What Are Conspiracy Theories? A Definitional Approach to Their Correlates, Consequences, and Communication

Reflection predicts and leads to decreased conspiracy belief

Recent research indicates a generally negative relationship between reflection and conspiracy beliefs. However, most of the existing research relies on correlational data on WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) populations. The few existing experimental studies are limited by weak manipulation techniques that fail to reliably activate cognitive reflection. Hence, questions remain regarding (1) the consistency of the negative relationship between conspiracy beliefs and cognitive reflection, (2) the extent of cross-cultural variation and potential moderating factors, and (3) the presence of a causal link between cognitive reflection and conspiracy beliefs. In two preregistered studies, we investigated the association between cognitive reflection and conspiracy beliefs. First, we studied the correlation between two variables across 48 cultures and investigated whether factors such as WEIRDness and narcissism (personal and collective) moderate this relationship. In the second study, we tested the causal effect of reflection using a reliable and effective manipulation technique-debiasing training-on both generic and specific conspiracy beliefs. The first study confirmed the negative association between reflection and belief in conspiracy theories across cultures, with the association being notably stronger in non-WEIRD societies. Both personal and collective narcissism played significant moderating roles. The second study demonstrated that debiasing training significantly decreases both generic and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs in a non-WEIRD context, with more pronounced effects for general conspiracy beliefs. Our research supports that reflection is a consistent cross-cultural predictor of conspiracy beliefs and that activating reflection can reduce such beliefs through rigorous experimental interventions.

How Epistemic Beliefs about Climate Change Predict Climate Change Conspiracy Beliefs

Belief in climate change conspiracy theories (CCCT) can undermine support for measures against climate change. In two studies, we therefore aim to gain a clearer understanding of the factors that contribute to CCCT. A significant factor associated with CCCT is distrust in science, which is also correlated with epistemic beliefs (EBs) (e.g., beliefs are about the nature of knowledge and the process of knowing). EBs influence how individuals respond to knowledge claims, address contradictory evidence, and integrate new information. We hypothesize that EBs are linked to belief in CCCT via distrust in science. To test this hypothesis, we conducted one correlational study and one experimental study (n = 404 and n = 104, both pre-registered). Study 1 found that participants were more likely to endorse climate-related conspiracy beliefs if they viewed climate knowledge as tentative, relied on intuition to understand climate change, and had weaker beliefs in the interconnectedness of climate knowledge and its reliance on experts and scientific sources. As anticipated, distrust in climate science significantly mediated the relationships between the EBs subscales and belief in CCCT. Additionally, political ideology moderated the effect of believing knowledge originates from experts and science on distrust in climate science - this effect was pronounced among participants identifying with the political center while being weaker among left-wing participants. In Study 2, we were unable to establish a causal relationship between certainty beliefs and belief in CCCT. In conclusion, we suggest that educational initiatives aimed at fostering EBs may reduce science distrust and conspiracy beliefs.

Suspicious of AI? Perceived autonomy and interdependence predict AI-related conspiracy beliefs

As artificial intelligence (AI) evolves, conspiracy theories have emerged that authorities will use AI to oppress humanity, or AI itself will. We propose that perceived high autonomy and low interdependence of AI increase AI-related conspiracy beliefs. Four studies (total N = 1897) have examined this line of reasoning. Study 1 (N = 300) supported the hypotheses in a correlational survey. Studies 2 (N = 400) and 3 (pre-registered; N = 400) manipulated the autonomy and interdependence of AI in experiments. Both studies found that higher autonomy and lower interdependence increased AI-related conspiracy beliefs, while perceived threat to society mediated these effects in most cases. Study 4 (pre-registered) replicated findings from Study 2 in the United States (N = 400) and China (N = 397) and found cultural differences in AI-related conspiracy beliefs. These findings illuminate how the perceived properties of AI contribute to AI-related conspiracy beliefs.

Prevalence of pharmaceutical industry conspiracy theories among the polish population

Conspiracy theories in the health domain can potentially erode trust in public health institutions and experts, resulting in non-compliance with public health guidelines and recommendations. This article aims to uncover and describe the widespread conspiracy theories associated with the pharmaceutical industry in Poland, while characterising the individuals who hold these beliefs. An online survey was conducted using a research-focused panel of participants. A quota sample of 1,057 was selected to reflect the basic demographic characteristics of the Polish population. Findings showed that pharmaceutical industry-linked conspiracy theories (PILCT) are widespread among respondents. The most popular theory regarding the concealment of drug side effects was held by 63.1% of respondents. Individuals with children, better financial situations, strong religious beliefs, living in a city or village with a population of less than 500,000 and a lower level of education tend to have higher PILCT beliefs. Higher PILCT beliefs correlate with reduced trust in doctors and the industry. Private healthcare services and vaccination behaviours (both irregular and regular vaccinations) are key predictors of lower PILCT beliefs. Considering the health risks and findings of this study, practitioners must be made aware of such widespread false beliefs to address this challenge properly.

The Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT): Applying Appraisal Theories to Understand Emotional and Behavioral Reactions to Conspiracy Theories

Beliefs in conspiracy theories are related to a diverse set of emotional and behavioral consequences. At the same time, a theoretical model detailing when a conspiracy theory is more likely to elicit confrontation compared to withdrawal, indirect aggression or community-building is missing. We argue that appraisals provide the missing link between conspiracy beliefs and their consequences, proposing the Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT). Based on appraisal theories of emotions, we outline how the focus on different features that vary between conspiracy theories and the situations in which they are embedded (i.e., focus on secrecy vs. gained knowledge; powerlessness vs. option of confrontation; harm to oneself vs. others) facilitate specific appraisals, resulting in different behavioral outcomes. We also outline how the AMCT helps to reconcile inconsistent research on conspiracy beliefs by providing better predictions about their emotional and behavioral consequences.

Construct Validity, Measurement Invariance, and Nomological Network of Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ) Across Four Different Languages

The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ) is a generic conspiracy mentality questionnaire whose content is suitable for different linguistic and cultural contexts. However, it needs to demonstrate strong measurement properties across these contexts to be effective. This study aimed to explore the psychometric properties of the CMQ across four different languages: Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and English. Despite its widespread use, the CMQ lacks sufficient research on its psychometric properties, especially in terms of measurement invariance across different linguistic versions (apart from the parent study). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated the equivalence of the CMQ across genders, even though it is used for gender comparisons. To address this gap, we analyzed data from 2,897 participants (76.1% female) aged 18-89. Confirmatory factor analysis supported the modified one-factor structure, with a correlated residual that was replicated/previously reported, across languages. Measurement invariance analysis confirmed metric invariance across languages and scalar invariance across genders. Scalar invariance was established across education for Serbian, Bulgarian, and, with some caution, Greek, while it was not a property of the English sample. The nomological network of the CMQ aligns with previous findings regarding the correlates of conspiracy mentality.

Ideology: Psychological Similarities and Differences Across the Ideological Spectrum Reexamined

A key debate in the psychology of ideology is whether leftists and rightists are psychologically similar or different. A long-standing view holds that left-wing and right-wing people are meaningfully different from one another across a whole host of basic personality and cognitive features. Scholars have recently pushed back, suggesting that left-wing and right-wing people are more psychologically similar than distinct. We review evidence regarding the psychological profiles of left-wing and right-wing people across a wide variety of domains, including their dispositions (values, personality, cognitive rigidity, threat-sensitivity, and authoritarianism), information processing (motivated reasoning and susceptibility to misinformation), and their interpersonal perceptions and behaviors (empathy, prejudice, stereotyping, and violence). Our review paints a nuanced picture: People across the ideological divide are much more similar than scholars sometimes appreciate. And yet, they differ-to varying degrees-in their personality, values, and (perhaps most importantly) in the groups and causes they prioritize, with important implications for downstream attitudes and behavior in the world.

Correlates of COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs in Japan: A cross-sectional study of 28,175 residents

BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 pandemic was associated with an increase in conspiracy theories worldwide. However, in Japan, the prevalence of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs has remained unclear. This study aimed to estimate the prevalence and correlates of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs using a survey of 28,175 residents of Japan aged 16-81 years old.

METHODS

A cross-sectional self-administered survey was conducted from September to October 2021. To assess the number of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, we used three questions from the Oxford Coronavirus Explanations, Attitudes, and Narratives Survey. Independent variables included general vaccine conspiracy beliefs, sociodemographic variables, information sources for COVID-19, trust in authorities, and fear of COVID-19.

RESULTS

After applying sampling weights and imputation, the estimated prevalence of holding at least one COVID-19 conspiracy belief was 24.4%. From a linear regression model, several factors were independently associated with conspiracy beliefs. Notably, people with the lowest level of education (lower secondary school) endorsed fewer COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (B -0.089, vs. upper secondary school). Furthermore, higher socioeconomic backgrounds-such as higher income, higher wealth, and regular employment-were associated with endorsing conspiracy beliefs. Only 37.3% of respondents trusted the government of Japan, but paradoxically, trust in the government was positively associated with conspiracy beliefs (B 0.175, vs. distrust).

CONCLUSIONS

COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs can be prevalent in about a quarter of the residents of Japan. Certain groups are more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs, and targeting interventions towards these groups might be efficient in stemming the spread of conspiracy beliefs.

Does Lower Psychological Need Satisfaction Foster Conspiracy Belief? Longitudinal Effects Over 3 Years in New Zealand

Although conspiracy belief may arise from a frustration of psychological needs, research has yet to investigate these relationships over time. Using four annual waves of longitudinal panel data in New Zealand (2019-2022; N = 55,269), we examined the relationship between four psychological needs (namely belonging, control, meaning in life, and self-esteem) and conspiracy belief. Results from four random-intercept cross-lagged panel models reveal stable between-person effects indicating that those whose core needs are less satisfied tend to exhibit higher levels of conspiracy belief across time. Within-person analyses further identify small cross-lagged effects within individuals: decreases in levels of control and belonging, as well as increases in levels of meaning in life, temporally precede increases in conspiracy belief. Within-person fluctuations in conspiracy belief also have negative cross-lagged associations with control (but not with the three other needs). These data provide novel insights into the psychological factors that foster conspiracy belief.

The role of epistemic trust and epistemic disruption in vaccine hesitancy, conspiracy thinking and the capacity to identify fake news

Epistemic trust - defined as readiness to regard knowledge, communicated by another agent, as significant, relevant to the self, and generalizable to other contexts-has recently been applied to the field of developmental psychopathology as a potential risk factor for psychopathology. The work described here sought to investigate how the vulnerability engendered by disruptions in epistemic trust may not only impact psychological resilience and interpersonal processes but also aspects of more general social functioning. We undertook two studies to examine the role of epistemic trust in determining capacity to recognise fake/real news, and susceptibility to conspiracy thinking-both in general and in relation to COVID-19. Measuring three different epistemic dispositions-trusting, mistrusting and credulous-in two studies (study 1, n = 705; study 2 n = 502), we found that Credulity was associated with inability to discriminate between fake/real news. We also found that both Mistrust and Credulity mediated the relationship between exposure to childhood adversity and difficulty in distinguishing between fake/real news, although the effect sizes were small. Finally, Mistrust and Credulity were associated with general and COVID-19 related conspiracy beliefs and vaccine hesitancy. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of fake news and conspiracy thinking.

Conspiracy narratives and vaccine hesitancy: a scoping review of prevalence, impact, and interventions

Believing conspiracy narratives is frequently assumed to be a major cause of vaccine hesitancy, i.e., the tendency to forgo vaccination despite its availability. In this scoping review, we synthesise and critically evaluate studies that assess i) the occurrence of vaccine-related conspiracy narratives on the internet, ii) the prevalence of belief in vaccine-related conspiracy narratives, iii) the relationship between belief in conspiracy narratives and vaccination intention or vaccination uptake, and iv) interventions that reduce the impact of conspiracy narratives on vaccination intention.In July 2022, we conducted a literature search using three databases: PubMed, PsychInfo, and Web of Science. Following the PRISMA approach, of the 500 initially identified articles, 205 were eligible and analysed.The majority of identified studies were conducted in Europe and North America, were published in 2021 and 2022, and investigated conspiracy narratives around the COVID-19 vaccination. The prevalence of belief in various vaccine-related conspiracy narratives varied greatly across studies, from 2 to 77%. We identified seven experimental studies investigating the effect of exposure to conspiracy narratives on vaccination intentions, of which six indicated a small negative effect. These findings are complemented by the evidence from over 100 correlative studies showing a significant negative relationship between conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intention or uptake. Additionally, the review identified interventions (e.g., social norm feedback, fact-checking labels, or prebunking) that decreased beliefs in vaccine-related conspiracy narratives and, in some cases, also increased vaccination intentions. Yet, these interventions had only small effects.In summary, the review revealed that vaccine-related conspiracy narratives have spread to varying degrees and can influence vaccination decisions. Causal relationships between conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intentions remain underexplored. Further, the review identified a need for more research on interventions that can reduce the impact of conspiracy narratives.

Conspiracy beliefs and negative attitudes towards outgroups in times of crises: Experimental evidence from Germany

While research on the determinants of conspiracy beliefs has been growing, there is still limited attention given to the broader consequences of conspiracy theories. This study examines the effects of conspiratorial framing on outgroup evaluations in the context of societal crises. Using an experimental design and a large representative sample of the German population, we exposed participants to conspiratorial framings of health, economic, and security crisis scenarios. The findings reveal that exposure to conspiratorial framing of crises leads to significantly more negative attitudes towards outgroups compared to control conditions. The impact is most pronounced in the security crisis treatment condition, particularly in war scenarios. Additionally, our study demonstrates the important role of political ideology, as individuals with left- as well as right-wing ideologies displayed more negative attitudes towards outgroups when exposed to conspiratorial framings of crises. These findings contribute to the literature by providing experimental evidence of the detrimental effects of conspiracy narratives on intergroup attitudes during crises.

Thought contagion? Conspiracy beliefs boost paranoid thoughts

Conspiracy theories accusing specific groups of secret malevolent actions can foster a perception of the world as a dangerous place. In our research, we contend that both adherence and exposure to conspiracy beliefs can serve as a potential cause of certain psychological problems in the form of paranoid thoughts. This hypothesis was tested in three studies conducted among Polish and British participants. In Study 1 (longitudinal, N = 603), we found that conspiracy beliefs exerted a positive overtime effect on paranoid thoughts. Experimental studies 2 (N = 384) and 3 (N = 445), showed that being exposed to conspiracy theories (vs. control stimuli) heightened paranoid thoughts. In Study 3, we proposed a potential mechanism explaining this effect, according to which exposure to conspiracies increased paranoid thoughts via only negative intense emotions. Our work adds to the discussion on the consequences of conspiracy beliefs and has implications for mental health research, underlining the importance of designing interventions limiting the adverse effects of conspiracy beliefs.

[Conspiracy theories, social polarization and crises]

OBJECTIVE

Social media facilitate the distribution of conspiracy theories. It is uncertain whether indeed the number of myths and also the number of those who appropriate myths has increased. Conspiracy theories have so far essentially been the subject of sociological and psychosociological research showing a general disposition to become infected irrespective of the topic of a myth. Are there specific psychopathological risk factors for becoming infected by conspiracy myths? Are there effective therapeutic or preventive measures?

METHODS

A systematic search was carried out in PubMed using the query "conspir*[title] AND review" followed by manual selection and appraisal only of publications addressing conspiracy theories in general, i.e. not limited to specific myths, with a focus on systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Moreover, the publications identified were manually screened for further meta-analyses.

RESULTS

The search resulted in 166 hits. The available evidence is essentially based on studies using questionnaires, which can clarify only associations but not causalities. The evidence suggests that the strongest correlates of conspiratorial ideation pertain to low cognitive abilities, nonanalytic style of thought resulting in reduced balancing of probabilities before deciding, feelings of loss of control, paranoia, schizotypy and the dark triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, authoritarianism).

CONCLUSION

Specific psychological characteristics are risk factors for conspiratorial ideation. Current research approaches are unsuitable to clarify whether psychiatric disorders are overrepresented. Sociodemographic risk factors include male gender, low level of education, low income, social isolation and are non-specific. Group processes promote, again presumably nonspecifically, conspiracy theories thus contributing to social polarization. The genetic basis and neurobiological mechanisms are unknown. Conspiracy theories were and are used as an instrument of political contention. The enlightened democratic social contract requires free, unbiased thinking. Consequently, the risk factors identified so far facilitate conspiratorial ideation and question the very fundaments of the social contract by impairing unbiased evaluation and decision making. Therefore, prevention is warranted. .

Science and sanity: A social epistemology of misinformation, disinformation, and the limits of knowledge

Recent challenges to scientific authority in relation to the COVID pandemic, climate change, and the proliferation of conspiracy theories raise questions about the nature of knowledge and conviction. This article considers problems of social epistemology that are central to current predicaments about popular or public knowledge and the status of science. From the perspective of social epistemology, knowing and believing are not simply individual cognitive processes but based on participation in social systems, networks, and niches. As such, knowledge and conviction can be understood in terms of the dynamics of epistemic communities, which create specific forms of authority, norms, and practices that include styles of reasoning, habits of thought and modes of legitimation. Efforts to understand the dynamics of delusion and pathological conviction have something useful to teach us about our vulnerability as knowers and believers. However, this individual psychological account needs to be supplemented with a broader social view of the politics of knowledge that can inform efforts to create a healthy information ecology and strengthen the civil institutions that allow us to ground our action in well-informed picture of the world oriented toward mutual recognition, respect, diversity, and coexistence.

Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI

Conspiracy theory beliefs are notoriously persistent. Influential hypotheses propose that they fulfill important psychological needs, thus resisting counterevidence. Yet previous failures in correcting conspiracy beliefs may be due to counterevidence being insufficiently compelling and tailored. To evaluate this possibility, we leveraged developments in generative artificial intelligence and engaged 2190 conspiracy believers in personalized evidence-based dialogues with GPT-4 Turbo. The intervention reduced conspiracy belief by ~20%. The effect remained 2 months later, generalized across a wide range of conspiracy theories, and occurred even among participants with deeply entrenched beliefs. Although the dialogues focused on a single conspiracy, they nonetheless diminished belief in unrelated conspiracies and shifted conspiracy-related behavioral intentions. These findings suggest that many conspiracy theory believers can revise their views if presented with sufficiently compelling evidence.

Conspiracy beliefs and majority influence

Conspiracy beliefs (i.e. beliefs in specific conspiracy theories or the more general conspiracy mentality) are associated with a need for uniqueness and lower adherence to social norms. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs might be generally associated with less influence by majority opinions - absolutely and compared to minority opinions. In five experiments involving scenarios unrelated to conspiracy theories (overall N = 1669), participants were informed about the majority/minority opinion on a given issue (e.g. the building of a tunnel), afterward indicating their evaluation or voting intentions regarding the issue. We then tested whether the influence of a majority/minority opinion on evaluation or voting intentions is moderated by conspiracy beliefs. Across studies, we find no significant moderation. A meta-analysis confirms no correlation between conspiracy beliefs and susceptibility to majority influence. Taken together, our studies provide no evidence for the assumption that those holding conspiracy beliefs reject majority opinions per se.

Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind

Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy mentality in autistic and non-autistic individuals

BACKGROUND

Belief in conspiracy theories has emerged across times and cultures. While previous accounts attributed conspiracy beliefs to mental health conditions, accumulating research suggests that conspiracy theories are common among the general population. In the present study we examined whether conspiracy mentality - that is, a general predisposition to believe conspiracy theories - differed between a group of autistic adults and a general population sample.

METHODS

This study included an autistic sample (n = 682) and a general population sample (n = 4358). Participants' conspiracy mentality was measured using the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ).

RESULTS

A one-way ANCOVA (controlling for participants' age, gender, educational level, and ethnicity) revealed no difference in conspiracy mentality between an autism and a community sample.

CONCLUSIONS

The current study suggests that being autistic, or having more autistic traits, does not predict conspiracy mentality. These findings underscore that autism does not predispose people to conspiracy theories and suggest that autism is neither a risk factor for, nor a protective factor against, conspiracy mentality.

"Trust me, do not trust anyone": how epistemic mistrust and credulity are associated with conspiracy mentality

Previous research shows that the propensity to endorse conspiracy theories is associated with disrupted forms of epistemic trust, i.e., the appropriate openness towards interpersonally communicated information. There are associations, first, with an increased mistrust in several actors and institutions responsible for the communication of information in society, and second, with a pronounced credulity in unreliable sources and implausible phenomena (e.g., superstition, astrology). This study aims to investigate whether these phenomena are associated with specific personality-related disruptions of epistemic trust. Based on selfreported data of 417 individuals (mean = 33.28; standard deviation = 11.11) from a UK population sampled online, the potential relationships between disruptions in epistemic trust and the endorsement of a conspiracy mentality are explored. The epistemic stances characterized by mistrust and credulity (independent variables) are measured with the epistemic trust, mistrust, and credulity questionnaire (ETMCQ), and conspiracy mentality (dependent variable) is measured with the conspiracy mentality questionnaire. In a multiple linear regression model, mistrust is associated with the endorsement of a conspiracy mentality, even when accounting for other contributing factors (e.g., individual narcissism, attachment avoidance and anxiety, authoritarianism, loneliness). In a bootstrapped mediation model controlling for other relevant predictors, the association between credulity and conspiracy mentality is fully mediated by mistrust. In future research, the impact of disrupted epistemic trust on conspiracy beliefs should be investigated in terms of the specific epistemic stances of mistrust and credulity. In this respect, the ETMCQ represents a highly promising instrument to assess individual differences in factors underpinning aspects of conspiracy endorsement.

Differentiating paranoia and conspiracy mentality using a network approach

Although mostly considered distinct, conspiracy mentality and paranoia share conceptual similarities (e.g., persecutory content, resistance to disconfirming evidence). Using self-report data from a large and multinational online sample (N = 2510; from the UK, the US, Hong Kong, Germany, and Australia), we examined whether paranoia and conspiracy mentality represent distinct latent constructs in exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Utilising network analysis, we then explored common and unique correlates of paranoia and conspiracy mentality while accounting for their shared variance. Across sites, paranoia and conspiracy mentality presented distinct, yet weakly correlated (r = 0.26), constructs. Both were associated with past traumatic experiences, holding negative beliefs about the self and other people, sleep problems, and a tendency to worry. However, paranoia was related to increased negative affect (i.e., anxiety) and decreased social support, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for conspiracy mentality (i.e., decreased anxiety and depression, increased social support). Paranoia and conspiracy mentality are related but not the same constructs. Their similar and distinct correlates point to common and unique risk factors and underlying mechanisms.

News Waves: Hard News, Soft News, Fake News, Rumors, News Wavetrains

We discuss the spread of a piece of news in a population. This is modeled by SIR model of epidemic spread. The model can be reduced to a nonlinear differential equation for the number of people affected by the news of interest. The differential equation has an exponential nonlinearity and it can be approximated by a sequence of nonlinear differential equations with polynomial nonlinearities. Exact solutions to these equations can be obtained by the Simple Equations Method (SEsM). Some of these exact solutions can be used to model a class of waves associated with the spread of the news in a population. The presence of exact solutions allow to study in detail the dependence of the amplitude and the time horizon of the news waves on the wave parameters, such as the size of the population, initial number of spreaders of the piece of the news, transmission rate, and recovery rate. This allows for recommendations about the change of wave parameters in order to achieve a large amplitude or appropriate time horizon of the news wave. We discuss five types of news waves on the basis of the values of the transmission rate and recovery rate-types A, B, C, D, and E of news waves. In addition, we discuss the possibility of building wavetrains by news waves. There are three possible kinds of wavetrains with respect of the amplitude of the wave: increasing wavetrain, decreasing wavetrain, and mixed wavetrain. The increasing wavetrain is especially interesting, as it is connected to an increasing amplitude of the news wave with respect to the amplitude of the previous wave of the wavetrain. It can find applications in advertising, propaganda, etc.

Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research.

Conspiracy thinking and the long historical shadow of Romanticism on authoritarian politics

Background

Similar effect sizes have been reported for the effects of conspiracy, pseudoscientific, and paranormal beliefs on authoritarian attitudes, which points to a conceptual problem at the heart of the conspiracy literature, namely lack of clarity as to what uniquely defines conspiracy beliefs and whether those unique elements contribute distinctly to authoritarian ideologies. To our knowledge, this is the first study to test empirically the predictive power of variance unique to each construct against covariance shared among these constructs when predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes.

Methods

Online survey was administered to 314 participants in 2021 that included a battery of demographic and psychological measures. Hierarchical factor models were used to isolate unique variance from shared covariance among responses to items representing conspiracy, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs. Structural equation models were used to test their unique and shared effects on authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes.

Results

We found that our combined measurement model of paranormal thinking, conspiracism, and pseudoscience exhibited exceptional model fit, and that each construct was strongly predictive of both SDO and RWA (r = 0.73-0.86). Once the shared covariance was partitioned into a higher order factor, the residual uniqueness in each first order factors was either negatively related or unrelated to authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. Moreover, the higher order factor explained the gross majority of variance in conspiracy (R2 = 0.81) paranormal (R2 = 0.81) and pseudoscientific (R2 = 0.95) beliefs and was a far stronger predictor (β = 0.85, p < 0.01) of anti-democratic attitudes than political partisanship (β = 0.17, p < 0.01). Strong partisan identifiers of both parties showed much higher romanticism scores than party moderates.

Conclusion and limitations

When predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes, we found no empirically unique contributions of conspiracy beliefs. Instead, we found that a shared factor, representing a 'romantic' mindset was the main predictor of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. This finding potentially explains failures of interventions in stopping the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theory researchers should refocus on the shared features that conspiracy thinking has with other unwarranted epistemic beliefs to better understand how to halt the spread of misinformation, conspiracy thinking, anti-science attitudes, and even global authoritarianism.

From Conspiracy to Hesitancy: The Longitudinal Impact of COVID-19 Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Perceived Vaccine Effectiveness

The embrace of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine conspiracies has been linked to vaccine hesitancy. This study aimed to investigate the relationship between COVID-19 vaccine conspiracy theories and perceived vaccine effectiveness. The study utilized a longitudinal follow-up study in which adults in Chile completed surveys in December 2020 (T1) and May 2021 (T2). The psychometric properties of the five-item instrument on conspiracy theories for the COVID-19 vaccine were evaluated using data from T1 (n = 578). A confirmatory one-factor structure with suitable indicators of reliability was found. The longitudinal analysis (n = 292) revealed that conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 vaccine in T1 were associated with lower beliefs in its effectiveness in T2. However, no significant association was found between beliefs in effectiveness in T1 and conspiracy theories in T2. The study suggests that beliefs in conspiracy theories may temporally precede beliefs in vaccine effectiveness for COVID-19. The results have implications for strategies to address vaccine conspiracy beliefs and their implementation at the public policy level.

What is so special about conspiracy theories? Conceptually distinguishing beliefs in conspiracy theories from conspiracy beliefs in psychological research

In psychological research, conspiracy theories are often defined as explanations of events involving the hidden action of a malevolent group. Such a definition raises a false negative problem, as it does not capture conspiracy theories that are not about events. It also raises a false positive problem because it categorises any conspiracy-based explanation as a conspiracy theory, even though distinguishing conspiracy theories from other conspiracy claims is at the core of many attempts to define this notion. Based on more elaborated definitions and a conceptual reengineering approach, we propose that conspiracy theories can be defined as claims that the public is being pervasively lied to regarding some aspect(s) of reality, to allow some group(s) to enact a harmful, self-serving agenda. Compared to other definitions, ours has the advantage of not taking a position regarding the truth value of conspiracy theories, making it highly operative for psychological research.

Do conspiracy theorists think too much or too little?

Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable? On the one hand, conspiracy theorists seem to disregard accuracy; they tend to endorse mutually incompatible conspiracies, think intuitively, use heuristics, and hold other irrational beliefs. But by definition, conspiracy theorists reject the mainstream explanation for an event, often in favor of a more complex account. They exhibit a general distrust of others and expend considerable effort to find 'evidence' supporting their beliefs. In searching for answers, conspiracy theorists likely expose themselves to misleading information online and overestimate their own knowledge. Understanding when elaboration and cognitive effort might backfire is crucial, as conspiracy beliefs lead to political disengagement, environmental inaction, prejudice, and support for violence.