Young children's use of transitive inference in causal chains

Young children’s use of probabilistic reliability and base-rates in decision-making

Children are skilled reasoners who readily use causal, reliability, and base-rate (i.e., prior probability) information in their decisions. Though these abilities are typically studied in isolation, children often must consider multiple pieces of information to make an informed decision. Four experiments (N = 320) explored the development of children’s ability to use reliability and base-rate information when making decisions about draw outcomes. Experiment 1 examined the age at which children can first compare and choose between probabilistically reliable machines. Three- and 4-year-old children saw machines that were probabilistically reliable at obtaining objects while sampling from uniform distributions (i.e., all target or non-target objects). Although 4-year-old children correctly used reliability in their decisions, 3-year-olds did not. In Experiment 2a, 4- to 6-year-olds were presented with the same probabilistically reliable machines, although they sampled from a mixture of target and non-target items. Here, children tended to choose the machine with the better proportion of targets, regardless of reliability. This was replicated in Experiment 2b. In Experiment 3, children were presented with one perfectly reliable machine and one probabilistically unreliable machine. Here, children continued to mostly choose the machine with the better proportion of targets. These results raise questions about base-rate overuse early in development and highlight the need for additional work on children’s ability to use multiple pieces of information in decision-making.

Blocking a redundant cue: what does it say about preschoolers' causal competence?

The current study investigates the degree to which preschoolers can engage in causal inferences in a blocking paradigm, a paradigm in which a cue is consistently linked with a target, either alone (A-T) or paired with another cue (AB-T). Unlike previous blocking studies with preschoolers, we manipulated the causal structure of the events without changing the specific contingencies. In particular, cues were said to be either potential causes (prediction condition), or they were said to be potential effects (diagnosis condition). The causally appropriate inference is to block the redundant cue B when it is a potential cause of the target, but not when it is a potential effect. Findings show a stark difference in performance between preschoolers and adults: While adults blocked the redundant cue only in the prediction condition, children blocked the redundant cue indiscriminately across both conditions. Therefore, children, but not adults, ignored the causal structure of the events. These findings challenge a developmental account that attributes sophisticated machinery of causal reasoning to young children.

Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens)

This study explored whether the tendency of chimpanzees and children to use emulation or imitation to solve a tool-using task was a response to the availability of causal information. Young wild-born chimpanzees from an African sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-box. The demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal information about the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it was impossible to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration. However, in the clear condition causal information was available, and subjects could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When chimpanzees were presented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear condition they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient, emulative technique. These results suggest that emulation is the favoured strategy of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is available. However, if such information is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more comprehensive copy of an observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation to solve the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. We suggest that the difference in performance of chimpanzees and children may be due to a greater susceptibility of children to cultural conventions, perhaps combined with a differential focus on the results, actions and goals of the demonstrator.

The infant's concept of agency: the distinction between social and nonsocial objects

The primary purpose of this study was to examine young infants' discrimination between the abilities of social and nonsocial objects to serve as agents. Thirty-one infants between 8 months and 8 days old and 14 months and 19 days old were studied. The children's communicative skills were evaluated through frustration episodes in which a toy was taken away in order to elicit communicative behaviors toward the mother. Visual fixation time was compared for events in which an inanimate object moved independently and events in which a human being was the agent. Analysis of the magnitude of decrease of attending responses revealed that the older infants took longer to process anomalous events, whereas the younger infants manifested more interest for events in which an animate being played the role of agent. The findings suggest that infants can distinguish between the causal powers of social and nonsocial objects by the end of the first year.