ASD so that even the challenging attribution of utterances to protagonists is possible if they are only implicitly given. We discuss the implications in the context of claims of impaired perspective taking in ASD as well as with regard to the underlying processing of FID.

A Systematic Replication of Teaching Children With Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities Correct Responding to False-Belief Tasks

Behavioral research has demonstrated that children with autism spectrum disorder can be taught to recognize the false beliefs of others using video modeling (e.g., Charlop-Christy & Daneshvar Journal of Positive Behavior Interventions, 5(1), 12-21, 2003; LeBlanc et al. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 36(2), 253-257, 2003). The current study extended such research by teaching three children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and other developmental disabilities to respond appropriately to false-belief tasks using behavioral intervention strategies conducted in the natural environment with people in their enviornment. We used a nonconcurrent multiple-baseline across-participants design to evaluate the use of multiple-exemplar training, prompting, and reinforcement for training correct responses with two false-belief tasks: the hide-and-seek task and the M&Ms task. We also conducted a pre/posttest of an untrained false-belief task, the Sally-Anne task. All participants learned to pass the hide-and-seek task and the M&Ms task and improved on their performance on the Sally-Anne task during the posttest.

Belief-attribution in adults with and without autistic spectrum disorders

An important aspect of daily life is the ability to infer information about the contents of other people's minds, such as what they can see and what they know, in order to engage in successful interactions. This is referred to as possession of a "Theory of Mind" (ToM). Past research has shown that adults with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) often show deficits in social communication abilities, although can successfully pass tests of explicit ToM. The current study utilized a computerized false-belief task to explore subtle differences (i.e., measuring response times and accuracy rates) in how efficiently ToM capacities-specifically, belief-attribution-are utilized in adults with and without ASD. In the task, participants were asked to attribute a belief-state to either themselves or another person, following establishment of a true or false-belief scenario. Results revealed comparable patterns of ToM engagement across individuals with and without ASD, with faster and more accurate responses to "Self" versus "Other" oriented questions, and slower response times when shifting between the "Self" and "Other" perspective compared to when maintaining a perspective. However, autistic individuals showed a particular deficit in correctly identifying a belief-state in false-belief trials, in which two contrasting belief-states had to be held in mind, suggesting more difficulty disengaging from current, reality based belief-states than neuro-typical individuals. Autism Res 2018, 11: 1542-1553. © 2018 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: To successfully communicate, we have to think about what other people do/do not know; this is called having a "Theory of Mind." This study looked at how well people use their Theory of Mind when thinking about the contents of people's minds. Results showed that people with autism had difficulties considering more than one mental state at a time, suggesting they may have more trouble in stopping themselves thinking about what is happening in reality than people without autism.

How Teaching Perspective Taking to Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders Affects Social Skills: Findings from Research and Suggestions for Practitioners

Behavior-analytic practitioners working with individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) may be approached to incorporate perspective taking into a client's programming. Teaching perspective taking to individuals with ASDs has received attention in both the developmental psychology and, more recently, the behavior-analytic literature. The results of our review of the current evidence suggest that although perspective-taking repertoires believed to be related to social skills can be taught (false belief task performance, deictic frames), only directly teaching the social skills of interest (or applied perspective-taking skills) results in improvements in socially important behavior. The aim of this article is to provide practitioners with the current state of research on how teaching perspective taking affects social skills and to provide suggestions on how these findings might be incorporated into their practice.

Strategies for Improving the Social Integration of Children with Asperger Syndrome

There is general agreement that children with Asperger syndrome have difficulties in social integration with their peers. Our current understanding of the nature of these difficulties is explained and specific strategies are described that are designed to encourage greater competence in the skills that are necessary to achieve effective social integration. While we do not have any clear scientific evidence of whether and how these strategies are successful, they provide a source of ideas for future examination by academic research and provisional remedial programmes for practitioners.

What Children with Autism Understand about Thoughts and Thought Bubbles

Children were tested on a series of tasks utilizing the pictorial convention of thought bubbles. In the first study, children with autism (mean verbal mental age 7:6 years) successfully interpreted thought bubbles as representational devices that could be used (a) to infer an unknown reality and (b) to inform them about the content of false beliefs. In the second study, children with autism (mean VMA 5:7 years) and children with non-specific learning disabilities (mean VMA 4:9 years) were tested on two false belief tasks which depicted the content of a protagonist’s belief encapsulated in a thought bubble and two that did not. In both groups, performance was improved in the ‘bubble condition’. It appears that at least some children with autism are capable of understanding thought bubbles as representational devices.

Elicitation of First-Order 'Theory of Mind in Children with Autism

Failure to pass certain kinds of false belief task is a characteristic both of preschool children and of children with autism. In the present study normally developing children, children with autism and children with learning difficulties, all of whom had failed a standard first-order false belief task, were given five replications of the standard false belief task with the inclusion of enhanced behavioural and emotional cues to the protagonist's false belief on the four repetitions. The results showed that the children with autism as well as some of the normally developing subjects benefited to a significant extent from the enhanced cues but not when the task was repeated without enhancement. The children with learning difficulties, by contrast, showed no improvement. The implications of the results for current cognitive theories of autistic dysfunction are discussed.

Counterfactual Reasoning and False Belief Understanding in Children with Autism

The Sally-Anne task used to assess children’s understanding of false belief has traditionally been conceptualized as a test of mental state understanding in that it asks the child where a protagonist thinks an object is located when the protagonist has a false belief about the object’s location. However, a recent logical analysis by Peterson and Riggs identifies a strategy for such tasks involving a specific reasoning process they term subtractive reasoning. This can be assessed by asking the child a question such as, ‘If the marble had not been moved, where would it be now?’ Studies of typically developing children have shown strong associations between false belief and subtractive reasoning tasks even when verbal mental age is controlled. In the present study we replicated these experiments using children with autism and children with severe learning difficulties. Although significant correlations between the two tasks were found for all three groups, analyses of contingencies between the two tasks and comparison of their respective difficulty for each group suggested that ability in subtractive reasoning was a necessary but not sufficient component of successful performance in the false belief tasks. Our results indicate the presence of a further factor which is required in these tasks, and which is deficient in autism, and we argue that this may consist in a specific type of generativity.

Transfer of the Picture-in-the-Head Analogy to Natural Contexts to Aid False Belief Understanding in Autism

Interventions to build false belief understanding in people with autism have successfully used a picture-in-the-head technique to illustrate that seeing directs actions. However, participants who subsequently passed some novel false belief tasks could not do so in real-life settings. The present intervention aimed to bridge this gap in understanding by using teaching methods that linked picture-in-the-head dolls to videos of actors in natural settings. The intervention comprised three levels. At level 1, participants were taught that seeing leads to knowing. At level 2, they were helped to pass false belief scenarios using picture-in-the-head dolls. At level 3, they were guided from these scenes to similar stories on video in which people acted out the false belief events. At post-test, seven out of ten subjects (mean verbal mental age 4:2 years) passed at least two out of three novel video-recorded false belief stories. However, some participants required narration in order to complete the tasks. Observation of the learning process across individuals indicated that there are subgroups of people with autism who have different areas of difficulty.

External self-representations improve self-awareness in a child with autism

We have previously suggested that the social symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) could be caused in part by a dysfunctional mirror neuron system (MNS). Since the recursive activity of a functioning MNS might enable the brain to integrate visual and motor sensations into a coherent body schema, the deficits in self-awareness often seen in ASD might be caused by the same mirror neuron dysfunction. CL is an autistic adolescent who is profoundly fascinated with his reflection, looking in mirrors at every opportunity. We demonstrate that CL's abnormal gait improves significantly when using a mirror for visual feedback. We also show that both the fascination and the happiness that CL derives from looking at a computer-generated reflection diminish when a delay is introduced between the camera input and screen output. We believe that immediate, real-time visual feedback allows CL to integrate motor sensations with external visual ones into a coherent body schema that he cannot internally generate, perhaps due to a dysfunctional MNS.

Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC): Spanish validation

We present the Spanish validation of the "Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition" instrument (MASC-SP). We recruited 22 adolescents and young adults with Asperger syndrome and 26 participants with typical development. The MASC-SP and three other social cognition instruments (Ekman Pictures of Facial Affect test, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, and Happé's Strange Stories) were administered to both groups. Individuals with Asperger syndrome had significantly lower scores in all measures of social cognition. The MASC-SP showed strong correlations with all three measures and relative independence of general cognitive functions. Internal consistency was optimal (0.86) and the test-retest was good. The MASC-SP is an ecologically valid and useful tool for assessing social cognition in the Spanish population.

Deafness, thought bubbles, and theory-of-mind development

The processes and mechanisms of theory-of-mind development were examined via a training study of false-belief conceptions in deaf children of hearing parents (N = 43). In comparison to 2 different control conditions, training based on thought-bubble instruction about beliefs was linked with improved false-belief understanding as well as progress on a broader theory-of-mind scale. By combining intervention, microgenetic, and developmental scaling methods, the findings provide informative data about the nature and mechanisms of theory-of-mind change in deaf children, as well as an initial demonstration of a useful intervention for enhancing social cognition in deaf children of hearing parents. The methods and results also point to possible avenues for the study of conceptual change more generally.

Role of sentence-final particles and prosody in irony comprehension in Cantonese-speaking children with and without Autism Spectrum Disorders

English-speaking children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are less capable of using prosodic cues such as intonation for irony comprehension. Prosodic cues, in particular intonation, in Cantonese are relatively restricted while sentence-final particles (SFPs) may be used for this pragmatic function. This study investigated the use of prosodic cues and SFPs in irony comprehension in Cantonese-speaking children with and without ASD. Thirteen children with ASD (8;3-12;9) were language-matched with 13 typically developing (TD) peers. By manipulating prosodic cues and SFPs, 16 stories with an ironic remark were constructed. Participants had to judge the speaker's belief and intention. Both groups performed similarly well in judging the speaker's belief. For the speaker's intention, the TD group relied more on SFPs. The ASD group performed significantly poorer and did not rely on either cue. SFPs may play a salient role in Cantonese irony comprehension. The differences between the two groups were discussed by considering the literature on theory of mind.

Functional brain networks and white matter underlying theory-of-mind in autism

Human beings constantly engage in attributing causal explanations to one's own and to others' actions, and theory-of-mind (ToM) is critical in making such inferences. Although children learn causal attribution early in development, children with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are known to have impairments in the development of intentional causality. This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) study investigated the neural correlates of physical and intentional causal attribution in people with ASDs. In the fMRI scanner, 15 adolescents and adults with ASDs and 15 age- and IQ-matched typically developing peers made causal judgments about comic strips presented randomly in an event-related design. All participants showed robust activation in bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) in response to intentional causality. Participants with ASDs showed lower activation in TPJ, right inferior frontal gyrus and left premotor cortex. Significantly weaker functional connectivity was also found in the ASD group between TPJ and motor areas during intentional causality. DTI data revealed significantly reduced fractional anisotropy in ASD participants in white matter underlying the temporal lobe. In addition to underscoring the role of TPJ in ToM, this study found an interaction between motor simulation and mentalizing systems in intentional causal attribution and its possible discord in autism.

Thinking in Pictures as a cognitive account of autism

We analyze the hypothesis that some individuals on the autism spectrum may use visual mental representations and processes to perform certain tasks that typically developing individuals perform verbally. We present a framework for interpreting empirical evidence related to this "Thinking in Pictures" hypothesis and then provide comprehensive reviews of data from several different cognitive tasks, including the n-back task, serial recall, dual task studies, Raven's Progressive Matrices, semantic processing, false belief tasks, visual search, spatial recall, and visual recall. We also discuss the relationships between the Thinking in Pictures hypothesis and other cognitive theories of autism including Mindblindness, Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence, and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning.

Disrupted cortical connectivity theory as an explanatory model for autism spectrum disorders

Recent findings of neurological functioning in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) point to altered brain connectivity as a key feature of its pathophysiology. The cortical underconnectivity theory of ASD (Just et al., 2004) provides an integrated framework for addressing these new findings. This theory suggests that weaker functional connections among brain areas in those with ASD hamper their ability to accomplish complex cognitive and social tasks successfully. We will discuss this theory, but will modify the term underconnectivity to 'disrupted cortical connectivity' to capture patterns of both under- and over-connectivity in the brain. In this paper, we will review the existing literature on ASD to marshal supporting evidence for hypotheses formulated on the disrupted cortical connectivity theory. These hypotheses are: 1) underconnectivity in ASD is manifested mainly in long-distance cortical as well as subcortical connections rather than in short-distance cortical connections; 2) underconnectivity in ASD is manifested only in complex cognitive and social functions and not in low-level sensory and perceptual tasks; 3) functional underconnectivity in ASD may be the result of underlying anatomical abnormalities, such as problems in the integrity of white matter; 4) the ASD brain adapts to underconnectivity through compensatory strategies such as overconnectivity mainly in frontal and in posterior brain areas. This may be manifested as deficits in tasks that require frontal-parietal integration. While overconnectivity can be tested by examining the cortical minicolumn organization, long-distance underconnectivity can be tested by cognitively demanding tasks; and 5) functional underconnectivity in brain areas in ASD will be seen not only during complex tasks but also during task-free resting states. We will also discuss some empirical predictions that can be tested in future studies, such as: 1) how disrupted connectivity relates to cognitive impairments in skills such as Theory-of-Mind, cognitive flexibility, and information processing; and 2) how connection abnormalities relate to, and may determine, behavioral symptoms hallmarked by the triad of Impairments in ASD. Furthermore, we will relate the disrupted cortical connectivity model to existing cognitive and neural models of ASD.

The Role of the Theory-of-Mind Cortical Network in the Comprehension of Narratives

Narrative comprehension rests on the ability to understand the intentions and perceptions of various agents in a story who interact with respect to some goal or problem. Reasoning about the state of mind of another person, real or fictional, has been referred to as Theory of Mind processing. While Theory of Mind Processing was first postulated prior to the existence of neuroimaging research, fMRI studies make it possible to characterize this processing in some detail. We propose that narrative comprehension makes use of some of the neural substrate of Theory of Mind reasoning, evoking what is referred to as a protagonist perspective network. The main cortical components of this protagonist-based network are the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction. The article discusses how these two cortical centers interact in narrative comprehension but still play distinguishable roles, and how the interaction between the two centers is disrupted in individuals with autism.

Atypical frontal-posterior synchronization of Theory of Mind regions in autism during mental state attribution

This study used fMRI to investigate the functioning of the Theory of Mind (ToM) cortical network in autism during the viewing of animations that in some conditions entailed the attribution of a mental state to animated geometric figures. At the cortical level, mentalizing (attribution of metal states) is underpinned by the coordination and integration of the components of the ToM network, which include the medial frontal gyrus, the anterior paracingulate, and the right temporoparietal junction. The pivotal new finding was a functional underconnectivity (a lower degree of synchronization) in autism, especially in the connections between frontal and posterior areas during the attribution of mental states. In addition, the frontal ToM regions activated less in participants with autism relative to control participants. In the autism group, an independent psychometric assessment of ToM ability and the activation in the right temporoparietal junction were reliably correlated. The results together provide new evidence for the biological basis of atypical processing of ToM in autism, implicating the underconnectivity between frontal regions and more posterior areas.

Developing social interaction and understanding in individuals with autism spectrum disorder: a groupwork intervention

BACKGROUND

Difficulties with social interaction and understanding lie at the heart of the communication disorder that characterises the autism spectrum. This study sought to improve social communication for individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) by means of a groupwork intervention focusing on social and emotional perspective-taking, conversation skills, and friendship skills. It also aimed to address some of the limitations of previous interventions, including a lack of generalisation to other settings, so as to maximise inclusion in the community.

METHOD

A group of 46 high functioning children and adolescents with ASD (38 boys, 8 girls, age range 6-16 years) were allocated to one of 6 intervention groups. Each group met over a period of 12-16 weeks for a minimum of one 1(1/2)-hour weekly session aimed at promoting key areas of social interaction and understanding, supported by home-based practice.

RESULTS

Significant gains were achieved in comparison with a normative population, and individual parent ratings showed marked and sustained changes in the key areas targeted in the group sessions.

CONCLUSION

Social communication in children and adolescents with ASD can be enhanced through the use of a groupwork intervention addressing social interaction and understanding.

Using virtual environments for teaching social understanding to 6 adolescents with autistic spectrum disorders

Six teenagers with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) experienced a Virtual Environment (VE) of a café. They also watched three sets of videos of real cafés and buses and judged where they would sit and explained why. Half of the participants received their VE experience between the first and second sets of videos, and half experienced it between the second and third. Ten naïve raters independently coded participants' judgments and reasoning. In direct relation to the timing of VE use, there were several instances of significant improvement in judgments and explanations about where to sit, both in a video of a café and a bus. The results demonstrate the potential of Virtual Reality for teaching social skills.

A training study of theory of mind and executive function in children with autistic spectrum disorders

This study investigated the relationship between theory of mind and executive functioning in children with autistic spectrum disorders through a training study. Ten children were trained on theory of mind, whilst ten were trained in executive function. Seven children were assigned to a control group, receiving no intervention. Training programmes were administered individually, lasting for 25 minutes per day for 5-10 days. Children were tested before training, after training and at a two-month follow-up. Significant improvements were seen in performance on theory of mind tasks in both trained groups, whilst the control group showed no improvement. No improvement on the executive function tasks was seen in any of the groups. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Mental state decoding abilities in clinical depression

BACKGROUND

Depression is associated with profound impairments in social functioning. Past research and theory suggests that these impairments may be related to a difficulty in the ability of depressed individuals to identify and decode others' social cues. However, the nature of this difficulty is equivocal. This investigation is the first to adopt a theory-of-mind framework to examine unipolar depressed individuals' ability to identify complex mental states from eye expressions.

METHODS

Women with unipolar clinical depression (N=52) and nondepressed controls (N=30) completed the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task" (). All participants also completed self-report measures assessing depressive and anxious symptoms.

RESULTS

Depressed women were significantly impaired in their ability to identify mental states in the Eyes task compared to nondepressed participants. This difference remained after controlling for anxiety and was stronger for the affective than the somatic symptoms of depression.

LIMITATIONS

The present study was limited by its sample size, resulting in low power for some comparisons. In addition, the study is limited by its use of a heterogeneous depressed sample, including outpatients and volunteers from the community, as well as its use of only female participants.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results demonstrate that severely depressed individuals are significantly impaired in their ability to decode others' mental states. We suggest that strategies based on improving basic theory-of-mind reasoning could be incorporated into current therapeutic interventions for depressed individuals to ameliorate their understanding and interpretation of social information.

A social adjustment enhancement intervention for high functioning autism, Asperger's syndrome, and pervasive developmental disorder NOS

This paper reports the findings of a 20-week social adjustment enhancement curriculum for boys aged 8-12. The curriculum was designed to address three areas hypothesized to be deficient in persons with HFA, AS, and PDDNOS: emotion recognition and understanding; theory of mind; and executive functions/real life type problem solving. Parents attended a semi-structured concurrent psychoeducational training meeting during children's sessions. Statistically significant improvements in facial expression recognition, and problem solving were reported for intervention group children compared to waiting list control group children. For the intervention group (the only group for whom data were available), older and less cognitively able boy's scores on a depression inventory decreased significantly more than younger children's. Mother's depression scores tended to decrease and there were significant reductions in child problem behaviors reported. Results are discussed in the context of individual differences in participant cognitive levels and profiles, symptom severity, and affect-related variables.

Thought-bubbles help children with autism acquire an alternative to a theory of mind

Children with autism have specific difficulties understanding complex mental states like thought, belief, and false belief and their effects on behaviour. Such children benefit from focused teaching, where beliefs are likened to photographs-in-the-head. Here two studies, one with seven participants and one with 10, tested a picturein-the-head strategy for dealing with thoughts and behaviour by teaching children with autism about cartoon thought-bubbles as a device for representing such mental states. This prosthetic device led children with autism to pass not only false belief tests, but also related theory of mind tests. These results confirm earlier findings of the efficacy of picture-in-the-head teaching about mental states, but go further in showing that thought-bubble training more easily extends to children's understanding of thoughts (not just behaviour) and to enhanced performance on several transfer tasks. Thought-bubbles provide a theoretically interesting as well as an especially easy and effective teaching technique.

Narrative discourse and theory of mind development

The authors examined experimentally whether exposure to social discourse about concepts related to mental states could promote changes in children's theory of mind understanding. In 2 studies, 3- to 4-year-old children were assigned to either a training or a no training control condition. All children were administered several theory of mind measures at pretest and 2 posttests. Training was not effective in improving performance in Study 1 (n = 37); but in Study 2 (n = 54), modifications of the training procedure led to significant improvements on measures of false belief and deception from pretest to 1st posttest. The findings support the influence of social discourse on children's theory of mind development.

The potential of virtual reality in social skills training for people with autistic spectrum disorders

BACKGROUND

People with autism experience profound and pervasive difficulties in the social domain. Attempts to teach social behaviours tend to adopt either a behavioural or a 'theory of mind' (ToM) approach. The beneficial aspects and limitations of both paradigms are summarized before an examination of how virtual reality technology may offer a way to combine the strengths from both approaches.

METHODS

This is not an exhaustive review of the literature; rather, the papers are chosen as representative of the current understanding within each broad topic. Web of Science ISI, EMBASE and PsycInfo were searched for relevant articles.

RESULTS

Behavioural and ToM approaches to social skills training achieve some success in improving specific skills or understanding. However, the failure to generalize learned behaviours to novel environments, and the unwieldy nature of some behavioural methodologies, means that there is a need for a training package that is easy to administer and successful in promoting learning across contexts.

CONCLUSIONS

Virtual reality technology may be an ideal tool for allowing participants to practise behaviours in role-play situations, whilst also providing a safe environment for rule learning and repetition of tasks. Role-play within virtual environments could promote the mental simulation of social events, potentially allowing a greater insight into minds. Practice of behaviours, both within and across contexts, could also encourage a more flexible approach to social problem solving. Virtual environments offer a new and exciting perspective on social skills training for people with autistic spectrum disorders.

The Existential Theory of Mind

The primary causal explanatory model for interpreting behavior, theory of mind, may have expanded into corridors of human cognition that have little to do with the context in which it evolved, questioning the suitability of domain-specific accounts of mind reading. Namely, philosophical–religious reasoning is a uniquely derived explanatory system anchored in intentionality that does not clearly involve behavior. The presence of an existential theory of mind (EToM) suggests that individuals perceive some nondescript or culturally elaborated (e.g., God) psychological agency as having encoded communicative intentions in the form of life events, similar to a person encoding communicative intentions in deictic gestures. The emergence of EToM is discussed from ontogenetic and phylogenetic perspectives; autism is examined to determine whether alternate core explanatory models (e.g., folk physics) are used by those with deficits in theory of mind to derive existential meaning.

Photographic cues do not always facilitate performance on false belief tasks in children with autism

Previous studies have indicated that a pictorial representation of a prior belief can help 3-year-old children (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991) as well as children with autism (Charman & Lynggaard, 1998) to pass false belief tasks that used the deceptive box or "Smarties" paradigm. The studies reported here attempted to replicate these findings using the unexpected transfer or "Sally-Anne" paradigm, which requires children to predict the actions of a protagonist on the basis of a false belief. Results showed no facilitative effect on "Sally-Anne" task performance for the children with autism or for comparison children of either representational or nonrepresentational cues. This effect was found even in children who benefited from the intervention with the deceptive box paradigm. The findings raise issues regarding the way false belief tasks are conceptualized by experimenters and the demands different false belief paradigms make on children.

Does a photographic cue facilitate false belief performance in subjects with autism?

The posting manipulation, which Mitchell and Lacohée (1991) successfully employed to facilitate false belief (FB) task performance in normally developing 3-year-olds, was employed with subjects with autism. There was no autism-specific impairment on the standard FB task, compared to mental handicap and normal controls: All groups performed poorly, with the autism and normal groups performing significantly worse than chance and the mental handicap group performing at chance. However, a facilitative effect was found on the posting FB task for all subject groups. On the posting task the mental handicap and normal controls groups performed significantly better than chance and the autism group performed at chance. The facilitative effect reached significance for the autism and normal groups. The lack of an autism-specific deficit on the standard task is discussed in relation to the somewhat variable findings of past studies of FB performance in autism. The facilitative effect of the posting manipulation may tell us something about the task demands required to pass a false belief task itself, and suggestions are made for future research to clarify how the facilitative effect operates.

Can children with autism be taught to understand false belief using computers?

A specially designed computer version of the Sally-Anne false task belief task was used to teach understanding of false belief to three groups: children with autism, children with Down's Syndrome and young normal children. In an initial assessment children were selected for teaching only if they failed four false belief tasks: the dolls version of the Sally-Anne task (close transfer task) and three other false belief tasks involving different scenarios (distant transfer tasks). Following teaching, all three groups were able to pass the Sally-Anne task, but the children with autism alone were unable to pass the distant transfer tasks. The possibility that the children with autism had developed an alternative strategy in order to pass the instruction task is discussed.