Assessment of farm-level biosecurity measures after an outbreak of avian influenza in the United Kingdom

Policies to prevent zoonotic spillover: a systematic scoping review of evaluative evidence

BACKGROUND

Emerging infectious diseases of zoonotic origin present a critical threat to global population health. As accelerating globalisation makes epidemics and pandemics more difficult to contain, there is a need for effective preventive interventions that reduce the risk of zoonotic spillover events. Public policies can play a key role in preventing spillover events. The aim of this review is to identify and describe evaluations of public policies that target the determinants of zoonotic spillover. Our approach is informed by a One Health perspective, acknowledging the inter-connectedness of human, animal and environmental health.

METHODS

In this systematic scoping review, we searched Medline, SCOPUS, Web of Science and Global Health in May 2021 using search terms combining animal health and the animal-human interface, public policy, prevention and zoonoses. We screened titles and abstracts, extracted data and reported our process in line with PRISMA-ScR guidelines. We also searched relevant organisations' websites for evaluations published in the grey literature. All evaluations of public policies aiming to prevent zoonotic spillover events were eligible for inclusion. We summarised key data from each study, mapping policies along the spillover pathway.

RESULTS

Our review found 95 publications evaluating 111 policies. We identified 27 unique policy options including habitat protection; trade regulations; border control and quarantine procedures; farm and market biosecurity measures; public information campaigns; and vaccination programmes, as well as multi-component programmes. These were implemented by many sectors, highlighting the cross-sectoral nature of zoonotic spillover prevention. Reports emphasised the importance of surveillance data in both guiding prevention efforts and enabling policy evaluation, as well as the importance of industry and private sector actors in implementing many of these policies. Thoughtful engagement with stakeholders ranging from subsistence hunters and farmers to industrial animal agriculture operations is key for policy success in this area.

CONCLUSION

This review outlines the state of the evaluative evidence around policies to prevent zoonotic spillover in order to guide policy decision-making and focus research efforts. Since we found that most of the existing policy evaluations target 'downstream' determinants, additional research could focus on evaluating policies targeting 'upstream' determinants of zoonotic spillover, such as land use change, and policies impacting infection intensity and pathogen shedding in animal populations, such as those targeting animal welfare.

Management and biosecurity practices by small to medium egg producers in Scotland

1. Information about procedures and biosecurity practices used by small and medium egg producers (SMEPs) is scarce. Anecdotal evidence suggests that biosecurity in such enterprises may be poor, as personnel and equipment move freely between sites and this may be compounded by personnel working on commercial units who keep their own poultry.2. To fill this knowledge gap, a questionnaire was designed and implemented targeting SMEPs in Scotland. Small enterprises were defined as egg producers that have ≥50 laying hens but <350 laying hens; while medium enterprises were defined as egg producers that have ≥350 laying hens but ≤32 000 laying hens. The questionnaire consisted of a total of 56 questions divided into multiple sections, covering the characteristics of the primary keeper, location of the enterprise and size of the flocks, husbandry, marketing of products and health/biosecurity.3. The questionnaire was posted to 375 holdings at the beginning of March 2017 and the survey remained open until the end of May 2017. In total 90 questionnaires were received by the cut-off date of which 76 questionnaires were from SMEPs. Forty were small enterprises and 36 were medium enterprises. For three questionnaires, it was not possible to identify the enterprise type.4. Differences were observed between SMEPs in terms of reported biosecurity and management practices, with medium enterprises reporting the adoption of more biosecurity measures than small enterprises. Furthermore, SMEPs behave differently from backyard poultry keepers and large commercial companies in terms of disease risk.5. In conclusion, it is important to ensure that SMEPs are considered in contingency plans and disease control programmes and that engagement with them is promoted so that the uptake of relevant information, such as awareness of disease control programmes, is optimised.

Accuracy of herdsmen reporting versus serologic testing for estimating foot-and-mouth disease prevalence

Herdsman-reported disease prevalence is widely used in veterinary epidemiologic studies, especially for diseases with visible external lesions; however, the accuracy of such reports is rarely validated. Thus, we used latent class analysis in a Bayesian framework to compare sensitivity and specificity of herdsman reporting with virus neutralization testing and use of 3 nonstructural protein ELISAs for estimates of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) prevalence on the Adamawa plateau of Cameroon in 2000. Herdsman-reported estimates in this FMD-endemic area were comparable to those obtained from serologic testing. To harness to this cost-effective resource of monitoring emerging infectious diseases, we suggest that estimates of the sensitivity and specificity of herdsmen reporting should be done in parallel with serologic surveys of other animal diseases.

Intervention strategies to reduce the risk of zoonotic infection with avian influenza viruses: scientific basis, challenges and knowledge gaps

A range of measures has been recommended and used for the control and prevention of avian influenza. These measures are based on the assessment of local epidemiological situations, field observations and other scientific information. Other non-technical factors are (or in some cases should be) taken into account when developing and recommending control measures. The precise effects under field conditions of most individual interventions applied to control and prevent avian influenza have not been established or subjected to critical review, often because a number of measures are applied simultaneously without controls. In most cases, the combination of measures used results in control or elimination of the virus although there are some countries where this has not been the case. In others, especially those with low poultry density, it is not clear whether the link between the adoption of a set of measures and the subsequent control of the disease is causative. This article discusses the various measures recommended, with particular emphasis on stamping out and vaccination, examines how these measures assist in preventing zoonotic infections with avian influenza viruses and explores gaps in knowledge regarding their effectiveness.

Epidemic protection zones: centred on cases or based on connectivity?

When an exotic infectious disease invades a susceptible environment, protection zones are enforced. Historically, such zones have been shaped as circles of equal radius (ER), centred on the location of infected premises. Because the ER policy seems to assume that epidemic dissemination is driven by a similar number of secondary cases generated per primary case, it does not consider whether local features, such as connectivity, influence epidemic dispersal. Here we explored the efficacy of ER protection zones. By generating a geographically explicit scenario that mimicked an actual epidemic, we created protection zones of different geometry, comparing the cost-benefit estimates of ER protection zones to a set of alternatives, which considered a pre-existing connecting network (CN) - the road network. The hypothesis of similar number of cases per ER circle was not substantiated: the number of units at risk per circle differed up to four times among ER circles. Findings also showed that even a small area (of <115 km(2) ) revealed network properties. Because the CN policy required 20% less area to be protected than the ER policy, and the CN-based protection zone included a 23.8% greater density of units at risk/km(2) than the ER-based alternative, findings supported the view that protection zones are likely to be less costly and more effective if they consider connecting structures, such as road, railroad and/or river networks. The analysis of local geographical factors (contacts, vectors and connectivity) may optimize the efficacy of control measures against epidemics.