The shredding of BAT's defence: McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia

Tobacco industry and public health responses to state and local efforts to end tobacco sales from 1969-2020

BACKGROUND

In June 2019, Beverly Hills, California, became the first American city in the 21st century to pass an ordinance ending the sale of most tobacco products, including cigarettes, and it is unlikely to be the last. Knowledge of previous efforts to ban tobacco sales in the US, both successful and unsuccessful, may help inform tobacco control advocates' approach to future efforts.

METHODS

We retrieved and analyzed archival tobacco industry documents. We confirmed and supplemented information from the documents with news media coverage and publicly available state and local government materials, such as meeting minutes and staff reports, related to proposed bans.

RESULTS

We found 22 proposals to end the sale of cigarettes or tobacco products from 1969-2020 in the US. Proposals came from five states, twelve cities or towns, and one county. Most came from elected officials or boards of health, and were justified on public health grounds. In opposing tobacco sales bans, the tobacco industry employed no tactics or arguments that it did not also employ in campaigns against other tobacco control measures. Public health groups typically opposed sales ban proposals on the grounds that they were not evidence-based. This changed with Beverly Hills' 2019 proposal, with public health organizations supporting this and other California city proposals because of their likely positive health impacts. This support did not always translate into passage of local ordinances, as some city council members expressed reservations about the impact on small businesses.

CONCLUSION

Tobacco control advocates are likely to encounter familiar tobacco industry tactics and arguments against tobacco sales ban proposals, and can rely on past experience and the results of a growing body of retail-related research to counter them. Considering how to overcome concerns about harming retailers will likely be vital if other jurisdictions are to succeed in ending tobacco sales.

"It doesn't seem to make sense for a company that sells cigarettes to help smokers stop using them": A case study of Philip Morris's involvement in smoking cessation

BACKGROUND

In the late 1990s, American tobacco companies began offering limited cessation assistance to smokers by posting links on their company websites to government-sponsored smoking cessation resources. Philip Morris USA (PM) went further, funding youth cessation programs and creating its own online cessation program, QuitAssist. We explore why PM entered the cessation arena, and describe the variety of options considered and how PM-supported cessation programs were evaluated and promoted.

METHODS

We retrieved and analyzed archival PM documents from 1998-2005. We supplemented information from the documents with scholarly articles assessing QuitAssist and archived versions of the PM and QuitAssist websites.

RESULTS

PM's Youth Smoking Prevention department began funding youth cessation projects and programs soon after its creation in 1998, motivated by the same issue that drove its interest in youth smoking prevention: regulatory threats posed by public and policymaker concern about youth smoking. The department took a similar approach to youth smoking cessation as it did with prevention, rejecting curricula with "anti-industry" themes. In 2002, a "cessation exploration team" examined a variety of rationales for and approaches to company support for adult smoking cessation. Ultimately, PM chose QuitAssist, a limited and less expensive option that nonetheless provided opportunities for engagement with a variety of public health and government officials. Independent research indicates that QuitAssist is not an effective cessation tool.

CONCLUSIONS

While the transformation of ambitious plans into a mundane final product is a recurring theme with PM's corporate responsibility efforts, it would be inappropriate to dismiss PM's smoking cessation endeavors as half-hearted attempts to appear responsible. Such endeavors have the potential to inflict real harm by competing with more effective programs and by helping to maintain a tobacco-favorable policy environment. If PM truly wanted to support cessation, it could drop legal and other challenges to public policies that discourage smoking.

"What Is Our Story?" Philip Morris's Changing Corporate Narrative

OBJECTIVES

We sought to learn how employees reacted to changes in the corporate narrative of Philip Morris Companies (PMC) in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

METHODS

We analyzed archival internal tobacco industry documents about PMC's creation of a new corporate story.

RESULTS

In response to litigation and public opprobrium, PMC replaced its market success-oriented corporate narrative with a new one centered on responsibility. Although management sought to downplay inconsistencies between the old and new narratives, some employees reportedly had difficulty reconciling them, concerned that the responsibility focus might affect company profitability. However, others embraced the new narrative, suggesting radical ideas to prevent youth smoking. These ideas were not adopted.

CONCLUSIONS

PMC's new narrative was unconvincing to many of its employees, who perceived it either as a threat to the company's continued profits or as incongruous with what they had previously been told. As it had done with the public, PMC misled its employees in explaining a narrative repositioning that would help the company continue business as usual. Moving toward a tobacco endgame will require ongoing discursive and symbolic efforts to disrupt this narrative.

"The Big WHY": Philip Morris's failed search for corporate social value

OBJECTIVES

We examined Philip Morris USA's exploration of corporate social responsibility practices and principles and its outcome.

METHODS

We analyzed archival internal tobacco industry documents, generated in 2000 to 2002, related to discussions of corporate social responsibility among a Corporate Responsibility Taskforce and senior management at Philip Morris.

RESULTS

In exploring corporate social responsibility, Philip Morris executives sought to identify the company's social value-its positive contribution to society. Struggling to find an answer, they considered dramatically changing the way the company marketed its products, apologizing for past actions, and committing the company to providing benefits for future generations. These ideas were eventually abandoned. Despite an initial call to distinguish between social and economic value, Philip Morris ultimately equated social value with providing shareholder returns.

CONCLUSIONS

When even tobacco executives struggle to define their company's social value, it signals an opening to advocate for endgame scenarios that would encourage supply-side changes appropriate to the scale of the tobacco disease epidemic and consistent with authentic social value.

British American Tobacco's partnership with Earthwatch Europe and its implications for public health

This paper explores a partnership between British American Tobacco (BAT) and the environmental organisation Earthwatch Europe (EE) and considers its implications for countries implementing Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. We reviewed approximately 100 internal BAT documents, interviewed EE's former executive director and examined media accounts and BAT and EE websites. We analysed materials by reviewing them iteratively, identifying themes, constructing a timeline of events and assembling a case study. BAT sought a partnership with EE to gain a global ally that could provide entrée into the larger non-governmental organisation (NGO) community. EE debated the ethics of working with BAT, resolving them in BAT's favour and taking a narrow view of its own overall organisational mission. To protect its reputation, EE delayed public disclosure of the partnership. Instead, EE promoted it to policy-makers and other NGOs, extending BAT's reputation and reach into influential circles. The potential for normalising the tobacco industry presence within government through NGO partnerships and the benefits that accrued to BAT even when the partnership was not being publicised show why governments seeking to protect effective tobacco control policies from industry influence need to consider ways to identify and discourage 'hidden' NGO partnerships.

Cigarette smoking is a risk factor for Alzheimer's Disease: an analysis controlling for tobacco industry affiliation

To examine the relationship between smoking and Alzheimer's disease (AD) after controlling for study design, quality, secular trend, and tobacco industry affiliation of the authors, electronic databases were searched; 43 individual studies met the inclusion criteria. For evidence of tobacco industry affiliation, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu was searched. One fourth (11/43) of individual studies had tobacco-affiliated authors. Using random effects meta-analysis, 18 case control studies without tobacco industry affiliation yielded a non-significant pooled odds ratio of 0.91 (95% CI, 0.75-1.10), while 8 case control studies with tobacco industry affiliation yielded a significant pooled odds ratio of 0.86 (95% CI, 0.75-0.98) suggesting that smoking protects against AD. In contrast, 14 cohort studies without tobacco-industry affiliation yielded a significantly increased relative risk of AD of 1.45 (95% CI, 1.16-1.80) associated with smoking and the three cohort studies with tobacco industry affiliation yielded a non-significant pooled relative risk of 0.60 (95% CI 0.27-1.32). A multiple regression analysis showed that case-control studies tended to yield lower average risk estimates than cohort studies (by -0.27 +/- 0.15, P=0.075), lower risk estimates for studies done by authors affiliated with the tobacco industry (by -0.37 +/- 0.13, P=0.008), no effect of the quality of the journal in which the study was published (measured by impact factor, P=0.828), and increasing secular trend in risk estimates (0.031/year +/- 0.013, P=0.02). The average risk of AD for cohort studies without tobacco industry affiliation of average quality published in 2007 was estimated to be 1.72 +/- 0.19 (P< 0.0005). The available data indicate that smoking is a significant risk factor for AD.

Creating the "desired mindset": Philip Morris's efforts to improve its corporate image among women

Through analysis of tobacco company documents, we explored how and why Philip Morris sought to enhance its corporate image among American women. Philip Morris regarded women as an influential political group. To improve its image among women, while keeping tobacco off their organizational agendas, the company sponsored women's groups and programs. It also sought to appeal to women it defined as "active moms" by advertising its commitment to domestic violence victims. It was more successful in securing women's organizations as allies than active moms. Increasing tobacco's visibility as a global women's health issue may require addressing industry influence.

Destroyed documents: uncovering the science that Imperial Tobacco Canada sought to conceal

BACKGROUND

In 1992, British American Tobacco had its Canadian affiliate, Imperial Tobacco Canada, destroy internal research documents that could expose the company to liability or embarrassment. Sixty of these destroyed documents were subsequently uncovered in British American Tobacco's files.

METHODS

Legal counsel for Imperial Tobacco Canada provided a list of 60 destroyed documents to British American Tobacco. Information in this list was used to search for copies of the documents in British American Tobacco files released through court disclosure. We reviewed and summarized this information.

RESULTS

Imperial Tobacco destroyed documents that included evidence from scientific reviews prepared by British American Tobacco's researchers, as well as 47 original research studies, 35 of which examined the biological activity and carcinogenicity of tobacco smoke. The documents also describe British American Tobacco research on cigarette modifications and toxic emissions, including the ways in which consumers adapted their smoking behaviour in response to these modifications. The documents also depict a comprehensive research program on the pharmacology of nicotine and the central role of nicotine in smoking behaviour. British American Tobacco scientists noted that ".. the present scale of the tobacco industry is largely dependent on the intensity and nature of the pharmacological action of nicotine," and that "... should nicotine become less attractive to smokers, the future of the tobacco industry would become less secure."

INTERPRETATION

The scientific evidence contained in the documents destroyed by Imperial Tobacco demonstrates that British American Tobacco had collected evidence that cigarette smoke was carcinogenic and addictive. The evidence that Imperial Tobacco sought to destroy had important implications for government regulation of tobacco.

The role of corporate credibility in legitimizing disease promotion

OBJECTIVES

We explored what corporate "credibility" means to tobacco companies to determine why it matters to companies and what a lack of credibility means to them.

METHODS

We collected documents from an online tobacco industry document archive and analyzed them with an interpretive approach.

RESULTS

Tobacco companies conceptualized credibility not as being worthy of belief or confidence but as inspiring it. Thus, credibility was understood primarily as altering public perception of the industry. "Truth" was largely absent from tobacco industry conceptualizations of credibility, which were linked with "responsibility" and "reasonableness." However, industry research found that the public regarded credibility and responsibility differently, expecting these to entail truth telling, advertising reductions, less harmful products, apologies for deception, making amends, or exiting the tobacco business altogether. Overall, industry credibility-building projects failed repeatedly.

CONCLUSIONS

Public health discourse increasingly attends to the roles of corporations in promoting disease. Industries such as tobacco and alcohol have been identified as profiting from harmful products. Yet corporations' ability to continue business as usual requires sustaining an implicit societal assent to their activities that depends on corporate credibility. For public health to address corporate disease promotion effectively, undermining corporate credibility may be strategically important.

"Working to shape what society's expectations of us should be": Philip Morris' societal alignment strategy

BACKGROUND

A key element of Philip Morris's (PM's) corporate social responsibility initiatives is "societal alignment", defined as "strategies and programs to meet society's expectations of a responsible tobacco company". This study explored the genesis and implementation of Philip Morris' (PM) societal alignment efforts.

METHODS

The study retrieved and analysed approximately 375 previously undisclosed PM documents now available electronically. Using an iterative process, the study categorised themes and prepared a case analysis.

RESULTS

Beginning in 1999, PM sought to become "societally aligned" by identifying expectations of a responsible tobacco company through public opinion research and developing and publicising programs to meet those expectations. Societal alignment was undertaken within the US and globally to ensure an environment favourable to PM's business objectives. Despite PM's claims to be "changing", however, societal alignment in practice was highly selective. PM responded to public "expectations" largely by retooling existing positions and programs, while entirely ignoring other expectations that might have interfered with its business goals. It also appears that convincing employees of the value and authenticity of societal alignment was difficult.

CONCLUSIONS

As implementation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control proceeds, tobacco control advocates should closely monitor development of such "alignment" initiatives and expose the motivations and contradictions they reveal.

False promises: the tobacco industry, "low tar" cigarettes, and older smokers

To investigate the role of the tobacco industry in marketing to and sustaining tobacco addiction among older smokers and aging baby boomers, We performed archival searches of electronic archives of internal tobacco company documents using a snowball sampling approach. Analysis was done using iterative and comparative review of documents, classification by themes, and a hermeneutic interpretive approach to develop a case study. Based on extensive marketing research, tobacco companies aggressively targeted older smokers and sought to prevent them from quitting. Innovative marketing approaches were used. "Low tar" cigarettes were developed in response to the health concerns of older smokers, despite industry knowledge that such products had no health advantage and did not help smokers quit. Tobacco industry activities influence the context of cessation for older smokers in several ways. Through marketing "low tar" or "light" cigarettes to older smokers "at risk" of quitting, the industry contributes to the illusion that such cigarettes are safer, although "light" cigarettes may make it harder for addicted smokers to quit. Through targeted mailings of coupons and incentives, the industry discourages older smokers from quitting. Through rhetoric aimed at convincing addicted smokers that they alone are responsible for their smoking, the industry contributes to self-blame, a documented barrier to cessation. Educating practitioners, older smokers, and families about the tobacco industry's influence may decrease the tendency to "blame the victim," thereby enhancing the likelihood of older adults receiving tobacco addiction treatment. Comprehensive tobacco control measures must include a focus on older smokers.

"I always thought they were all pure tobacco": American smokers' perceptions of "natural" cigarettes and tobacco industry advertising strategies

OBJECTIVE

To examine how the US tobacco industry markets cigarettes as "natural" and American smokers' views of the "naturalness" (or unnaturalness) of cigarettes.

METHODS

Internal tobacco industry documents, the Pollay 20th Century Tobacco Ad Collection, and newspaper sources were reviewed, themes and strategies were categorised, and the findings were summarised.

RESULTS

Cigarette advertisements have used the term "natural" since at least 1910, but it was not until the 1950s that "natural" referred to a core element of brand identity, used to describe specific product attributes (filter, menthol, tobacco leaf). The term "additive-free", introduced in the 1980s, is now commonly used to define natural cigarettes. Tobacco company market research, available from 1970 to 1998, consistently revealed that within focus group sessions, smokers initially had difficulty interpreting the term "natural" in relation to cigarettes; however, after discussion of cigarette ingredients, smokers viewed "natural" cigarettes as healthier. Tobacco companies regarded the implied health benefits of natural cigarettes as their key selling point, but hesitated to market them because doing so might raise doubts about the composition of their highly profitable "regular" brands.

CONCLUSION

Although our findings support the idea advanced by some tobacco control advocates that informing smokers of conventional cigarettes' chemical ingredients could promote cessation, they also suggest that such a measure could increase the ubiquity and popularity of "natural" cigarettes. A more effective approach may be to "denaturalise" smoking.

Tobacco industry issues management organizations: creating a global corporate network to undermine public health

Background

The global tobacco epidemic claims 5 million lives each year, facilitated by the ability of transnational tobacco companies to delay or thwart meaningful tobacco control worldwide. A series of cross-company tobacco industry "issues management organizations" has played an important role in coordinating and implementing common strategies to defeat tobacco control efforts at international, national, and regional levels. This study examines the development and enumerates the activities of these organizations and explores the implications of continuing industry cooperation for global public health.

Methods

Using a snowball sampling strategy, we collected documentary data from tobacco industry documents archives and assembled them into a chronologically organized case study.

Results

The International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI) was formed in 1977 by seven tobacco company chief executives to create common anti-tobacco control strategies and build a global network of regional and national manufacturing associations. The organization's name subsequently changed to INFOTAB. The multinational companies built the organization rapidly: by 1984, it had 69 members operating in 57 countries. INFOTAB material, including position papers and "action kits" helped members challenge local tobacco control measures and maintain tobacco-friendly environments. In 1992 INFOTAB was replaced by two smaller organizations. The Tobacco Documentation Centre, which continues to operate, distributes smoking-related information and industry argumentation to members, some produced by cross-company committees. Agro-Tobacco Services, and now Hallmark Marketing Services, assists the INFOTAB-backed and industry supported International Tobacco Growers Association in advancing claims regarding the economic importance of tobacco in developing nations.

Conclusion

The massive scale and scope of this industry effort illustrate how corporate interests, when threatened by the globalization of public health, sidestep competitive concerns to coordinate their activities. The global network of national and regional manufacturing associations created and nurtured by INFOTAB remains active, particularly in relation to the recently negotiated global health treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Policymakers should be aware that although these associations claim to represent only national or regional interests, they are allied to and coordinated with a confederation of transnational tobacco companies seeking to protect profits by undermining public health.

Tobacco industry lawyers as "disease vectors"

OBJECTIVE

Despite their obligation to do so, tobacco companies often failed to conduct product safety research or, when research was conducted, failed to disseminate the results to the medical community and to the public. The tobacco company lawyers' role in these actions was investigated with a focus on their involvement in company scientific research, claims of attorney-client privilege and work-product cover, document concealment, and litigation tactics.

METHODS

Searches of previously secret internal tobacco industry documents located at Tobacco Documents Online. Additional searches included court transcripts, legal cases and articles obtained through Westlaw, PubMed, and the internet.

RESULTS

Tobacco company lawyers have been involved in activities having little or nothing to do with the practice of law, including gauging and attempting to influence company scientists' beliefs, vetting in-house scientific research, and instructing in-house scientists not to publish potentially damaging results. Additionally, company lawyers have taken steps to manufacture attorney-client privilege and work-product cover to assist their clients in protecting sensitive documents from disclosure, have been involved in the concealment of such documents, and have employed litigation tactics that have largely prevented successful lawsuits against their client companies.

CONCLUSIONS

Tobacco related diseases have proliferated partly because of tobacco company lawyers. Their tactics have impeded the flow of information about the dangers of smoking to the public and the medical community. Additionally, their extravagantly aggressive litigation tactics have pushed many plaintiffs into dropping their cases before trial, thus reducing the opportunities for changes to be made to company policy in favour of public health. Stricter professional oversight is needed to ensure that this trend does not continue.

Philip Morris's Project Sunrise: weakening tobacco control by working with it

OBJECTIVE

To analyse the implications of Philip Morris USA's (PM's) overtures toward tobacco control and other public health organisations, 1995-2006.

DATA SOURCES

Internal PM documents made available through multi-state US attorneys general lawsuits and other cases, and newspaper sources.

METHODS

Documents were retrieved from several industry documents websites and analysed using a case study approach.

RESULTS

PM's Project Sunrise, initiated in 1995 and proposed to continue through 2006, was a long-term plan to address tobacco industry delegitimisation and ensure the social acceptability of smoking and of the company itself. Project Sunrise laid out an explicit divide-and-conquer strategy against the tobacco control movement, proposing the establishment of relationships with PM-identified "moderate" tobacco control individuals and organisations and the marginalisation of others. PM planned to use "carefully orchestrated efforts" to exploit existing differences of opinion within tobacco control, weakening its opponents by working with them. PM also planned to thwart tobacco industry delegitimisation by repositioning itself as "responsible". We present evidence that these plans were implemented.

CONCLUSION

Sunrise exposes differences within the tobacco control movement that should be further discussed. The goal should not be consensus, but a better understanding of tensions within the movement. As the successes of the last 25 years embolden advocates to think beyond passage of the next clean indoor air policy or funding of the next cessation programme, movement philosophical differences may become more important. If tobacco control advocates are not ready to address them, Project Sunrise suggests that Philip Morris is ready to exploit them.

Implementation failures in the use of two New Zealand laws to control the tobacco industry: 1989-2005

BACKGROUND

We reviewed the implementation of New Zealand laws in relation to the activities of the tobacco industry and their allies. Material for two brief case studies was obtained from correspondence with official agencies, official information requests, internet searches (tobacco industry documents and official government sites), and interviews with 12 key informants.

RESULTS

The first case study identified four occasions over a period of 14 years where New Zealand Government agencies appeared to fail to enforce consumer protection law, although apparent breaches by the tobacco industry and their allies had occurred in relation to statements on the relative safety of secondhand smoke. The second case study examined responses to a legal requirement for the tobacco industry to provide information on tobacco additives. There was failure to enforce the law, and a failure of the political process for at least 13 years to clarify and strengthen the law. Relevant factors in both these cases of 'policy slippage' appear to have been financial and opportunity costs of taking legal action, political difficulties and the fragmented nature of government structures.

CONCLUSION

Considered together, these case studies suggest the need for governments to: (i) make better use of national consumer laws (with proper monitoring and enforcement) in relation to tobacco; and (ii) to strengthen international law and resources around tobacco-related consumer protection. A number of options for achieving these aims are available to governments.

The tobacco industry and pesticide regulations: case studies from tobacco industry archives

Tobacco is a heavily pesticide-dependent crop. Because pesticides involve human safety and health issues, they are regulated nationally and internationally; however, little is known about how tobacco companies respond to regulatory pressures regarding pesticides. In this study we analyzed internal tobacco industry documents to describe industry activities aimed at influencing pesticide regulations. We used a case study approach based on examination of approximately 2,000 internal company documents and 3,885 pages of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests. The cases involved methoprene, the ethylene bisdithiocarbamates, and phosphine. We show how the tobacco industry successfully altered the outcome in two cases by hiring ex-agency scientists to write reports favorable to industry positions regarding pesticide regulations for national (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) and international (World Health Organization) regulatory bodies. We also show how the industry worked to forestall tobacco pesticide regulation by attempting to self-regulate in Europe, and how Philip Morris encouraged a pesticide manufacturer to apply for higher tolerance levels in Malaysia and Europe while keeping tobacco industry interest a secret from government regulators. This study suggests that the tobacco industry is able to exert considerable influence over the pesticide regulatory process and that increased scrutiny of this process and protection of the public interest in pesticide regulation may be warranted.

Playing hide-and-seek with the tobacco industry

Despite many peer-reviewed works that draw on tobacco industry documents that have now been made public, questions remain about how complete a picture has emerged. We present a conceptual framework that identifies and evaluates tobacco industry efforts to conceal information. Widespread document destruction like that in recent litigation in Australia is just one of more than a dozen tobacco industry efforts to prevent access, or at least timely access, to documents. Industry efforts range from small, locally employed initiatives to company-wide tactics. Some efforts, such as using "oral only" procedures, scrambling telephone lines, or involving lawyers in scientific projects, are preemptive. Others seek to deal with already existing documents by invoking bogus claims of legal privilege, stipulating "read then destroy" for memos, and rewriting problematic memos. That evidence of concealment has, in fact, been found in tobacco company archives attests to the futility of attempting to control the flow of millions of pieces of paper among tens of thousands of employees. However, researchers have yet to reveal the full story: We know of the industry's failures in concealing information, but not its successes. The industry's objective is not destruction of information per se, but prevention of public disclosure of that information. Exposing the tobacco industry's many approaches to concealment provides greater insight into companies' intentions and potential means for stripping away that concealment.

Nicotine analogues: a review of tobacco industry research interests

AIMS

To explore the tobacco industry's interest and intentions driving its nicotine analogue research.

METHODS

Review of internal tobacco industry documents regarding nicotine analogues released as part of the Master Settlement Agreement between the tobacco industry and US state governments in 1998.

FINDINGS

The tobacco industry investigated nicotine analogues extensively. Four principal areas of interest are evident. First, research on tobacco products was directed towards greater understanding of nicotine pharmacology, how to screen for potential analogues and how to separate the central and peripheral effects of nicotine. Secondly, interest lay in the potential for analogues to replace nicotine in order to create more 'desirable' products and to circumvent anticipated nicotine regulation. Thirdly, interest lay in potential pharmaceutical applications for analogues such as treatments for neurological disorders. Finally, there was interest in the public relations potential of the therapeutic potential of analogues to reduce the demonization of nicotine, by allowing the industry to point to its beneficial uses.

CONCLUSIONS

With tobacco product and nicotine regulation being increasingly advocated in tobacco control it is important to understand the industry's interests in the potential role of nicotine analogues. Initial interest included using analogues as a means to circumvent regulation, but evidence suggests these plans were discarded due to fear that this may have instigated regulation of tobacco products. Nicotine analogue research has led to potential therapeutic uses for Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases and alarmingly for the industry, to a potential vaccine to prevent nicotine addiction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Tobacco manufacturers should be obliged to declare all additives being used in tobacco products. Regulatory bodies should be aware that that there is a distinct possibility that the industry has discovered ways to circumvent future regulation of nicotine through the utilization of nicotine analogues. Any regulatory drafting should broaden the definition of nicotine in order to incorporate analogues into the scope of pharmacologically active substances being regulated.

Environmental tobacco smoke research published in the journal Indoor and Built Environment and associations with the tobacco industry

In the late 1980s, the international tobacco industry assisted in the establishment of the International Society of the Built Environment, which published the journal Indoor and Built Environment. Using evidence from tobacco industry documents, we examine the industry associations of the Society's executive, the journal's editor and board, and the extent to which the journal publishes papers on environmental tobacco smoke that would be deemed favourable by the tobacco industry. The society's executive has been dominated by paid consultants to the tobacco industry: all six members in 1992 and seven of eight members in 2002 had financial associations through industry lawyers. 67% of the editorial board in 1992 and 66% in 2002 had histories of financial associations with the tobacco industry. 61% (40/66) of papers related to environmental tobacco smoke published in Indoor and Built Environment in the study period reached conclusions that could be judged to be industry-positive. Of these, 90% (36/40) had at least one author with a history of association with the tobacco industry. The executive of the International Society of the Built Environment and the editorial board of Indoor and Built Environment are in large part consisted of people with histories of consultancies to the tobacco industry. On the basis of the evidence presented in this paper, there is a serious concern the tobacco industry may have been unduly influential on the content of the journal.

Complicity in contraband: British American Tobacco and cigarette smuggling in Asia

OBJECTIVES

To examine the complicity of British American Tobacco (BAT) in cigarette smuggling in Asia, and to assess the centrality of illicit trade to regional corporate strategy.

METHODS

Analysis of previously confidential documents from BAT's Guildford depository. An iterative strategy combined searches based on geography, organisational structure, and key personnel, while corporate euphemisms for contraband were identified by triangulation.

RESULTS

BAT documents demonstrate the strategic importance of smuggling across global, regional, national, and local levels. Particularly important in Asia, contraband enabled access to closed markets, created pressure for market opening, and was highly profitable. Documents demonstrate BAT's detailed oversight of illicit trade, seeking to reconcile the conflicting demands of control and deniability.

CONCLUSIONS

BAT documents demonstrate that smuggling has been driven by corporate objectives, indicate national measures by which the problem can be addressed, and highlight the importance of a coordinated global response via WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

Turning free speech into corporate speech: Philip Morris' efforts to influence U.S. and European journalists regarding the U.S. EPA report on secondhand smoke

BACKGROUND

Previously secret internal tobacco company documents show that the tobacco industry launched an extensive multifaceted effort to influence the scientific debate about the harmful effects of secondhand smoke. Integral to the industry's campaign was an effort to derail the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) risk assessment on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) by recruiting a network of journalists to generate news articles supporting the industry's position and pushing its public relations messages regarding the ETS issue.

METHODS

Searches of previously secret internal tobacco industry records were conducted online and at the Minnesota Tobacco Document Depository. In addition, searches on the World Wide Web were conducted for each National Journalism Center alumnus. Lexis-Nexis was used to locate news stories written by the journalists cited in this paper.

RESULTS

Philip Morris turned to its public relations firm Burson Marsteller to "build considerable reasonable doubt em leader particularly among consumers" about the "scientific weaknesses" of the EPA report. A Washington, DC, media and political consultant Richard Hines was a key player in carrying out Burson Marsteller's media recommendations of "EPA bashing" for Philip Morris. In March 1993, Philip Morris' vice president of corporate affairs policy and administration reported to Steve Parrish, vice president and general counsel of Philip Morris, that their consultant was "responsible for a number of articles that have appeared in em leader major news publications regarding EPA and ETS." In addition to placing favorable stories in the press through its consultant, Philip Morris sought to expand its journalist network by financially supporting a U.S. school of journalism; the National Journalism Center (NJC). Philip Morris gleaned "about 15 years worth of journalists at print and visual media throughout the country em leader to get across [its] side of the story" resulting in "numerous pieces consistent with our point of view." The company planned to "design innovative strategies to communicate [its] position on ETS through education programs targeting policy makers and the media" via the NJC. Finally, journalists associated with think tanks that were financially supported by Philip Morris wrote numerous articles critical of the EPA.

CONCLUSIONS

This is the first report, from the tobacco industry's own documents, to show the extent to which the tobacco industry has gone to influence the print media on the issue of the health effects of secondhand smoke. Unfortunately, what we report here is that even journalists can fall victim to well-orchestrated and presented public relations efforts regardless of their scientific validity. It is not clear how various professional media organizations oversee the ethical conduct of their members. Certainly, on the topic of the health effects of secondhand smoke, more scrutiny is warranted from these organizations for articles written by their members lest the public be misinformed and thus ill served.

The tobacco industry's political efforts to derail the EPA report on ETS

Previously secret tobacco industry documents detailed a multifaceted approach of political strategies aimed to derail the 1993 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) risk assessment on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). These pervasive strategies included the following: (1) lobbying the first Bush Administration to approve an executive order that would impose new risk assessment standards for federal agencies, thus delaying the release of the EPA report; (2) having the first Bush Administration transfer jurisdiction over ETS from the EPA to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), thus obviating the need for the release of the EPA report; and (3) applying enormous political pressure directly by alleging improper procedure and policy at EPA. Although some of the attempted strategies failed, the political pressure from Congressman Thomas Bliley (R-VA) was a success. This is the first report showing how a single member of Congress in conjunction with his staff, tobacco industry attorneys, and executives worked very aggressively to do the tobacco industry's bidding. These tactics successfully delayed the EPA risk assessment and placed a cloud over its validity that was not fully vindicated until December 2002 when the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the tobacco industry's suit against the EPA. The documents show that the industry will expend whatever effort is necessary to protect itself from public health policy that would adversely affect consumption of cigarettes and, therefore, profit.