Molecular epidemiology and pathogenicity of H5N1 and H9N2 avian influenza viruses in clinically affected chickens on farms in Bangladesh

Modelling the transmission dynamics of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in a live bird market

H9N2 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are a major concern for the poultry sector and human health in countries where this subtype is endemic. By fitting a model simulating H9N2 AIV transmission to data from a field experiment, we characterise the epidemiology of the virus in a live bird market in Bangladesh. Many supplied birds arrive already exposed to H9N2 AIVs, resulting in many broiler chickens entering the market as infected, and many indigenous backyard chickens entering with pre-existing immunity. Most susceptible chickens become infected within one day spent at the market, owing to high levels of viral transmission within market and short latent periods, as brief as 5.3 hours. Although H9N2 AIV transmission can be substantially reduced under moderate levels of cleaning and disinfection, effective risk mitigation also requires a range of additional interventions targeting markets and other nodes along the poultry production and distribution network.

Construction and Immunogenicity Evaluation of Recombinant Bacillus subtilis Expressing HA1 Protein of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus

The H9N2 subtype of the avian influenza virus (AIV) is one of the main subtypes of low pathogenic AIV, and it seriously affects the poultry breeding industry. Currently, vaccination is still one of China's main strategies for controlling H9N2 avian influenza. In this study, we selected MW548848.1 on the current popular main branch h9.4.2.5 as the reference strain, and we optimized the amino acid sequence of HA1 to make it suitable for expression in Bacillus subtilis. The B. subtilis expression vector showed good safety and stress resistance; therefore, this study constructed a recombinant B. subtilis expressing H9N2 HA1 protein and evaluated its immunogenicity in mice. The following results were obtained: the sIgA level of HA1 protein in small intestine fluid and the IgG level of PHT43-HA1/B. subtilis in serum were significantly improved (P < 0.01); PHT43-HA1/B. subtilis can cause a special immune response in mice; and cytokine detection interferon-gamma (IFN-γ) (P < 0.05) and Interleukin 2 (IL-2) (P < 0.01) expressions significantly increased. Additionally, the study found that PHT43-HA1/B. subtilis can alleviate the attack of H9N2 AIV in the spleen, lungs, and small intestine of mice. This study was the first to use an oral recombinant B. subtilis-HA1 vaccine candidate, and it provides theoretical data and technical reference for the creation of a new live vector vaccine against H9N2 AIV.

Annual trading patterns and risk factors of avian influenza A/H5 and A/H9 virus circulation in turkey birds (Meleagris gallopavo) at live bird markets in Dhaka city, Bangladesh

The impacts of the avian influenza virus (AIV) on farmed poultry and wild birds affect human health, livelihoods, food security, and international trade. The movement patterns of turkey birds from farms to live bird markets (LBMs) and infection of AIV are poorly understood in Bangladesh. Thus, we conducted weekly longitudinal surveillance in LBMs to understand the trading patterns, temporal trends, and risk factors of AIV circulation in turkey birds. We sampled a total of 423 turkeys from two LBMs in Dhaka between May 2018 and September 2019. We tested the swab samples for the AIV matrix gene (M-gene) followed by H5, H7, and H9 subtypes using real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR). We used exploratory analysis to investigate trading patterns, annual cyclic trends of AIV and its subtypes, and a generalized estimating equation (GEE) logistic model to determine the factors that influence the infection of H5 and H9 in turkeys. Furthermore, we conducted an observational study and informal interviews with traders and vendors to record turkey trading patterns, demand, and supply and turkey handling practices in LBM. We found that all trade routes of turkey birds to northern Dhaka are unidirectional and originate from the northwestern and southern regions of Bangladesh. The number of trades from the source district to Dhaka depends on the turkey density. The median distance that turkey was traded from its source district to Dhaka was 188 km (Q1 = 165, Q3 = 210, IQR = 45.5). We observed seasonal variation in the median and average distance of turkey. The qualitative findings revealed that turkey farming initially became reasonably profitable in 2018 and at the beginning of 2019. However, the fall in demand and production in the middle of 2019 may be related to unstable market pricing, high feed costs, a shortfall of adequate marketing facilities, poor consumer knowledge, and a lack of advertising. The overall prevalence of AIV, H5, and H9 subtypes in turkeys was 31% (95% CI: 26.6-35.4), 16.3% (95% CI: 12.8-19.8), and 10.2% (95% CI: 7.3-13.1) respectively. None of the samples were positive for H7. The circulation of AIV and H9 across the annual cycle showed no seasonality, whereas the circulation of H5 showed significant seasonality. The GEE revealed that detection of AIV increases in retail vendor business (OR: 1.71; 95% CI: 1.12-2.62) and the bird's health status is sick (OR: 10.77; 95% CI: 4.31-26.94) or dead (OR: 11.33; 95% CI: 4.30-29.89). We also observed that winter season (OR: 5.83; 95% CI: 2.80-12.14) than summer season, dead birds (OR: 61.71; 95% CI: 25.78-147.75) and sick birds (OR 8.33; 95% CI: 3.36-20.64) compared to healthy birds has a higher risk of H5 infection in turkeys. This study revealed that the turkeys movements vary by time and season from the farm to the LBM. This surveillance indicated year-round circulation of AIV with H5 and H9 subtypes in turkey birds in LBMs. The seasonality and health condition of birds influence H5 infection in birds. The trading pattern of turkey may play a role in the transmission of AIV viruses in the birds. The selling of sick turkeys infected with H5 and H9 highlights the possibility of virus transmission to other species of birds sold at LBMs and to people.

H9N2 avian influenza virus dispersal along Bangladeshi poultry trading networks

Avian influenza virus subtype H9N2 is endemic in Bangladesh's poultry population. The subtype affects poultry production and poses a potential zoonotic risk. Insufficient understanding of how the poultry trading network shapes the dissemination of avian influenza viruses has hindered the design of targeted interventions to reduce their spread. Here, we use phylodynamic analyses of haemagglutinin sequences to investigate the spatial spread and dispersal patterns of H9N2 viruses in Bangladesh's poultry population, focusing on its two largest cities (Dhaka and Chattogram) and their poultry production and distribution networks. Our analyses suggest that H9N2 subtype avian influenza virus lineage movement occurs relatively less frequently between Bangladesh's two largest cities than within each city. H9N2 viruses detected in single markets are often more closely related to viruses from other markets in the same city than to each other, consistent with close epidemiological connectivity between markets. Our analyses also suggest that H9N2 viruses may spread more frequently between chickens of the three most commonly sold types (sunali-a cross-bred of Fayoumi hen and Rhode Island Red cock, deshi-local indigenous, and exotic broiler) in Dhaka than in Chattogram. Overall, this study improves our understanding of how Bangladesh's poultry trading system impacts avian influenza virus spread and should contribute to the design of tailored surveillance that accommodates local heterogeneity in virus dispersal patterns.

Semi-Scavenging Poultry as Carriers of Avian Influenza Genes

Ducks are the natural reservoir of influenza A virus and the central host for the avian influenza virus (AIV) subtype H5N1, which is highly pathogenic. Semi-scavenging domestic ducks allow for the reemergence of new influenza subtypes which could be transmitted to humans. We collected 844 cloacal swabs from semi-scavenging ducks inhabiting seven migratory bird sanctuaries of Bangladesh for the molecular detection of avian influenza genes. We detected the matrix gene (M gene) using real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR). Subtyping of the AIV-positive samples was performed by RT-qPCR specific for H5, H7, and H9 genes. Out of 844 samples, 21 (2.488%) were positive for AIV. Subtyping of AIV positive samples (n = 21) revealed that nine samples (42.85%) were positive for the H9 subtype, five (23.80%) were positive for H5, and seven (33.33%) were negative for the three genes (H5, H7, and H9). We detected the same genes after propagating the virus in embryonated chicken eggs from positive samples. Semi-scavenging ducks could act as carriers of pathogenic AIV, including the less pathogenic H9 subtype. This can enhance the pathogenicity of the virus in ducks by reassortment. The large dataset presented in our study from seven areas should trigger further studies on AIV prevalence and ecology.

Farm-Level Risk Factors Associated With Avian Influenza A (H5) and A (H9) Flock-Level Seroprevalence on Commercial Broiler and Layer Chicken Farms in Bangladesh

A cross-sectional study was conducted to identify farm-level risk factors associated with avian influenza A H5 and H9 virus exposure on commercial chicken farms in Bangladesh. For broiler farms, both H5 and H9 seropositivity were associated with visits by workers from other commercial chicken farms [odds ratio (OR) for H5 = 15.1, 95% confidence interval (CI): 2.8-80.8; OR for H9 = 50.1, 95% CI: 4.5-552.7], H5 seropositivity was associated with access of backyard ducks (OR = 21.5, 95% CI: 2.3-201.1), and H9 seropositivity with a number of farm employees (OR = 9.4, 95% CI: 1.1-80.6). On layer farms, both H5 and H9 seropositivity were associated with presence of stray dogs (OR for H5 = 3.1, 95% CI: 1.1-9.1; OR for H9 = 4.0, 95% CI: 1.1-15.3), H5 seropositivity with hatcheries supplying chicks (OR = 0.0, 95% CI: 0.0-0.3), vehicles entering farms (OR = 5.8, 95% CI: 1.5-22.4), number of farm employees (OR = 5.8, 95% CI: 1.2-28.2), and burying of dead birds near farms (OR = 4.6, 95% CI: 1.2-17.3); H9 seropositivity with traders supplying feed (OR = 5.9, 95% CI: 1.0-33.9), visits conducted of other commercial poultry farms (OR = 4.7, 95% CI: 1.1-20.6), number of spent layers sold (OR = 24.0, 95% CI: 3.7-155.0), and frequency of replacing chicken droppings (OR = 28.3, 95% CI: 2.8-284.2). Policies addressing these risk factors will increase the effectiveness of prevention and control strategies reducing the risk of avian influenza on commercial chicken farms.

Avian influenza overview September - December 2021

Between 16 September and 8 December 2021, 867 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 27 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (316), in wild (523) and in captive birds (28). The detections in poultry were mainly reported by Italy (167) followed by Hungary and Poland (35 each). Tha majority of the detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (280), Netherlands (65) and United Kingdom (53). The observed persistence and continuous circulation of HPAI viruses in migratory and resident wild birds will continue to pose a risk for the poultry industry in Europe for the coming months. The frequent occurrence of HPAI A(H5) incursions in commercial farms (including poultry production types considered at low avian influenza risk) raises concern about the capacity of the applied biosecurity measures to prevent virus introduction. Short-term preparedness and medium- and long-term prevention strategies, including revising and reinforcing biosecurity measures, reduction of the density of commercial poultry farms and possible appropriate vaccination strategies, should be implemented. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses characterised during this reporting period belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. Some of the characterized HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in Sweden, Germany, Poland and United Kingdom are related to the viruses which have been circulating in Europe since October 2020; in North, Central, South and East Europe novel reassortant A(H5N1) virus has been introduced starting from October 2021. HPAI A(H5N1) was also detected in wild mammal species in Sweden, Estonia and Finland; some of these strains characterised so far present an adaptive marker that is associated with increased virulence and replication in mammals. Since the last report, 13 human infections due to HPAI A(H5N6) and two human cases due to LPAI A(H9N2) virus have been reported from China. Some of these A(H5N6) cases were caused by a reassortant virus of clade 2.3.4.4b, which possessed an HA gene closely related to the A(H5) viruses circulating in Europe. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as low, and for occupationally exposed people, low to medium, with large uncertainty due to the high diversity of circulating viruses in the bird populations.