Improbable or impossible? How children reason about the possibility of extraordinary events

Children and adults' intuitions of what people can believe

Two preregistered studies tested how 5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and adults judged the possibility of holding alternative beliefs (N = 240, 110 females, U.S. sample, mixed ethnicities, data collected from September 2020 through October 2021). In Study 1, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were supported by evidence (but judged they could without this evidential constraint). In Study 2, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were moral beliefs (but judged they could without this moral constraint). Young children viewed moral beliefs as more constrained than adults. These results suggest that young children already have sophisticated intuitions of the possibility of holding various beliefs and how certain beliefs are constrained.

Children's susceptibility to online misinformation

Children have a reputation for credulity that is undeserved; even preschoolers have proven adept at identifying implausible claims and unreliable informants. Still, the strategies children use to identify and reject dubious information are often superficial, which leaves them vulnerable to accepting such information if conveyed through seemingly authoritative channels or formatted in seemingly authentic ways. Indeed, children of all ages have difficulty differentiating legitimate websites and news stories from illegitimate ones, as they are misled by the inclusion of outwardly professional features such as graphs, statistics, and journalistic layout. Children may not be inherently credulous, but their skepticism toward dubious information is often shallow enough to be overridden by the deceptive trappings of online misinformation.

Many preschoolers do not distinguish the possible from the impossible in a marble-catching task

Do preschoolers differentiate events that might and might not happen from events that cannot happen? The current study modified Redshaw & Suddendorf's "Y-shaped tube task" to test how the ability to distinguish mere possibilities from impossibilities emerges over ontogenesis. In the Y-shaped tube task, the experimenter holds a ball above a tube shaped like an upside-down "Y" and asks a participant to catch it. A participant who identifies the two possible paths the ball can take should cover both exits at the bottom of the Y. But children might cover both exits without identifying both possibilities. For example, there are two good places to put hands, so they might just put one hand in each place. This does not require checking whether there is a path from the entrance to each exit. If children cover both exits because they have identified two possible paths for the ball, then they should differentiate exits where it is possible for the ball to come out from impossible exits, where there is no path from the entrance to the exit. In total, 24 36-month-olds and 24 48-month-olds were tested. Less than 20% of 36-month-olds and only about half of 48-month-olds distinguished between possible and impossible exits. Children who do not distinguish the possible from the impossible might not be evaluating possibilities at all. Results converge with existing literature suggesting that action planning that is sensitive to incompatible possibilities often emerges after the fourth birthday.

Close counterfactuals and almost doing the impossible

Can we feel that an unrealized outcome nearly happened if it was never possible in the first place? People often consider counterfactual events that did not happen, and some counterfactuals seem so close to reality that people say they "almost" or "easily could have" happened. Across four preregistered experiments (total N = 1,228), we investigated how judgments of counterfactual closeness depend on possibility, and whether this varies across two kinds of close counterfactuals. In judging whether outcomes almost happened, participants were more strongly impacted by possibility than by incremental manipulations of probability. In contrast, when judging whether outcomes easily could have happened, participants treated the distinction between impossible and possible like any other variation in probability. Both kinds of judgments were also impacted by propensity, though these effects were comparatively small. Together, these findings reveal novel differences between the two kinds of close counterfactuals and suggest that while possibility is privileged when judging what almost happened, probability is the focus when judging what easily could have happened.

Young children's conceptualization of empirical disagreement

Chinese and American children aged 5-11 years (total N = 144) heard two child informants make conflicting empirical claims about each of 4 scenarios. For example, one informant claimed that a ball would float when dropped in water whereas the other informant claimed that it would sink. Children were asked to judge whether each informant could be right, and to justify their overall judgment. In both samples, there was a change with age. Older children often said that each informant could be right whereas younger children, especially in China, were more likely to say that only one informant could be right. Nevertheless, in the wake of decisive empirical evidence (e.g., the ball was shown to sink when dropped in water), almost all children, irrespective of age, drew appropriate conclusions about which of the two informants had been right. Thus, with increasing age, children differ in their prospective - but not in their retrospective - appraisal of empirical disagreement. Absent decisive evidence, older children are more likely than younger children to suspend judgment by acknowledging that either of two conflicting claims could be right. We argue that children's tendency to suspend judgment is linked to their developing awareness of empirical uncertainty, as expressed both in the justifications they give when judging the disagreement and in their own beliefs about the scenarios. Implications for children's understanding of disagreement are discussed.

Could it? Should it? Cognitive reflection facilitates children's reasoning about possibility and permissibility

Children can be unduly skeptical of events that violate their expectations, claiming that these events neither could happen nor should happen even if the events violate no physical or social laws. Here, we explored whether children's reasoning about possibility and permissibility-modal cognition-is aided by cognitive reflection, or the disposition to privilege analysis over intuition. A total of 99 children aged 4 to 11 years judged the possibility and permissibility of several hypothetical events, and their judgments were compared with their scores on a developmental version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-D). Children's CRT-D scores predicted their ability to differentiate possible events from impossible ones and their ability to differentiate impermissible events from permissible ones as well as their ability to differentiate possibility from permissibility in general. Such differentiations were predicted by children's CRT-D scores independent of age and executive function. These findings suggest that mature modal cognition may require the ability to reflect on, and override, the intuition that unexpected events cannot happen.

Minimally counterintuitive stimuli trigger greater curiosity than merely improbable stimuli

Curiosity plays a key role in directing learning throughout the lifespan. Prior work finds that violations of expectations can be powerful triggers of curiosity in both children and adults, but it is unclear which expectation-violating events induce the greatest curiosity and how this might vary over development. Some theories have suggested a U-shaped function such that stimuli of moderate extremity pique the greatest curiosity. However, expectation-violations vary not only in degree, but in kind: for example, some things violate an intuitive theory (e.g., an alligator that can talk) and others are merely unlikely (e.g., an alligator hiding under your bed). Combining research on curiosity with distinctions posited in the cognitive science of religion, we test whether minimally counterintuitive (MCI) stimuli, which involve one violation of an intuitive theory, are especially effective at triggering curiosity. We presented adults (N = 77) and 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 36) in the United States with stimuli that were ordinary, unlikely, MCI, and very counterintuitive (VCI) and asked which one they would like to learn more about. Adults and 5-year-olds chose Unlikely over Ordinary and MCI over Unlikely, but not VCI over MCI, more often than chance. Our results suggest that (i) minimally counterintuitive stimuli trigger greater curiosity than merely unlikely stimuli, (ii) surprisingness has diminishing returns, and (iii) sensitivity to surprisingness increases with age, appearing in our task by age 5.

Anchored in the present: preschoolers more accurately infer their futures when confronted with their pasts

People often speculate about what the future holds. They wonder what will happen tomorrow, and what the world will be like in the distant future. Nonetheless, people's ability to consider future possibilities may be restricted when they consider their own futures. Adults show the 'end of history' illusion, believing they have changed more in the past than they will in the future. Further, preschoolers are even more limited in anticipating future change, as 3-year-olds insist their current desires will persist later in life. These findings suggest a deficit in children's and adults' abilities to simulate alternative possibilities that pertain to themselves. However, we report four experiments (n = 233) suggesting otherwise, at least for children. We find that 3-year-olds accurately infer their futures when prompted to consider their past rather than present preferences. Children also succeed at inferring their past preferences when not shown items they currently prefer. This shows that children can reason about their pasts and futures, though this ability is hindered when they are shown items that anchor them to the present. Our findings suggest that children's difficulties with mental time travel reflect a failure to shift away from the present rather than an inability to simulate alternative possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

It's not what you did, it's what you could have done

We are more likely to judge agents as morally culpable after we learn they acted freely rather than under duress or coercion. Interestingly, the reverse is also true: Individuals are more likely to be judged to have acted freely after we learn that they committed a moral violation. Researchers have argued that morality affects judgments of force by making the alternative actions the agent could have done instead appear comparatively normal, which then increases the perceived availability of relevant alternative actions. Across five studies, we test the novel predictions of this account. We find that the degree to which participants view possible alternative actions as normal strongly predicts their perceptions that an agent acted freely. This pattern holds both for perceptions of the prescriptive normality of the alternatives (whether the actions are good) and descriptive normality of the alternatives (whether the actions are unusual). We also find that manipulating the prudential value of alternative actions or the degree to which alternatives adhere to social norms, has a similar effect to manipulating whether the actions or their alternatives violate moral norms. This pattern persists even when what is actually done is held constant, and these effects are explained by changes in the perceived normality of the alternatives. Together, these results suggest that across contexts, participants' force judgments depend not on the morality of the actual action taken, but on the normality of possible alternatives. More broadly, our results build on prior work that suggests a unifying role of normality and counterfactuals across many areas of high-level human cognition.

Imagination and social cognition in childhood

Imagination is a cognitive process used to generate new ideas from old, not just in the service of creativity and fantasy, but also in our ordinary thoughts about alternatives to current reality. In this article, I argue for the central function of imagination in the development of social cognition in infancy and childhood. In Section 1, I review a work showing that even in the first year of life, social cognition can be viewed through a nascent ability to imagine the physical possibilities and physical limits on action. In Section 2, I discuss how imagination of what should happen is appropriately constrained by what can happen, and how this influences children's moral evaluations. In the final section, I suggest developmental changes in imagination—especially the ability to imagine improbable events—may have implications for social inference, leading children to learn that inner motives can conflict. These examples point to a flexible and domain‐general process that operates on knowledge to make social meaning.

This article is categorized under:

Psychology > Development and Aging

Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development

Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief

Causal knowledge and children's possibility judgments

Children often say that strange and improbable events, like eating pickle-flavored ice cream, are impossible. Two experiments explored whether these beliefs are explained by limits in children's causal knowledge. Participants were 423 predominantly White Canadian 4- to 7-year-olds (44% female) tested in 2020-2021. Providing children with causal information about ordinary events did not lead them to affirm that improbable events are possible, and they more often affirmed improbable events after merely learning that a similar event had occurred. However, children were most likely to affirm events if they learned how similar events happened (OR = 2.16). The findings suggest that knowledge of causal circumstances may only impact children's beliefs about the possibility after they are able to draw connections between potential events and known events.

Children's Ideas About What Can Really Happen: The Impact of Age and Religious Background

Five- to 11-year-old U.S. children, from either a religious or secular background, judged whether story events could really happen. There were four different types of stories: magical stories violating ordinary causal regularities; religious stories also violating ordinary causal regularities but via a divine agent; unusual stories not violating ordinary causal regularities but with an improbable event; and realistic stories not violating ordinary causal regularities and with no improbable event. Overall, children were less likely to judge that religious and magical stories could really happen than unusual and realistic stories although religious children were more likely than secular children to judge that religious stories could really happen. Irrespective of background, children frequently invoked causal regularities in justifying their judgments. Thus, in justifying their conclusion that a story could really happen, children often invoked a causal regularity, whereas in justifying their conclusion that a story could not really happen, they often pointed to the violation of causal regularity. Overall, the findings show that children appraise the likelihood of story events actually happening in light of their beliefs about causal regularities. A religious upbringing does not impact the frequency with which children invoke causal regularities in judging what can happen, even if it does impact the type of causal factors that children endorse.

The Magic School Bus dilemma: How fantasy affects children's learning from stories

Although children's books often include fantasy, research suggests that children do not learn as well from fantastical stories as from realistic ones. The current studies investigated whether the type of fantasy matters, in effect testing two possible mechanisms for fantasy's interference. Across two studies, 110 5-year-olds were read different types of fantastical stories containing a problem and then were asked to solve an analogous problem in a real lab setting. Children who were read a minimally fantastical version of the story, in which the story occurred on another planet "that looked just like Earth," were no more likely to transfer the solution than children who heard a story that was slightly more fantastical in that the story occurred on another planet and that planet looked different from Earth (e.g., orange grass, a green sky). In contrast, significantly higher rates of learning were observed when the story contained those elements and two physically impossible events (e.g., walking through walls). Furthermore, this improvement was obtained only when the impossible events preceded, and not when they followed, the educational content. Although fantasy may sometimes detract from learning (as other research has shown), these new studies suggest that minimal fantasy does not and that particular types of fantasy may even increase learning. We propose that the mechanism for this may be that a small dose of impossible events induces deeper processing of the subsequent events in the story.

Preschoolers' learning of information from fantastical narrative versus expository books

This study investigated preschool children's learning from expository and fantastical narrative books and whether the children would show a tendency for learning from expository books in cases of conflicting information. Over three testing sessions, 71 3- and 5-year-olds were individually read one expository book and one fantastical narrative book. These books contained four types of information units: narrative-only, expository-only, conflicting, and consistent. Children were asked questions that tapped these information units. Results showed a main effect of age, with 5-year-olds learning more information from both books than 3-year-olds. When the information in the narrative and expository books conflicted, 5-year-olds showed a tendency to report information from the expository book, but 3-year-olds were at chance level for prioritizing information learned from either book.

Pretending with realistic and fantastical stories facilitates executive function in 3-year-old children

Fictional stories can affect many aspects of children's behavior and cognition, yet little is known about how they might help or hinder children's executive function skills. The current study investigated the role of story content (fantasy or reality) and mode of engagement with the story (pretense or a non-pretense control) on children's inhibitory control, an important component of early executive function. A total of 60 3-year-olds were randomly assigned to hear a fantastical or realistic story and were encouraged to engage in either pretense or a non-pretense activity related to the story. They then completed the Less Is More task of inhibitory control. Story content had no impact on children's inhibitory control; children performed equally well after hearing a fantastical or realistic story. However, children who engaged in story-related pretend play showed greater inhibitory control than those who engaged in a non-pretense activity. We found no interaction between story content and play engagement type. These results held when controlling for baseline inhibitory control, receptive vocabulary, age, gender, affect, and propensity toward pretense. Therefore, mode of play engagement with a story was more important in promoting children's inhibitory control skills than the degree of realism in the story.

Culture moderates the relationship between self-control ability and free will beliefs in childhood

We investigate individual, developmental, and cultural differences in self-control in relation to children's changing belief in "free will" - the possibility of acting against and inhibiting strong desires. In three studies, 4- to 8-year-olds in the U.S., China, Singapore, and Peru (N = 441) answered questions to gauge their belief in free will and completed a series of self-control and inhibitory control tasks. Children across all four cultures showed predictable age-related improvements in self-control, as well as changes in their free will beliefs. Cultural context played a role in the timing of these emerging free will beliefs: Singaporean and Peruvian children's beliefs changed at later ages than Chinese and U.S. children. Critically, culture moderated the link between self-control abilities and free will beliefs: Individual differences in self-control behaviors were linked to individual differences in free will beliefs in U.S. children, but not in children from China, Singapore or Peru. There was also evidence of a causal influence of self-control performance on free will beliefs in our U.S. sample. In Study 2, a randomly assigned group of U.S. 4- and 5-year-olds who failed at two self-control tasks showed reduced belief in free will, but a group of children who completed free will questions first did not show changes to self-control. Together these results suggest that culturally-acquired causal-explanatory frameworks for action, along with observations of one's own abilities, might influence children's emerging understanding of free will.

A Similarity Heuristic in Children's Possibility Judgments

Children often judge that strange and improbable events are impossible, but the mechanisms behind their reasoning remain unclear. This article (N = 250) provides evidence that young children use a similarity heuristic that compares potential events to similar known events to determine whether events are possible. Experiment 1 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds who hear about improbable events go on to judge that similar improbable events can happen. Experiment 2 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds more often affirm that improbable events can happen if told about related improbable events than if told about unrelated ones. Finally, Experiment 3 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds affirm the possibility of improbable events related to known events, but deny that related impossible events can happen.

Viewing Fantastical Events in Animated Television Shows: Immediate Effects on Chinese Preschoolers' Executive Function

Three experiments were conducted to test whether watching an animated show with frequent fantastical events decreased Chinese preschoolers’ post-viewing executive function (EF), and to test possible mechanisms of this effect. In all three experiments, children were randomly assigned to watch a video with either frequent or infrequent fantastical events; their EF was immediately assessed after viewing, using behavioral measures of working memory, sustained attention, and cognitive flexibility. Parents completed a questionnaire to assess preschoolers’ hyperactivity level as a potential confounding variable. In Experiment 1 (N = 90), which also included a control group, there was an immediate negative effect of watching frequent fantastical events, as seen in lower scores on the behavioral EF tasks. In Experiment 2 (N = 20), eye tracking data showed more but shorter eye fixations in the high frequency group, suggesting a higher demand on cognitive resources; this group also did more poorly on behavioral measures of EF. In Experiment 3 (N = 20), functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) data showed that the high frequency group had a higher concentration of oxygenated hemoglobin (Coxy-Hb), an indicator of higher brain activation consistent with a greater use of cognitive resources; this group also had lower scores on the behavioral EF tasks. The findings are discussed in reference to models of limited cognitive resources.

"When something like a ladybug lands on you": Origins and development of the concept of luck

In Study 1, 103 children ages 4 through 10 answered questions about their concept of and belief in luck, and completed a story task assessing their use of luck as an explanation for events. The interview captured a curvilinear trajectory of children's belief in luck from tentative belief at age 4 to full belief at age 6, weakening belief at age 8, and significant skepticism by age 10. The youngest children appeared to think of luck simply as a positive outcome; with age, children increasingly considered the unexpected nature of lucky outcomes and many came to view luck as synonymous with chance. On the story task, younger children attributed a stronger role to luck in explaining events than did older children. Studies 2 and 3 explored 2 potential sources of children's concepts. Study 2 explored adult use of the words luck and lucky, and found that most of this input consisted in using lucky to refer to positive outcomes, although the nature of use changed with the ages of the children. In Study 3, we examined children's storybooks about luck and found them to be rich potential sources of children's concepts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Children's Beliefs About Possibility Differ Across Dreams, Stories, and Reality

Are children's judgments about what can happen in dreams and stories constrained by their beliefs about reality? This question was explored across three experiments, in which four hundred and sixty-nine 4- to 7-year-olds judged whether improbable and impossible events could occur in a dream, a story, or reality. In Experiment 1, children judged events more possible in dreams than in reality. In Experiment 2, children also judged events more possible in dreams than in stories. Both experiments also suggested that children's beliefs about reality constrain their judgments about dreams and stories. Finally, in Experiment 3 children were asked about impossible events more typical of dreams and stories. In contrast with the other experiments, children now affirmed the events could happen in these worlds.

Influence of Mothers/Grandmothers Coviewing Cartoons With Children on Children's Viewing Experience

Watching cartoons is one important event in children’s early lives. This activity is highly influential on many factors, such as children’s cognitive and behavioral development. Some researchers believe that parents should coview cartoons with children to help them filter and distinguish useful content. However, intergenerational education is already common in China, and the influence of grandparents cannot be ignored. Because they are in different stages of life, the members of these two generations manifest great differences in parenting style, which may lead to differences in child development. Does this generational difference have differential effects on the children’s cartoon-viewing experience? We recruited 89 parents and grandparents and their kindergarten-aged children (approximately 5 years old) to participate in the study. The mothers or grandmothers were asked to coview a cartoon for approximately 7 min with their child, after which the child was asked questions about the cartoon-viewing experience. The results show the following: (1) compared with grandmothers, mothers generally think that cartoons have a very high influence on children’s physical and mental health (χ² = 8.83, p < 0.05), (2) mothers place more restrictions on the content of cartoons that their children view, whereas grandmothers’ attitudes are characterized by greater tolerance (χ² = 11.94, p < 0.01), and (3) in the case of coviewing with mothers, when the children are asked “why” questions about the cartoon-viewing experience questionnaire, they use more experience proofs to explain their answers than when they coview with grandmothers (χ² = 16.69, p < 0.01; χ² = 10.44, p < 0.05).

Beliefs About the Persistence of History in Objects and Spaces in the United States and India

Scattered evidence in the literature suggests that people may believe that non-visible traces of past events (e.g., origins, emotions, and qualities of the owner) persist over time in objects and spaces, even after the original source has been removed. To date, however, there has been no unified treatment to determine the scope and cultural consistency of this expectation. This study had four primary goals: (a) to assess how broadly participants display persistence-of-history beliefs, (b) to explore individual differences in these beliefs, (c) to examine the explanatory frameworks for these beliefs, and (d) to determine whether these beliefs were endorsed across two cultural settings. Adults in both United States ( N = 195) and India ( N = 173) evaluated a broad range of situations involving possible persistence of history. In both countries, three patterns emerged: (a) A broad range of persistence-of-history scenarios were judged to be possible, falling into two underlying thematic clusters (supernatural vs. non-supernatural); (b) paranormal beliefs predicted endorsement of items in both thematic clusters; and yet (c) most scenarios were explained using natural explanatory frameworks. Together, these results demonstrate broad endorsement of the persistence of history—across cultures, situations, and individuals—as well as substantial individual variation.

Reality Status Judgments of Real and Fantastical Events in Children's Prefrontal Cortex: An fNIRS Study

The present study aimed to examine neural mechanisms underlying the ability to differentiate reality from fantasy. Using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), we measured prefrontal activations in children and adults while they performed a reality judgment task. Participants’ task was to judge the reality status of events in fantastical and realistic videos. Behavioral data revealed that, although there was no accuracy difference, children showed significantly longer reaction times in making the judgments than did adults. The fNIRS data consistently revealed higher prefrontal activations in children than in adults when watching the videos and judging the reality of the events. These results suggest that when making judgments of event reality, children may require more cognitive resources and also mainly rely on their own personal experiences.

The Acquisition of Modal Concepts

Sometimes we accept propositions, sometimes we reject them, and sometimes we take propositions to be worth considering but not yet established, as merely possible. The result is a complex representation with logical structure. Is the ability to mark propositions as merely possible part of our innate representational toolbox or does it await development, perhaps relying on language acquisition? Several lines of inquiry show that preverbal infants manage possibilities in complex ways, while others find that preschoolers manage possibilities poorly. Here, we discuss how this apparent conflict can be resolved by distinguishing modal representations of possibility, which mark possibility symbolically, from minimal representations of possibility, which do not encode any modal status and need not have a logical structure.

How We Know What Not To Think

Humans often represent and reason about unrealized possible actions - the vast infinity of things that were not (or have not yet been) chosen. This capacity is central to the most impressive of human abilities: causal reasoning, planning, linguistic communication, moral judgment, etc. Nevertheless, how do we select possible actions that are worth considering from the infinity of unrealized actions that are better left ignored? We review research across the cognitive sciences, and find that the possible actions considered by default are those that are both likely to occur and generally valuable. We then offer a unified theory of why. We propose that (i) across diverse cognitive tasks, the possible actions we consider are biased towards those of general practical utility, and (ii) a plausible primary function for this mechanism resides in decision making.

Optimism and Wishful Thinking: Consistency Across Populations in Children's Expectations for the Future

Two studies investigated 5- to 10-year-olds' (N = 194) positivity bias when forecasting the future. Children from two geographic locations (mostly Caucasian, higher income college town; mostly African American, lower income urban community) completed a future expectations task (FET). For multiple scenarios, children predicted whether a positive versus negative (optimism items) or a positive versus extraordinary positive (wishful thinking items) outcome would occur, including its likelihood. In both samples, optimism and wishful thinking decreased with age, optimism was higher than wishful thinking, children did not show a comparative self-optimism bias, and individual differences in the FET optimism score correlated with self-reported dispositional optimism and hope. Exploratory comparisons revealed between-sample equivalence in responses to all measures, except for less tempered wishful thinking in the urban community.

Is the most representative skunk the average or the stinkiest? Developmental changes in representations of biological categories

People often think of categories in terms of their most representative examples (e.g., robin for BIRD). Thus, determining which exemplars are most representative is a fundamental cognitive process that shapes how people use concepts to navigate the world. The present studies (N = 669; ages 5 years - adulthood) revealed developmental change in this important component of cognition. Studies 1-2 found that young children view exemplars with extreme values of characteristic features (e.g., the very fastest cheetah) as most representative of familiar biological categories; the tendency to view average exemplars in this manner (e.g., the average-speeded cheetah) emerged slowly across age. Study 3 examined the mechanisms underlying these judgments, and found that participants of all ages viewed extreme exemplars as representative of novel animal categories when they learned that the variable features fulfilled category-specific adaptive needs, but not otherwise. Implications for developmental changes in conceptual structure and biological reasoning are discussed.

Wondering how: Children's and adults' explanations for mundane, improbable, and extraordinary events

Children aged 5 through 9 years and adults judged the reality status of parallel mundane, improbable, and extraordinary events, generated an explanation for each event, and evaluated explanations purportedly generated by other participants. Participants of all ages claimed that mundane and improbable events could happen, whereas extraordinary events could not. Participants also overwhelmingly generated natural explanations for all three types of events but did so most for mundane, less for improbable, and least for extraordinary events. Supernatural explanations followed the reverse pattern, indicating that an event's possibility affects explanation. Participants also evaluated natural explanations most favorably and evaluated claims that there was no explanation for an event least favorably across all story types. However, significant rejection of the "no explanation" claim did not emerge until age 8 years, indicating that age affects acceptance of the idea that some events might be unexplainable.

Concern and death anxiety during an ongoing terror wave: The moderating role of direct vs. indirect exposure

The current study examined whether emotional concern over one's security situation is connected with death anxiety during an ongoing terror wave, and whether type of exposure (media exposure vs. contact with witnesses) moderates this connection. A total of 345 individuals, aged 18-70, were sampled during an ongoing wave of terror in Israel and filled out scales measuring death anxiety, concern over security situation, and type of exposure. Results indicated that increased concern was connected with enhanced death anxiety. Moreover, this connection was more pronounced among individuals exposed to the events through the media, in comparison with individuals who had first-hand contact with witnesses.

The Role of Book Features in Young Children's Transfer of Information from Picture Books to Real-World Contexts

Picture books are an important source of new language, concepts, and lessons for young children. A large body of research has documented the nature of parent-child interactions during shared book reading. A new body of research has begun to investigate the features of picture books that support children's learning and transfer of that information to the real world. In this paper, we discuss how children's symbolic development, analogical reasoning, and reasoning about fantasy may constrain their ability to take away content information from picture books. We then review the nascent body of findings that has focused on the impact of picture book features on children's learning and transfer of words and letters, science concepts, problem solutions, and morals from picture books. In each domain of learning we discuss how children's development may interact with book features to impact their learning. We conclude that children's ability to learn and transfer content from picture books can be disrupted by some book features and research should directly examine the interaction between children's developing abilities and book characteristics on children's learning.

Science Is Awe-Some: The Emotional Antecedents of Science Learning

Scientists from Einstein to Sagan have linked emotions like awe with the motivation for scientific inquiry, but no research has tested this possibility. Theoretical and empirical work from affective science, however, suggests that awe might be unique in motivating explanation and exploration of the physical world. We synthesize theories of awe with theories of the cognitive mechanisms related to learning, and offer a generative theoretical framework that can be used to test the effect of this emotion on early science learning.