Metamemory in children with autism

A meta-analysis and critical review of metacognitive accuracy in autism

LAY ABSTRACT

The ability to make accurate judgements about our own and others' mental states has been widely researched; however, it is unclear how these two abilities relate to each other. This is important given that there is evidence that autistic individuals can have difficulty with accurately judging others' mental states. Recent evidence suggests that some autistic individuals may also have difficulty accurately judging their own mental states. This may have an impact on various aspects of everyday life but particularly academic success, and therefore it is important that this skill is not overlooked when exploring areas of individual support. The aim of this article is to bring together the research examining autistic individual's ability of making accurate judgements about their own mental states and to establish whether this is an area that warrants further investigation. The results from this article show that autistic individuals may have difficulty making accurate judgements about their own mental states, although this depends on the type of judgement being made. It also highlighted that while autistic children may have difficulties in some areas, these may improve by adulthood. Overall, this article shows that more research is needed to fully understand where specific difficulties lie and how they may be overcome.

Memory and metamemory for actions in children with autism: Exploring global metacognitive judgements

BACKGROUND

Standards in education emphasize the role of metacognition in successful academic outcomes for those with and without learning challenges. Research into metamemory in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) has produced mixed outcomes, with some studies finding children with ASD to have spared metacognitive accuracy and others finding it impaired. While most research has used item-by-item metamemory judgements, the novelty of the current study was to use global judgments-of-learning (global JOLs).

METHOD

Twenty-three children with and twenty without ASD were presented with two lists of action words during a learning phase and were asked to either act out the words in a self-performed task or just listen to them being read aloud in a verbal task (control condition). Typically, self-performance produces memory benefits called the enactment effect. For both tasks, children also made pre-learning and post-learning global JOLs, stating how many words they thought they would recall.

RESULTS

Both groups demonstrated the enactment effect, but neither predicted its beneficial effect. Compared to controls, participants with ASD were found to be less accurate in predicting their future memory performance, specifically in the self-performed task. Both groups were comparable in terms of metacognitive monitoring.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the findings suggest that success or failure in metacognitive tasks in ASD might depend on task difficulty, and the type of metacognitive judgement used.

Metacognitive Monitoring and Control of Eyewitness Memory Reports in Autism

Providing eyewitness testimony involves monitoring one's memory to provide a detailed and accurate account: reporting details likely to be accurate and withholding potentially inaccurate details. Autistic individuals reportedly experience difficulties in both retrieving episodic memories and monitoring their accuracy, which has important implications for eyewitness testimony. Thirty autistic and 33 IQ‐matched typically developing (TD) participants viewed a video of a mock bank robbery followed by three phases of questions (with judgments of confidence). In Phase 1, participants freely generated the granularity of their responses (i.e., fine‐ or coarse‐grained). In Phase 2, participants answered the same questions but provided both a fine‐ and a coarse‐grained answer. In Phase 3, participants were instructed to maximize accuracy over informativeness by selecting one of their Phase 2 answers as their final answer. They either received the questions socially (from the experimenter) or answered them online. There were no group differences in accuracy or metacognitive monitoring, with both autistic and TD witnesses demonstrating: (a) a strong preference for reporting fine‐grained details at the expense of accuracy; (b) improved though still suboptimal grain size reporting when instructed to maximize accuracy over informativeness; (c) effective accuracy monitoring; and (d) higher overall accuracy when questions were delivered socially. There was, however, a subtle difference in metacognitive control, with autistic witnesses performing more poorly than TD witnesses when questions were delivered socially, but not when they were delivered online. These findings contrast with evidence suggesting that autism is marked by impairments in episodic memory and metacognitive monitoring and control. Autism Res 2020, 13: 2017‐2029. © 2020 The Authors. Autism Research published by International Society for Autism Research published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Lay Summary

Autistic people have been reported to experience subtle difficulties in monitoring and regulating their information reporting, which has important implications for providing eyewitness testimony. We found that autistic witnesses' testimony comprised a similar level of detail and accuracy as non‐autistic witnesses' accounts. However, autistic people found it difficult to optimize their testimony when the questions were delivered socially—but not when they answered the questions online. © 2020 The Authors. Autism Research published by International Society for Autism Research published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Visual and verbal semantic productions in children with ASD, DLD, and typical language

PURPOSE

Associations between visual and verbal input allow children to form, augment, and refine their semantic representations within their mental lexicons. However, children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and with developmental language disorder (DLD; also known as specific language impairment) process visual and verbal information differently than their typically developing peers, which may impact how they incorporate visual and verbal features into their semantic representations. The purpose of this exploratory study was to investigate how children with ASD and DLD use visually and verbally presented input to produce semantic representations of newly learned words.

METHOD

Semantic features produced by 36 school-aged children (12 with ASD, 12 with DLD, and 12 with typical language development) were extracted from previously collected novel word definitions and coded based on their initial presentation modality (either visual, verbal, or both in combination) during an extended novel word learning paradigm. These features were then analyzed to explore group differences in the use of visual and verbal input.

RESULTS

The children with ASD and DLD produced significantly more visually-presented semantic features than their typical peers in their novel word definitions. There were no differences between groups in the proportion of semantic features presented verbally or via both modalities in combination. Also, the children increased their production of semantic features presented via both modalities combined across the sessions; this same increase in production was not observed for the semantic features taught in either the visual or verbal modality alone.

CONCLUSION

Children with ASD and DLD benefit from visually presented semantic information, either in isolation or combined with verbal input, during tasks of word learning. Also, the reinforcement of combined visual-verbal input appears to enhance semantic learning over time.

Supporting metacognitive monitoring in mathematics learning for young people with autism spectrum disorder: A classroom-based study

Previous research suggests impaired metacognitive monitoring and mathematics under-achievement in autism spectrum disorder. Within educational settings, metacognitive monitoring is supported through the provision of feedback (e.g. with goal reminders and by explicitly correcting errors). Given the strength of the relationship between metacognition, learning and educational attainment, this research tested new computer-based metacognitive support (the 'Maths Challenge') for mathematics learners with autism spectrum disorder within the context of their classroom. The Maths Challenge required learners to engage in metacognitive monitoring before and after answering each question (e.g. intentions and judgements of accuracy) and negotiate with the system the level of difficulty. Forty secondary school children with autism spectrum disorder and 95 typically developing learners completed the Maths Challenge in either a Feedback condition, with metacognitive monitoring support regarding the accuracy of their answers, goal reminders and strategy support, or with No Feedback. Contrary to previous findings, learners with autism showed an undiminished ability to detect errors. They did, however, demonstrate reduced cohesion between their pre- and post-test intentions. Crucially, support from the Feedback condition significantly improved task performance for both groups. Findings highlight important implications for educational interventions regarding the provision of metacognitive support for learners with autism to ameliorate under-performance in mathematics within the classroom.

Metacognitive Awareness of Facial Affect in Higher-Functioning Children and Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Higher-functioning participants with and without autism spectrum disorder (ASD) viewed a series of face stimuli, made decisions regarding the affect of each face, and indicated their confidence in each decision. Confidence significantly predicted accuracy across all participants, but this relation was stronger for participants with typical development than participants with ASD. In the hierarchical linear modeling analysis, there were no differences in face processing accuracy between participants with and without ASD, but participants with ASD were more confident in their decisions. These results suggest that individuals with ASD have metacognitive impairments and are overconfident in face processing. Additionally, greater metacognitive awareness was predictive of better face processing accuracy, suggesting that metacognition may be a pivotal skill to teach in interventions.

Deficits in metacognitive monitoring in mathematics assessments in learners with autism spectrum disorder

Children and adults with autism spectrum disorder have been found to have deficits in metacognition that could impact upon their learning. This study explored metacognitive monitoring in 28 (23 males and 5 females) participants with autism spectrum disorder and 56 (16 males and 40 females) typically developing controls who were being educated at the same level. Participants were asked a series of mathematics questions. Based upon previous research, after each question they were asked two metacognitive questions: (1) whether they thought they had got the answer correct or not (or 'don't know') and (2) whether they meant to get the answer correct or not (or 'don't know'). Participants with autism spectrum disorder were significantly more likely than the typically developing group to erroneously think that they had got an incorrect answer correct. Having made an error, those with autism spectrum disorder were also significantly more likely to report that they had meant to make the error. Different patterns in the types of errors made were also identified between the two groups. Deficits in metacognition were identified for the autism spectrum disorder group in the learning of mathematics. This is consistent with metacognitive research from different contexts and the implications for supporting learning in autism spectrum disorder are discussed.

Spontaneous strategy use in children with autism spectrum disorder: the roles of metamemory and language skills

Metamemory, or beliefs about one’s own memory capabilities, knowing what you know, and knowing what you don’t know, has frequently been linked to the spontaneous use of rehearsal strategies in typically developing children. However, limited research has investigated mnemonic strategy use, metamemory, or the relationship between these two cognitive processes in children with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). The current study examined the relative strength of metamemory knowledge and language skills as predictors of rehearsal use and memory performance in individuals with ASD. Twenty-one children with ASD and 21 children in a combined comparison group were matched on chronological and verbal mental age. Over two sessions, participants completed a serial recall task, a language measure, and a metamemory questionnaire. Children were classified as rehearsers/non-rehearsers based on behavioral observations and/or verbal reports of strategy use. As expected from previous research, the comparison group had a significantly higher proportion of rehearsers than the ASD group. However, spontaneous rehearsers performed significantly better on the serial recall task than non-rehearsers, regardless of group membership. Children in the comparison group had a higher mean total score on the metamemory questionnaire than the ASD group. However, when examined by rehearsal use, participants classified as rehearsers, regardless of diagnostic group, scored significantly higher on the metamemory questionnaire than non-rehearsers. Finally, across groups, hierarchical regression analyses identified both metamemory and language proficiency as significant predictors of rehearsal strategy use. The fact that the predictors showed the same relationship across the comparison group and the ASD group implies that metamemory and language proficiency, while separate entities, are both fundamental underlying skills contributing to the emergence of rehearsal strategies, and that the results are likely generalizable to other populations with developmental challenges.

Being aware of own performance: how accurately do children with autism spectrum disorder judge own memory performance?

Self-awareness was investigated by assessing accuracy of judging own memory performance in a group of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) compared with a group of typically developing (TD) children. Effects of stimulus type (social vs. nonsocial), and availability of feedback information as the task progressed, were examined. Results overall showed comparable levels and patterns of accuracy in the ASD and TD groups. A trend level effect (p = 061, d = 0.60) was found, with ASD participants being more accurate in judging own memory for nonsocial than social stimuli and the opposite pattern for TD participants. These findings suggest that awareness of own memory can be good in children with ASD. It is discussed how this finding may be interpreted, and it is suggested that further investigation into the relation between content, frequency, and quality of self-awareness, and the context of self-awareness, is needed.

Relations among prospective memory, cognitive abilities, and brain structure in adolescents who vary in prenatal drug exposure

This investigation examined how prospective memory (PM) relates to cognitive abilities (i.e., executive function, attention, working memory, and retrospective memory) and brain structure in adolescents who vary in prenatal drug exposure (PDE). The sample consisted of 105 (55 female and 50 male) urban, primarily African American adolescents (mean age=15.5 years) from low socioeconomic status (SES) families. Approximately 56% (n=59) were prenatally exposed to drugs (heroin and/or cocaine) and 44% (n=46) were not prenatally exposed, but the adolescents were similar in age, gender, race, and SES. Executive functioning, attentional control, working memory, retrospective memory, and overall cognitive ability were assessed by validated performance measures. Executive functioning was also measured by caregiver report. A subset of 52 adolescents completed MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scans, which provided measures of subcortical gray matter volumes and thickness of prefrontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. Results revealed no differences in PM performance by PDE status, even after adjusting for age and IQ. Executive function, retrospective memory, cortical thickness in frontal and parietal regions, and volume of subcortical regions (i.e., putamen and hippocampus) were related to PM performance in the sample overall, even after adjusting for age, IQ, and total gray matter volume. Findings suggest that variations in PM ability during adolescence are robustly related to individual differences in cognitive abilities, in particular executive function and retrospective memory, and brain structure, but do not vary by PDE status.

Metacognitive judgments-of-learning in adolescents with autism spectrum disorder

This study investigated metacognitive monitoring abilities in adolescents with autism spectrum disorder in two experiments using the judgment-of-learning paradigm. Participants were asked to predict their future recall of unrelated word pairs during the learning phase. Experiment 1 compared judgments-of-learning made immediately after learning and judgments-of-learning made after a delay. We found that both groups overestimated their memory performance but that overall there were no group differences in judgment-of-learning accuracy. Additionally, both groups displayed the standard delayed judgment-of-learning effect (yielding greater judgment accuracy in delayed compared to immediate judgments), suggesting that both groups were able to use appropriate information in making their judgments-of-learning. Experiment 2 assessed whether adolescents with autism spectrum disorder could regulate their study time according to their judgments-of-learning using a self-paced learning procedure. Results showed that both groups spent more time learning items given lower judgments-of-learning. Finally, Experiment 2 showed that judgments-of-learning and study time varied according to item difficulty in both groups. As a whole, these findings demonstrate that adolescents with autism spectrum disorder can accurately gauge their memory performance while learning new word associations and use these skills to control their study time at learning.

Memory in ASD: have we been barking up the wrong tree?

In this theoretical note, possible neural causes of episodic memory impairment in individuals with ASD and currently normal intellectual and linguistic function are considered. The neural causes most commonly argued for are hippocampal or prefrontal cortex dysfunction, associated with impaired neural connectivity. It is argued here that a hippocampal dysfunction hypothesis is weakened by differences in cued recall and paired associate learning in individuals with ASD compared with individuals with developmental or acquired hippocampus-related amnesia, and that recent findings on patients with posterior parietal lesions (PPC) offer a better fit with the dissociation between free and cued recall observed in ASD. The PPC forms part of the default system subserving mindreading, among other functions, and an association between PPC dysfunction and memory impairment in ASD is consistent with recent suggestions that neural disconnectivity within the default system underlies behaviours diagnostic of ASD.

Putting theory of mind in its place: psychological explanations of the socio-emotional-communicative impairments in autistic spectrum disorder

In this review, the history of the theory of mind (ToM) theory of autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is outlined (in which ToM is indexed by success on false belief tasks), and the explanatory power and psychological causes of impaired ToM in ASD are critically discussed. It is concluded that impaired ToM by itself has only limited explanatory power, but that explorations of the psychological precursors of impaired ToM have been fruitful in increasing understanding of mindreading impairments in ASD (where 'mindreading' refers those abilities that underlie triadic interaction as well as ToM). It is argued that early explanations of impaired mindreading are untenable for various reasons, but that impairments of dyadic interaction in ASD that could lead to impaired ability to represent others' mental states may be the critical psychological cause, or causes, of impaired ToM. The complexity of causal routes to impaired ToM is emphasized.

Information seeking by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Animal metacognition is an active, growing research area, and one part of metacognition is flexible information-seeking behavior. In Roberts et al. (2009), pigeons failed an intuitive information-seeking task. They basically refused, despite multiple fostering experiments, to view a sample image before attempting to find its match. Roberts et al. concluded that pigeons' lack of an information-seeking capacity reflected their broader lack of metacognition. We report a striking species contrast to pigeons. Eight rhesus macaques and seven capuchin monkeys passed the Roberts et al. test of information seeking-often in their first testing session. Members of both primate species appreciated immediately the lack of information signaled by an occluded sample, and the need for an information-seeking response to manage the situation. In subsequent testing, macaques demonstrated flexible/varied forms of information management. Capuchins did not. The research findings bear on the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition across the vertebrates, and on the underlying psychological requirements for metacognitive and information-seeking performances.

Memory awareness for faces in individuals with autism

Little is known regarding metacognition in individuals with autism. Specifically, it is unclear how individuals with autism think about their own mental states. The current study assessed memory awareness during a facial recognition task. High-functioning children (M = 13.1 years, n = 18) and adults (M = 27.5 years, n = 16) with autism matched with typically developing children (M = 14.3 years, n = 13) and adults (M = 26.9 years, n = 15) were tested. Children with autism demonstrated less accurate memory awareness for faces and less reliable differentiation between their confidence ratings compared to typically developing children. Subtle impairments in memory awareness for faces were also evident in adults with autism. Results indicate that broader metacognitive deficits may exist in individuals with autism, possibly contributing to other known impairments.

How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition

Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the "mindreading is prior" model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to our own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. This section also considers the model's relationship to the expression of attitudes in speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues briefly that data from childhood development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to which the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that are not borne out by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7 considers "two systems" accounts of human thinking and reasoning, arguing that although there are introspectable events within System 2, there are no introspectable attitudes. Section 8 examines alleged evidence of "unsymbolized thinking". Section 9 considers the claim that schizophrenia exhibits a dissociation between mindreading and metacognition. Finally, section 10 evaluates the claim that autism presents a dissociation in the opposite direction, of metacognition without mindreading.

Overlooking metacognitive experience

Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences.

Development of rostral prefrontal cortex and cognitive and behavioural disorders

Information on the development and functions of rostral prefrontal cortex (PFC), or Brodmann area 10, has been gathered from different fields, from anatomical development to functional neuroimaging in adults, and put forward in relation to three particular cognitive and behavioural disorders. Rostral PFC is larger and has a lower cell density in humans than in other primates. It also has a large number of dendritic spines per cell and numerous connections to the supramodal cortex. These characteristics suggest that rostral PFC is likely to support processes of integration or coordination of inputs that are particularly developed in humans. The development of rostral PFC is prolonged, with decreases in grey matter and synaptic density continuing into adolescence. Functions attributed to rostral PFC, such as prospective memory, seem similarly to follow a prolonged development until adulthood. Neuroimaging studies have generally found a reduced recruitment of rostral PFC, for example in tasks requiring response inhibition, in adults compared with children or adolescents, which is consistent with maturation of grey matter. The examples of autism, attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder, and schizophrenia show that rostral PFC could be affected in several disorders as a result of the susceptibility of its prolonged maturation to developmental abnormalities.

High functioning children with autism spectrum disorder: A novel test of multitasking

High functioning children with a diagnosis of autism or Asperger's syndrome (HF-ASD) often experience difficulties organising goal-directed actions in their day-to-day lives, requiring support to schedule daily activities. This study aimed to capture these everyday difficulties experimentally using multitasking, a methodology that taps into the cognitive processes necessary for successful goal-directed activities in everyday life. We investigated multitasking in children with HF-ASD using a novel multitask test, the Battersea Multitask Paradigm. Thirty boys participated in the study, 14 with HF-ASD and 16 typically developing controls, matched for age and IQ. Group differences in multitasking were observed. Participants with HF-ASD were less efficient at planning, attempted fewer tasks, switched inflexibly between tasks and broke performance rules more frequently than controls.

Counterfactual and mental state reasoning in children with autism

The contributions of counterfactual conditional reasoning (CCR), belief understanding, and inferential reasoning to the performance of children with autism (CWA) on standard false belief tasks were investigated. To assess the roles of these three factors, we compared the performance of CWA on physical-state CCR tasks (which do not require either an understanding of belief or inferential reasoning); on Wellman and Bartsch's (1988) nonstandard tests of false belief (which require an understanding of belief, but not CCR or inferential reasoning), and on standard tests of false belief tasks. The CWA were impaired relative to controls on the physical-state CCR and standard false-belief tasks, but not on the nonstandard false-belief tasks, and the CWA's performance on the physical-state CCR and standard false-belief tasks correlated highly, even when the effects of verbal ability were partialled out. Finally, the CWA's performance on standard false-belief tasks was more impaired than their performance on the physical-state CCR tasks. We concluded that impaired performance on standard false-belief tasks in autism is associated with defective competence in CCR (or some of its component skills), plus defective competence in inferential reasoning and possibly generativity, but that impaired performance is not caused by an inadequate understanding of belief. The results are discussed in relation to other hypotheses concerning the cause or causes of impaired performance on standard false-belief tasks in children with autism.

Developmental patterns in priming and familiarity in explicit recollection

Developmental trajectories of two classes of human memory, implicit and explicit memory, appear to diverge. We examined how developmental differences in perceptual and conceptual priming, two types of implicit memory, coincide with differences between familiarity and recollective responses on explicit memory tests that employ the Remember/Know paradigm ( Tulving, 1985 ). Both types of priming were characterized by developmental invariance in 52 children and adolescents ages 8-19 years. Contrary to Komatsu, Naito, and Fuke (1996) results, few age-group differences in perceptual priming were observed following a levels-of-processing encoding manipulation. In contrast, age group differences were found for "Remember" but not "Know" responses. Neither levels of awareness nor strategies influenced priming. Adult levels of performance appear earlier in development on perceptual and conceptual priming tests compared to explicit memory tests. Similar developmental dissociations exist between explicit and implicit memory performance as between "Remember" and "Know" recollective responses.

Recall readiness in children with autism

When people are asked to learn information they need to judge when they have encoded the information accurately and will be able to retrieve it correctly. Making such a judgment is an aspect of metacognitive ability, and is referred to as "recall readiness." Previous researchers have not considered recall readiness in children with autism, therefore we asked matched groups of children with autism, children with mental retardation, and normally developing children (mean mental age: 7 years) to study several pictures of objects until they felt ready to recall all the objects without error. Their recall was then tested. The children with autism and the children with mental retardation had impaired recall readiness compared to the normally developing children. We discuss this result with reference to other research into the metacognitive abilities of children with autism.