Evolutionary game model of health care and social care collaborative services for the elderly population in China

The cross-regional settlement methods in hospitals and the treatment-seeking behavior of patients with malignant tumors in China: an evolutionary game model

Background

Cross-regional settlement management is a key indicator of national health insurance system maturity. Given the significant demand for cross-regional medical treatment among Chinese patients with malignant tumors and the territorially managed health insurance system, further research is necessary to explore the relationship between hospital settlement methods and treatment-seeking behaviors among these patients. This study introduces and validates an evolutionary game model that provides a theoretical foundation for direct settlement policies in cross-regional treatment.

Methods

An evolutionary game model was constructed with patients and hospitals serving as strategic players within a dynamic system. This model integrates the patients' treatment utility, medical and nonmedical costs, and hospitals' financial and technological advancement benefits.

Results

The evolutionary stability analysis revealed seven-game outcomes between hospitals and patients with malignant tumors. The numerical simulations suggest an evolutionary convergence toward strategy (1, 0), indicating a trend where patients with malignant tumors opt for cross-regional treatment, yet hospitals choose not to implement a direct settlement policy. Parameter sensitivity analysis showed that the parameters set in this study affected player behavioral choices and game equilibria.

Conclusion

A strong demand for cross-regional medical treatment among Chinese patients with malignant tumors, and some hospitals require more incentives to implement cross-regional settlements. The key factors influencing the willingness of some patients with malignant tumors to resettle include the costs of in-area medical care, costs of cross-regional treatment without direct settlement, and the utility of cross-regional treatment. Technological advancement benefits and input costs influence some hospitals' motivation to adopt cross-regional settlements. Policy adjustments that effectively implement direct settlement policies can facilitate equilibrium, enhance the initiatives of some local health insurance management departments, improve the accessibility and efficiency of medical services, and reduce nonmedical expenses for patients.

Incentive policy for the comprehensive development of young medical talents: an evolutionary game study

Introduction

Currently in China, there is a lack of well-defined and viable incentive mechanisms at the governmental and hospital levels to support the development of young medical talents, thereby hindering their growth Existing studies primarily investigate the current state and trajectory of incentives, yet they inadequately address the distinctive characteristics of various stakeholders involved in medical talent incentive processes, particularly the lack of research on incentive mechanisms with Chinese attributes.

Methods

This study adopts evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of replication and the strategies for achieving evolutionary stability in the comprehensive development of young medical talents, considering both scenarios with and without supportive policies.

Results

In the absence of any supportive policy measures, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) point is O(0,0), the unstable equilibrium point is C(1,1), and the saddle points are A(0,1), B(1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point C(1,1), which means that the young medical talents and medical institutions adopt a combination of strategies (actively seeking comprehensive development and taking incentive measures). Under the scenario with supportive policies, the ESS point is C(1,1), the unstable equilibrium point is O(0,0), and the saddle points are A(0,1), B(1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point O(0,0), which means that young medical talents and medical institutions adopt (N,N) strategy combinations (inactively seeking comprehensive development, implementing no incentive measure).

Discussion

(1) Government incentives play a crucial role in motivating young medical talents to seek comprehensive development. (2) The level of government incentive support for young medical talents should exceed the cost increment of individual efforts. Additionally, the policy support provided by the government to medical institutions should surpass the incentive support offered by these institutions to young medical talents. This will enhance the motivation and encouragement efforts of medical institutions in actively promoting comprehensive development among young medical talents. (3) With the backing of certain government incentive policies, medical institutions implementing incentive measures and young medical talents actively seeking comprehensive development will establish a virtuous cycle of mutual promotion.

Middle-aged and older people's preference for medical-elderly care integrated institutions in China: a discrete choice experiment study

BACKGROUND

With the continuing impact of the aging population, medical-elderly care integrated institutions, as a way to bear the pressure of medical and elderly care, effectively ensure the quality of life of the elderly in their later years.

OBJECTIVES

To explore the preferences of medical-elderly care integrated institutions among Chinese middle-aged and older people and to provide a reference for establishing elderly-oriented development of medical-elderly care integrated institutions.

METHODS

In this study, a discrete choice experiment (DCE) was used to investigate the preferences of people aged 45 years and older in medical-elderly care integrated institutions in China from October 20, 2022, to November 10, 2022. A mixed logit regression model was used to analyze the DCE data. Participants' willingness to pay for each attribute was also calculated.

RESULTS

Data from 420 participants who provided valid responses were included in the analysis. In terms of the choice preference, moderate service quality (vs. poor service quality: β = 1.707, p < 0.001, 95% CI 1.343 ~ 2.071) and high medical technology level (vs. low medical technology level: β = 1.535, p < 0.001, 95% CI 1.240 ~ 1.830) were the most important attributes to middle-aged and older people, followed by monthly cost, environmental facilities, the convenience of transportation, and entertainment activities. Regarding the willingness to pay, participants were more willing to pay for service quality and medical technology level than for other attributes. They were willing to pay $3156 and $2838 more for "poor service quality" and "low medical technology level," respectively, to receive "moderate service quality " (p = 0.007, 95% CI 963 ~ 5349) and "high medical technology level" (p = 0.005, 95% CI 852 ~ 4824).

CONCLUSIONS

The state should attach great importance to the development of medical-elderly care integrated services industry, actively optimize the model of the medical-elderly care integrated service, improve the facilities, and create a healthy environment. At the same time, give full play to the role of medical insurance, long-term care insurance, and commercial insurance, so as to improve the comprehensive quality of life of the elderly.

PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION

The design of the experimental selection was guided by 10 experts in the field, 5 Chinese government officials, and interviews and focus group discussions, without whose participation this study would not have been possible.

An evolutionary game-based simulation study of a multi-agent governance system for smart senior care services in China

BACKGROUND

The competing interests of the government, smart senior care technology service providers, and older adults have led to a serious fragmentation of governance in China. This study aims to identify the collaboration mechanisms and evolutionary stabilization strategies for these agents.

METHODS

An evolutionary game model is developed to analyze the strategic decisions made by the government, smart senior care technology service providers, and older adults. A sensitivity analysis is conducted using data from Anhui Province, China, to verify the effects of relevant parameters on the strategy decisions of each agent.

RESULTS

The results of the simulation and sensitivity analysis indicated that, first, despite changes in the initial willingness values of the tripartite agents, the system eventually converges on 1. Second, the collaboration mechanism of the tripartite agents in the smart senior care system is related to government incentives, penalties, and subsidies, smart senior care service costs, and the additional benefits provided to smart senior care technology service providers.

CONCLUSION

The strategy decisions of the government, providers, and older adults interact with each other. To promote collaboration among the tripartite agents and improve governance effectiveness, the government should strengthen the regulations for providers, increase penalties for providers that engage in a breach of trust, provide moderate incentives and subsidies, and control smart senior care service costs.

Study on the evolutionary strategy of upward patient transfer in the loose medical consortia

Medical institutions in loose medical consortia tend to have poor cooperation due to fragmented interests. We aim to explore any issues associated with patient upward transfer in a loose medical consortium system consisting of two tertiary hospitals with both cooperative and competitive relationships. A two-sided evolutionary game model was constructed to assess the stability of equilibrium strategy combinations in the process of interaction between game players under different cost-sharing scenarios and different degrees of penalties when running patient upward transfer between super triple-A hospitals (STH) and general triple-A hospitals (GTH). We found that a hospital's stabilization strategy was related to its revenue status. When a hospital has high/low revenues, it will treat patients negatively/positively, regardless of the strategy chosen by the other hospital. When the hospital has a medium revenue, the strategy choice will be related to the delay cost, delay cost sharing coefficient, government penalty and the strategic choice of the other hospital. Delay cost-sharing coefficient is an important internal factor affecting the cooperation in a medical consortium for patient upward transfer. External interventions, such as government penalty mechanisms, can improve the cooperation between hospitals when hospitals have moderate revenue.

Evolutionary game and stability analysis of elderly care service quality supervision from the perspective of government governance

Objective

The performance of government functions is an important guarantee for the standardized operation of the elderly service market. The objective of this study is to explore the optimal path for the government to govern the elderly care service market.

Methods

The tripartite evolutionary game model is proposed in the paper, which composed of local governments, private elderly care institutions and the public. Furthermore, three mechanisms, i.e. dynamic penalty and static subsidy, static penalty and dynamic subsidy, dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy, are designed. Under these different mechanisms, the stability of each subject's strategy choice is analyzed by using system dynamics simulation.

Results

The introduction of dynamic mechanisms can compensate for the inability of static mechanisms to bring the system to a steady state. The dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy mechanism allows the system to evolve to the desired point of stability. The self-discipline behavior of private elderly care institutions is positively correlated with penalties and reputation gains-losses, negatively correlated with subsidies, and not correlated with supervision rewards. Excessive subsidies will promote the collusion of private elderly institutions.

Conclusion

Only when the local government adopts the dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy mechanism will private elderly care institutions choose to operate in a fully self-disciplined manner. Reasonable adjustments of penalties, reputation gains-losses and subsidies can not only further optimize the dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy mechanism, but also help to achieve diversified regulatory objectives of the government. This study would provide a reference for local governments seeking to develop effective regulatory policies for the elderly service market.

What is the degree of social disability risk in China under the background of the aging population? Social disability risk measurement index system design and evaluation research based on China

Objective

The impact of the aging population in China varies between regions. It is because regions with different resource endowments, such as those related to economy, population, and medical care, have different degrees of disability risk in the face of the increases in the disabled and semi-disabled older population caused by the overall aging of the population. This study aimed to construct an evaluation system to monitor and measure the degree of social disability risk in different regions in China and to evaluate and compare the degree of social disability risk in different regions using empirical data.

Method

This study used the Delphi method to construct a social disability risk measurement index system with macro, meso, and micro dimensions. At the same time, based on the data of CHARLS2018, an AHP-entropy method was used to calculate the index's total weight, and the standard deviation classification method was used to classify the total and criterion-level measurement scores of 28 provinces.

Results

The regional degree of social disability risk was analyzed in subdimensions. Our research indicates that China's social disability risk situation is not promising, with a general medium to high-risk level. The score of degree of social disability risk among provinces is consistent with the regional economic development level to a large extent. The risk of social disability varies significantly among the eastern and central, and western regions of China and the provinces within the three regions.

Discussion

Currently, the situation facing the degree of social disability risk in China is that the overall risk level of the country is higher, and the difference between regions is significant. It is necessary to take measures to meet better the needs of the aging population and the disabled and semi-disabled older populations in a large-range, large-scale, multilevel way.