Social distance modulates the influence of social observation on pro-environmental behavior: An event-related potential (ERP) study

Pro-environmental behavior benefits the environment but is individually costly. Therefore, understanding the neural processes of pro-environmental behavior can advance our knowledge of its implicit cost-benefit calculations and mechanisms. Previous studies have focused separately on the effects of social distance and social observation on explicit pro-environmental behavior responses, yet the underlying neurophysiological mechanism remains unknown. Using the event-related potentials (ERPs), we investigated the neural responses to the effects of social distance and social observation on pro-environmental behavior. Participants were instructed to decide between self-interest and pro-environmental choices towards different social distance targets (family members, acquaintances, or strangers) under observable and non-observable conditions. The behavioral results demonstrated that the rate of pro-environmental choices towards acquaintances and strangers was higher under the observable condition than under the non-observable condition. Nonetheless, the rate of pro-environmental choices was higher-unaffected by social observation-towards family members than towards acquaintances and strangers. The ERP results showed that the P2 and P3 amplitudes were smaller under the observable than under the non-observable condition when the potential bearers of environmental decisions were acquaintances and strangers. However, this difference did not emerge when the potential bearers of environmental decisions were family members. The ERP findings of smaller P2 and P3 amplitudes suggest that social observation may reduce the deliberate calculation of personal costs, thereby promoting individuals' pro-environmental behaviors towards acquaintances and strangers.

Communicating the cost of your altruism makes you cool—competitive altruism and sexual selection in a real-life charity situation

Abstract

Maintaining a good reputation is crucial for humans. Altruism, e.g. charity, may serve as a costly signal that enhances reputation based on the real or communicated cost. Fundraising via charity running triggers competitive altruism when potential donors donate in reaction to the reputation increase of the fundraiser. Using real-life data of marathonists and half-marathonists (388 runners) and their 9281 donors, the present research focuses on how the communicated cost and goal of a charity run affected the potential donors. We analysed the introductory texts of the runners presented online according to the cost and the social benefit of the fundraising communicated by them. We have shown that emphasizing more the subjective cost of running and the social benefit of the goal, or writing a longer text, attracted more donors and, even though the average amount of donation per donor did not increase, still lead to a greater amount of donations collected overall by the fundraiser. It was also shown that a higher communicated subjective cost resulted in a higher ratio of opposite-sex donors, both in the case of male and female runners, suggesting that the communication of the cost of an altruistic act might be the object of sexual selection.

Significance statement

A good reputation is crucial for humans, as a reputable person enjoys several benefits. One way to maintain a good reputation is to be altruistic, e.g. doing charity. A seemingly high cost and a socially accepted goal may result in a higher reputation. Using data from a charity running community we demonstrate that fundraisers who emphasize their subjective cost (how difficult to run), and emphasize the good goal of the charity, attract more donors, and even though the average amount of each donation does not increase, a higher number of donors results in a greater amount of donations collected overall. Talking about the difficulties of the charity run results in a higher ratio of opposite-sex donors. Our results may be helpful to plan more successful charity events or to make a human community more altruistic and cooperative in general.

Variations in progesterone and estradiol across the menstrual cycle predict generosity toward socially close others

The human tendency to share goods with others at personal costs declines across the perceived social distance to them, an observation termed social discounting. Cumulating evidence suggests that social preferences are influenced by the agent's neurohormonal state. Here we tested whether endogenous fluctuations in steroid hormone compositions across the menstrual cycle were associated with differences in generosity in a social discounting task. Adult healthy, normally-cycling, women made incentivized decisions between high selfish rewards for themselves and lower generous rewards for themselves but also for other individuals at variable social distances from their social environment. We determined participants' current levels of menstrual-cycle-dependent steroid hormones via salivary sampling. Results revealed that the increase in progesterone levels as well as the decrease in estradiol levels, but not changes in testosterone or cortisol, across the menstrual cycle, accounted for increased generosity specifically toward socially close others, but not toward remote strangers.

Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation : Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure

Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation.

Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Is it costly to deceive? People are adept at detecting gossipers' lies but may not reward honesty

The possibility that gossipers may share dishonest reputational information is a key challenge to claims that gossip can shore up cooperation in social groups. It has been suggested that imposing social costs on dishonest gossipers should increase the honesty of these reputational signals. However, at present, there is little evidence of people's willingness to impose costs on dishonest gossipers; there is also little evidence of their ability to detect gossipers' lies in the first place. This paper aims to shed light on people's abilities to detect dishonest gossip and their treatment of those who share it. To do this, we report the results of two trust game studies using the strategy method (study 1) and repeated interactions in the laboratory (study 2). We show that in an environment where gossipers tell spontaneous lies people are more inclined to believe honest than dishonest gossip. We also show that people are more likely to treat favourably gossipers they believe to be honest, but that this does not always result in more favourable treatment for gossipers who were actually honest. We discuss the implications for the potential utility of social sanctions as a tool for securing honesty. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling

Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Truth, Lies, and Gossip

It is widely assumed that people will share inaccurate gossip for their own selfish purposes. This assumption, if true, presents a challenge to the growing body of work positing that gossip is a ready source of accurate reputational information and therefore is welfare improving. We tested this inaccuracy assumption by examining the frequency and form of spontaneous lies shared between gossiping members of networks playing a series of one-shot trust games (N = 320). We manipulated whether gossipers were or were not competing with each other. We showed that lies make up a sizeable minority of messages and are twice as frequent under gossiper competition. However, this had no discernible effect on trust levels. We attribute this to the findings that (a) gossip targets are insensitive to lies and (b) some lies are welfare enhancing. These findings suggest that lies need not prevent-and may help-gossip to serve reputational functions.

The developmental emergence of direct reciprocity and its influence on prosocial behavior

Humans are a remarkably cooperative species, and one behavior thought to play an important role is that of reciprocal altruism. By ensuring that the immediate costs associated with performing a prosocial action will be recouped in the long-run, reciprocal interactions support the emergence and maintenance of group-level cooperation. Existing developmental research suggests that a tendency toward selective prosocial behavior and an understanding of direct reciprocal interactions emerge in early childhood, but much less is known about the interplay between these two behaviors. In this paper, I review the existing literature supporting the notion that reciprocity mediates early prosocial tendencies and suggest that a greater understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying reciprocity is needed. Finally, I propose two social cognitive capacities related to prospection that I believe may help to shed light on the psychology of strategic reciprocal interactions and their role in prosocial behavior more broadly.

Knowledge of Social Affiliations Biases Economic Decisions

An individual's reputation and group membership can produce automatic judgments and behaviors toward that individual. Whether an individual's social reputation impacts interactions with affiliates has yet to be demonstrated. We tested the hypothesis that during initial encounters with others, existing knowledge of their social network guides behavior toward them. Participants learned reputations (cooperate, defect, or equal mix) for virtual players through an iterated economic game (EG). Then, participants learned one novel friend for each player. The critical question was how participants treated the friends in a single-shot EG after the friend-learning phase. Participants tended to cooperate with friends of cooperators and defect on friends of defectors, indicative of a decision making bias based on memory for social affiliations. Interestingly, participants' explicit predictions of the friends' future behavior showed no such bias. Moreover, the bias to defect on friends of defectors was enhanced when affiliations were learned in a social context; participants who learned to associate novel faces with player faces during reinforcement learning did not show reputation-based bias for associates of defectors during single-shot EG. These data indicate that when faced with risky social decisions, memories of social connections influence behavior implicitly.

Biological trade and markets

Cooperation between organisms can often be understood, like trade between merchants, as a mutually beneficial exchange of services, resources or other 'commodities'. Mutual benefits alone, however, are not sufficient to explain the evolution of trade-based cooperation. First, organisms may reject a particular trade if another partner offers a better deal. Second, while human trade often entails binding contracts, non-human trade requires unwritten 'terms of contract' that 'self-stabilize' trade and prevent cheating even if all traders strive to maximize fitness. Whenever trading partners can be chosen, market-like situations arise in nature that biologists studying cooperation need to account for. The mere possibility of exerting partner choice stabilizes many forms of otherwise cheatable trade, induces competition, facilitates the evolution of specialization and often leads to intricate forms of cooperation. We discuss selected examples to illustrate these general points and review basic conceptual approaches that are important in the theory of biological trade and markets. Comparing these approaches with theory in economics, it turns out that conventional models-often called 'Walrasian' markets-are of limited relevance to biology. In contrast, early approaches to trade and markets, as found in the works of Ricardo and Cournot, contain elements of thought that have inspired useful models in biology. For example, the concept of comparative advantage has biological applications in trade, signalling and ecological competition. We also see convergence between post-Walrasian economics and biological markets. For example, both economists and biologists are studying 'principal-agent' problems with principals offering jobs to agents without being sure that the agents will do a proper job. Finally, we show that mating markets have many peculiarities not shared with conventional economic markets. Ideas from economics are useful for biologists studying cooperation but need to be taken with caution.

Perceived reputation of others modulates empathic neural responses

Empathy enables us to understand and share the emotional and affective states of another person and plays a key role in social behaviors. The current study investigated whether and how empathic neural responses to pain were modulated by the perceived reputation of others. Action histories reflecting individuals' past cooperation or betrayal actions in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game were introduced as an index of reputation. We assessed brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging while the participants observed individuals with a good or bad reputation receiving or not receiving pain. The results indicated that the participants exhibited reduced empathic responses in AI and dACC to the individual who had a bad reputation relative to the one who had a good reputation, suggesting that their empathy for pain was modulated by the perceived reputation of others.

The Signaling Theory of Symptoms : An Evolutionary Explanation of the Placebo Effect

Placebo research shows that the subjective quality of care and social support, as well as the patients' expectations of treatment, influence therapeutic outcomes. However, this phenomenon, known as the placebo effect, does not usually cure the disease, but rather can provide symptomatic relief: It may soothe symptoms such as pain, swelling, or nausea that constitute part of an immune response. The function of this mechanism remains unclear. This article puts forward the Signaling Theory of Symptoms (STS) as a possible explanation. According to STS, discernible aspects of an immune response, such as pain, swelling, or nausea, not only serve a defensive and healing function but also a signaling function: symptoms signal the need for care and treatment to potential helpers. Once help and treatment are granted, the signaling function is fulfilled and the symptoms diminish. This mechanism may have been a significant advantage in preindustrial environments, when sufferers depended on extensive social support and personal treatment. Nowadays, from the point of view of modern materialist medicine, the mobilization of social support no longer seems so crucial, and thus the placebo effect has been assigned a somewhat mysterious quality.

Evolutionary Psychology in the Modern World: Applications, Perspectives, and Strategies

An evolutionary approach is a powerful framework which can bring new perspectives on any aspect of human behavior, to inform and complement those from other disciplines, from psychology and anthropology to economics and politics. Here we argue that insights from evolutionary psychology may be increasingly applied to address practical issues and help alleviate social problems. We outline the promise of this endeavor, and some of the challenges it faces. In doing so, we draw parallels between an applied evolutionary psychology and recent developments in Darwinian medicine, which similarly has the potential to complement conventional approaches. Finally, we describe some promising new directions which are developed in the associated papers accompanying this article.

Evolutionary psychology in the modern world: applications, perspectives, and strategies

An evolutionary approach is a powerful framework which can bring new perspectives on any aspect of human behavior, to inform and complement those from other disciplines, from psychology and anthropology to economics and politics. Here we argue that insights from evolutionary psychology may be increasingly applied to address practical issues and help alleviate social problems. We outline the promise of this endeavor, and some of the challenges it faces. In doing so, we draw parallels between an applied evolutionary psychology and recent developments in Darwinian medicine, which similarly has the potential to complement conventional approaches. Finally, we describe some promising new directions which are developed in the associated papers accompanying this article.