Reverse genetics approach towards understanding pathogenesis of H5N1 Hong Kong influenza A virus infection

A Single Amino Acid in the M1 Protein Responsible for the Different Pathogenic Potentials of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Strains

Two highly pathogenic avian influenza virus strains, A/duck/Hokkaido/WZ83/2010 (H5N1) (WZ83) and A/duck/Hokkaido/WZ101/2010 (H5N1) (WZ101), which were isolated from wild ducks in Japan, were found to be genetically similar, with only two amino acid differences in their M1 and PB1 proteins at positions 43 and 317, respectively. We found that both WZ83 and WZ101 caused lethal infection in chickens but WZ101 killed them more rapidly than WZ83. Interestingly, ducks experimentally infected with WZ83 showed no or only mild clinical symptoms, whereas WZ101 was highly lethal. We then generated reassortants between these viruses and found that exchange of the M gene segment completely switched the pathogenic phenotype in both chickens and ducks, indicating that the difference in the pathogenicity for these avian species between WZ83 and WZ101 was determined by only a single amino acid in the M1 protein. It was also found that WZ101 showed higher pathogenicity than WZ83 in mice and that WZ83, whose M gene was replaced with that of WZ101, showed higher pathogenicity than wild-type WZ83, although this reassortant virus was not fully pathogenic compared to wild-type WZ101. These results suggest that the amino acid at position 43 of the M1 protein is one of the factors contributing to the pathogenicity of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in both avian and mammalian hosts.

Role of poultry in the spread of novel H7N9 influenza virus in China

The recent outbreak of H7N9 influenza in China has resulted in many human cases with a high fatality rate. Poultry are the likely source of infection for humans on the basis of sequence analysis and virus isolations from live bird markets, but it is not clear which species of birds are most likely to be infected and shedding levels of virus sufficient to infect humans. Intranasal inoculation of chickens, Japanese quail, pigeons, Pekin ducks, Mallard ducks, Muscovy ducks, and Embden geese with 10(6) 50% egg infective doses of the A/Anhui/1/2013 virus resulted in infection but no clinical disease signs. Virus shedding was much higher and prolonged in quail and chickens than in the other species. Quail effectively transmitted the virus to direct contacts, but pigeons and Pekin ducks did not. In all species, virus was detected at much higher titers from oropharyngeal swabs than cloacal swabs. The hemagglutinin gene from samples collected from selected experimentally infected birds was sequenced, and three amino acid differences were commonly observed when the sequence was compared to the sequence of A/Anhui/1/2013: N123D, N149D, and L217Q. Leucine at position 217 is highly conserved for human isolates and is associated with α2,6-sialic acid binding. Different amino acid combinations were observed, suggesting that the inoculum had viral subpopulations that were selected after passage in birds. These experimental studies corroborate the finding that certain poultry species are reservoirs of the H7N9 influenza virus and that the virus is highly tropic for the upper respiratory tract, so testing of bird species should preferentially be conducted with oropharyngeal swabs for the best sensitivity.

IMPORTANCE

The recent outbreak of H7N9 influenza in China has resulted in a number of human infections with a high case fatality rate. The source of the viral outbreak is suspected to be poultry, but definitive data on the source of the infection are not available. This study provides experimental data to show that quail and chickens are susceptible to infection, shed large amounts of virus, and are likely important in the spread of the virus to humans. Other poultry species can be infected and shed virus but are less likely to play a role of transmitting the virus to humans. Pigeons were previously suggested to be a possible source of the virus because of isolation of the virus from several pigeons in poultry markets in China, but experimental studies show that they are generally resistant to infection and are unlikely to play a role in the spread of the virus.

Host- and strain-specific regulation of influenza virus polymerase activity by interacting cellular proteins

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype have recently emerged from avian zoonotic reservoirs to cause fatal human disease. Adaptation of HPAI virus RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (PB1, PB2, and PA proteins) and nucleoprotein (NP) to interactions with mammalian host proteins is thought to contribute to the efficiency of viral RNA synthesis and to disease severity. While proteomics experiments have identified a number of human proteins that associate with H1N1 polymerases and/or viral ribonucleoprotein (vRNP), how these host interactions might regulate influenza virus polymerase functions and host adaptation has been largely unexplored. We took a functional genomics (RNA interference [RNAi]) approach to assess the roles of a network of human proteins interacting with influenza virus polymerase proteins in viral polymerase activity from prototype H1N1 and H5N1 viruses. A majority (18 of 31) of the cellular proteins tested, including RNA-binding (DDX17, DDX5, NPM1, and hnRNPM), stress (PARP1, DDB1, and Ku70/86), and intracellular transport proteins, were required for efficient activity of both H1N1 and H5N1 polymerases. NXP2 and NF90 antagonized both polymerases, and six more RNA-associated proteins exhibited strain-specific phenotypes. Remarkably, 12 proteins differentially regulated H5N1 polymerase according to PB2 genotype at mammalian-adaptive residue 627. Among these, DEAD box RNA helicase DDX17/p72 facilitated efficient human-adapted (627K) H5N1 virus mRNA and viral RNA (vRNA) synthesis in human cells. Likewise, the chicken DDX17 homologue was required for efficient avian (627E) H5N1 infection in chicken DF-1 fibroblasts, suggesting that this conserved virus-host interaction contributes to PB2-dependent host species specificity of influenza virus and ultimately to the outcome of human HPAI infections.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) viruses have recently emerged from wild and domestic birds to cause fatal human disease. In human patients, it is thought that adaptation of the viral polymerase, a complex of viral proteins responsible for viral gene expression and RNA genome replication, to interactions with mammalian rather than avian host proteins contributes to disease severity. In this study, we used computational analysis and RNA interference (RNAi) experiments to identify a biological network of human proteins that regulates an H5N1 HPAI virus polymerase, in comparison to a mammalian H1N1 virus. Of 31 proteins tested, 18 (58%) were required for polymerase function in both HPAI and H1N1 viruses. Remarkably, we also found proteins such as DDX17 that governed the HPAI virus polymerase’s adaptation to human cells. These virus-host interactions may thus control pathogenicity of HPAI virus in humans and are promising therapeutic targets for antiviral drugs in severe influenza infections.

Age at infection affects the pathogenicity of Asian highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses in ducks

The Asian highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses have changed from producing no disease or mild respiratory infections in ducks to some strains causing systemic disease and death. Differences in pathogenicity between four of these viruses as well as the effect of host age on the outcome of infection were studied in ducks. Three of the viruses were highly lethal in 2-week-old ducks and induced severe neurological dysfunction. Neurological signs were also observed in 5-week-old ducks inoculated with one of these viruses; however mortality was low. The fourth virus studied did not induce neurological signs in 2-week-old ducks, but did produce moderate mortality. This virus caused no clinical signs or death in 5-week-old ducks. All viruses studied were isolated from oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs, and also from brain, heart, lung and muscle tissues, demonstrating systemic infection. All viruses evaluated transmitted efficiently to contact ducks. Phylogenetic analysis of the viruses studied and other Asian H5N1 HPAI viruses with diverse pathogenicity in ducks, showed changes in several genes, but none clearly associated with pathogenicity. In conclusion, the pathogenicity of circulating H5N1 HPAI viruses in ducks varies depending on the virus strain and the age of the duck and correlates with the level of viral replication in tissues. High titers of virus in organs, high viral shedding, and variable mortality enable ducks to circulate H5N1 HPAI viruses.

Cross-species transfer of viruses: implications for the use of viral vectors in biomedical research, gene therapy and as live-virus vaccines

All living organisms are continuously exposed to a plethora of viruses. In general, viruses tend to be restricted to the natural host species which they infect. From time to time viruses cross the host-range barrier expanding their host range. However, in very rare cases cross-species transfer is followed by the establishment and persistence of a virus in the new host species, which may result in disease. Recent examples of viruses that have crossed the species barrier from animal reservoirs to humans are hantavirus, haemorrhagic fever viruses, arboviruses, Nipah and Hendra viruses, avian influenza virus (AI), monkeypox virus, and the SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). The opportunities for cross-species transfer of mammalian viruses have increased in recent years due to increased contact between humans and animal reservoirs. However, it is difficult to predict when such events will take place since the viral adaptation that is needed to accomplish this is multifactorial and stochastic. Against this background the intensified use of viruses and their genetically modified variants as viral gene transfer vectors for biomedical research, experimental gene therapy and for live-vector vaccines is a cause for concern. This review addresses a number of potential risk factors and their implications for activities with viral vectors from the perspective of cross-species transfer of viruses in nature, with emphasis on the occurrence of host-range mutants resulting from either cell culture or tropism engineering. The issues are raised with the intention to assist in risk assessments for activities with vector viruses.

Genetic characterization of H5N1 influenza A viruses isolated from zoo tigers in Thailand

The H5N1 avian influenza virus outbreak among zoo tigers in mid-October 2004, with 45 animals dead, indicated that the avian influenza virus could cause lethal infection in a large mammalian species apart from humans. In this outbreak investigation, six H5N1 isolates were identified and two isolates (A/Tiger/Thailand/CU-T3/04 and A/Tiger/Thailand/CU-T7/04) were selected for whole genome analysis. Phylogenetic analysis of the 8 gene segments showed that the viruses clustered within the lineage of H5N1 avian isolates from Thailand and Vietnam. The hemagglutinin (HA) gene of the viruses displayed polybasic amino acids at the cleavage site, identical to those of the 2004 H5N1 isolates, which by definition are highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). In addition, sequence analyses revealed that the viruses isolated from tigers harbored few genetic changes compared with the viruses having infected chicken, humans, tigers and a leopard isolated from the early 2004 H5N1 outbreaks. Sequence analyses also showed that the tiger H5N1 isolated in October 2004 was more closely related to the chicken H5N1 isolated in July than that from January. Interestingly, all the 6 tiger H5N1 isolates contained a lysine substitution at position 627 of the PB2 protein similar to the human, but distinct from the original avian isolates.

The potential use of influenza virus as an agent for bioterrorism

Influenza A virus has been responsible for widespread human epidemics because it is readily transmitted from humans to humans by aerosol. Recent events have highlighted the potential of influenza A virus as a bioterrorist weapon: the high virulence of the influenza A virus that infected people in Hong Kong in 1997; and the development of laboratory methods to generate influenza A viruses by transfection of DNAs without a helper virus. Antiviral drugs that are directed at functions shared by all influenza A viruses constitute the best line of defense against a bioterrorist attack. Consequently, new antiviral drugs need to be developed, and the few currently available antiviral drugs should be stockpiled.

A reverse genetics approach for recovery of recombinant influenza B viruses entirely from cDNA

The recovery of recombinant influenza A virus entirely from cDNA was recently described (9, 19). We adapted the technique for engineering influenza B virus and generated a mutant bearing an amino acid change E116G in the viral neuraminidase which was resistant in vitro to the neuraminidase inhibitor zanamivir. The method also facilitates rapid isolation of single-gene reassortants suitable as vaccine seeds and will aid further investigations of unique features of influenza B virus.