Knowing no fear

Dissociable contributions of the amygdala and ventral hippocampus to stress-induced changes in defensive behavior

BACKGROUND

Severe stress can produce multiple persistent changes in defensive behavior relevant to psychiatric illness. While much is known about the circuits supporting stress-induced associative fear, how stress-induced circuit plasticity supports non-associative changes in defensive behavior remains unclear.

METHODS

Mice were exposed to an acute severe stressor, and subsequently, both associative and non-associative defensive behavioral responses were assessed. A mixture of local protein synthesis inhibition, pan-neuronal chemogenetic inhibition, and projection-specific chemogenetic inhibition were utilized to isolate the roles of the basolateral amygdala (BLA) and ventral hippocampus (vHC) to the induction and expression of associative and non-associative defensive behavioral changes.

RESULTS

Stress-induced protein synthesis in the BLA was necessary for enhancements in stress sensitivity but not enhancements in anxiety-related behaviors, whereas protein synthesis in the vHC was necessary for enhancements in anxiety-related behavior but not enhancements in stress sensitivity. Like protein synthesis, neuronal activity of the BLA and vHC were found to differentially support the expression of these same defensive behaviors. Additionally, projection-specific inhibition of BLA-vHC connections failed to alter these behaviors, indicating that these defensive behaviors are regulated by distinct BLA and vHC circuits. Lastly, contributions of the BLA and vHC to stress sensitivity and anxiety-related behavior were independent of their contributions to associative fear.

CONCLUSIONS

Stress-induced plasticity in the BLA and vHC were found to support dissociable non-associative behavioral changes, with BLA supporting enhancements in stress sensitivity and vHC supporting increased anxiety-related behavior. These findings demonstrate that independent BLA and vHC circuits are critical for stress-induced defensive behaviors, and that differential targeting of BLA and vHC circuits may be needed in disease treatment.

Topographic representation of visually evoked emotional experiences in the human cerebral cortex

Affective neuroscience seeks to uncover the neural underpinnings of emotions that humans experience. However, it remains unclear whether an affective space underlies the discrete emotion categories in the human brain, and how it relates to the hypothesized affective dimensions. To address this question, we developed a voxel-wise encoding model to investigate the cortical organization of human emotions. Results revealed that the distributed emotion representations are constructed through a fundamental affective space. We further compared each dimension of this space to 14 hypothesized affective dimensions, and found that many affective dimensions are captured by the fundamental affective space. Our results suggest that emotional experiences are represented by broadly spatial overlapping cortical patterns and form smooth gradients across large areas of the cortex. This finding reveals the specific structure of the affective space and its relationship to hypothesized affective dimensions, while highlighting the distributed nature of emotional representations in the cortex.

Recognizing emotions in bodies: Vagus nerve stimulation enhances recognition of anger while impairing sadness

According to the Polyvagal theory, the vagus nerve is the key phylogenetic substrate that supports efficient emotion recognition for promoting safety and survival. Previous studies showed that the vagus nerve affects people's ability to recognize emotions based on eye regions and whole facial images, but not static bodies. The purpose of this study was to verify whether the previously suggested causal link between vagal activity and emotion recognition can be generalized to situations in which emotions must be inferred from images of whole moving bodies. We employed transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation (tVNS), a noninvasive brain stimulation technique that stimulates the vagus nerve by a mild electrical stimulation to the auricular branch of the vagus, located in the anterior protuberance of the outer ear. In two sessions, participants received active or sham tVNS before and while performing three emotion recognition tasks, aimed at indexing their ability to recognize emotions from static or moving bodily expressions by actors. Active tVNS, compared to sham stimulation, enhanced the recognition of anger but reduced the ability to recognize sadness, regardless of the type of stimulus (static vs. moving). Convergent with the idea of hierarchical involvement of the vagus in establishing safety, as put forward by the Polyvagal theory, we argue that our findings may be explained by vagus-evoked differential adjustment strategies to emotional expressions. Taken together, our findings fit with an evolutionary perspective on the vagus nerve and its involvement in emotion recognition for the benefit of survival.

Case of Asperger's Syndrome and Lesion of the Right Amygdala: Deficits in Implicit and Explicit Fearful Face Recognition

Introduction: Studies of brain-damaged patients revealed that amygdala lesions cause deficits in the processing and recognition of emotional faces. Patients with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have similar deficits also related to dysfunctions of the limbic system including the amygdala.

Methods: We investigated a male patient who had been diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome. He also presented with a lesion of the right mesial temporal cortex, including the amygdala. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate neuronal processing during a passive viewing task of implicit and explicit emotional faces. Clinical assessment included a facial emotion recognition task.

Results: There was no amygdala activation on both sides during the presentation of masked emotional faces compared to the no-face control condition. Presentation of unmasked happy and angry faces activated the left amygdala compared to the no-face control condition. There was no amygdala activation in response to unmasked fearful faces on both sides. In the facial emotion recognition task, the patient biased positive and neutral expressions as negative.

Conclusions: This case report describes a male patient with right amygdala damage and an ASD. He displayed a non-response of the amygdala to fearful faces and tended to misinterpret fearful expressions. Moreover, a non-reactivity of both amygdalae to emotional facial expressions at an implicit processing level was revealed. It is discussed whether the deficient implicit processing of facial emotional information and abnormalities in fear processing could contribute and aggravate the patient's impairments in social behavior and interaction.

Bilateral amygdala damage linked to impaired ability to predict others' fear but preserved moral judgements about causing others fear

The amygdala is a subcortical structure implicated in both the expression of conditioned fear and social fear recognition. Social fear recognition deficits following amygdala lesions are often interpreted as reflecting perceptual deficits, or the amygdala's role in coordinating responses to threats. But these explanations fail to capture why amygdala lesions impair both physiological and behavioural responses to multimodal fear cues and the ability to identify them. We hypothesized that social fear recognition deficits following amygdala damage reflect impaired conceptual understanding of fear. Supporting this prediction, we found specific impairments in the ability to predict others' fear (but not other emotions) from written scenarios following bilateral amygdala lesions. This finding is consistent with the suggestion that social fear recognition, much like social recognition of states like pain, relies on shared internal representations. Preserved judgements about the permissibility of causing others fear confirms suggestions that social emotion recognition and morality are dissociable.

Impaired Recognition of Facial Emotion in Patients With Parkinson Disease Under Dopamine Therapy

INTRODUCTION

Parkinson disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by motor and nonmotor symptoms. The impaired ability to recognize facial emotion expressions represents an important nonmotor symptom. The aim of this study is to investigate the ability in recognizing facial emotion expressions in patients with PD under dopamine replacement therapy.

METHODS

Thirty medicated patients with PD and 15 healthy controls (HC) were enrolled. All participants performed the Ekman 60-Faces test for emotional recognition. All patients underwent a neuropsychological evaluation for global cognitive functioning, depression, and anxiety.

RESULTS

Patients with PD were impaired in recognizing emotions. Significant differences between PD and HC were found in Ekman 60-Faces test scores (P < .001), and in Ekman 60-Faces test subscales, in particular, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, and surprise (P < .001).

CONCLUSIONS

The nigrostriatal dopaminergic depletion seems to determine emotional information processing dysfunction. This relevant nonmotor symptom could have consequences in daily living reducing interactions and social behavioral competence.

Impaired Recognition of Emotional Faces after Stroke Involving Right Amygdala or Insula

Despite its basic and translational importance, the neural circuitry supporting the perception of emotional faces remains incompletely understood. Functional imaging studies and chronic lesion studies indicate distinct roles of the amygdala and insula in recognition of fear and disgust in facial expressions, whereas intracranial encephalography studies, which are not encumbered by variations in human anatomy, indicate a somewhat different role of these structures. In this article, we leveraged lesion-mapping techniques in individuals with acute right hemisphere stroke to investigate lesions associated with impaired recognition of prototypic emotional faces before significant neural reorganization can occur during recovery from stroke. Right hemisphere stroke patients were significantly less accurate than controls on a test of emotional facial recognition for both positive and negative emotions. Patients with right amygdala or anterior insula lesions had significantly lower scores than other right hemisphere stroke patients on recognition of angry and happy faces. Lesion volume within several regions, including the right amygdala and anterior insula, each independently contributed to the error rate in recognition of individual emotions. Results provide additional support for a necessary role of the right amygdala and anterior insula within a network of regions underlying recognition of facial expressions, particularly those that have biological importance or motivational relevance and have implications for clinical practice.

Faces, people and the brain: The 45th Sir Frederic Bartlett Lecture

The fact that the face is a source of diverse social signals allows us to use face and person perception as a model system for asking important psychological questions about how our brains are organised. A key issue concerns whether we rely primarily on some form of generic representation of the common physical source of these social signals (the face) to interpret them, or instead create multiple representations by assigning different aspects of the task to different specialist components. Variants of the specialist components hypothesis have formed the dominant theoretical perspective on face perception for more than three decades, but despite this dominance of formally and informally expressed theories, the underlying principles and extent of any division of labour remain uncertain. Here, I discuss three important sources of constraint: first, the evolved structure of the brain; second, the need to optimise responses to different everyday tasks; and third, the statistical structure of faces in the perceiver’s environment. I show how these constraints interact to determine the underlying functional organisation of face and person perception.

A return to the psychiatric dark ages with a two-system framework for fear

The past several decades has seen considerable progress in our understanding of the neurobiology of fear and anxiety. These advancements were spurred on by envisioning fear as emerging from the coordinated activation of brain and behavioral systems that evolved for the purpose of defense from environmental dangers. Recently, Joseph LeDoux, a previous proponent of this view, published a series of papers in which he challenges the value of this approach. As an alternative, he and colleagues propose that a 'two-system' framework for the study of responses to threat will expedite the advancement of medical treatments for fear disorders. This view suggests one system for autonomic and behavioral responses and a second for the subjective feeling of fear. They argue that these two systems operate orthogonally and thus inferences concerning the emotion of fear cannot be gleaned from physiological and behavioral measures; confounding these systems has impeded the mechanistic understanding and treatment of fear disorders. Counter to the claim that this view will advance scientific progress, it carries the frightening implication that we ought to reduce the study of fear to subjective report. Here, we outline why we believe that fear is best considered an integrated autonomic, behavioral, and cognitive-emotional response to danger emerging from a central fear generator whose evolutionarily conserved function is that of defense. Furthermore, we argue that although components of the fear response can be independently modulated and studied, common upstream brain regions dictate their genesis, and therefore inferences about a central fear state can be garnered from measures of each.

Amygdala-midbrain connectivity indicates a role for the mammalian parental care system in human altruism

Costly altruism benefitting a stranger is a rare but evolutionarily conserved phenomenon. This behaviour may be supported by limbic and midbrain circuitry that supports mammalian caregiving. In rodents, reciprocal connections between the amygdala and the midbrain periaqueductal grey (PAG) are critical for generating protective responses toward vulnerable and distressed offspring. We used functional and structural magnetic resonance imaging to explore whether these regions play a role in supporting costly altruism in humans. We recruited a rare population of altruists, all of whom had donated a kidney to a stranger, and measured activity and functional connectivity of the amygdala and PAG as altruists and matched controls responded to care-eliciting scenarios. When these scenarios were coupled with pre-attentive distress cues, altruists' sympathy corresponded to greater activity in the left amygdala and PAG, and functional connectivity analyses revealed increased coupling between these regions in altruists during this epoch. We also found that altruists exhibited greater fractional anisotropy within the left amygdala-PAG white matter tract. These results, coupled with previous evidence of altruists' increased amygdala-linked sensitivity to distress, are consistent with costly altruism resulting from enhanced care-oriented responses to vulnerability and distress that are supported by recruitment of circuitry that supports mammalian parental care.

Neurocircuitry of impaired affective sound processing: A clinical disorders perspective

Decoding affective meaning from sensory information is central to accurate and adaptive behavior in many natural and social contexts. Human vocalizations (speech and non-speech), environmental sounds (e.g. thunder, noise, or animal sounds) and human-produced sounds (e.g. technical sounds or music) can carry a wealth of important aversive, threatening, appealing, or pleasurable affective information that sometimes implicitly influences and guides our behavior. A deficit in processing such affective information is detrimental to adaptive environmental behavior, psychological well-being, and social interactive abilities. These deficits can originate from a diversity of psychiatric and neurological disorders, and are associated with neural dysfunctions across largely distributed brain networks. Recent neuroimaging studies in psychiatric and neurological patients outline the cortical and subcortical neurocircuitry of the complimentary and differential functional roles for affective sound processing. This points to and confirms a recently proposed distributed network rather than a single brain region underlying affective sound processing, and highlights the notion of a multi-functional process that can be differentially impaired in clinical disorders.

Basic Emotions in Human Neuroscience: Neuroimaging and Beyond

The existence of so-called ‘basic emotions’ and their defining attributes represents a long lasting and yet unsettled issue in psychology. Recently, neuroimaging evidence, especially related to the advent of neuroimaging meta-analytic methods, has revitalized this debate in the endeavor of systems and human neuroscience. The core theme focuses on the existence of unique neural bases that are specific and characteristic for each instance of basic emotion. Here we review this evidence, outlining contradictory findings, strengths and limits of different approaches. Constructionism dismisses the existence of dedicated neural structures for basic emotions, considering that the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between neural structures and their functions is central to basic emotion theories. While these critiques are useful to pinpoint current limitations of basic emotions theories, we argue that they do not always appear equally generative in fostering new testable accounts on how the brain relates to affective functions. We then consider evidence beyond PET and fMRI, including results concerning the relation between basic emotions and awareness and data from neuropsychology on patients with focal brain damage. Evidence from lesion studies are indeed particularly informative, as they are able to bring correlational evidence typical of neuroimaging studies to causation, thereby characterizing which brain structures are necessary for, rather than simply related to, basic emotion processing. These other studies shed light on attributes often ascribed to basic emotions, such as automaticity of perception, quick onset, and brief duration. Overall, we consider that evidence in favor of the neurobiological underpinnings of basic emotions outweighs dismissive approaches. In fact, the concept of basic emotions can still be fruitful, if updated to current neurobiological knowledge that overcomes traditional one-to-one localization of functions in the brain. In particular, we propose that the structure-function relationship between brain and emotions is better described in terms of pluripotentiality, which refers to the fact that one neural structure can fulfill multiple functions, depending on the functional network and pattern of co-activations displayed at any given moment.

A comparative neurological approach to emotional expressions in primate vocalizations

Different approaches from different research domains have crystallized debate over primate emotional processing and vocalizations in recent decades. On one side, researchers disagree about whether emotional states or processes in animals truly compare to those in humans. On the other, a long-held assumption is that primate vocalizations are innate communicative signals over which nonhuman primates have limited control and a mirror of the emotional state of the individuals producing them, despite growing evidence of intentional production for some vocalizations. Our goal is to connect both sides of the discussion in deciphering how the emotional content of primate calls compares with emotional vocal signals in humans. We focus particularly on neural bases of primate emotions and vocalizations to identify cerebral structures underlying emotion, vocal production, and comprehension in primates, and discuss whether particular structures or neuronal networks solely evolved for specific functions in the human brain. Finally, we propose a model to classify emotional vocalizations in primates according to four dimensions (learning, control, emotional, meaning) to allow comparing calls across species.

The Language, Tone and Prosody of Emotions: Neural Substrates and Dynamics of Spoken-Word Emotion Perception

Rapid assessment of emotions is important for detecting and prioritizing salient input. Emotions are conveyed in spoken words via verbal and non-verbal channels that are mutually informative and unveil in parallel over time, but the neural dynamics and interactions of these processes are not well understood. In this paper, we review the literature on emotion perception in faces, written words, and voices, as a basis for understanding the functional organization of emotion perception in spoken words. The characteristics of visual and auditory routes to the amygdala—a subcortical center for emotion perception—are compared across these stimulus classes in terms of neural dynamics, hemispheric lateralization, and functionality. Converging results from neuroimaging, electrophysiological, and lesion studies suggest the existence of an afferent route to the amygdala and primary visual cortex for fast and subliminal processing of coarse emotional face cues. We suggest that a fast route to the amygdala may also function for brief non-verbal vocalizations (e.g., laugh, cry), in which emotional category is conveyed effectively by voice tone and intensity. However, emotional prosody which evolves on longer time scales and is conveyed by fine-grained spectral cues appears to be processed via a slower, indirect cortical route. For verbal emotional content, the bulk of current evidence, indicating predominant left lateralization of the amygdala response and timing of emotional effects attributable to speeded lexical access, is more consistent with an indirect cortical route to the amygdala. Top-down linguistic modulation may play an important role for prioritized perception of emotions in words. Understanding the neural dynamics and interactions of emotion and language perception is important for selecting potent stimuli and devising effective training and/or treatment approaches for the alleviation of emotional dysfunction across a range of neuropsychiatric states.

Emotion Perception from Dynamic and Static Body Expressions in Point-Light and Full-Light Displays

Research on emotion recognition has been dominated by studies of photographs of facial expressions. A full understanding of emotion perception and its neural substrate will require investigations that employ dynamic displays and means of expression other than the face. Our aims were: (i) to develop a set of dynamic and static whole-body expressions of basic emotions for systematic investigations of clinical populations, and for use in functional-imaging studies; (ii) to assess forced-choice emotion-classification performance with these stimuli relative to the results of previous studies; and (iii) to test the hypotheses that more exaggerated whole-body movements would produce (a) more accurate emotion classification and (b) higher ratings of emotional intensity. Ten actors portrayed 5 emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness) at 3 levels of exaggeration, with their faces covered. Two identical sets of 150 emotion portrayals (full-light and point-light) were created from the same digital footage, along with corresponding static images of the ‘peak’ of each emotion portrayal. Recognition tasks confirmed previous findings that basic emotions are readily identifiable from body movements, even when static form information is minimised by use of point-light displays, and that full-light and even point-light displays can convey identifiable emotions, though rather less efficiently than dynamic displays. Recognition success differed for individual emotions, corroborating earlier results about the importance of distinguishing differences in movement characteristics for different emotional expressions. The patterns of misclassifications were in keeping with earlier findings on emotional clustering. Exaggeration of body movement (a) enhanced recognition accuracy, especially for the dynamic point-light displays, but notably not for sadness, and (b) produced higher emotional-intensity ratings, regardless of lighting condition, for movies but to a lesser extent for stills, indicating that intensity judgments of body gestures rely more on movement (or form-from-movement) than static form information.

Attentional bias towards and away from fearful faces is modulated by developmental amygdala damage

The amygdala is believed to play a major role in orienting attention towards threat-related stimuli. However, behavioral studies on amygdala-damaged patients have given inconsistent results-variously reporting decreased, persisted, and increased attention towards threat. Here we aimed to characterize the impact of developmental amygdala damage on emotion perception and the nature and time-course of spatial attentional bias towards fearful faces. We investigated SF, a 14-year-old with selective bilateral amygdala damage due to Urbach-Wiethe disease (UWD), and ten healthy controls. Participants completed a fear sensitivity questionnaire, facial expression classification task, and dot-probe task with fearful or neutral faces for spatial cueing. Three cue durations were used to assess the time-course of attentional bias. SF expressed significantly lower fear sensitivity, and showed a selective impairment in classifying fearful facial expressions. Despite this impairment in fear recognition, very brief (100 msec) fearful cues could orient SF's spatial attention. In healthy controls, the attentional bias emerged later and persisted longer. SF's attentional bias was due solely to facilitated engagement to fear, while controls showed the typical phenomenon of difficulty in disengaging from fear. Our study is the first to demonstrate the separable effects of amygdala damage on engagement and disengagement of spatial attention. The findings indicate that multiple mechanisms contribute in biasing attention towards fear, which vary in their timing and dependence on amygdala integrity. It seems that the amygdala is not essential for rapid attention to emotion, but probably has a role in assessment of biological relevance.

The effect of cognitive challenge on delay discounting

Recent findings suggest that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a region consistently associated with impulse control, is vulnerable to transient suppression of its activity and attendant functions by excessive stress and/or cognitive demand. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that a capacity-exceeding cognitive challenge induced decreased DLPFC activity and correlated increases in the preference for immediately available rewards. Consistent with growing evidence of a link between working memory capacity and delay discounting, the effect was inversely proportional to baseline performance on a working memory task. Subjects who performed well on the working memory task had unchanged, or even decreased, delay discounting rates, suggesting that working memory ability may protect cognitive control from cognitive challenge.

Understanding amygdala responsiveness to fearful expressions through the lens of psychopathy and altruism

Because the face is the central focus of human social interactions, emotional facial expressions provide a unique window into the emotional lives of others. They play a particularly important role in fostering empathy, which entails understanding and responding to others' emotions, especially distress-related emotions such as fear. This Review considers how fearful facial as well as vocal and postural expressions are interpreted, with an emphasis on the role of the amygdala. The amygdala may be best known for its role in the acquisition and expression of conditioned fear, but it also supports the perception and recognition of others' fear. Various explanations have been supplied for the amygdala's role in interpreting and responding to fearful expressions. They include theories that amygdala responses to fearful expressions 1) reflect heightened vigilance in response to uncertain danger, 2) promote heightened attention to the eye region of faces, 3) represent a response to an unconditioned aversive stimulus, or 4) reflect the generation of an empathic fear response. Among these, only empathic fear explains why amygdala lesions would impair fear recognition across modalities. Supporting the possibility of a link between fundamental empathic processes and amygdala responses to fear is evidence that impaired fear recognition in psychopathic individuals results from amygdala dysfunction, whereas enhanced fear recognition in altruistic individuals results from enhanced amygdala function. Empathic concern and caring behaviors may be fostered by sensitivity to signs of acute distress in others, which relies on intact functioning of the amygdala.

The independence of expression and identity in face-processing: evidence from neuropsychological case studies

The processing of facial identity and facial expression have traditionally been seen as independent—a hypothesis that has largely been informed by a key double dissociation between neurological patients with a deficit in facial identity recognition but not facial expression recognition, and those with the reverse pattern of impairment. The independence hypothesis is also reflected in more recent anatomical models of face-processing, although these theories permit some interaction between the two processes. Given that much of the traditional patient-based evidence has been criticized, a review of more recent case reports that are accompanied by neuroimaging data is timely. Further, the performance of individuals with developmental face-processing deficits has recently been considered with regard to the independence debate. This paper reviews evidence from both acquired and developmental disorders, identifying methodological and theoretical strengths and caveats in these reports, and highlighting pertinent avenues for future research.

Asymmetrical effects of unilateral right or left amygdala damage on auditory cortical processing of vocal emotions

We tested whether human amygdala lesions impair vocal processing in intact cortical networks. In two functional MRI experiments, patients with unilateral amygdala resection either listened to voices and nonvocal sounds or heard binaural vocalizations with attention directed toward or away from emotional information on one side. In experiment 1, all patients showed reduced activation to voices in the ipsilesional auditory cortex. In experiment 2, emotional voices evoked increased activity in both the auditory cortex and the intact amygdala for right-damaged patients, whereas no such effects were found for left-damaged amygdala patients. Furthermore, the left inferior frontal cortex was functionally connected with the intact amygdala in right-damaged patients, but only with homologous right frontal areas and not with the amygdala in left-damaged patients. Thus, unilateral amygdala damage leads to globally reduced ipsilesional cortical voice processing, but only left amygdala lesions are sufficient to suppress the enhanced auditory cortical processing of vocal emotions.

A Constructionist Review of Morality and Emotions

Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many “whole number” accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality–emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality–emotion links.

Neural responses to facial expressions support the role of the amygdala in processing threat

The amygdala is known to play an important role in the response to facial expressions that convey fear. However, it remains unclear whether the amygdala's response to fear reflects its role in the interpretation of danger and threat, or whether it is to some extent activated by all facial expressions of emotion. Previous attempts to address this issue using neuroimaging have been confounded by differences in the use of control stimuli across studies. Here, we address this issue using a block design functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, in which we compared the response to face images posing expressions of fear, anger, happiness, disgust and sadness with a range of control conditions. The responses in the amygdala to different facial expressions were compared with the responses to a non-face condition (buildings), to mildly happy faces and to neutral faces. Results showed that only fear and anger elicited significantly greater responses compared with the control conditions involving faces. Overall, these findings are consistent with the role of the amygdala in processing threat, rather than in the processing of all facial expressions of emotion, and demonstrate the critical importance of the choice of comparison condition to the pattern of results.

Unseen Fearful Faces Influence Face Encoding: Evidence from ERPs in Hemianopic Patients

Visual threat-related signals are not only processed via a cortical geniculo-striatal pathway to the amygdala but also via a subcortical colliculo-pulvinar-amygdala pathway, which presumably mediates implicit processing of fearful stimuli. Indeed, hemianopic patients with unilateral damage to the geniculo-striatal pathway have been shown to respond faster to seen happy faces in their intact visual field when unseen fearful faces were concurrently presented in their blind field [Bertini, C., Cecere, R., & Làdavas, E. I am blind, but I “see” fear. Cortex, 49, 985–993, 2013]. This behavioral facilitation in the presence of unseen fear might reflect enhanced processing of consciously perceived faces because of early activation of the subcortical pathway for implicit fear perception, which possibly leads to a modulation of cortical activity. To test this hypothesis, we examined ERPs elicited by fearful and happy faces presented to the intact visual field of right and left hemianopic patients, whereas fearful, happy, or neutral faces were concurrently presented in their blind field. Results showed that the amplitude of the N170 elicited by seen happy faces was selectively increased when an unseen fearful face was concurrently presented in the blind field of right hemianopic patients. These results suggest that when the geniculo-striate visual pathway is lesioned, the rapid and implicit processing of threat signals can enhance facial encoding. Notably, the N170 modulation was only observed in left-lesioned patients, favoring the hypothesis that implicit subcortical processing of fearful signals can influence face encoding only when the right hemisphere is intact.

The role of the medial temporal limbic system in processing emotions in voice and music

Subcortical brain structures of the limbic system, such as the amygdala, are thought to decode the emotional value of sensory information. Recent neuroimaging studies, as well as lesion studies in patients, have shown that the amygdala is sensitive to emotions in voice and music. Similarly, the hippocampus, another part of the temporal limbic system (TLS), is responsive to vocal and musical emotions, but its specific roles in emotional processing from music and especially from voices have been largely neglected. Here we review recent research on vocal and musical emotions, and outline commonalities and differences in the neural processing of emotions in the TLS in terms of emotional valence, emotional intensity and arousal, as well as in terms of acoustic and structural features of voices and music. We summarize the findings in a neural framework including several subcortical and cortical functional pathways between the auditory system and the TLS. This framework proposes that some vocal expressions might already receive a fast emotional evaluation via a subcortical pathway to the amygdala, whereas cortical pathways to the TLS are thought to be equally used for vocal and musical emotions. While the amygdala might be specifically involved in a coarse decoding of the emotional value of voices and music, the hippocampus might process more complex vocal and musical emotions, and might have an important role especially for the decoding of musical emotions by providing memory-based and contextual associations.

Multimodal emotion perception after anterior temporal lobectomy (ATL)

In the context of emotion information processing, several studies have demonstrated the involvement of the amygdala in emotion perception, for unimodal and multimodal stimuli. However, it seems that not only the amygdala, but several regions around it, may also play a major role in multimodal emotional integration. In order to investigate the contribution of these regions to multimodal emotion perception, five patients who had undergone unilateral anterior temporal lobe resection were exposed to both unimodal (vocal or visual) and audiovisual emotional and neutral stimuli. In a classic paradigm, participants were asked to rate the emotional intensity of angry, fearful, joyful, and neutral stimuli on visual analog scales. Compared with matched controls, patients exhibited impaired categorization of joyful expressions, whether the stimuli were auditory, visual, or audiovisual. Patients confused joyful faces with neutral faces, and joyful prosody with surprise. In the case of fear, unlike matched controls, patients provided lower intensity ratings for visual stimuli than for vocal and audiovisual ones. Fearful faces were frequently confused with surprised ones. When we controlled for lesion size, we no longer observed any overall difference between patients and controls in their ratings of emotional intensity on the target scales. Lesion size had the greatest effect on intensity perceptions and accuracy in the visual modality, irrespective of the type of emotion. These new findings suggest that a damaged amygdala, or a disrupted bundle between the amygdala and the ventral part of the occipital lobe, has a greater impact on emotion perception in the visual modality than it does in either the vocal or audiovisual one. We can surmise that patients are able to use the auditory information contained in multimodal stimuli to compensate for difficulty processing visually conveyed emotion.

Dynamic stimuli demonstrate a categorical representation of facial expression in the amygdala

Face-selective regions in the amygdala and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) are strongly implicated in the processing of transient facial signals, such as expression. Here, we measured neural responses in participants while they viewed dynamic changes in facial expression. Our aim was to explore how facial expression is represented in different face-selective regions. Short movies were generated by morphing between faces posing a neutral expression and a prototypical expression of a basic emotion (either anger, disgust, fear, happiness or sadness). These dynamic stimuli were presented in block design in the following four stimulus conditions: (1) same-expression change, same-identity, (2) same-expression change, different-identity, (3) different-expression change, same-identity, and (4) different-expression change, different-identity. So, within a same-expression change condition the movies would show the same change in expression whereas in the different-expression change conditions each movie would have a different change in expression. Facial identity remained constant during each movie but in the different identity conditions the facial identity varied between each movie in a block. The amygdala, but not the posterior STS, demonstrated a greater response to blocks in which each movie morphed from neutral to a different emotion category compared to blocks in which each movie morphed to the same emotion category. Neural adaptation in the amygdala was not affected by changes in facial identity. These results are consistent with a role of the amygdala in category-based representation of facial expressions of emotion.

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How facial expression is represented remains controversial.

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Responses to facial expressions were measured with fMRI using dynamic stimuli.

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The amygdala shows a categorical representation of facial expression.

Altered amygdala connectivity within the social brain in schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Impairments in social cognition have been described in schizophrenia and relate to core symptoms of the disorder. Social cognition is subserved by a network of brain regions, many of which have been implicated in schizophrenia. We hypothesized that deficits in connectivity between components of this social brain network may underlie the social cognition impairments seen in the disorder.

METHODS

We investigated brain activation and connectivity in a group of individuals with schizophrenia making social judgments of approachability from faces (n = 20), compared with a group of matched healthy volunteers (n = 24), using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Effective connectivity from the amygdala was estimated using the psychophysiological interaction approach.

RESULTS

While making approachability judgments, healthy participants recruited a network of social brain regions including amygdala, fusiform gyrus, cerebellum, and inferior frontal gyrus bilaterally and left medial prefrontal cortex. During the approachability task, healthy participants showed increased connectivity from the amygdala to the fusiform gyri, cerebellum, and left superior frontal cortex. In comparison to controls, individuals with schizophrenia overactivated the right middle frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, and precuneus and had reduced connectivity between the amygdala and the insula cortex.

DISCUSSION

We report increased activation of frontal and medial parietal regions during social judgment in patients with schizophrenia, accompanied by decreased connectivity between the amygdala and insula. We suggest that the increased activation of frontal control systems and association cortex may reflect a compensatory mechanism for impaired connectivity of the amygdala with other parts of the social brain networks in schizophrenia.

Observed touch on a non-human face is not remapped onto the human observer's own face

Visual remapping of touch (VRT) is a phenomenon in which seeing a human face being touched enhances detection of tactile stimuli on the observer's own face, especially when the observed face expresses fear. This study tested whether VRT would occur when seeing touch on monkey faces and whether it would be similarly modulated by facial expressions. Human participants detected near-threshold tactile stimulation on their own cheeks while watching fearful, happy, and neutral human or monkey faces being concurrently touched or merely approached by fingers. We predicted minimal VRT for neutral and happy monkey faces but greater VRT for fearful monkey faces. The results with human faces replicated previous findings, demonstrating stronger VRT for fearful expressions than for happy or neutral expressions. However, there was no VRT (i.e. no difference between accuracy in touch and no-touch trials) for any of the monkey faces, regardless of facial expression, suggesting that touch on a non-human face is not remapped onto the somatosensory system of the human observer.

Amygdala volume predicts inter-individual differences in fearful face recognition

The present study investigates the relationship between inter-individual differences in fearful face recognition and amygdala volume. Thirty normal adults were recruited and each completed two identical facial expression recognition tests offline and two magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans. Linear regression indicated that the left amygdala volume negatively correlated with the accuracy of recognizing fearful facial expressions and positively correlated with the probability of misrecognizing fear as surprise. Further exploratory analyses revealed that this relationship did not exist for any other subcortical or cortical regions. Nor did such a relationship exist between the left amygdala volume and performance recognizing the other five facial expressions. These mind-brain associations highlight the importance of the amygdala in recognizing fearful faces and provide insights regarding inter-individual differences in sensitivity toward fear-relevant stimuli.

Unimpaired discrimination of fearful prosody after amygdala lesion

Prosody (i.e. speech melody) is an important cue to infer an interlocutor's emotional state, complementing information from face expression and body posture. Inferring fear from face expression is reported as impaired after amygdala lesions. It remains unclear whether this deficit is specific to face expression, or is a more global fear recognition deficit. Here, we report data from two twins with bilateral amygdala lesions due to Urbach-Wiethe syndrome and show they are unimpaired in a multinomial emotional prosody classification task. In a two-alternative forced choice task, they demonstrate increased ability to discriminate fearful and neutral prosody, the opposite of what would be expected under an hypothesis of a global role for the amygdala in fear recognition. Hence, we provide evidence that the amygdala is not required for recognition of fearful prosody.

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Prosody recognition is assessed in two twin sisters with amygdala lesions due to Urbach–Wiethe syndrome.

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In a multinomial classification task, there is no impairment.

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In a two-alternative forced choice task, patients discriminate fearful and neutral prosody better than a control sample.

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This study provides evidence that the amygdala has no general role in fear recognition.

Discrete Neural Correlates for the Recognition of Negative Emotions: Insights from Frontotemporal Dementia

Patients with frontotemporal dementia have pervasive changes in emotion recognition and social cognition, yet the neural changes underlying these emotion processing deficits remain unclear. The multimodal system model of emotion proposes that basic emotions are dependent on distinct brain regions, which undergo significant pathological changes in frontotemporal dementia. As such, this syndrome may provide important insight into the impact of neural network degeneration upon the innate ability to recognise emotions. This study used voxel-based morphometry to identify discrete neural correlates involved in the recognition of basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise and happiness) in frontotemporal dementia. Forty frontotemporal dementia patients (18 behavioural-variant, 11 semantic dementia, 11 progressive nonfluent aphasia) and 27 healthy controls were tested on two facial emotion recognition tasks: The Ekman 60 and Ekman Caricatures. Although each frontotemporal dementia group showed impaired recognition of negative emotions, distinct associations between emotion-specific task performance and changes in grey matter intensity emerged. Fear recognition was associated with the right amygdala; disgust recognition with the left insula; anger recognition with the left middle and superior temporal gyrus; and sadness recognition with the left subcallosal cingulate, indicating that discrete neural substrates are necessary for emotion recognition in frontotemporal dementia. The erosion of emotion-specific neural networks in neurodegenerative disorders may produce distinct profiles of performance that are relevant to understanding the neurobiological basis of emotion processing.

What can we learn about emotion by studying psychopathy?

Psychopathy is a developmental disorder associated with core affective traits, such as low empathy, guilt, and remorse, and with antisocial and aggressive behaviors. Recent neurocognitive and neuroimaging studies of psychopathy in both institutionalized and community samples have begun to illuminate the basis of this condition, in particular the ways that psychopathy affects the experience and recognition of fear. In this review, I will consider how understanding emotional processes in psychopathy can shed light on the three questions central to the study of emotion: (1) Are emotions discrete, qualitatively distinct phenomena, or quantitatively varying phenomena best described in terms of dimensions like arousal and valence? (2) What are the brain structures involved in generating specific emotions like fear, if any? And (3) how do our own experiences of emotion pertain to our perceptions of and responses to others' emotion? I conclude that insights afforded by the study of psychopathy may provide better understanding of not only fundamental social phenomena like empathy and aggression, but of the basic emotional processes that motivate these behaviors.

Morphing between expressions dissociates continuous from categorical representations of facial expression in the human brain

Whether the brain represents facial expressions as perceptual continua or as emotion categories remains controversial. Here, we measured the neural response to morphed images to directly address how facial expressions of emotion are represented in the brain. We found that face-selective regions in the posterior superior temporal sulcus and the amygdala responded selectively to changes in facial expression, independent of changes in identity. We then asked whether the responses in these regions reflected categorical or continuous neural representations of facial expression. Participants viewed images from continua generated by morphing between faces posing different expressions such that the expression could be the same, could involve a physical change but convey the same emotion, or could differ by the same physical amount but be perceived as two different emotions. We found that the posterior superior temporal sulcus was equally sensitive to all changes in facial expression, consistent with a continuous representation. In contrast, the amygdala was only sensitive to changes in expression that altered the perceived emotion, demonstrating a more categorical representation. These results offer a resolution to the controversy about how facial expression is processed in the brain by showing that both continuous and categorical representations underlie our ability to extract this important social cue.

A functional architecture of the human brain: emerging insights from the science of emotion

The 'faculty psychology' approach to the mind, which attempts to explain mental function in terms of categories that reflect modular 'faculties', such as emotions, cognitions, and perceptions, has dominated research into the mind and its physical correlates. In this paper, we argue that brain organization does not respect the commonsense categories belonging to the faculty psychology approach. We review recent research from the science of emotion demonstrating that the human brain contains broadly distributed functional networks that can each be re-described as basic psychological operations that interact to produce a range of mental states, including, but not limited to, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and so on. When compared to the faculty psychology approach, this 'constructionist' approach provides an alternative functional architecture to guide the design and interpretation of experiments in cognitive neuroscience.

A functional architecture of the human brain: emerging insights from the science of emotion

The 'faculty psychology' approach to the mind, which attempts to explain mental function in terms of categories that reflect modular 'faculties', such as emotions, cognitions, and perceptions, has dominated research into the mind and its physical correlates. In this paper, we argue that brain organization does not respect the commonsense categories belonging to the faculty psychology approach. We review recent research from the science of emotion demonstrating that the human brain contains broadly distributed functional networks that can each be re-described as basic psychological operations that interact to produce a range of mental states, including, but not limited to, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and so on. When compared to the faculty psychology approach, this 'constructionist' approach provides an alternative functional architecture to guide the design and interpretation of experiments in cognitive neuroscience.

The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.

A review on the relationship between testosterone and the interpersonal/affective facet of psychopathy

Testosterone (T) has received increasing interest in the recent years as a probable biological determinant in the etiology of male-biased clinical conditions such as psychopathy (i.e. psychopathy is more prevalent in men and leads to an earlier onset and more severe expression of antisocial and aggressive behavior in men compared to women). In this review, the authors evaluated the potential relationship between T and different constructs closely related to the core characteristics of psychopathy (affective empathy, fear-reactivity, and instrumental aggression). After a thorough examination of the literature, it is concluded that high T exposure in utero and high circulating T levels throughout important life phases (most notably adolescence) or in response to social challenges (e.g. social stress, competition) could be an important etiological risk factor in the emergence of psychopathic behavior. Nevertheless, studies consistently indicate that high T is not related to a significantly reduced fear-reactivity and is only indirectly associated with the increased levels of instrumental aggression observed in psychopathic individuals. Therefore, psychopathy is likely to arise from an interaction between high T levels and other biological and socio-psychological risk factors, such as a constitutionally based dampened fear-reactivity, insecure/disordered attachment processes in childhood, and social discrimination/rejection in adolescence and/or adulthood.

The insular cortex and the neuroanatomy of major depression

BACKGROUND

The neuroanatomical substrate underlying Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is incompletely understood. Recent reports have implicated the insular cortex.

METHODS

Two cohorts of participants with MDD were tested. In the first MDD cohort, we used standardised facial expression recognition tasks. In the second cohort, we focused on facial disgust recognition, a function associated with the insular cortex. T1 weighted MR imaging was used in the second cohort to test the hypothesis of abnormal insular volume being associated with impaired disgust recognition.

RESULTS

Disgust recognition was particularly impaired in both cohorts. In the second cohort, the magnitude of the disgust recognition deficit correlated with reduced insula grey matter volume. Exploring the idea of insula involvement in MDD further, we identified the insular cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex as key neural correlates of core symptoms, in that scores of 3 clinical scales (the Beck Depression Inventory, the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, and the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale) correlated with grey matter volume in these structures.

LIMITATIONS

MDD participants were clinically representative of specialist and academic psychiatric practice in the UK and presented with robust primary diagnoses; we did not exclude common co-morbidities such as anxiety and personality disorders.

CONCLUSIONS

We propose that cognitive and emotional functions assumed to be associated with the insula are adversely affected in patients with MDD and that this may, therefore, represent the substrate for some core clinical features of MDD. Further exploration of the involvement of the insular cortex in MDD is warranted.

The Bodily Expressive Action Stimulus Test (BEAST). Construction and Validation of a Stimulus Basis for Measuring Perception of Whole Body Expression of Emotions

Whole body expressions are among the main visual stimulus categories that are naturally associated with faces and the neuroscientific investigation of how body expressions are processed has entered the research agenda this last decade. Here we describe the stimulus set of whole body expressions termed bodily expressive action stimulus test (BEAST), and we provide validation data for use of these materials by the community of emotion researchers. The database was composed of 254 whole body expressions from 46 actors expressing 4 emotions (anger, fear, happiness, and sadness). In all pictures the face of the actor was blurred and participants were asked to categorize the emotions expressed in the stimuli in a four alternative-forced-choice task. The results show that all emotions are well recognized, with sadness being the easiest, followed by fear, whereas happiness was the most difficult. The BEAST appears a valuable addition to currently available tools for assessing recognition of affective signals. It can be used in explicit recognition tasks as well as in matching tasks and in implicit tasks, combined either with facial expressions, with affective prosody, or presented with affective pictures as context in healthy subjects as well as in clinical populations.