The political left rolls with the good and the political right confronts the bad: connecting physiology and cognition to preferences

Donald Trump's contribution to the study of politics and the life sciences

If the life sciences are to have much to say about politics, there needs to be a universal element to political orientations. In this essay, I argue that the recent prominence of nativist, law-and-order, populist politicians reveals the nature of this universal element. All social units have to address bedrock dilemmas about how to deal with norm violators and how welcoming to be to outsiders as well as to proponents of new lifestyles. Might differences on these core dilemmas be the universal element of political life? Using the followers of one of the most prominent examples of a nativist political leader-Donald Trump-as an example, I present data showing that Trump's most earnest followers are different from others-even those who share their general ideological leanings-not on traditional economic or social issues, but rather on the group-based security issues that grow out of the bedrock dilemmas of social life.

The role of individual differences in resistance to persuasion on memory for political advertisements

When people see political advertisements on a polarized issue they take a stance on, what factors influence how they respond to and remember the adverts contents? Across three studies, we tested competing hypotheses about how individual differences in social vigilantism (i.e., attitude superiority) and need for cognition relate to intentions to resist attitude change and memory for political advertisements concerning abortion. In Experiments 1 and 2, we examined participants' intentions to use resistance strategies to preserve their pre-existing attitudes about abortion, by either engaging against opposing opinions or disengaging from them. In Experiment 3, we examined participants' memory for information about both sides of the controversy presented in political advertisements. Our results suggest higher levels of social vigilantism are related to greater intentions to counterargue and better memory for attitude-incongruent information. These findings extend our understanding of individual differences in how people process and respond to controversial social and political discourse.

Afraid of whom?: Threat sensitivity's influence changes with perceived source of threat

Taking insights from the fields of psychology and biology, a growing body of scholarship considers the psychophysiological foundations of political attitudes. Subconscious emotional reactions to threat, for example, have been shown to predict socially conservative attitudes toward out-groups. However, many of these studies fail to consider different sources of perceived threat. Using a combination of survey and physiological data, I distinguish between fear of others and fear of authority, finding that threat sensitivity predicts divergent political attitudes depending on the strength of each. Those who are more sensitive to threat from others tend to hold socially conservative attitudes, while those who fear authority generally take more libertarian positions. As sensitivity to threat is at least partially inherited, these findings highlight the genetic role of political predispositions.

Coalitionality shapes moral elevation: evidence from the U.S. Black Lives Matter protest and counter-protest movements

Witnessing altruistic behaviour can elicit moral elevation, an emotion that motivates prosocial cooperation. This emotion is evoked more strongly when the observer anticipates that other people will be reciprocally cooperative. Coalitionality should therefore moderate feelings of elevation, as whether the observer shares the coalitional affiliation of those observed should influence the observer's assessment of the likelihood that the latter will cooperate with the observer. We examined this thesis in studies contemporaneous with the 2020 Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. Although BLM protests were predominantly peaceful, they were depicted by conservative media as destructive and antisocial. In two large-scale, pre-registered online studies (total N = 2172), political orientation strongly moderated feelings of state elevation elicited by a video of a peaceful BLM protest (Studies 1 and 2) or a peaceful Back the Blue (BtB) counter-protest (Study 2). Political conservatism predicted less elevation following the BLM video and more elevation following the BtB video. Elevation elicited by the BLM video correlated with preferences to defund police, whereas elevation elicited by the BtB video correlated with preferences to increase police funding. These findings extend prior work on elevation into the area of prosocial cooperation in the context of coalitional conflict.

It takes guts to be a rebel! A dynamic coordination account of the relationship between motivational reactivity, social morality, and political ideology

This study tests two sets of competing hypotheses about the relationship between trait reactivity to positive and negative stimuli (i.e., motivational reactivity), moral stances on social principles (i.e., social morality), and political ideology. The classic view contends that a specific political ideology or social morality results from a specific motivational reactivity pattern, whereas the dynamic coordination account suggests that trait motivational reactivity modulates an individual's political ideology and social morality as a result of the majority political beliefs in their immediate social context. A survey using subjects recruited from a liberal-leaning social context was conducted to test these hypotheses. Results support the dynamic coordination account. Reactivity to negativity (indexed by defensive system activation scores) is associated with the adoption of the dominant social morality and political ideology. Reactivity to positivity (indexed by appetitive system activation scores) is associated with the adoption of nondominant social moral and political stances.

Physiological threat sensitivity predicts anti-immigrant attitudes

Research finds that the perception that immigrants are culturally and economically threatening is associated with negative attitudes toward immigration. In a largely separate body of work, psychophysiological predispositions toward threat sensitivity are connected to a range of political attitudes, including immigration. This article draws together these two literatures, using a lab experiment to explore psychophysiological threat sensitivity and immigration attitudes in the United States. Respondents with higher threat sensitivity, as measured by skin conductance responses to threatening images, tend to be less supportive of immigration. This finding builds on our understanding of the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes.

Shared neural representations and temporal segmentation of political content predict ideological similarity

Despite receiving the same sensory input, opposing partisans often interpret political content in disparate ways. Jointly analyzing controlled and naturalistic functional magnetic resonance imaging data, we uncover the neurobiological mechanisms explaining how these divergent political viewpoints arise. Individuals who share an ideology have more similar neural representations of political words, experience greater neural synchrony during naturalistic political content, and temporally segment real-world information into the same meaningful units. In the striatum and amygdala, increasing intersubject similarity in neural representations of political concepts during a word reading task predicts enhanced synchronization of blood oxygen level-dependent time courses when viewing real-time, inflammatory political videos, revealing that polarization can arise from differences in the brain's affective valuations of political concepts. Together, this research shows that political ideology is shaped by semantic representations of political concepts processed in an environment free of any polarizing agenda and that these representations bias how real-world political information is construed into a polarized perspective.

Investigating the conservatism-disgust paradox in reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic: A reexamination of the interrelations among political ideology, disgust sensitivity, and pandemic response

Research has documented robust associations between greater disgust sensitivity and (1) concerns about disease, and (2) political conservatism. However, the COVID-19 disease pandemic raised challenging questions about these associations. In particular, why have conservatives—despite their greater disgust sensitivity—exhibited less concern about the pandemic? Here, we investigate this “conservatism-disgust paradox” and address several outstanding theoretical questions regarding the interrelations among disgust sensitivity, ideology, and pandemic response. In four studies (N = 1,764), we identify several methodological and conceptual factors—in particular, an overreliance on self-report measures—that may have inflated the apparent associations among these constructs. Using non-self-report measures, we find evidence that disgust sensitivity may be a less potent predictor of disease avoidance than is typically assumed, and that ideological differences in disgust sensitivity may be amplified by self-report measures. These findings suggest that the true pattern of interrelations among these factors may be less “paradoxical” than is typically believed.

De-evolving human eyes: The effect of eye camouflage on human attention

Eyes are communicative. But what happens when eyes are camouflaged? In the present study, while either wearing sunglasses (that camouflaged the eyes) or clear glasses, participants were presented with sexually provocative and neutral images, which they viewed in the presence of another person who they knew was observing their eyes. Unbeknownst to the participants, however, we also surreptitiously monitored and recorded their eye gaze in both conditions. People spontaneously looked more and for longer at the sexually provocative images when their eyes were camouflaged by sunglasses. This finding provides convergent evidence for the proposal that covert attention operates in service of overt social attention, and suggests that decoupling overt and covert attention is much more prevalent than previously assumed. In doing so it also sheds light on the relation between the evolution of human eye morphology and systems of attention.

The politics of mask-wearing: Political preferences, reactance, and conflict aversion during COVID

The current project examines how psychological reactance and conflict orientation relate to the highly politicized debate over mask-wearing in the U.S. during the COVID-19 pandemic. We explore how psychological reactance and conflict orientation are related to self-reported mask-wearing, and how these same predispositions are correlated with political beliefs. We then assess how favorability towards President Trump in the context of the 2020 Election was uniquely correlated with these traits and how Trump favorability both mediated and moderated the effects of conflict orientation and psychological reactance on individuals' likelihood of wearing masks. Results from a national survey of U.S. adults from Nov-Dec 2020 suggest that Trump favorability was positively associated with trait reactance, negatively associated with conflict aversion, and negatively associated with self-reported mask-wearing. The opposite was true of favorability towards Joe Biden. Moderation analyses indicate that conflict-approaching Biden detractors were especially unlikely to report wearing masks, while mediation analyses show that political preferences significantly mediated the relationships between both psychological traits and self-reported mask-wearing. Implications for the politicization of health messaging and health behavior are discussed.

Politically Biased Time Perception and Perspective

The main objective of this study was to determine if the estimation of time could be used to reveal an implicit political bias. The study also aimed at determining if a political bias is related to a specific temporal perspective or to other personality factors. The main demonstration is based on a bisection temporal task where the participants were asked to say if the duration of the presentation of a politician’s photo is short or long. There were three independent variables of interest: the location of politicians on the left (liberal) or right (conservative) on the political axis, the emotions expressed on a politician’s photo (joy, anger or neutral), and the political allegiances of the participants. Overall, compared to conditions with neutral faces or faces expressing joy, participants overestimated the duration of faces expressing anger. This effect, however, depends on the political allegiance of the participants. Compared to the neutral face condition, liberal participants overestimated the length of presentation of politicians’ faces in the joy and anger conditions. The results also showed that, compared to the condition in which photos of conservative politicians are presented, conservative participants underestimated the presentation duration of liberal politicians’ photos; such an influence of the orientation of presented politicians was not observed with liberal participants. The results also reveal that conservative participants differed from liberal participants on the future-oriented scale and on the past-positive-oriented scale of the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI). The study shows that time perception can be used to reveal a kind of implicit political bias.

Is negativity bias intuitive for liberals and conservatives?

Previous research suggests that conservatives (right-wingers) tend to show more negativity bias than liberals (left-wingers) in several tasks. However, the majority of these studies are based on correlational findings and do not provide information on the cognitive underpinnings of this tendency. The current research investigated whether intuition promotes negativity bias and mitigates the ideological asymmetry in this domain in three underrepresented, non-western samples (Turkey). In line with the previous literature, we defined negativity bias as the tendency to interpret ambiguous faces as threatening. The results of the lab experiment revealed that negativity bias increases under high-cognitive load overall. In addition, this effect was moderated by the participants' political orientation (Experiment 1). In other words, when their cognitive resources were depleted, liberals became more like conservatives in terms of negativity bias. However, we failed to conceptually replicate this effect using time-limit manipulations in two online preregistered experiments during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the baseline negativity bias is thought to be already at peak. Thus, the findings provide no strong evidence for the idea that intuition promotes negativity bias and that liberals use cognitive effort to avoid this perceptual bias.

Conservatism predicts aversion to consequential Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to revolutionize society by automating tasks as diverse as driving cars, diagnosing diseases, and providing legal advice. The degree to which AI can improve outcomes in these and other domains depends on how comfortable people are trusting AI for these tasks, which in turn depends on lay perceptions of AI. The present research examines how these critical lay perceptions may vary as a function of conservatism. Using five survey experiments, we find that political conservatism is associated with low comfort with and trust in AI-i.e., with AI aversion. This relationship between conservatism and AI aversion is explained by the link between conservatism and risk perception; more conservative individuals perceive AI as being riskier and are therefore more averse to its adoption. Finally, we test whether a moral reframing intervention can reduce AI aversion among conservatives.

Measuring attitudes as a complex system: Structured thinking and support for the Canadian carbon tax

We test a method for applying a network-based approach to the study of political attitudes. We use cognitive-affective mapping, an approach that visually represents attitudes as networks of concepts that an individual associates with a given issue. Using a software tool called Valence, we asked a sample of Canadians (n = 111) to draw a cognitive-affective map (CAM) of their views on the carbon tax. We treat these networks as a series of undirected graphs and examine the extent to which support for the tax can be predicted based on each graph's emotional and structural properties. We find evidence that the emotional but not the structural properties significantly predict individuals' attitudes toward the carbon tax. We also find associations between CAMs' structural properties (density and centrality) and several measures of political interest. Our results provide preliminary evidence for the efficacy of CAMs as a tool for studying political attitudes. The study data are available at https://osf.io/qwpvd/?view_only=6834a1c442224e72bf45e7641880a17f.

Political Orientation as Psychological Defense or Basic Disposition? A Social Neuroscience Examination

Psychological views on political orientation generally agree that conservatism is associated with negativity bias but disagree on the form of that association. Some view conservatism as a psychological defense that insulates from negative stimuli and events. Others view conservatism as a consequence of increased dispositional sensitivity to negative stimuli and events. Further complicating matters, research shows that conservatives are sometimes more and sometimes less sensitive to negative stimuli and events. The current research integrates these opposing views and results. We reasoned that conservatives should typically be less sensitive to negative stimuli if conservative beliefs act as a psychological defense. However, when core components of conservative beliefs are threatened, the psychological defense may fall, and conservatives may show heightened sensitivity to negative stimuli. In two ERP studies, participants were randomly assigned to either an ostensibly real economic threat or a nonthreatening control condition. To measure reactivity to negative stimuli, we indexed the P3 component to aversive white noise bursts in an auditory oddball paradigm. In both studies, the relationship between increased conservatism and P3 mean amplitude was negative in the control condition but positive in threat condition (this relationship was stronger in Study 2). In Study 2, source localization of the P3 component revealed that, after threat, conservatism was associated with increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, regions associated with conflict-related processes. These results demonstrate that the link between conservatism and negativity bias is context-dependent, i.e., dependent on threat experiences.

Testosterone and cortisol are more predictive of choice behavior than a social nudge in adult males on a simple gift give-get task

Reproducibility of social research is ambitious, and evidence supporting this argument is increasing in psychology and social science research. This may be attributed to, in part, the high volume of qualitative research methodology used in social research along with difficulties in the reliability of measurement techniques. Therefore, use of more and better objective measures to complement existing techniques in social research are necessitated. To highlight this point we explored the success of give-get nudge in adults. Nudge being a subtle intervention to influence choice, without restricting choice. We also wanted to explore whether testosterone and cortisol, as objective psychophysiological markers, could explain nudge outcome. Participants were asked what they would like to get for Christmas, or what they would like to give. They were then presented with two chocolates, one big and one small, and instructed to take as a "reward" for their participation with the knowledge there was one other participant to take chocolate after them. It was hypothesized that those asked to give something for Christmas would take the smaller reward and vice versa. Salivary testosterone and cortisol were measured prior to, and 10 min after completing the exercise. The nature of the nudge itself did not predict behavior, but the hormone measures did. We speculate that testosterone may focus an individual on the nature of the question (nudge), while cortisol encourages self-focus. These results support the need to combine existing social research techniques with more objective markers.

Differentiated evaluation of counter-conditioned stimuli as a function of right-wing authoritarianism

Right Wing Authoritarianism (i.e., RWA) is associated with enhanced conservatism and social prejudice. Because research linking RWA to attitudes is largely correlational (i.e., it provides control for neither RWA nor attitude learning), it is not clear how RWA relates to attitude learning dynamics. We addressed this question in 11 evaluative conditioning experiments that ensured rigorous control of the affective learning setting. Results from two integrative data analyses suggest that (i) individuals scoring higher in RWA show a stronger acquisition of positive attitudes, and that (ii) the residuals of this stronger acquisition remain even after exposure to counter-attitudinal information. Implications of these findings for research on RWA and its link to social prejudice are discussed.

Of pathogens and party lines: Social conservatism positively associates with COVID-19 precautions among U.S. Democrats but not Republicans

Social liberals tend to be less pathogen-avoidant than social conservatives, a pattern consistent with a model wherein ideological differences stem from differences in threat reactivity. Here we investigate if and how individual responses to a shared threat reflect those patterns of ideological difference. In seeming contradiction to the general association between social conservatism and pathogen avoidance, the more socially conservative political party in the United States has more consistently downplayed the dangers of COVID-19 during the ongoing pandemic. This puzzle offers an opportunity to examine the contributions of multiple factors to disease avoidance. We investigated the relationship between social conservatism and COVID-19 precautionary behavior in light of the partisan landscape of the United States. We explored whether consumption of, and attitudes toward, different sources of information, as well as differential evaluation of various threats caused by the pandemic-such as direct health costs versus indirect harms to the economy and individual liberties-shape partisan differences in responses to the pandemic in ways that overwhelm the contributions of social conservatism. In two pre-registered studies, socially conservative attitudes correlate with self-reported COVID-19 prophylactic behaviors, but only among Democrats. Reflecting larger societal divisions, among Republicans and Independents, the absence of a positive relationship between social conservatism and COVID-19 precautions appears driven by lower trust in scientists, lower trust in liberal and moderate sources, lesser consumption of liberal news media, and greater economic conservatism.

Factors Affecting the Perception of Disability: A Developmental Perspective

Perception of disability is an important construct affecting not only the well-being of individuals with disabilities, but also the moral compass of the society. Negative attitudes toward disability disempower individuals with disabilities and lead to their social exclusion and isolation. By contrast, a healthy society encourages positive attitudes toward individuals with disabilities and promotes social inclusion. The current review explored disability perception in the light of the in-group vs. out-group dichotomy, since individuals with disabilities may be perceived as a special case of out-group. We implemented a developmental approach to study perception of disability from early age into adolescence while exploring cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of children’s attitudes. Potential factors influencing perception of disability were considered at the level of society, family and school environment, and the individual. Better understanding of factors influencing the development of disability perception would allow the design of effective interventions to improve children’s attitudes toward peers with disabilities, reduce intergroup biases, and promote social inclusion. Based on previous research in social and developmental psychology, education, and anthropology, we proposed an integrative model that provides a conceptual framework for understanding the development of disability perception.

Intolerance of uncertainty modulates brain-to-brain synchrony during politically polarized perception

Political partisans see the world through an ideologically biased lens. What drives political polarization? Although it has been posited that polarization arises because of an inability to tolerate uncertainty and a need to hold predictable beliefs about the world, evidence for this hypothesis remains elusive. We examined the relationship between uncertainty tolerance and political polarization using a combination of brain-to-brain synchrony and intersubject representational similarity analysis, which measured committed liberals' and conservatives' (n = 44) subjective interpretation of naturalistic political video material. Shared ideology between participants increased neural synchrony throughout the brain during a polarizing political debate filled with provocative language but not during a neutrally worded news clip on polarized topics or a nonpolitical documentary. During the political debate, neural synchrony in mentalizing and valuation networks was modulated by one's aversion to uncertainty: Uncertainty-intolerant individuals experienced greater brain-to-brain synchrony with politically like-minded peers and lower synchrony with political opponents-an effect observed for liberals and conservatives alike. Moreover, the greater the neural synchrony between committed partisans, the more likely that two individuals formed similar, polarized attitudes about the debate. These results suggest that uncertainty attitudes gate the shared neural processing of political narratives, thereby fueling polarized attitude formation about hot-button issues.

Moving Morality Beyond the In-Group: Liberals and Conservatives Show Differences on Group-Framed Moral Foundations and These Differences Mediate the Relationships to Perceived Bias and Threat

Moral foundations research suggests that liberals care about moral values related to individual rights such as harm and fairness, while conservatives care about those foundations in addition to caring more about group rights such as loyalty, authority, and purity. However, the question remains about how conservatives and liberals differ in relation to group-level moral principles. We used two versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with the target group being either abstract or specific ingroups or outgroups. Across three studies, we observed that liberals showed more endorsement of Individualizing foundations (Harm and Fairness foundations) with an outgroup target, while conservatives showed more endorsement of Binding foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations) with an ingroup target. This general pattern was found when the framed, target-group was abstract (i.e., 'ingroups' and 'outgroups' in Study 1) and when target groups were specified about a general British-ingroup and an immigrant-outgroup (Studies 2 and 3). In Studies 2 and 3, both Individualizing-Ingroup Preference and Binding-Ingroup Preference scores predicted more Attitude Bias and more Negative Attitude Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), more Implicit Bias (Study 3), and more Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). We also demonstrated that increasing liberalism was associated with less Attitude Bias and less Negative Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), less Implicit Bias (Study 3), and less Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). Outgroup-individualizing foundations and Ingroup-Binding foundations showed different patterns of mediation of these effects.

Political games of attack and defence

Political conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo. We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric game of attack and defence with its equilibrium in mixed strategies. Formal analyses generate predictions about effort expended on revising and protecting the status quo, the form and function of false signalling and cheap talk, how power differences impact conflict intensity and the likelihood of status quo revision. Laboratory experiments on the neurocognitive and hormonal foundations of attack and defence reveal that out-of-equilibrium investments in attack emerge because of non-selfish preferences, limited capacity to compute costs and benefits and optimistic beliefs about the chances of winning from one's rival. We conclude with implications for the likelihood of political change and inertia, and discuss the role of ideology in political games of attack and defence.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

Of pathogens and party lines: Social conservatism positively associates with COVID-19 precautions among U.S. Democrats but not Republicans

Social liberals tend to be less pathogen-avoidant than social conservatives, a pattern consistent with a model wherein ideological differences stem from differences in threat reactivity. Here we investigate if and how individual responses to a shared threat reflect those patterns of ideological difference. In seeming contradiction to the general association between social conservatism and pathogen avoidance, the more socially conservative political party in the United States has more consistently downplayed the dangers of COVID-19 during the ongoing pandemic. This puzzle offers an opportunity to examine the contributions of multiple factors to disease avoidance. We investigated the relationship between social conservatism and COVID-19 precautionary behavior in light of the partisan landscape of the United States. We explored whether consumption of, and attitudes toward, different sources of information, as well as differential evaluation of various threats caused by the pandemic-such as direct health costs versus indirect harms to the economy and individual liberties-shape partisan differences in responses to the pandemic in ways that overwhelm the contributions of social conservatism. In two pre-registered studies, socially conservative attitudes correlate with self-reported COVID-19 prophylactic behaviors, but only among Democrats. Reflecting larger societal divisions, among Republicans and Independents, the absence of a positive relationship between social conservatism and COVID-19 precautions appears driven by lower trust in scientists, lower trust in liberal and moderate sources, lesser consumption of liberal news media, and greater economic conservatism.

Dispositional Fear and Political Attitudes

Previous work proposes that dispositional fear exists predominantly among political conservatives, generating the appearance that fears align strictly along party lines. This view obscures evolutionary dynamics because fear evolved to protect against myriad threats, not merely those in the political realm. We suggest prior work in this area has been biased by selection on the dependent variable, resulting from an examination of exclusively politically oriented fears that privilege conservative values. Because the adaptation regulating fear should be based upon both universal and ancestral-specific selection pressures combined with developmental and individual differences, the elicitation of it should prove variable across the ideological continuum dependent upon specific combinations of fear and value domains. In a sample of ~ 1,600 Australians assessed with a subset of the Fear Survey Schedule II, we find fears not infused with political content are differentially influential across the political spectrum. Specifically, those who are more fearful of sharp objects, graveyards, and urinating in public are more socially conservative and less supportive of gay rights. Those who are more fearful of death are more supportive of gay rights. Those who are more fearful of suffocating and swimming alone are more concerned about emissions controls and immigration, while those who are more fearful of thunderstorms are also more anti-immigration. Contrary to existing research, both liberals and conservatives are more fearful of different circumstances, and the role of dispositional fears are attitude-specific.

Yikes! Are we disgusted by politicians?

In the political domain, disgust is primarily portrayed as an emotion that explains individual differences in pathogen avoidance. We hypothesized that political rhetoric accusing opponents of moral transgressions also elicits disgust responses. In this registered report, we present the results from a laboratory experiment. We find that participants self-report higher disgust and have stronger physiological (Levator labii) responses to pictures of out-party leaders compared with in-party leaders. Participants also report higher disgust in response to moral violations of in-party leaders. There is more suggestive evidence that in-party leaders evoke more labii activity when they commit moral violations than when out-party leaders do. The impact of individual differences in moral disgust and partisanship strength is very limited to absent. Intriguingly, on average, the physiological and self-reported disgust responses to the treatment are similar, but individuals differ in whether their response is physiological or cognitive. This motivates further theorizing regarding the concordance of emotional responses.

Fusiform Activity Distinguishes Between Subjects With Low and High Xenophobic Attitudes Toward Refugees

This study analyzes how people's attitudes to the European refugee crisis (ERC) correspond to selected psychological state and trait measures and impact the neural processing of media images of refugees. From a large pool of respondents, who filled in an online xenophobia questionnaire, we selected two groups (total N = 38) with the same socio-demographic background, but with opposite attitudes toward refugees. We found that a negative attitude toward refugees (high xenophobia - HX) was associated with a significantly higher conscientiousness score and with a higher trait aggression and hostility, but there was no group effect connected with empathy, fear, and anxiety measures. At the neural level we found that brain activity during the presentation of ERC stimuli is affected by xenophobic attitudes—with more xenophobic subjects exhibiting a higher BOLD response in the left fusiform gyrus. However, while the fMRI results demonstrate increased attention and vigilance toward ERC-related stimuli in the HX group, they do not show differentiated patterns of brain activity associated with perception of dehumanized outgroup.

Factors Predicting Willingness to Share COVID-19 Misinformation

We conducted a preregistered exploratory survey to assess whether patterns of individual differences in political orientation, social dominance orientation (SDO), traditionalism, conspiracy ideation, or attitudes about science predict willingness to share different kinds of misinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic online. Analyses revealed two orthogonal models of individual differences predicting the willingness to share misinformation over social media platforms. Both models suggest a sizable role of different aspects of political belief, particularly SDO, in predicting tendencies to share different kinds of misinformation, predominantly conspiracy theories. Although exploratory, results from this study can contribute to the formulation of a socio-cognitive profile of individuals who act as vectors for the spread of scientific misinformation online, and can be useful for computationally modeling misinformation diffusion.

Ideology and social cognition Are liberals and conservatives differentially affected by social cues about group inequality?

Research links liberal and conservative ideological orientations with variation on psychological and cognitive characteristics that are important for perceptual processes and decision-making. This study investigates whether this variation can impact the social behaviors of liberals and conservatives. A sample of subjects (n = 1,245) participated in a modified public goods game in which an intragroup inequality was introduced to observe the effect on individuals' tendency toward self-interested versus prosocial behavior. Overall, the contributions of neither liberal- nor conservative-oriented individuals were affected by conditions of a general intragroup inequality. However, in response to the knowledge that group members voted to redress the inequality, levels of contribution among liberals significantly increased in comparison to the control. This was not true for conservatives. The results provide evidence that differences in ideological orientation are associated with individual differences in social cognition.

Conservatives and liberals have similar physiological responses to threats

About a decade ago, a study documented that conservatives have stronger physiological responses to threatening stimuli than liberals. This work launched an approach aimed at uncovering the biological roots of ideology. Despite wide-ranging scientific and popular impact, independent laboratories have not replicated the study. We conducted a pre-registered direct replication (n = 202) and conceptual replications in the United States (n = 352) and the Netherlands (n = 81). Our analyses do not support the conclusions of the original study, nor do we find evidence for broader claims regarding the effect of disgust and the existence of a physiological trait. Rather than studying unconscious responses as the real predispositions, alignment between conscious and unconscious responses promises deeper insights into the emotional roots of ideology.

The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology

Research over the last fifty years has suggested that political attitudes and values around the globe are shaped by two ideological dimensions, often referred to as economic and social conservatism. However, it remains unclear why this ideological structure exists. Here we highlight the striking concordance between these dual dimensions of ideology and independent convergent evidence for two key shifts in the evolution of human group living. First, humans began to cooperate more and across wider interdependent networks. Second, humans became more group-minded, conforming to social norms in culturally marked groups and punishing norm-violators. We propose that fitness trade-offs and behavioural plasticity have maintained functional variation in willingness to cooperate and conform within modern human groups, naturally giving rise to the two dimensions of political ideology. Supported by evidence from across the behavioural sciences, this evolutionary framework provides insight into the biological and cultural basis of political ideology.

Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle

Do clashes between ideologies reflect policy differences or something more fundamental? The present research suggests they reflect core psychological differences such that liberals express compassion toward less structured and more encompassing entities (i.e., universalism), whereas conservatives express compassion toward more well-defined and less encompassing entities (i.e., parochialism). Here we report seven studies illustrating universalist versus parochial differences in compassion. Studies 1a-1c show that liberals, relative to conservatives, express greater moral concern toward friends relative to family, and the world relative to the nation. Studies 2a-2b demonstrate these universalist versus parochial preferences extend toward simple shapes depicted as proxies for loose versus tight social circles. Using stimuli devoid of political relevance demonstrates that the universalist-parochialist distinction does not simply reflect differing policy preferences. Studies 3a-3b indicate these universalist versus parochial tendencies extend to humans versus nonhumans more generally, demonstrating the breadth of these psychological differences.

Religiosity Predicts Evidentiary Standards

Research shows that religious and nonreligious individuals have different standards of evidence for religious and scientific claims. Here, in a preregistered replication and extension of McPhetres and Zuckerman, participants read about an effect attributed to either a scientific or religious cause, then assessed how much evidence, in the form of successful replications, would be needed to confirm or to reject the causal claim. As previously observed, religious individuals exhibited a bias for believing religious claims relative to scientific claims, while nonreligious individuals were consistent in their standards of evidence across domains. In a novel extension examining standards of evidence with respect to failures of replication, we found that religious individuals were consistent across domains, whereas nonreligious individuals indicated a lower threshold for rejecting religious claims relative to scientific claims. These findings indicate asymmetries in the evaluation of claims based on the presence versus absence of supportive evidence.

Cross-national evidence of a negativity bias in psychophysiological reactions to news

News coverage of current affairs is predominantly negative. American accounts of this tendency tend to focus on journalistic practices, but this cannot easily account for negative news content around the world. It is more likely that negativity in news is a product of a human tendency to be more attentive to negative news content. Just how widespread is this tendency? Our evidence suggest that, all around the world, the average human is more physiologically activated by negative than by positive news stories. Even so, there is a great deal of variation across individuals. The latter finding is of real significance for newsmakers: Especially in a diversified media environment, news producers should not underestimate the audience for positive news content.

What accounts for the prevalence of negative news content? One answer may lie in the tendency for humans to react more strongly to negative than positive information. “Negativity biases” in human cognition and behavior are well documented, but existing research is based on small Anglo-American samples and stimuli that are only tangentially related to our political world. This work accordingly reports results from a 17-country, 6-continent experimental study examining psychophysiological reactions to real video news content. Results offer the most comprehensive cross-national demonstration of negativity biases to date, but they also serve to highlight considerable individual-level variation in responsiveness to news content. Insofar as our results make clear the pervasiveness of negativity biases on average, they help account for the tendency for audience-seeking news around the world to be predominantly negative. Insofar as our results highlight individual-level variation, however, they highlight the potential for more positive content, and suggest that there may be reason to reconsider the conventional journalistic wisdom that “if it bleeds, it leads.”

Moral Foundations in the 2015-16 U.S. Presidential Primary Debates: The Positive and Negative Moral Vocabulary of Partisan Elites

Moral foundations theory (MFT) suggests that individuals on the political left draw upon moral intuitions relating primarily to care and fairness, whereas conservatives are more motivated than liberals by authority, ingroup, and purity concerns. The theory of conservatism as motivated social cognition (CMSC) suggests that conservatives are more attuned than liberals to threat and to negative stimuli. Because evidence for both accounts rests on studies of mass publics, however, it remains unclear whether political elites of the left and right exhibit these inclinations. Thus, this analysis uses the 2015-16 United States presidential primary season as an occasion to explore partisan differences in candidates’ moral rhetoric. The analysis focuses on verbal responses to questions posed during party primary debates, a setting that is largely unscripted and thus potentially subject to intuitive influences. The Moral Foundations Dictionary is employed to analyze how frequently candidates used words representing various moral foundations, distinguishing between positive and negative references to each. Consistent with CMSC, the Republican candidates were more likely to use negative-valence moral terminology, describing violations of moral foundations. The direction of some partisan differences contradicts the expectations of MFT. Donald Trump, a novice candidate, was an exception to the typical Republican pattern, making markedly lower overall use of moral-foundations vocabulary.

“Giant Toxic Lakes You Can See from Space”: A Theory of Multimodal Messages and Emotion in Legitimacy Work

Organizations need to appear legitimate to access resources. Thus, actors often carry out legitimacy work to shape others’ evaluation of something as “desirable, proper or appropriate.” Such research has tended to focus on the cognitive appeal of words. Recently, research has also emerged on the persuasiveness of images, especially for creating emotional appeals. We develop a process model to explain the role of multimodal messages—combining words and images—in legitimacy work. With this model, we aim to answer: Why do certain combinations of multimodal messages (words and images) more forcefully evoke emotion and more reliably capture recipients’ attention, motivate them to process those messages, and (re)evaluate the legitimacy of an organization, its activities, and/or its industry? We conclude by discussing theoretical extensions and connections to other methods such as institutional work and values work.

Threats to the validity of eye-movement research in psychology

Eyetracking research in psychology has grown exponentially over the past decades, as equipment has become cheaper and easier to use. The surge in eyetracking research has not, however, been equaled by a growth in methodological awareness, and practices that are best avoided have become commonplace. We describe nine threats to the validity of eyetracking research and provide, whenever possible, advice on how to avoid or mitigate these challenges. These threats concern both internal and external validity and relate to the design of eyetracking studies, to data preprocessing, to data analysis, and to the interpretation of eyetracking data.

Electoral fortunes reverse, mindsets do not

Conservatives and liberals have previously been shown to differ in the propensity to view socially-transmitted information about hazards as more plausible than that concerning benefits. Given differences between conservatives and liberals in threat sensitivity and dangerous-world beliefs, correlations between political orientation and negatively-biased credulity may thus reflect endogenous mindsets. Alternatively, such results may owe to the political hierarchy at the time of previous research, as the tendency to see dark forces at work is thought to be greater among those who are out of political power. Adjudicating between these accounts can inform how societies respond to the challenge of alarmist disinformation campaigns. We exploit the consequences of the 2016 U.S. elections to test these competing explanations of differences in negatively-biased credulity and conspiracism as a function of political orientation. Two studies of Americans reveal continued positive associations between conservatism, negatively-biased credulity, and conspiracism despite changes to the power structure in conservatives’ favor.

Conservatism and the neural circuitry of threat: economic conservatism predicts greater amygdala-BNST connectivity during periods of threat vs safety

Political conservatism is associated with an increased negativity bias, including increased attention and reactivity toward negative and threatening stimuli. Although the human amygdala has been implicated in the response to threatening stimuli, no studies to date have investigated whether conservatism is associated with altered amygdala function toward threat. Furthermore, although an influential theory posits that connectivity between the amygdala and bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) is important in initiating the response to sustained or uncertain threat, whether individual differences in conservatism modulate this connectivity is unknown. To test whether conservatism is associated with increased reactivity in neural threat circuitry, we measured participants’ self-reported social and economic conservatism and asked them to complete high-resolution fMRI scans while under threat of an unpredictable shock and while safe. We found that economic conservatism predicted greater connectivity between the BNST and a cluster of voxels in the left amygdala during threat vs safety. These results suggest that increased amygdala–BNST connectivity during threat may be a key neural correlate of the enhanced negativity bias found in conservatism.

Elites are people, too: The effects of threat sensitivity on policymakers' spending priorities

Recent research suggests that psychological needs can influence the political attitudes of ordinary citizens, often outside of their conscious awareness. In this paper, we investigate whether psychological needs also shape the spending priorities of political elites in the US. Most models of policymaking assume that political elites respond to information in relatively homogeneous ways. We suggest otherwise, and explore one source of difference in information processing, namely, threat sensitivity, which previous research links to increased support for conservative policy attitudes. Drawing on a sample of state-level policymakers, we measure their spending priorities using a survey and their level of threat sensitivity using a standard psychophysiological measure (skin conductance). We find that, like ordinary citizens, threat sensitivity leads even state-level policymakers to prioritize spending on government polices that are designed to minimize threats.

Battle of Wits

Political conservatism and threat salience have been consistently associated with intergroup bias. However, prior research has not examined potential effects of conservatism and/or threat on the attribution of relative in-group/out-group intelligence. In a cross-cultural study conducted in Spain and the United Kingdom, priming violent conflict with ISIS led participants to view an in-group ally as relatively more intelligent than an out-group adversary, in an effect mediated by feelings of anger (but not fear or general arousal). Conservatism similarly predicted biased perception of the ally’s relative intellect, a tendency that was driven by militaristic (not social/fiscal) political attitudes but was not explained by associated increases in state anger following conflict cues. This overall pattern indicates that conflict cues and militaristic political orientation heighten assessments of relative intergroup intellect during warfare via distinct affective and attitudinal pathways.

Lower Levels of Resistance to Change (but not Opposition to Equality) Is Related to Analytic Cognitive Style

Abstract. In recent years, there has been increasing research attention to cognitive style differences between liberals and conservatives. While some studies have found a negative relation between conservatism and analytic thinking tendency, others have not observed such a relation. None of these studies has measured the core motives underlying conservative ideology and investigated their relation with analytic cognitive style (ACS). We predicted that ACS is related to only one of the core motives underlying conservatism (resistance to change), but not the other (opposition to equality). This hypothesis was supported in three non-Western samples (total n = 1,552). This finding may clarify why some studies found a relation between cognitive style and conservatism, while others did not.