Searching and planning: young children's reasoning about past and future event sequences

The role of iconicity in children's production of adverbial clauses

Young children's comprehension of adverbial clauses is significantly affected by iconicity, which refers to whether the order of information in the sentence reflects the order of events in the real world. In contrast, clause order (main-subordinate vs. subordinate-main) and input frequency of specific adverbial clauses do not seem to play independent roles (De Ruiter et al., 2018). The present study tests children's sentence production across four different connective types (after, before, because, if) to determine whether the factors that underpin the comprehension of adverbial clauses also apply to production, which involves utterance planning and articulation. 42 four-year-old, 42 five-year-old, and 22 eight-year-old monolingual English-speaking children, along with 20 adult controls, completed a sentence completion task. The results showed that both four- and five-year-olds produced all type of sentences in iconic order ("She builds a tower, before she breaks her train"; "After she builds a tower, she breaks her train") more accurately than in non-iconic order. This suggests that while comprehension and production likely impose different demands on children, iconicity as a general semantic strategy benefits children's early processing of adverbial clauses. Moreover, the effect of iconicity persisted in older children's production, but only for their because- and if-sentences, which could be related to their semantic complexity and the pragmatic properties they encode.

Time from structure: Children infer the temporal order of past events from visual arrays

The current locations of objects are informative about the temporal order of past events. For example, by simply examining the locations of objects underground, geologists and historians can determine their relative ages. In three experiments, we explored the development of this ability to infer time from structure in children 3-6-years of age (N = 317). In all experiments, children saw pictures of object arrays (e.g., a stack of blocks) and selected the item placed first or last. Children in the final experiment also made judgments about the future (e.g., "Which block will they pick up first?"). By age 5, children were mostly accurate at inferring the order of past events. Children were more accurate when inferring first than last, and when inferring the future than the past. The findings suggest that children infer history by simulating how past events unfolded, and that 3-4-year-olds may struggle to perform these simulations.

On the Logic of the Unconscious Conception of Causation Part I: The Oedipal Meta-Wish and the Sexualization of Asymmetric Time

The direction of time is often defined by describing asymmetries between past and future events, referred to as "time-arrows." Two important time-arrows are the mutability time-arrow, which specifies that the past is unalterable, while the future is not; and the causal time-arrow, which stipulates that past events may cause future events, but not vice versa. The author argues that the unconscious conception of causation expressed in both the oedipal myth and certain oedipal wishes negates the mutability and causal time-arrows. The author suggests, therefore, distinguishing between oedipal phantasies that undermine the ordinary conceptions of causation and time (such as the wish of being one's own parent), and classical content that is in line with our time perception (such as sexual and aggressive wishes toward parents). Analyzing clinical examples suggests that some patients' oedipal phantasies are combined with unconscious sexual satisfaction from the asymmetric conception of time. When this sexual satisfaction is analyzed, they might expose the oedipal phantasies founded on the symmetric conception of time.

Children's reasoning about the efficiency of others' actions: The development of rational action prediction

The relative efficiency of an action is a central criterion in action control and can be used to predict others' behavior. Yet, it is unclear when the ability to predict on and reason about the efficiency of others' actions develops. In three main and two follow-up studies, 3- to 6-year-old children (n = 242) were confronted with vignettes in which protagonists could take a short (efficient) path or a long path. Children predicted which path the protagonist would take and why the protagonist would take a specific path. The 3-year-olds did not take efficiency into account when making decisions even when there was an explicit goal, the task was simplified and made more salient, and children were questioned after exposure to the agent's action. Four years is a transition age for rational action prediction, and the 5-year-olds reasoned on the efficiency of actions before relying on them to predict others' behavior. Results are discussed within a representational redescription account.

Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past-Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will, too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is in the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but they prefer their pleasure to lie in the past and do not predict that others' levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past-future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible.

It is about time: Conceptual and experimental evaluation of the temporal cognitive mechanisms in mental time travel

Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability that allows humans to mentally project themselves backwards in time to remember past events (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards in time to imagine future events (i.e., future thinking). Despite empirical evidence showing that animals might possess MTT abilities, some still claim that this ability is uniquely human. Recent debates have suggested that it is the temporal cognitive mechanism (i.e., ability to represent the sense of past and future) that makes MTT uniquely human. Advances in the field have been constrained by a lack of comparative data, methodological shortcomings that prevent meaningful comparisons, and a lack of clear conceptualizations of the temporal cognitive mechanism. Here I will present a comprehensive review into MTT in humans and animals-with a particular focus on great apes. I will examine three of the most prominent and influential theoretical models of human MTT. Drawing on these accounts, I suggest that a basic way of understanding time might be shared across species, however culture and language will play a critical role at shaping the way we elaborate mental representations about past and future events. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

"What Should You Bring with You to This Place?": Examining Children's Episodic Foresight Using Open-Ended Questions

Children's episodic foresight, the ability to mentally project oneself into the future to pre-experience an event (e.g., Atance & O'Neill, 2005), begins to emerge early in the preschool years. Results from the Picture-book task (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005) have shown that children are generally capable of selecting an item needed in the future (from provided options), but young preschoolers have difficulty justifying their choice with future-oriented explanations. Because episodic foresight has typically been measured using forced-choice questions (such as the Picture-book task) less is known about children's more naturalistic and "open-ended" future thinking (i.e., more spontaneous forms of episodic foresight). Forty-eight 3-to 5-year-olds completed a new, open-ended version of the Picture-book task. Using a descriptive approach, we found that children were able to generate an appropriate item to bring with them to a future location, and that this ability improved with age. Temporal focus as well as internal (episodic) and external (semantic) details were explored in the context of children's explanations. Children's explanations were mostly present-oriented and included episodic and semantic details equally. Our findings extend our knowledge of children's episodic foresight by highlighting children's ability to solve future-oriented problems in an open-ended manner.

What Human Planning Can Tell Us About Animal Planning: An Empirical Case

The ability to think about and plan for the future is a critical cognitive skill for our daily life. There is ongoing debate about whether other animals possess future thinking. Part of the difficulty in resolving this debate is that there is not a definite methodology that allow us to conclude that animals (and human children) are truly thinking about a future event. Research with humans-both children and adults- will benefit the field of comparative psychology by providing information about the range of humans' responses when they are faced with problems similar to those presented to other animals. Inspired by a problem that chimpanzees experienced in the wild, children of 4 and 5 years of age and young adults were presented with a situation in which they were expected to select two tools in order to obtain a reward. More older children than 4 years old successfully obtained the reward. Adults also succeeded at solving the problem. However, both children and adults struggled to select the two correct tools before any tool-use action was executed. While children's performance is discussed in the context of temporal components required to envisage future events, adults' performance is interpreted in the context of cognitive effort. These findings link developmental and adult cognition with comparative psychology.

Children's future-oriented cognition

Children's future-oriented cognition has become a well-established area of research over the last decade. Future-oriented cognition encompasses a range of processes, including those involved in conceiving the future, imagining and preparing for future events, and making decisions that will affect how the future unfolds. We consider recent empirical advances in the study of such processes by outlining key findings that have yielded a clearer picture of how future thinking emerges and changes over childhood. Our interest in future thinking stems from a broader interest in temporal cognition, and we argue that a consideration of developmental changes in how children understand and represent time itself provides a valuable framework in which to study future-oriented cognition.

The impact of children's lexical and morphosyntactic knowledge on narrative competence development: A prospective cohort study

The authors investigate the contribution of children's early comprehension of relational terms and morphosyntactic knowledge to the development of narrative competence in kindergarten and Grade 1. Narrative competence was assessed through the cohesion, coherence, and structure of children's productions. The participants in this study were 714 Italian children. The authors measured their oral narrative competence through a storytelling task at the beginning and end of the kindergarten year. A total of 115 children were randomly selected and followed through Grade 1, and their narrative competence was measured again. According to the path analysis model, early morphosyntactic knowledge contributes to explain narrative competence in Grade 1. Early comprehension of relational terms contributes to narrative competence at the end of the school year. These findings confirm the importance of exploring the influence of early language skills on narrative competence development and suggests early intervention at the level of language antecedents of narrative competence.

The Development of Temporal Concepts: Linguistic Factors and Cognitive Processes

Temporal concepts are fundamental constructs of human cognition, but the trajectory of how these concepts emerge and develop is not clear. Evidence of children's temporal concept development comes from cognitive developmental and psycholinguistic studies. This paper reviews the linguistic factors (i.e., temporal language production and comprehension) and cognitive processes (i.e., temporal judgment and temporal reasoning) involved in children's temporal conceptualization. The relationship between children's ability to express time in language and the ability to reason about time, and the challenges and difficulties raised by the interaction between cognitive and linguistic components are discussed. Finally, we propose ways to reconcile controversies from different research perspectives and present several avenues for future research to better understand the development of temporal concepts.

Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition

We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a specific feature of humans’ everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the context of characterizing two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification.

Time and Narrative: An Investigation of Storytelling Abilities in Children With Autism Spectrum Disorder

This study analyzed the relation between mental time travel (MTT) and the ability to produce a storytelling focusing on global coherence, which is one of the most notable characteristics of narrative discourse. As global coherence is strictly tied to the temporal sequence of the events narrated in a story, we hypothesized that the construction of coherent narratives would rely on the ability to mentally navigate in time. To test such a hypothesis, we investigated the relation between one component of MTT—namely, episodic future thinking (EFT)—and narrative production skills by comparing the narratives uttered by 66 children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD) with those produced by 66 children with typical development. EFT was assessed by administering a task with minimal narrative demands, whereas storytelling production skills were assessed by administering two narrative production tasks that required children to generate future or past episodes with respect to the target stimuli. The results showed that EFT skills were impaired only in a subgroup of children with ASD and that such subgroup performed significantly worse on the narrative production task than ASD participants with high EFT skills and participants with typical development. The practical and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

Children's planning performance in the Zoo Map task (BADS-C): Is it driven by general cognitive ability, executive functioning, or prospection?

A minimal amount of research has examined the cognitive predictors of children's performance in naturalistic, errand-type planning tasks such as the Zoo Map task of the Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome for Children (BADS-C). Thus, the current study examined prospection (i.e., the ability to remember to carry out a future intention), executive functioning, and intelligence markers as predictors of performance in this widely used naturalistic planning task in 56 children aged 7- to 12-years-old. Measures of planning, prospection, inhibition, crystallized intelligence, and fluid intelligence were collected in an individual differences study. Regression analyses showed that prospection (rather than traditional measures of intelligence or inhibition) predicted planning, suggesting that naturalistic planning tasks such as the Zoo Map task may rely on future-oriented cognitive processes rather than executive problem solving or general knowledge.

Episodic memory and future thinking during early childhood: Linking the past and future

Despite extensive examination of episodic memory and future thinking development, little is known about the concurrent emergence of these capacities during early childhood. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds participated in an episodic memory hiding task ("what, when, where" [WWW] components) with an episodic future thinking component. In Experiment 2, a group of 4-year-olds (including children from Experiment 1) participated in the same task (different objects and locations), providing the first longitudinal investigation of episodic memory and future thinking. Although children exhibited age-related improvements in recall, recognition, and binding of the WWW episodic memory components, there were no age-related changes in episodic future thinking. At both ages, WWW episodic memory performance was higher than future thinking performance, and episodic future thinking and WWW memory components were unrelated. These findings suggest that the WWW components of episodic memory are potentially less fragile than the future components when assessed in a cognitively demanding task.

The development of reasoning about the temporal and causal relations among past, present, and future events

Children's capacity to reason about temporal and causal relations among past, present, and future events was investigated. In two studies, 4- and 6-year-olds (N=160) received structurally analogous search and planning tasks that required retrospective or prospective temporal-causal reasoning, respectively. The search task was compared with a closely matched control task that did not require temporal-causal reasoning. Results revealed that (a) both age groups solved the control task, (b) 6-year-olds mastered both retrospective and prospective tasks, and (c) 4-year-olds showed limited competence in both retrospective and prospective tasks. The current study, thus, suggests that flexible temporal-causal reasoning develops in parallel for past- and future-directed reasoning, is qualitatively different from simpler forms of temporal cognition, and develops during the late preschool years.

Brief report: episodic foresight in autism spectrum disorder

Episodic foresight (EpF) or, the ability to imagine the future and use such imagination to guide our actions, is an important aspect of cognition that has not yet been explored in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This is despite its proposed links with theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF), two areas found to be impaired in ASD. Twenty-five children with ASD (M = 5 years, 10 months; 22 male) and 25 mental-age-matched typically developing children (M = 4 years, 10 months; 22 male) completed a series of EpF, ToM, and EF tasks. Significant group differences were detected on several EpF tasks suggesting that children with ASD show impairments in thinking about their future selves.

Young children's agent-neutral representations of action roles

Recent developmental research has shown that young children coordinate complementary action roles with others. But what do they understand about the logical structure of such roles? Do they have an agent-neutral conception of complementary action roles, grasping that such roles can be variably filled by any two agents or even by one agent over time? Accordingly, can they make use of such representations for planning both their own and others' actions? To address these questions, 3- and 4-year-olds were introduced to an activity comprising two action roles, A and B, by seeing either two agents performing A and B collaboratively or one agent performing A and B individually. Children's flexible inferences from these demonstrations were then tested by asking them later on to plan ahead for the fulfillment of one of the roles either by themselves or by someone else. The 4-year-olds competently drew inferences in all directions, from past individual and collaborative demonstrations, when planning how they or someone else would need to fulfill the roles in the future. The 3-year-olds, in contrast, showed more restricted competence; they were capable of such inferences only when planning in the immediate present. Taken together, these results suggest that children form and use agent-neutral representations of action roles by 3 years of age and flexibly use such representations for episodic memory and future deliberation in planning their own and others' actions by 4 years of age. The findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of understanding self-other equivalence and agent-neutral frames of references.

Young children understand the normative implications of future-directed speech acts

Much recent research has shown that the capacity for mental time travel and temporal reasoning emerges during the preschool years. Nothing is known so far, however, about young children's grasp of the normative dimension of future-directed thought and speech. The present study is the first to show that children from age 4 understand the normative outreach of such future-directed speech acts: subjects at time 1 witnessed a speaker make future-directed speech acts about/towards an actor A, either in imperative mode ("A, do X!") or as a prediction ("the actor A will do X"). When at time 2 the actor A performed an action that did not match the content of the speech act at time 1, children identified the speaker as the source of a mistake in the prediction case, and the actor as the source of the mistake in the imperative case and leveled criticism accordingly. These findings add to our knowledge about the emergence and development of temporal cognition in revealing an early sensitivity to the normative aspects of future-orientation.

Assessing the role of memory in preschoolers' performance on episodic foresight tasks

A total of 48 preschoolers (ages 3, 4, and 5) received four tasks modelled after prior work designed to assess the development of "episodic foresight". For each task, children encountered a problem in one room and, after a brief delay, were given the opportunity in a second room to select an item to solve the problem. Importantly, after selecting an item, children were queried about their memory for the problem. Age-related changes were found both in children's ability to select the correct item and their ability to remember the problem. However, when we controlled for children's memory for the problem, there were no longer significant age-related changes on the item choice measure. These findings suggest that age-related changes in children's performance on these tasks are driven by improvements in children's memory versus improvements in children's future-oriented thinking or "foresight" per se. Our results have important implications for how best to structure tasks to measure children's episodic foresight, and also for the relative role of memory in this task and in episodic foresight more broadly.

The development of mental scenario building and episodic foresight

Episodic foresight is the future-directed counterpart of episodic memory. It is a sophisticated, potentially uniquely human capacity, with tremendous adaptive consequences. Here we review what is currently known about its development through early childhood. We tackle this from two distinct perspectives. First, we present the first systematic evaluation of the development of purported components of mental scenario building as highlighted by a theater metaphor: the stage, the playwright, the set, the actors, the director, the executive producer, and the broadcaster. We find that, although there are diverse developmental trajectories, by 4 years of age children have acquired the basic cognitive components required to mentally construct specific future events. Second, we examine recent attempts to test children's episodic foresight more directly and find that results are in line with those examining the development of required components. This is not to say that children younger than four have no inkling of upcoming events or that older children have nothing left to learn about constructing the future. Episodic foresight, and its neurocognitive foundations, continues to develop throughout childhood.

Foresight beyond the very next event: four-year-olds can link past and deferred future episodes

Previous experiments have demonstrated that by 4 years of age children can use information from a past episode to solve a problem for the very next future episode. However, it remained unclear whether 4-year-olds can similarly use such information to solve a problem for a more removed future episode that is not of immediate concern. In the current study we introduced 4-year-olds to problems in one room before taking them to another room and distracting them for 15 min. The children were then offered a choice of items to place into a bucket that was to be taken back to the first room when a 5-min sand-timer had completed a cycle. Across two conceptually distinct domains, the children placed the item that could solve the deferred future problem above chance level. This result demonstrates that by 48 months many children can recall a problem from the past and act in the present to solve that problem for a deferred future episode. We discuss implications for theories about the nature of episodic foresight.

The temporal priority principle: at what age does this develop?

The temporal priority principle states that all causes must precede their effects. It is widely assumed that children's causal reasoning is guided by this principle from early in development. However, the empirical studies that have examined children's use of the principle, most of which were conducted some decades ago, in fact show inconsistent findings. Some researchers have argued that 3-year-olds reliably use this principle, whereas others have suggested that it is not until 5 years that children properly grasp the inviolability of the principle. To examine this issue, 100 children, 50 three-year-olds, and 50 four-year-olds, took part in a study in which they had to judge which of two causes yielded an effect. In the task, children saw one event (A), an effect (E), and then another event (B). The events A and B involved the rolling of balls down runways, and the effect E was a Jack-in-a-box popping up. The extent to which E left a visible trace was also varied, because comparisons across previous studies suggested that this may affect performance. As a group, 3- and 4-year-olds performed at above-chance levels, but performance improved with age. The nature of the effect did not have a significant impact on performance. Although some previous studies suggested that 3-year-olds may be more likely to choose B rather than A as a cause due to a recency effect, we found no evidence of this pattern of performance in the younger group. Potential explanations of the age-related improvement in performance are discussed.

Cognitive mechanisms of memory for order in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

One important aspect of episodic memory is the ability to remember the order in which events occurred. Memory for sequences in rats and has been shown to rely on the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (DeVito and Eichenbaum (2011) J Neuro 31:3169-3175; Fortin et al. (2002) Nat Neuro 5:458-462). Rats with hippocampal lesions were impaired in selecting the odor that had appeared earlier in a sequence of five odors but were not impaired in recognition of previously sampled odors (Fortin et al., 2002; Kesner et al. (2002) Behav Neuro 116:286-290). These results suggest that order is not represented by relative familiarity or memory strength. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying memory for order have not been determined. We presented monkeys with lists of five images drawn randomly from a pool of 6,000 images. At test, two images were presented and monkeys were rewarded for selecting the image that had appeared earlier in the studied list. Monkeys learned to discriminate the order of the images, even those that were consecutive in the studied list. In subsequent experiments, we found that discrimination of order was not controlled by list position or relative memory strength. Instead, monkeys used temporal order, a mechanism that appears to encode order of occurrence relative to other events, rather than in absolute time. We found that number of intervening images, rather than passage of time per se, most strongly determined the discriminability of order of occurrence. Better specifying the cognitive mechanisms nonhuman primates use to remember the order of events enhances this animal model of episodic memory, and may further inform our understanding of the functions of the hippocampus.

The development of episodic foresight: emerging concepts and methods

Episodic foresight is here defined as the ability to project oneself into the future and mentally simulate situations and outcomes. Tasks used to study the development of episodic foresight in young children are reviewed and compared to tasks used to study other future-oriented abilities (planning, delay of gratification, and prospective memory) in the same age-group. We argue for the importance of accounting for and minimizing the role of other cognitive demands in research tasks. Because episodic foresight is an emerging ability in young children, more research needs to be directed at the contexts in which it emerges and the extent to which episodic foresight is part of a growing ability for mental representation.

The signature of inhibition in theory of mind: children's predictions of behavior based on avoidance desire

Theory-of-mind reasoning may require inhibitory processing, a view for which we provide new, more direct, evidence. Our research capitalizes on the lingering property of inhibition: After a response is inhibited, it temporarily becomes more difficult to select than uninhibited responses. In two experiments, 3-year-olds predicted to which of three buckets a girl would go, given a desire to avoid one (e.g., the red one). When next predicting where a boy would play, children were biased against the location the girl had avoided. However, predictions for the boy were unbiased when not preceded by predictions for the girl. These findings suggest that preschoolers predict behavior based on avoidance desires by inhibiting the target to be avoided, as well as that the inhibition lingers, reducing the target's accessibility for subsequent predictions.

Episodic memory versus episodic foresight: Similarities and differences

There are logical and empirical grounds that link episodic memory and the ability to imagine future events. In some sense, both episodic memory and episodic foresight may be regarded as two sides of the same capacity to travel mentally in time. After reviewing some of the recent evidence for commonalities, I discuss limits of these parallels. There are fundamental differences between thinking about past and future events that need to be kept in clear view if we are to make progress in understanding the nature of mental time travel. The reviewed evidence suggests that mental time travel is based on a complex system selected not for accuracy about past and future per se, but for fitness benefits. Functional analyses promise to lead to fruitful avenues for future research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.