Time from structure: Children infer the temporal order of past events from visual arrays

The current locations of objects are informative about the temporal order of past events. For example, by simply examining the locations of objects underground, geologists and historians can determine their relative ages. In three experiments, we explored the development of this ability to infer time from structure in children 3-6-years of age (N = 317). In all experiments, children saw pictures of object arrays (e.g., a stack of blocks) and selected the item placed first or last. Children in the final experiment also made judgments about the future (e.g., "Which block will they pick up first?"). By age 5, children were mostly accurate at inferring the order of past events. Children were more accurate when inferring first than last, and when inferring the future than the past. The findings suggest that children infer history by simulating how past events unfolded, and that 3-4-year-olds may struggle to perform these simulations.

"Ours": Understanding Collective Psychological Ownership

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in collective psychology ownership in different disciplines. However, and in contrast to a feeling of personal ownership ("mine"), the theoretical thinking about a sense of collective ownership ("ours") is limited. This article proposes that the social identity perspective (social identity theory and self-categorization theory) provides a coherent framework for understanding and examining collective psychological ownership toward various targets of ownership and in a range of settings. It is argued that research on collective ownership will be enhanced by more fully considering the implications of this perspective, which include (a) the importance of the group self and self-stereotyping, (b) developing ingroup consensus and shared understandings, (c) the role of sociotropic threat and group identification, and (d) the importance of the sociocultural context. These implications have not been fully considered in the literature but indicate that the social identity perspective offers the possibility for theoretically integrating and empirically examining collective psychological ownership.

Developing Concepts of Authenticity: Insights From Parents' and Children's Conversations About Historical Significance

The present study investigated children's understanding that an object's history may increase its significance, an appreciation that underpins the concept of historical authenticity (i.e., the idea that an item's history determines its true identity, beyond its functional or material qualities, leading people to value real items over copies or fakes). We examined the development of historical significance through the lens of parent-child conversations, and children's performance on an authenticity assessment. The final sample was American, 79.2% monoracial White, and mid-high socio-economic status (SES) and included 48 parent-child pairs: 24 with younger children (R = 3.5 to 4.5 years) and 24 with older children (R = 5.5 to 6.5 years). Parent-child pairs discussed three books we created, with three storylines: a museum (culturally authentic) storyline, a clean-up (personally authentic) storyline, and a control storyline. Across measures, conversations suggested that authenticity may begin as a "placeholder concept" that is initially rooted in a broad appreciation for the significance of old objects and only later filled in with specifics. This placeholder initially directs children's learning about authenticity by linking, in an unspecified way, the value and significance of objects to their past. For example, we found that young children appropriately appealed to history (vs. perceptual or functional features of objects) in contexts regarding authentic objects but struggled in determining which objects were more significant on the post-test assessment, suggesting that they attend to object history but are not yet sure how histories matter for making authenticity judgments. We also found some evidence that directing children's attention toward conceptual information related to object history may in turn direct them away from material or perceptual considerations, as seen in trade-offs in parents' and children's conversations. Together, this exploratory report offers many new avenues for work on the development of authenticity concepts in childhood.

Preschoolers and adults metonymically extend proper names to owned objects

Three preregistered experiments, conducted in 2021, investigated whether English-speaking American preschoolers (N = 120; 4-6 years; 54 females, predominantly White) and adults (N = 80; 18-52 years; 59 females, predominantly Asian) metonymically extend owners' names to owned objects-an extension not typically found in English. In Experiment 1, 5- and 6-year-olds and adults extended names to owned objects over duplicates (d = 0.34 in children; d = 1.13 in adults). In Experiment 2, 5- and 6-year-olds and adults extended names to owned over borrowed objects (d = 1.37 in children; d = 4.34 in adults). Experiment 3 replicated this finding with 4-year-olds (d = 0.43). Thus, English-speaking preschoolers can acquire semantic generalizations, even those not present in their language.

Development, history, and a minimalist model of ownership psychology

Boyer's minimalist model is a compelling account of ownership psychology that is more efficient than previous models. However, it is unclear whether the two simple systems that make up this model - acquisitiveness and cooperation - are sufficient to both explain the nuanced development of ownership concepts and to account for the prominent influence that history has on ownership psychology.

Ownership is (likely to be) a moral foundation

Boyer presents a compelling account of ownership as the outcome of interaction between two evolved cognitive systems. We integrate this model into current discussions of moral pluralism, suggesting that ownership meets the criteria to be a moral foundation. We caution against ignoring cultural variation in ownership norms and against explaining complex, contested moral phenomena using a monist approach.

Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirely ad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as "this is hers," "that is not mine." This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand "cultural appropriation" and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free of ad hoc stipulations.

A Dollar Is a Dollar Is a Dollar, or Is It? Insights From Children's Reasoning About "Dirty Money"

Money can take many forms-a coin or a bill, a payment for an automobile or a prize for an award, a piece from the 1989 series or the 2019 series, and so on-but despite this, money is designed to represent an amount and only that. Thus, a dollar is a dollar, in the sense that money is fungible. But when adults ordinarily think about money, they think about it in terms of its source, and in particular, its moral source (e.g., dirty money). Here we investigate the development of the belief that money carries traces of its moral history. We study children ages 5-6 and 8-9, who are sensitive to both object history and morality, and thus possess the component pieces needed to think that a dollar may not be like any other. Across three principal studies (and three additional studies in Appendix S1; N = 327; 219 five- and six-year-olds; 108 eight- and nine-year-olds), we find that children are less likely to want money with negative moral history, a pattern that was stronger and more consistent among 8- and 9-year-olds than 5- and 6-year-olds. These findings highlight pressing directions for future research that could help shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to the belief that money carries traces of its moral history.

Developmental antecedents of cleansing effects: Evidence against domain-generality

Lee and Schwarz propose grounded procedures of separation as a domain-general mechanism underlying cleansing effects. One strong test of domain generality is to investigate the ontogenetic origins of a process. Here, we argue that the developmental evidence provides weak support for a domain-general grounded procedures account. Instead, it is likely that distinct separation procedures develop uniquely for different content domains.

Beliefs About the Persistence of History in Objects and Spaces in the United States and India

Scattered evidence in the literature suggests that people may believe that non-visible traces of past events (e.g., origins, emotions, and qualities of the owner) persist over time in objects and spaces, even after the original source has been removed. To date, however, there has been no unified treatment to determine the scope and cultural consistency of this expectation. This study had four primary goals: (a) to assess how broadly participants display persistence-of-history beliefs, (b) to explore individual differences in these beliefs, (c) to examine the explanatory frameworks for these beliefs, and (d) to determine whether these beliefs were endorsed across two cultural settings. Adults in both United States ( N = 195) and India ( N = 173) evaluated a broad range of situations involving possible persistence of history. In both countries, three patterns emerged: (a) A broad range of persistence-of-history scenarios were judged to be possible, falling into two underlying thematic clusters (supernatural vs. non-supernatural); (b) paranormal beliefs predicted endorsement of items in both thematic clusters; and yet (c) most scenarios were explained using natural explanatory frameworks. Together, these results demonstrate broad endorsement of the persistence of history—across cultures, situations, and individuals—as well as substantial individual variation.

Exploring the influence of ownership history on object valuation in typical development and autism

Items with special histories (e.g. celebrity owners) or qualities (e.g. limited editions) are more valuable than similar "inauthentic" items. Typically developing (TD) children privilege authenticity and are particularly influenced by who objects belong to. Here, we explore why children and adults over-value items with special ownership histories and examine how autism spectrum disorder (ASD) affects object valuation. In Studies 1 and 2, TD children perceived items belonging to famous owners (with "good" or "bad" reputations) to be more valuable than similar items belonging to non-famous owners. However, they ascribed significantly higher values to items belonging to famous heroes than infamous villains when compared. Children with ASD did not over-value objects with special ownership histories, but their valuations were moderated by qualities unrelated to ownership (e.g. rarity). In Study 3, adults with ASD assigned high values to authentic items with special ownership histories but were more likely to keep inauthentic objects than neurotypical adults. Our findings show that association with a famous owner is sufficient to increase an item's value for TD children and adults (with and without ASD). The degree of added value may be determined by the famous owner's character for TD children, but not adults. By contrast, children with ASD value objects via a different strategy that prioritizes material qualities over ownership history. However, the awareness of authenticity displayed by adults with ASD suggests that the emergence of ownership history as an important influence on object evaluation may be developmentally delayed in ASD, rather than completely absent.

Children, but not great apes, respect ownership

Access to and control of resources is a major source of costly conflicts. Animals, under some conditions, respect what others control and use (i.e. possession). Humans not only respect possession of resources, they also respect ownership. Ownership can be viewed as a cooperative arrangement, where individuals inhibit their tendency to take others' property on the condition that those others will do the same. We investigated to what degree great apes follow this principle, as compared to human children. We conducted two experiments, in which dyads of individuals could access the same food resources. The main test of respect for ownership was whether individuals would refrain from taking their partner's resources even when the partner could not immediately access and control them. Captive apes (N = 14 dyads) failed to respect their partner's claim on food resources and frequently monopolized the resources when given the opportunity. Human children (N = 14 dyads), tested with a similar apparatus and procedure, respected their partner's claim and made spontaneous verbal references to ownership. Such respect for the property of others highlights the uniquely cooperative nature of human ownership arrangements.

Exploring the first possessor bias in children

Even very young children are adept at linking property to owners (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012). However, some studies report that children systematically conserve property with the first possessors (Blake & Harris, 2009; Friedman & Neary, 2008). The present study seeks to integrate these two findings by testing for the presence of a first possessor bias in older children (ages 7-10) using a broader array of property transfers, and by investigating how manipulations of context-from third-person to first-person-yield ownership attributions that are more or less biased. Seven- and 8-year-olds, but not older children, exhibited a first possessor bias when property transfers were presented in a third-person context. This finding suggests that the first possessor bias persists longer in childhood than previously suspected. However, the bias was greatly attenuated or absent when property transfers were presented in a first-person context, rather than a third-person context.

Ownership Matters: People Possess a Naïve Theory of Ownership

Ownership is at the heart of people's daily activities and has been throughout history. People consider ownership when acting on objects, engaging in financial matters, and assessing the acceptability of actions. We propose that people's understanding of ownership depends on an early-emerging, causally powerful, naïve theory of ownership. We draw on research from multiple disciplines to suggest that, from childhood, a naïve theory of ownership includes ontological commitments, causal-explanatory reasoning, and unobservable constructs. These components are unlikely to stem from other core theories or from noncausal representations. We also address why people might have a naïve theory of ownership, how it develops across the lifespan, and whether aspects of this theory may be universal despite variation across cultures and history.

Nothing Personal: What Psychologists Get Wrong about Identity

What makes someone the same person over time? There is a growing body of research exploring how people ordinarily think about personal identity. We argue here that many of the experiments in this domain fail to properly distinguish similarity from personal identity, and therefore certain conclusions regarding commonsense intuitions about identity are not supported.

Three Unresolved Issues in Human Morality

This article discusses three major, but related, controversies surrounding the idea of morality. Is the complete pattern of features defining human morality unique to this species? How context dependent are moral beliefs and the emotions that often follow a violation of a moral standard? What developmental sequence establishes a moral code? This essay suggests that human morality rests on a combination of cognitive and emotional processes that are missing from the repertoires of other species. Second, the moral evaluation of every behavior, whether by self or others, depends on the agent, the action, the target of the behavior, and the context. The ontogeny of morality, which begins with processes that apes possess but adds language, inference, shame, and guilt, implies that humans are capable of experiencing blends of thoughts and feelings for which no semantic term exists. As a result, conclusions about a person's moral emotions based only on questionnaires or interviews are limited to this evidence.

Using versus liking: Young children use ownership to predict actions but not to infer preferences

Three experiments show that young children (N = 384) use ownership to predict actions but not to infer preferences. In Experiment 1, 3- to 6-year-olds considered ownership when predicting actions but did not expect it to trump preferences. In Experiment 2, 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, used ownership to predict actions, and 5-year-olds grasped that an agent would use his or her own property despite preferring someone else's. This experiment also showed that relating an agent to an object interfered with 3- and 4-year-olds' judgments that a more attractive object is preferred. Finally, Experiment 3 found that 3- and 4-year-olds do not believe that owning an object increases regard for it. These findings are informative about the kinds of information children use to predict actions and the inferences they make from ownership. The findings also reveal specificity in how children use ownership to make judgments about others, and suggest that children more closely relate ownership to people's actions than to their desires.

Social Traces of Generic Humans Increase the Value of Everyday Objects

Past research finds that people behave as though the particular qualities of specific, strongly valenced individuals "rub off" on objects. People thus value a sweater worn by George Clooney but are disgusted by one worn by Hitler. We hypothesized that social traces of generic humans can also adhere to objects, increasing their value. Experiments 1 and 2 found that simply marking that consumer products (mugs, giftwrap) were made by generic strangers (e.g., "by people using machines" vs. "by machines run by people") increased their perceived value. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this effect was mediated by thoughts about attention the object received from other people, which, in turn, led people to see the object as possessing more positive social qualities (e.g., friendly), increasing valuation. The results suggest that generic humans are perceived positively, possessing warm social qualities, and these can "rub off" and adhere to everyday objects increasing their value.

Young children's preference for unique owned objects

An important aspect of human thought is the value we place on unique individuals. Adults place higher value on authentic works of art than exact replicas, and young children at times value their original possessions over exact duplicates. What is the scope of this preference in early childhood, and when do children understand its subjective nature? On a series of trials, we asked three-year-olds (N=36) to choose between two toys for either themselves or the researcher: an old (visibly used) toy vs. a new (more attractive) toy matched in type and appearance (e.g., old vs. brand-new blanket). Focal pairs contrasted the child's own toy with a matched new object; Control pairs contrasted toys the child had never seen before. Children preferred the old toys for Focal pairs only, and treated their own preferences as not shared by the researcher. By 3years of age, young children place special value on unique individuals, and understand the subjective nature of that value.