Believing versus Disbelieving in Free Will: Correlates and Consequences

At freedom's edge: Belief in free will during the COVID-19 pandemic

Among life-and-death health concerns surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic were frustrations about the loss of personal freedom due to emergency quarantine. To test these perceptions, two studies examined whether belief in free will was resilient during different points of the pandemic. In Study 1, conducted in 2020, participants completed a writing task describing their lives before the COVID-19 pandemic, during the COVID-19 pandemic while under emergency quarantine, and during the COVID-19 pandemic while under state re-openings. Following each task, they completed belief in free will measures. Results indicated that free will beliefs were higher before the pandemic than during emergency quarantine. Free will beliefs were also greater during state re-opening than during emergency quarantine. Belief in free will did not differ between pre-pandemic and state re-opening. Study 2 replicated and extended these effects two years later. These findings highlight the brief loss of freedom during COVID-19 as well as the resiliency of agentic control.

The role of free will beliefs in social behavior: Priority areas for future research

Recent research has examined the consequences that holding views about free will has on social behavior. Specifically, through manipulating people's belief in free will, researchers have tested the psychological and behavioral consequences of free will belief change. However, findings of such manipulations have been shown to be relatively small and inconsistent. The purpose of this paper is to outline four key areas for researchers in this area to consider. We believe considering these areas will give a more nuanced understanding of the role of free will beliefs.

Climbing the Invisible Ladder: Attenuating Belief in Free Will Reduces Subjective Perceptions of Social Mobility

Can belief in free will alter our perceptions of social mobility? Five studies manipulated free will beliefs and assessed subjective individual social mobility (Study 1), subjective social status across time (Study 2), objective social class 10 years (Study 3) and 20 years (Study 4) into the future, and counterbalanced subjective and objective social mobility measures (Study 5). Challenging free will beliefs reduced subjective perceptions of upward mobility in Study 1 and led to lower perceptions of subjective social status in the distant, but not in near future in Study 2. Studies 3 and 4 found that threatening free will beliefs did not influence perceptions of future objective social class. Study 5 revealed that weakening free will beliefs affected subjective and objective social mobility, with the latter under specific boundary conditions. The differential effects of belief in free will on perceived social mobility are discussed.

Can I Pay at Purgatory? The Negative Impact of the Purgatory Ethic in Islamic Societies: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

The psychological and social effects of the doctrine of purgatory (temporary afterlife punishment) have not received sufficient attention from sociologists. Temporary afterlife punishment (TAP) is any kind of ‘temporary’ torment a person believes they will receive after death as a result of one’s sins, before admission into heaven/paradise. Investigating the effects of TAP beliefs can help to understand their social impact on contemporary Islamic societies. Drawing on related research on the Protestant ethic hypothesis, and self-control theory, the present study theorized the negative psychological and social impact of TAP. We argue that the effect of the Predestination doctrine on pro-sociality is best attributed to the Protestant denial of belief in TAP, and that the positive impact of afterlife punishment beliefs on self-control and prosocial behavior decreases with belief in TAP. To test these hypotheses, we first developed the Temporary Afterlife Punishment Expectations (TAPE) scale and examined the relationship between TAPE and self-control, rule-breaking ability, and integrity (as an indicator of prosocial behavior). Data were collected from Muslim youth in two countries (Jordan N = 605 and Malaysia N = 303). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the Jordanian data support the construct validity of the TAPE scale. In line with our hypotheses, path analysis results supported the negative effects of TAPE on self-control, rule-breaking ability, and integrity. Replicating the study with the Malaysian sample led to similar results. Future research directions are recommended.

A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments

In the seminal Libet experiment (Libet et al., 1983), unconscious brain activity preceded the self-reported, conscious intention to move. This was repeatedly interpreted as challenging the view that (conscious) mental states cause behavior and, prominently, as challenging the existence of free will. Extensive discussions in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and jurisprudence followed, but further empirical findings were heterogeneous. However, a quantitative review of the literature summarizing the evidence of Libet-style experiments is lacking. The present meta-analysis fills this gap. The results revealed a temporal pattern that is largely consistent with the one found by Libet and colleagues. Remarkably, there were only k = 6 studies for the time difference between unconscious brain activity and the conscious intention to move - the most crucial time difference regarding implications about conscious causation and free will. Additionally, there was a high degree of uncertainty associated with this meta-analytic effect. We conclude that some of Libet et al.'s findings appear more fragile than anticipated in light of the substantial scientific work that built on them.

Moralizing mental states: The role of trait self-control and control perceptions

Which attributes of a person contribute to their tendency to moralize others' thoughts? Adopting an individual-difference approach to moral cognition, eight studies (N = 2,033) investigated how people's ability for self-control shapes their moral reactions to others' mental states. Specifically, Studies 1a-2b found positive predictive effects of trait self-control (TSC) on the moralization (e.g., blaming) of another person's fantasies about different immoral behaviors. While ruling out alternative explanations, they furthermore supported the mediating role of ascribing targets control over their mental states. Studies 3a-3b provided correlational evidence of the perceived ability to control one's own mental states as a mechanism in the relationship between TSC and ascriptions of control to others. Studies 4a-4b followed a causal-chain experimental approach: A manipulation of participants' self-perceived ability to control their emotions impacted their control ascriptions to others over their immoral mental states (Study 4a), and targets perceived as high (vs. low) in control over their immoral mental states elicited stronger moralizing reactions. Taken together, the present studies elucidate why people moralize others' purely mental states, even in the absence of overt behavior. More broadly, they advance our knowledge about the role of individual differences, particularly in self-control, in moral cognition.

Belief in Altruistic Motives Predicts Prosocial Actions and Inferences

Are humans ever truly altruistic? Or are all actions, however noble, ultimately motivated by self-interest? Psychologists and philosophers have long grappled with this question, but few have considered laypeople's beliefs about the nature of prosocial motives. Here we examine these beliefs and their social correlates across two experiments (N = 445). We find that people tend to believe humans can be, and frequently are, altruistically motivated-echoing prior work. Moreover, people who more strongly believe in altruistic motives act more prosocially themselves-for instance, sacrificing greater amounts of money and time to help others-a relationship that holds even when controlling for trait empathy. People who believe in altruistic motives also judge other prosocial agents to be more genuinely kind, especially when agents' motives are ambiguous. Lastly, people independently show a self-serving bias-believing their own motives for prosociality are more often altruistic than others'. Overall, this work suggests that believing in altruistic motives predicts the extent to which people both see altruism and act prosocially, possibly reflecting the self-fulfilling nature of such lay theories.

Are mental disorders related to disbelief in free will? A systematic review

BACKGROUND

The nature and existence of free will have been debated for centuries. Since some psychiatric disorders are known to interfere with one's ability to control their actions and thoughts (e.g., schizophrenia), the investigation of the psychiatric facet of free will beliefs seems to be relevant. In this systematic review, we were interested in clarifying if and how having a mental disorder affects individuals' beliefs in free will by comparing psychiatric vs. non-psychiatric samples.

METHODS

A systematic search of MEDLINE, Web of Science, EMBASE, and PsycINFO databases was performed between 04 and 09 November 2020. The search strategy included "free will" and related constructs and terms related to DSM-5 mental disorders characterized by psychotic, compulsive, avoidant, or impulsive symptoms. Eligible designs of studies included case-control and cohort studies. Study selection took place in committee meetings consisting of six researchers. Quality assessment of the selected studies was performed through the Joanna Briggs Institute Appraisal Checklist for Case Control Studies.

RESULTS

After removing duplicates, a total of 12,218 titles/abstracts were screened. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were followed, and three articles were eventually selected.

CONCLUSIONS

It is not possible to provide unequivocal confirmation that having a mental disorder can or cannot affect someone's belief in free will. Studies with different mental disorders should be conducted in this field.

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW REGISTRATION

PROSPERO CRD42018109468.

The weirdness of belief in free will

It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. Is there a widespread consensus about the conceptual content of free will? We compared English "free will" with its lexical equivalents in Lithuanian, Hindi, Chinese and Mongolian languages and found that unlike Lithuanian, Chinese, Hindi and Mongolian lexical expressions of "free will" do not refer to the same concept free will. What kind people have been studied so far? A review of papers indicate that, overall, 91% of participants in studies on belief in free will were WEIRD. Thus, given that free will has no cross-culturally universal conceptual content and that most of the reviewed studies were based on WEIRD samples, belief in free will is not a psychological universal.

Would You Sacrifice Your Privacy to Protect Public Health? Prosocial Responsibility in a Pandemic Paves the Way for Digital Surveillance

Digital surveillance methods, such as location tracking apps on smartphones, have been implemented in many countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, but not much is known about predictors of their acceptance. Could it be that prosocial responsibility, to which authorities appealed in order to enhance compliance with quarantine measures, also increases acceptance of digital surveillance and restrictions of privacy? In their fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world communicated that self-isolation and social distancing measures are every citizen’s duty in order to protect the health not only of oneself but also of vulnerable others. We suggest that prosocial responsibility besides motivating people to comply with anti-pandemic measures also undermines people’s valuation of privacy. In an online research conducted with US participants, we examined correlates of people’s willingness to sacrifice individual rights and succumb to surveillance with a particular focus on prosocial responsibility. First, replicating prior research, we found that perceived prosocial responsibility was a powerful predictor of compliance with self-isolation and social distancing measures. Second, going beyond prior research, we found that perceived prosocial responsibility also predicted willingness to accept restrictions of individual rights and privacy, as well as to accept digital surveillance for the sake of public health. While we identify a range of additional predictors, the effects of prosocial responsibility hold after controlling for alternative processes, such as perceived self-risk, impact of the pandemic on oneself, or personal value of freedom. These findings suggest that prosocial responsibility may act as a Trojan horse for privacy compromises.

Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will

A key source of support for the view that challenging people's beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests.

The Illusion of Time: Testing the Bidirectional Relationship Between Belief in Free Will and Temporal Horizons

The current research examined the bidirectional relationship between belief in free will and perceptions of time. Studies 1 and 2 explored the association between free will beliefs (FWB) and future time perspective (FTP) in correlational and longitudinal studies, respectively. Results indicated a positive relationship between the two constructs. Study 3 manipulated FTP and assessed FWB. Study 4 manipulated FWB and assessed FTP about current goal-pursuit. While manipulating FTP did not directly influence FWB, attenuating FWB led participants to perceive time as more limited to accomplish their goals. Exploratory mediation suggests that the perception of increased paths to successful goal-pursuit accounts for this relationship. The interplay between FWB and FTP is discussed.

Addiction and Voluntariness: Five “Challenges” to Address in Moving the Discussion Forward

The question as to whether people with an addiction have control (and to what extent) over their addiction, and voluntarily decide to use substances is an ongoing source of controversy in the context of research on addiction, health policy and clinical practice. We describe and discuss a set of five challenges for further research into voluntariness (definition[s], measurement and study tools, first person perspectives, contextual understandings, and connections to broader frameworks) based on our own research experiences and those of others.

Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism

For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments-and only when the descriptions had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.

On the Necessity of Consciousness for Sophisticated Human Action

In this essay, we aim to counter and qualify the epiphenomenalist challenge proposed in this special issue on the grounds of empirical and theoretical arguments. The current body of scientific knowledge strongly indicates that conscious thought is a necessary condition for many human behaviors, and therefore, consciousness qualifies as a cause of those behaviors. We review illustrative experimental evidence for the causal power of conscious thought while also acknowledging its natural limitations. We argue that it is implausible that the metabolic costs inherent to conscious processes would have evolved in humans without any adaptive benefits. Moreover, we discuss the relevance of conscious thought to the issue of freedom. Many accounts hold conscious thought as necessary and conducive to naturalistic conceptions of personal freedom. Apart from these theories, we show that the conscious perception of freedom and the belief in free will provide sources of interesting findings, beneficial behavioral effects, and new avenues for research. We close by proposing our own challenge via outlining the gaps that have yet to be filled to establish hard evidence of an epiphenomenal model of consciousness. To be sure, we appreciate the epiphenomenalist challenge as it promotes critical thinking and inspires rigorous research. However, we see no merit in downplaying the causal significance of consciousness a priori. Instead, we believe it more worthwhile to focus on the complex interplay between conscious and other causal processes.

Nurturing Our Better Nature: A Proposal for Cognitive Integrity as a Foundation for Autonomous Living

As we account for the genetic and environmental influences on morally-relevant character traits like intellectual honesty, industriousness, and self-control, do we risk becoming ever less accountable to ourselves? Behavioral genetic research suggests that about half the variance in such character traits is likely attributable to heredity, and a small fraction to the shared family environment. The remaining 40-60% is explained by neither genes nor family upbringing. This raises the question: how active a role can individuals play in shaping their own character? What, if anything, can and should one do to take responsibility for the kind of person one becomes? This paper sketches a novel theoretical proposal for addressing these questions, by drawing on several previously disparate lines of research within behavior genetics, philosophy, and experimental psychology. Our core proposal concerns the metacognitive capacity to engage in active, reality-based cognition, as opposed to passive, stimulus-driven processing or an active pretense at cognition (i.e., self-deception). We review arguments and evidence indicating that human beings both can and should exercise this capacity, which we have termed "cognitive integrity." We argue that doing so can in a certain sense "set us free" of our genetic and environmental influences-not by rendering them irrelevant, but by giving us the awareness and motivation to manage them more responsibly. This perspective has important implications for guiding the development of psychosocial interventions, and for informing how we direct ourselves more generally, both as individuals and as a society.

A free will needs a free mind: Belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism differentially predict belief in free will and determinism

In this article, we show that lay people's beliefs about how minds relate to bodies are more complex than past research suggests, and that treating them as a multidimensional construct helps explain inconclusive findings from the literature regarding their relation to beliefs about whether humans possess a free will. In two studies, we found that items previously used to assess a unidimensional belief in how minds relate to bodies indeed capture two distinguishable constructs (belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism) that differently predict belief in free will and two types of determinism (Studies 1 and 2). Additionally, we found that two fundamental personality traits pertaining to people's preference for experiential versus rational information processing predict those metaphysical beliefs that were theorized to be based on subjective phenomenological experience and rational deliberation, respectively (Study 2). In sum, beliefs about mind-body relations are a multidimensional construct with unique predictive abilities.

Mind-Body Dualism and Health Revisited

Abstract. Does a sound mind require a sound body? Whether or not lay people subscribe to this notion depends on their belief in mind-body dualism and critically shapes their health-related behaviors. Six studies (N = 1,710) revisit the relation between dualism and health. We replicate the negative correlation between belief in dualism and health behavior (Study 1) and extend it to behavior in the field (Study 2). Studies 3a and 3b investigate how belief in dualism shapes intuitions about the material origin of psychological well-being, while Studies 4a and 4b examine how these intuitions determine health-related outcomes. In sum, construing minds as different from bodies entails the intuition that mental well-being has little material substrate which in turn attenuates health-sustaining behaviors.

Laypersons' Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism: New Insights Linking the Social Psychology and Experimental Philosophy Paradigms

We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants' free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.

Self-Regulation Facilitates Meaning in Life

Meaning is a central feature of human life. Our overarching proposition is that self-regulation helps facilitate meaning in life. We propose that purposeful, effortful, and directive actions that regulate selfish impulses are necessary to continually develop a sense of meaning in life. We explain how self-regulatory processes map onto this process: the drive for meaning is governed by internalized standards of meaning, people monitor their experiences to ensure a fit between their experiences and standards of meaning, and strength is required for deliberative behaviors aimed at reaffirming and regaining meaning. Moreover, we outline various self-regulatory pathways to gain meaning via coherence, significance, and purpose. Finally, we suggest various ways to test and expand our model and hypotheses.

Agency Beliefs Over Time and Across Cultures: Free Will Beliefs Predict Higher Job Satisfaction

In three studies, we examined the relationship between free will beliefs and job satisfaction over time and across cultures. Study 1 examined 252 Taiwanese real-estate agents over a 3-months period. Study 2 examined job satisfaction for 137 American workers on an online labor market over a 6-months period. Study 3 extended to a large sample of 14,062 employees from 16 countries and examined country-level moderators. We found a consistent positive relationship between the belief in free will and job satisfaction. The relationship was above and beyond other agency constructs (Study 2), mediated by perceived autonomy (Studies 2-3), and stronger in countries with a higher national endorsement of the belief in free will (Study 3). We conclude that free-will beliefs predict outcomes over time and across cultures beyond other agency constructs. We call for more cross-cultural and longitudinal studies examining free-will beliefs as predictors of real-life outcomes.

How disentangled sense of agency and sense of ownership can interact with different emotional events on stress feelings

We used the virtual hand illusion paradigm to study how sense of agency and sense of (body) ownership can interact with different emotional events on stress feelings. Converging evidence for at least the partial independence of agency and ownership was found. For instance, sense of agency was a better predictor of individual anxiety levels than sense of ownership and males showed stronger effects related to agency-presumably due to gender-specific attribution styles and empathy skills. Moreover, agency and ownership also interacted with emotional events and led to different anxiety levels. Taken together, our findings suggest that the disentangled sense of agency and sense of ownership can interact with different emotional events and influenced stress feelings more in threatening situations than awarding ones.

Making punishment palatable: Belief in free will alleviates punitive distress

Punishing wrongdoers is beneficial for group functioning, but can harm individual well-being. Building on research demonstrating that punitive motives underlie free will beliefs, we propose that free will beliefs help justify punitive impulses, thus alleviating the associated distress. In Study 1, trait-level punitiveness predicted heightened levels of anxiety only for free will skeptics. Study 2 found that higher state-level incarceration rates predicted higher mental health issue rates, only in states with citizens relatively skeptical about free will. In Study 3, participants who punished an unfair partner experienced greater distress than non-punishers, only when their partner did not have free choice. Studies 4 and 5 confirmed experimentally that punitive desires led to greater anxiety only when free will beliefs were undermined by an anti-free will argument. These results suggest that believing in free will permits holding immoral actors morally responsible, thus justifying punishment with diminished negative psychological consequences for punishers.

Ordinary people associate addiction with loss of free will

Introduction

It is widely believed that addiction entails a loss of free will, even though this point is controversial among scholars. There is arguably a downside to this belief, in that addicts who believe they lack the free will to quit an addiction might therefore fail to quit an addiction.

Methods

A correlational study tested the relationship between belief in free will and addiction. Follow-up studies tested steps of a potential mechanism: 1) people think drugs undermine free will 2) people believe addiction undermines free will more when doing so serves the self 3) disbelief in free will leads people to perceive various temptations as more addictive.

Results

People with lower belief in free will were more likely to have a history of addiction to alcohol and other drugs, and also less likely to have successfully quit alcohol. People believe that drugs undermine free will, and they use this belief to self-servingly attribute less free will to their bad actions than to good ones. Low belief in free will also increases perceptions that things are addictive.

Conclusions

Addiction is widely seen as loss of free will. The belief can be used in self-serving ways that may undermine people's efforts to quit.

Disassociating the Agent From the Self

Undermining the belief in free will influences thoughts and behavior, yet little research has explored its implications for the self and identity. The current studies examined whether lowering free will beliefs reduces perceived true self-knowledge. First, a new free will manipulation was validated. Next, in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to high belief or low belief in free will conditions and completed measures of true self-knowledge. In Study 2, participants completed the same free will manipulation and a moral decision-making task. We then assessed participants’ perceived sense of authenticity during the task. Results illustrated that attenuating free will beliefs led to less self-knowledge, such that participants reported feeling more alienated from their true selves and experienced lowered perceptions of authenticity while making moral decisions. The interplay between free will and the true self are discussed.

Bad is freer than good: Positive-negative asymmetry in attributions of free will

Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons' sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances.

The experience of freedom in decisions - Questioning philosophical beliefs in favor of psychological determinants

Six experiments tested two competing models of subjective freedom during decision-making. The process model is mainly based on philosophical conceptions of free will and assumes that features of the process of choosing affect subjective feelings of freedom. In contrast, the outcome model predicts that subjective freedom is due to positive outcomes that can be expected or are achieved by a decision. Results heavily favored the outcome model over the process model. For example, participants felt freer when choosing between two equally good than two equally bad options. Process features including number of options, complexity of decision, uncertainty, having the option to defer the decision, conflict among reasons, and investing high effort in choosing generally had no or even negative effects on subjective freedom. In contrast, participants reported high freedom with good outcomes and low freedom with bad outcomes, and ease of deciding increased subjective freedom, consistent with the outcome model.

The making of might-have-beens: effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking

Counterfactual thoughts are based on the assumption that one situation could result in multiple possible outcomes. This assumption underlies most theories of free will and contradicts deterministic views that there is only one possible outcome of any situation. Three studies tested the hypothesis that stronger belief in free will would lead to more counterfactual thinking. Experimental manipulations (Studies 1-2) and a measure (Studies 3-4) of belief in free will were linked to increased counterfactual thinking in response to autobiographical (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and hypothetical (Study 2) events. Belief in free will also predicted the kind of counterfactuals generated. Belief in free will was associated with an increase in the generation of self and upward counterfactuals, which have been shown to be particularly useful for learning. These findings fit the view that belief in free will is promoted by societies because it facilitates learning and culturally valued change.

Free Will, Counterfactual Reflection, and the Meaningfulness of Life Events

Research has found that counterfactual reflection, the act of mentally undoing past events, imbues major life experiences with meaning. The current studies examined whether individual differences in free will beliefs moderate this relationship. Participants described a significant event in their lives, were randomly assigned to counterfactual or factual reflection about the event, and completed measures of meaning and free will. Two studies found that counterfactual reflection enhanced the meaningfulness of life events for people with high belief in free will but not for people with low belief in free will. These studies suggest that beliefs in free will are an important factor in meaning-making processes.

Individual differences in attributional style but not in interoceptive sensitivity, predict subjective estimates of action intention

The debate on the existence of free will is on-going. Seminal findings by Libet et al. (1983) demonstrate that subjective awareness of a voluntary urge to act (the W-judgment) occurs before action execution. Libet's paradigm requires participants to perform voluntary actions while watching a clock hand rotate. On response trials, participants make a retrospective judgment related to awareness of their urge to act. This research investigates the relationship between individual differences in performance on the Libet task and self-awareness. We examined the relationship between W-judgment, attributional style (AS; a measure of perceived control) and interoceptive sensitivity (IS; awareness of stimuli originating from one's body; e.g., heartbeats). Thirty participants completed the AS questionnaire (ASQ), a heartbeat estimation task (IS), and the Libet paradigm. The ASQ score significantly predicted performance on the Libet task, while IS did not - more negative ASQ scores indicated larger latency between W-judgment and action execution. A significant correlation was also observed between ASQ score and IS. This is the first research to report a relationship between W-judgment and AS and should inform the future use of electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the relationship between AS, W-judgment and RP onset. Our findings raise questions surrounding the importance of one's perceived control in determining the point of conscious intention to act. Furthermore, we demonstrate possible negative implications associated with a longer period between conscious awareness and action execution.

The effect of belief in free will on prejudice

The current research examined the role of the belief in free will on prejudice across Han Chinese and white samples. Belief in free will refers to the extent to which people believe human beings truly have free will. In Study 1, the beliefs of Han Chinese people in free will were measured, and their social distances from the Tibetan Chinese were used as an index of ethnic prejudice. The results showed that the more that Han Chinese endorsed the belief in free will, the less that they showed prejudice against the Tibetan Chinese. In Study 2, the belief of the Han Chinese in free will was manipulated, and their explicit feelings towards the Uyghur Chinese were used as an indicator of ethnic prejudice. The results showed that the participants in the condition of belief in free will reported less prejudice towards Uyghur Chinese compared to their counterparts in the condition of disbelief in free will. In Study 3, white peoples' belief in free will was manipulated, and their pro-black attitudes were measured as an indirect indicator of racial prejudice. The results showed that, compared to the condition of disbelief in free will, the participants who were primed by a belief in free will reported stronger pro-black attitudes. These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.