Mechanisms of social evaluation in infancy: A preregistered exploration of infants' eye-movement and pupillary responses to prosocial and antisocial events

Catching up with iCatcher: Comparing analyses of infant eye tracking based on trained human coders and iCatcher+ automated gaze coding software

Eye-tracking measures, which provide crucial insight into the processes underlying human language cognition, perception, and social behavior, are particularly important in research with preverbal infants. Until recently, infant eye-gaze analysis required either expensive corneal-reflection eye-tracking technology or labor-intensive manual annotation (coding). Fortunately, iCatcher+, a recently developed AI-based automated gaze annotation tool, promises to reduce these expenses. To adopt this tool as a mainstream tool for gaze annotation, it is key to determine how annotations produced by iCatcher+ compare to the annotations produced by trained human coders. Here, we provide such a comparison, using 288 videos from a word-learning experiment with 12-month-olds. We evaluate the agreement between these two annotation systems and the effects identified using each system. We find that (1) agreement between human-coded and iCatcher+-annotated video data is excellent (88%) and comparable to intercoder agreement among human coders (90%), and (2) both annotation systems yield the same patterns of effects. This provides strong assurances that iCatcher+ is a viable alternative to manual annotation of infant gaze, one that holds promise for increasing efficiency, reducing the costs, and broadening the empirical base in infant eye-tracking.

Infants' Social Evaluation of Helpers and Hinderers: A Large-Scale, Multi-Lab, Coordinated Replication Study

Evaluating whether someone's behavior is praiseworthy or blameworthy is a fundamental human trait. A seminal study by Hamlin and colleagues in 2007 suggested that the ability to form social evaluations based on third-party interactions emerges within the first year of life: infants preferred a character who helped, over hindered, another who tried but failed to climb a hill. This sparked a new line of inquiry into the origins of social evaluations; however, replication attempts have yielded mixed results. We present a preregistered, multi-laboratory, standardized study aimed at replicating infants' preference for Helpers over Hinderers. We intended to (1) provide a precise estimate of the effect size of infants' preference for Helpers over Hinderers, and (2) determine the degree to which preferences are based on social information. Using the ManyBabies framework for big team-based science, we tested 1018 infants (567 included, 5.5-10.5 months) from 37 labs across five continents. Overall, 49.34% of infants preferred Helpers over Hinderers in the social condition, and 55.85% preferred characters who pushed up, versus down, an inanimate object in the nonsocial condition; neither proportion differed from chance or from each other. This study provides evidence against infants' prosocial preferences in the hill paradigm, suggesting the effect size is weaker, absent, and/or develops later than previously estimated. As the first of its kind, this study serves as a proof-of-concept for using active behavioral measures (e.g., manual choice) in large-scale, multi-lab projects studying infants.

Neural and Physiological Correlates of Prosocial Behavior: Temporoparietal Junction Activity in 3-year-old Children

Although the development of prosocial behavior has been widely studied from the behavioral aspect, the neural mechanisms underlying prosocial behavior in the early stages of development remain unclear. Therefore, this study investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the emergence of prosocial behavior in 3-year-old children. Brain activity in the medial pFC and right TPJ (rTPJ) and facial expression activity, which are related to the ability to infer others' mental states (mentalizing), during the observation of prosocial and antisocial scenes were measured using functional near-infrared spectroscopy and electromyography, respectively. Subsequently, the children's helping and comforting behaviors toward an experimenter were assessed to examine prosocial behavioral tendencies. A correlation analysis revealed that the children who showed stronger activity levels in the rTPJ while observing prosocial scenes had more immediate helping behaviors toward others than those who did not show stronger response levels. Moreover, the amount of facial expression activity correlated with prosocial behavior, including both helping and comforting behaviors. These results suggest that the development of mentalizing ability and the social evaluation of others' actions, mediated by the rTPJ, contribute to the emergence of prosocial behavior.

The Cognitive Architecture of Infant Attachment

Meta-analytic evidence indicates that the quality of the attachment relationship that infants establish with their primary caregiver has enduring significance for socioemotional and cognitive outcomes. However, the mechanisms by which early attachment experiences contribute to subsequent development remain underspecified. According to attachment theory, early attachment experiences become embodied in the form of cognitive-affective representations, referred to as internal working models (IWMs), that guide future behavior. Little is known, however, about the cognitive architecture of IWMs in infancy. In this article, we discuss significant advances made in the field of infant cognitive development and propose that leveraging insights from this research has the potential to fundamentally shape our understanding of the cognitive architecture of attachment representations in infancy. We also propose that the integration of attachment research into cognitive research can shed light on the role of early experiences, individual differences, and stability and change in infant cognition, as well as open new routes of investigation in cognitive studies, which will further our understanding of human knowledge. We provide recommendations for future research throughout the article and conclude by using our collaborative research as an example.

Evidence for core social goal understanding (and, perhaps, core morality) in preverbal infants

Spelke's What Babies Know masterfully describes infants' impressive repertoire of core cognitive concepts, from which the suite of human knowledge is eventually built. The current commentary argues for the existence of a core concept that Spelke claims preverbal infants lack: social goal. Core social goal concepts, operative extremely early in human development, underlie infants' basic abilities to interpret and evaluate entities within the moral world; such abilities support claims for a core moral domain.

Infants rationally infer the goals of other people's reaches in the absence of first-person experience with reaching actions

Does knowledge of other people's minds grow from concrete experience to abstract concepts? Cognitive scientists have hypothesized that infants' first-person experience, acting on their own goals, leads them to understand others' actions and goals. Indeed, classic developmental research suggests that before infants reach for objects, they do not see others' reaches as goal-directed. In five experiments (N = 117), we test an alternative hypothesis: Young infants view reaching as undertaken for a purpose but are open-minded about the specific goals that reaching actions are aimed to achieve. We first show that 3-month-old infants, who cannot reach for objects, lack the expectation that observed acts of reaching will be directed to objects rather than to places. Infants at the same age learned rapidly, however, that a specific agent's reaching action was directed either to an object or to a place, after seeing the agent reach for the same object regardless of where it was, or to the same place regardless of what was there. In a further experiment, 3-month-old infants did not demonstrate such inferences when they observed an actor engaging in passive movements. Thus, before infants have learned to reach and manipulate objects themselves, they infer that reaching actions are goal-directed, and they are open to learning that the goal of an action is either an object or a place. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: In the present experiments, 3-month-old prereaching infants learned to attribute either object goals or place goals to other people's reaching actions. Prereaching infants view agents' actions as goal-directed, but do not expect these acts to be directed to specific objects, rather than to specific places. Prereaching infants are open-minded about the specific goal states that reaching actions aim to achieve.

Preverbal infants' understanding of social norms

Social norms are foundational to human cooperation and co-existence in social groups. A crucial marker of social norms is that a behavior is not only shared, but that the conformity to the behavior of others is a basis for social evaluation (i.e., reinforcement and sanctioning), taking the is, how individuals usually behave, to an ought, how individuals should behave to be socially approved by others. In this preregistered study, we show that 11-month-old infants grasp this fundamental aspect about social norms already in their first year. They showed a pupillary surprise response for unexpected social responses, namely the disapproval and exclusion of an individual who showed the same behavior like others or the approval and inclusion of an individual who behaved differently. That preverbal infants link the conformity with others' behavior to social evaluations, before they respond to norm violations themselves, indicates that the foundations of social norm understanding lie in early infancy.

The science of justice: The neuropsychology of social punishment

The social punishment (SP) of norm violations has received much attention across multiple disciplines. However, current models of SP fail to consider the role of motivational processes, and none can explain the observed behavioral and neuropsychological differences between the two recognized forms of SP: second-party punishment (2PP) and third-party punishment (3PP). After reviewing the literature giving rise to the current models of SP, we propose a unified model of SP which integrates general psychological descriptions of decision-making as a confluence of affect, cognition, and motivation, with evidence that SP is driven by two main factors: the amount of harm (assessed primarily in the salience network) and the norm violator's intention (assessed primarily in the default-mode and central-executive networks). We posit that motivational differences between 2PP and 3PP, articulated in mesocorticolimbic pathways, impact final SP by differentially impacting the assessments of harm and intention done in these domain-general large-scale networks. This new model will lead to a better understanding of SP, which might even improve forensic, procedural, and substantive legal practices.

Toddlers' affective responses to sociomoral scenes: Insights from physiological measures

A growing literature suggests that preverbal infants are sensitive to sociomoral scenes and prefer prosocial agents over antisocial agents. It remains unclear, however, whether and how emotional processes are implicated in infants' responses to prosocial/antisocial actions. Although a recent study found that infants and toddlers showed more positive facial expressions after viewing helping (vs. hindering) events, these findings were based on naïve coder ratings of facial activity; furthermore, effect sizes were small. The current studies examined 18- and 24-month-old toddlers' real-time reactivity to helping and hindering interactions using three physiological measures of emotion-related processes. At 18 months, activity in facial musculature involved in smiling/frowning was explored via facial electromyography (EMG). At 24 months, stress (sweat) was explored via electrodermal activity (EDA). At both ages, arousal was explored via pupillometry. Behaviorally, infants showed no preferences for the helper over the hinderer across age groups. EMG analyses revealed that 18-month-olds showed higher corrugator activity (more frowning) during hindering (vs. helping) actions, followed by lower corrugator activity (less frowning) after hindering (vs. helping) actions finished. These findings suggest that antisocial actions elicited negativity, perhaps followed by brief disengagement. EDA analyses revealed no significant event-related differences. Pupillometry analyses revealed that both 18- and 24-month-olds' pupils were smaller after viewing hindering (vs. helping), replicating recent evidence with 5-month-olds and suggesting that toddlers also show less arousal following hindering than following helping. Together, these results provide new evidence with respect to whether and how arousal/affective processes are involved when infants process sociomoral scenarios.

Teenagers' but not young adults' beliefs about intrinsic interpersonal obligations for group members

Previous research has indicated that children perceive social category members as having intrinsic obligations toward each other, which shape their expectations for social interactions. However, it is unclear whether teenagers (aged 13 to 15) and young adults (aged 19 to 21) continue to hold such beliefs, given their increased experience with group dynamics and external social rules. To explore this question, three experiments were conducted with a total of 360 participants (N = 180 for each age group). Experiment 1 examined negative social interactions using different methods in two sub-experiments, while Experiment 2 focused on positive social interactions to examine whether participants viewed social category members as intrinsically obligated to avoid harming each other and to offer assistance. Results revealed that teenagers evaluated within-group harm and non-help as unacceptable, regardless of external rules, whereas they viewed between-group harm and non-help as both acceptable and unacceptable, depending on the presence of external rules. Conversely, young adults considered both within-group and between-group harm/non-help as more acceptable if an external rule permitted such behavior. These findings suggest that teenagers believe that members of a social category are intrinsically obligated to help and not harm each other, whereas young adults believe that individual social interactions are constrained mainly by external rules. That is, teenagers hold stronger beliefs than young adults about intrinsic interpersonal obligations to group members. Thus, in-group moral obligations and external rules contribute differently to the evaluation and interpretation of social interactions at different developmental stages.

Socially evaluative contexts facilitate mentalizing

Our ability to understand others' minds stands at the foundation of human learning, communication, cooperation, and social life more broadly. Although humans' ability to mentalize has been well-studied throughout the cognitive sciences, little attention has been paid to whether and how mentalizing differs across contexts. Classic developmental studies have examined mentalizing within minimally social contexts, in which a single agent seeks a neutral inanimate object. Such object-directed acts may be common, but they are typically consequential only to the object-seeking agent themselves. Here, we review a host of indirect evidence suggesting that contexts providing the opportunity to evaluate prospective social partners may facilitate mentalizing across development. Our article calls on cognitive scientists to study mentalizing in contexts where it counts.