The contributions of mental state understanding and executive functioning to preschool-aged children's lie-telling

Elementary school-aged children's perceptions of academic dishonesty: Definitions and moral evaluations of cheating behaviors in school

A total of 76 children (Mage = 9 years 5 months, SD = 2.22 years) participated in a structured interview about their experiences with and knowledge of academic dishonesty. Overall, 27% of the sample reported having cheated in school. Most of these children were 10 to 13 years old, and the most prevalent form of cheating behavior reported was using forbidden materials during a test. Children's age group was a significant positive predictor of their reported cheating history; however, no significant difference was found between children's gender and engagement with cheating. Children's moral evaluations of cheating did not predict their reported cheating history, nor did children's parents' cheating history. Vignette type (cheating vs. non-cheating), age group, and the interaction between vignette type and age group were significant predictors of children's ability to accurately identify behaviors that constitute cheating. Children rated cheating behaviors as significantly less moral than non-cheating behaviors. Overall, the current results provide insight into what forms of cheating behavior children engage in at the elementary school-age level.

To tell the truth or not: What effortful control, false belief, and sympathy tell us about preschoolers' instrumental lies

This study aimed to examine the predictors of instrumental lies in preschool children, specifically focusing on false belief, effortful control, and sympathy. Instrumental lies are intentional falsehoods used to achieve personal goals such as avoiding punishment and obtaining an undeserved reward. A total of 192 preschool children (age range = 32-73 month-olds), along with their mothers and fathers, participated in the study. The Temptation Resistance Paradigm, an experimental task, was employed to elicit instrumental lies from the children. The children also completed first-order false belief measures, and their parents filled out questionnaires assessing their children's effortful control and sympathy skills. Results revealed a positive association between children's effortful control and their decisions to tell instrumental lies. However, no significant relationship was found between false belief and instrumental lying. Age moderated the link between sympathy and the decision to tell instrumental lies, with sympathy being negatively associated with lie-telling behavior among older children but showing no effect among younger children. The study variables did not predict the maintenance of instrumental lies. Overall, this study provides valuable insights into the role of effortful control and sympathy as underlying temperamental and emotional processes influencing children's decisions to engage in instrumental lie-telling.

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children's elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children's second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children's ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.

Socio-cognitive correlates of primary school children's deceptive behavior toward peers in competitive settings

Competing for limited resources with peers is common among children from an early age, illustrating their propensity to use deceptive strategies to win. We focused on how primary school-age (6-8 years old) children's strategic deception toward peers is associated with their socio-cognitive development (theory of mind and executive functions). In a novel computerized competitive hide-and-seek game, we manipulated the peer opponents' familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and actions (following vs. not following children's indications), as well as the stimuli likability (liked vs. disliked cards). Our findings demonstrated that children deceived the familiar opponent less than the unfamiliar one, indicating their determination to preserve positive peer interactions. We showed that theory of mind and executive functions significantly predicted children's willingness to deceive. Notably, second-order false belief understanding and visuospatial working memory positively predicted children's use of truths to deceive, whereas inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility efficacy scores were negatively related to their deceptive performance when using the same strategy. Implications for children's competitive behavior toward peers involving lie-telling are discussed.

When kindergarteners are tempted to deceive: A study of factors predicting lie-telling for personal gain

The current study examined the relations between children's cognitive and emotion abilities with their likelihood to tell a lie for personal gain in a tempting situation. These relations were examined using behavioral tasks and questionnaires. A total of 202 Israel Arab Muslim kindergarten children participated in this study. Our results showed that behavioral self-regulation was positively associated with children's likelihood to tell a lie for personal gain. Children with higher behavioral self-regulation actually tended to lie more for their own gain, suggesting that the likelihood to tell a lie might be related to children's ability to mobilize and integrate their cognitive abilities to self-regulate their behavior. In addition, through exploratory analysis, we found a positive relation between theory of mind and children's likelihood to tell a lie, which was moderated by inhibition. Specifically, only among children with low inhibition was there a positive correlation between their theory of mind and the likelihood to lie. Moreover, age and gender were related to children's lie-telling; older children tended more to lie for their own gain, and this likelihood was higher for boys than for girls.

A cross-cultural comparison of the relation between children's moral standards of honesty and their lie-telling behavior

This study examined the relation between children's moral standards of honesty and their lie-telling behavior and the role that culture plays in this relation. In the study, 6- to 12-year-old Chinese and Northern American (Canadian and American) children underwent a behavioral paradigm where they had the opportunity to tell a lie about their performance to gain a benefit. The children then read vignettes where a character told lies to conceal a transgression committed to satisfy either a need or a desire and evaluated those lies. Northern American children were less likely to lie with age, but Chinese children did not demonstrate this trend. Lie-telling rates were higher for Chinese children than for Northern American children, but children were overall unlikely to tell a lie about their performance. Chinese children evaluated the lies in the vignettes more negatively than Northern American children. Children's moral standards of honesty were related to their lie-telling behavior, and the relation between children's moral standards and behavior did not differ by age in either culture. Overall, results suggest that culture influences how children make moral evaluations and decisions related to lie-telling and support the notion that children's moral standards and behavior are related. These findings suggest that socialization plays a central role in children's moral decision making related to honesty through helping children to develop moral standards related to honesty.

Peeking and lying in the temptation resistance paradigm in 2.5-year-olds: The role of inhibitory control

The main aim of the present study was to establish whether inhibitory control (IC) abilities influence the peeking and lying behaviours of 2.5-year-olds, as measured by a modified temptation resistance paradigm (mTRP). Using a longitudinal design, 252 children's IC abilities were tested at ages 1.5, 2 and 2.5, as well as their ability to lie at age 2.5. Results showed that 35% of 2.5-year-olds peeked, 27% of peekers lied and 40% of non-peekers falsely confessed they had peeked. Non-peekers had higher IC than peekers at ages 2 and 2.5. Lower IC at age 2 increased the probability of peeking at age 2.5 by 6 times. The highest level of IC was presented in children who followed the adult's restrictions in the mTRP and were then able to tell the truth about their behaviour. These results suggested that the first, or so-called primary, lies of 2.5-year-olds are probably spontaneous, rather than deliberate. Implications for further research were discussed.

Give and take: A microgenetic study of preschoolers' deceptive and prosocial behavior in relation to their socio-cognitive development

Early on, young children begin to learn the social skills which will help them navigate through an increasingly complex social world. We explored how deceiving for personal gain potentially interacts with sharing the resulting resources and how they both relate to theory of mind (ToM) and inhibitory control in 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 92, 43 girls). Children played a hide-and-seek zero-sum game in which they could win stickers if they discovered how to deceive the experimenter. Then they were prompted to share their stickers in a dictator game paradigm. Using a microgenetic design, we tracked deceptive behavior across ten sessions and sharing behavior across five of these sessions, plus a follow-up session 15 months later. Children polarized into a group who never deceived across all sessions, and a group who constantly deceived above chance levels (around 85 % of the time). Sharing behavior was extremely low (under 6 % of stickers) across the sessions. At follow-up, deceptive behavior was above 80 %, while sharing remained at a low level (under 5 %). The novelty of our findings was that children who initially discovered how to deceive shared less than the children who didn't use this deceptive strategy. Nonetheless, this pattern was reversed at follow-up. Furthermore, ToM positively predicted deceptive behavior across all sessions and improved after the microgenetic sessions but wasn't related with deception at follow-up. Implications for enabling children to deploy the growing understanding of their worlds in a more prosocial way are discussed.

A Review of the Nature and Development of Lying and Deception and Considerations for Teaching Prosocial Lying to Autistic Persons

Compared with their neurotypical (NT) counterparts, persons with autism appear to be less inclined to tell lies and less skilled in delivering sophisticated forms of deception. At the same time, some forms of deception like white lies and prosocial lies are frequent in human interaction because they are important for social success. This article challenges the reader to evaluate the therapeutic potential for prosocial deception and teaching white-lie telling to autistic persons. The nature and development of antisocial and prosocial lying in NT development and autism are reviewed. Considerations for when to (and when not to) teach the skill of empathic lying are discussed and recommendations for how to teach the comprehension and production of prosocial lies are offered.

Theory of Mind and Concealing vs. Forthcoming Communication in Adolescence

Concealing information requires that adolescents manage the information that they share, which requires cognitive skills, for example, theory of mind (ToM). This study explored motivations for concealment that early adolescents (N = 90, M = 12.81 years, SD = 5.10 months, range 12–14 years, and 58% female) endorsed concealing or disclosing to friends and parents, in relation to their theory of mind. We found that adolescents broadly endorsed disclosure to both parents and friends, even when it might mean they would face consequences, be impolite (by not protecting another’s feelings), or face negative identity-related emotions. We found that ToM ability was associated with a tendency to endorse being forthcoming and sharing information with both friends and parents. These findings provide new insight into how the relation between ToM and concealment may change with age, specifically how in early adolescence it may foster open communication rather than concealment as is the case in early and middle childhood.

Lie-telling for personal gain in children with and without externalizing behavior problems

Few studies have examined the lie-telling behavior of children who have externalizing problems using experimental procedures. In the current study, children's lie-telling for personal gain (N = 110 boys aged 6-11 years) was examined using an experimental paradigm in relation to their theory-of-mind abilities and inhibitory control as well as their moral evaluations of truths and lies. Children with externalizing behavior problems (n = 53) were significantly more likely to lie and to be less skilled at lying than a typical comparison group (n = 57). Children who had lower theory-of-mind scores were significantly less likely to tell a lie for personal gain compared with those who had higher theory-of-mind scores. Children with externalizing problems who told personal gain lies were also more likely to rate tattle truths more positively than other children. For a subsample of children (n = 55), parent-reported diaries of the frequency of children's lies over 2 weeks revealed a higher frequency of lies by children with externalizing problems compared with the typical comparison group. Children whose parents reported a high frequency of lies for their children were also more likely to lie in the experimental personal gain lie paradigm. Results suggest that children with externalizing behavior may have a different pattern of lie-telling than has been previously reported for normative lie development.

A Longitudinal Study of the Relations Between Theory of Mind, Executive Function, and Lying in Children

This study used longitudinal cross-lagged modeling to examine the contribution of theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF) to children’s lying development and of children’s lying to ToM and EF development. Ninety-seven Chinese children (initial M_age = 46 months, 47 boys) were tested three times approximately 4 months apart. Results showed that the diverse desire understanding and knowledge access understanding components of ToM, as well as the inhibitory control component of EF predicted the development of children’s lying, while the diverse belief understanding and false belief understanding components of ToM, and the working memory component of EF did not predict development of children’s lying. Meanwhile, children’s lying predicted development of children’s belief-emotion understanding components of ToM, but not any other ToM components, or EF components. These findings provide longitudinal evidence for the relation between ToM, EF, and children’s lying during the preschool years.

Functional connectivity between the caudate and medial prefrontal cortex reflects individual honesty variations in adults and children

Deception emerges in early childhood and prevails in adults. Activation patterns in previous adults' task-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), though sensitive to state honesty on a specific decision, are less reliable reflecting trait honesty. Besides of state honesty, most previous neuroimaging studies about dishonesty suffer the generalization problem due to the major focus on adults with children unexplored. To investigate honesty associated functional brain networks variations, 98 healthy adults (Age: 18-28 y.o.; 49 males and 49 females) were invited to participate in a resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rfMRI) study (Study 1). We investigated how functional connections between the caudate and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) change among adults who differ in self-reported trait honesty. Results showed that adults with higher trait honesty have increased functional connectivity from the caudate to the mPFC, which is identified as an honesty-related hub region in global brain connectivity analysis and connects more tightly to a wide range of brain regions including the amygdala. Study 2 compared functional connectivity between children with high vs. low lying frequencies (Age: 6-16 y.o.; 61 males and 39 females) based on a publicly accessible database of rfMRI. Consistent with findings in adults, increased functional connectivity from the caudate to the mPFC was found in less frequently lying children. Despite different honesty indicators of self-reported honesty trait in adults and parent-reported lying patterns in children, consistent findings have been noted in the two samples with regards to functional connectivity variations between reward-related and self-related brain regions. These findings suggest functional connectivity alterations between the caudate and the mPFC contribute to honesty variations in both adults and children.

Three-year-olds' spontaneous lying in a novel interaction-based paradigm and its relations to explicit skills and motivational factors

Previous research has investigated children's lying and its motivational and social-cognitive correlates mostly through explicit tasks. The current study used an anticipatory interaction-based paradigm adopted from research with preverbal infants. We investigated 3-year-olds' spontaneous lying within interaction and its motivational basis and relations to explicit skills of lying, false belief understanding, inhibitory control, and socialization. Children interacted with puppets to secure stickers that were hidden in one of two boxes. Either a friend or a competitor puppet tried to obtain the stickers. Nearly all children helpfully provided information about the sticker's location to the friend, and about half of the sample anticipatorily provided false information to the competitor. Children misinformed the competitor significantly more often than the friend, both when the reward was for themselves and when it was for someone else. Explicitly planning to lie in response to a question occurred significantly less often but predicted spontaneous lying, as did passing the explicit standard false belief task. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously invoke false beliefs in others. This communicative skill reveals an interactional use of false belief understanding in that it requires holding one's perspective to pursue one's goal while providing a different perspective to distract a competitor. Findings support the view that practical theory of mind skills emerge for social coordination and serve as a basis for developing explicit false belief reasoning.

Theory of mind, executive function, and lying in children: a meta-analysis

Scientific research on how children learn to tell lies has existed for more than a century. Earlier studies mainly focused on moral, social, and situational factors contributing to the development of lying. Researchers have only begun to explore the cognitive correlations of children's lying in the last two decades. Cognitive theories suggest that theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) should be closely related to the development of lying since lying is, in essence, ToM and EF in action. Yet, findings from empirical studies are mixed. To address this issue, the current meta-analysis reviewed all prior literature that examined the relations between children's lying and ToM and/or between children's lying and EF. In total, 47 papers consisting of 5099 participants between 2 and 19 years of age were included, which yielded 74 effect sizes for ToM and 94 effect sizes for EF. Statistically significant but relatively small effects were found between children's lying and ToM (r = .17) and between lying and EF (r = .13). Furthermore, EF's correlation with children's initial lies was significantly smaller than its correlation with children's ability to maintain lies. This comprehensive meta-analysis provides a clear picture of the associations between children's ToM/EF and their lying behavior and confirms that ToM and EF indeed play a positive role in children's lying and its development.

Lying and Theory of Mind: A Meta-Analysis

This meta-analysis investigated the link between lying and theory-of-mind (ToM) by integrating findings from 81 studies involving 7,826 children between 2 and 14 years of age from 14 different collectivist and individualist cultures. Overall, there was a small, significant positive association (r = .23). Four main moderators were examined: facet of lying (understanding, instigated production, spontaneous production, maintenance); valence of lies (antisocial, prosocial); type of ToM (first-order, second-order); and culture (collectivist, individualist). Facet of lying and type of ToM were significant moderators. ToM was positively related to all facets of lying, but most strongly linked to lie maintenance and weakest for spontaneous production. Both first-order and second-order ToM were positively related to lying, but the link was stronger for the former.

Children's concealment of a minor transgression: The role of age, maltreatment, and executive functioning

This study examined the role of age, maltreatment status, and executive functioning on 752 4- to 9-year-old maltreated and nonmaltreated children's recall disclosure of a transgression in which the children appeared to have broken toys while playing with a stranger. Interviewers used narrative practice rapport building and then questioned children with free recall and cued recall questions. Younger and maltreated children were more likely to disclose during rapport building, whereas older and nonmaltreated children were more likely to disclose in response to recall questions. Working memory deficits appeared to mediate the relation between children's characteristics and disclosure during rapport but not during recall. The results demonstrate that how children are questioned affects the relations between deception and age, maltreatment, and executive functioning.

Learning through observing: Effects of modeling truth- and lie-telling on children's honesty

The current study examined the influence of observing another's lie- or truth-telling - and its consequences - on children's own honesty about a transgression. Children (N = 224, 5-8 years of age) observed an experimenter (E) tell the truth or lie about a minor transgression in one of five conditions: (a) Truth-Positive Outcome - E told the truth with a positive outcome; (b) Truth-Negative Outcome - E told the truth with a negative outcome; (c) Lie-Positive Outcome - E lied with a positive outcome; (d) Lie-Negative Outcome - E lied with a negative outcome; (e) Control - E did not tell a lie or tell the truth. Later, to examine children's truth- or lie-telling behavior, children participated in a temptation resistance paradigm where they were told not to peek at a trivia question answer. They either peeked or not, and subsequently lied or told the truth about that behavior. Additionally, children were asked to give moral evaluations of different truth- and lie-telling vignettes. Overall, 85% of children lied. Children were less likely to lie about their own transgression in the TRP when they had previously witnessed the experimenter tell the truth with a positive outcome or tell a lie with a negative outcome.

The Relation Between Young Children's False Statements and Response Latency, Executive Functioning, and Truth-Lie Understanding

This study examined relations between children's false statements and response latency, executive functioning, and truth-lie understanding in order to understand what underlies children's emerging ability to make false statements. A total of 158 (2- to 5-year-old) children earned prizes for claiming that they were looking at birds even when presented with images of fish. Children were asked recall ("What do you have?"), recognition ("Do you have a bird/fish?"), and outcome ("Did you win/lose?") questions. Response latencies were greater when children were presented with fish pictures than bird pictures, particularly when they were asked recall questions, and were greater for false statements than for true statements, again when children were asked recall questions. Older but not younger children exhibited longer latencies when making false responses to outcome questions, which suggests that younger children were providing impulsive desire-based responses to the outcome questions. Executive functioning, as measured by the Stroop task, was not related to false statements. Children who were better at labeling statements as the truth or not the truth were more proficient at making false statements. The results support the proposition that the cognitive effort required for making false statements depends on the types of questions asked.

Stop in the name of lies: The cost of blocking the truth to deceive

Most researchers assume that deception involves a conflict between a predominant truth response and a deliberate deceptive response. Such a view is consistent with dual process theories that state that high-order cognition operates through fast-automatic processes that may conflict with slow-deliberate ones. In the present study, we tested whether one must inhibit the truth to deceive in light of inconsistent findings in the literature. One hundred and eighty-nine participants were tested across two Negative Priming paradigms that rest on the logic that the activation of a fast-automatic process will be hampered on a given display if it is inhibited on the previous display. Our findings suggest that truthful responses are predominant in healthy adults, which is why inhibitory control is required to activate a deliberate deceptive mode. We argue that the findings from deception studies could be best accounted for by dual process theories.