Approach-Induced Biases in Human Information Sampling

Measuring self-regulation in everyday life: Reliability and validity of smartphone-based experiments in alcohol use disorder

Self-regulation, the ability to guide behavior according to one's goals, plays an integral role in understanding loss of control over unwanted behaviors, for example in alcohol use disorder (AUD). Yet, experimental tasks that measure processes underlying self-regulation are not easy to deploy in contexts where such behaviors usually occur, namely outside the laboratory, and in clinical populations such as people with AUD. Moreover, lab-based tasks have been criticized for poor test-retest reliability and lack of construct validity. Smartphones can be used to deploy tasks in the field, but often require shorter versions of tasks, which may further decrease reliability. Here, we show that combining smartphone-based tasks with joint hierarchical modeling of longitudinal data can overcome at least some of these shortcomings. We test four short smartphone-based tasks outside the laboratory in a large sample (N = 488) of participants with AUD. Although task measures indeed have low reliability when data are analyzed traditionally by modeling each session separately, joint modeling of longitudinal data increases reliability to good and oftentimes excellent levels. We next test the measures' construct validity and show that extracted latent factors are indeed in line with theoretical accounts of cognitive control and decision-making. Finally, we demonstrate that a resulting cognitive control factor relates to a real-life measure of drinking behavior and yields stronger correlations than single measures based on traditional analyses. Our findings demonstrate how short, smartphone-based task measures, when analyzed with joint hierarchical modeling and latent factor analysis, can overcome frequently reported shortcomings of experimental tasks.

A Novel, Expert-Endorsed, Neurocognitive Digital Assessment Tool for Addictive Disorders: Development and Validation Study

BACKGROUND

Many people with harmful addictive behaviors may not meet formal diagnostic thresholds for a disorder. A dimensional approach, by contrast, including clinical and community samples, is potentially key to early detection, prevention, and intervention. Importantly, while neurocognitive dysfunction underpins addictive behaviors, established assessment tools for neurocognitive assessment are lengthy and unengaging, difficult to administer at scale, and not suited to clinical or community needs. The BrainPark Assessment of Cognition (BrainPAC) Project sought to develop and validate an engaging and user-friendly digital assessment tool purpose-built to comprehensively assess the main consensus-driven constructs underpinning addictive behaviors.

OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this study was to psychometrically validate a gamified battery of consensus-based neurocognitive tasks against standard laboratory paradigms, ascertain test-retest reliability, and determine their sensitivity to addictive behaviors (eg, alcohol use) and other risk factors (eg, trait impulsivity).

METHODS

Gold standard laboratory paradigms were selected to measure key neurocognitive constructs (Balloon Analogue Risk Task [BART], Stop Signal Task [SST], Delay Discounting Task [DDT], Value-Modulated Attentional Capture [VMAC] Task, and Sequential Decision-Making Task [SDT]), as endorsed by an international panel of addiction experts; namely, response selection and inhibition, reward valuation, action selection, reward learning, expectancy and reward prediction error, habit, and compulsivity. Working with game developers, BrainPAC tasks were developed and validated in 3 successive cohorts (total N=600) and a separate test-retest cohort (N=50) via Mechanical Turk using a cross-sectional design.

RESULTS

BrainPAC tasks were significantly correlated with the original laboratory paradigms on most metrics (r=0.18-0.63, P<.05). With the exception of the DDT k function and VMAC total points, all other task metrics across the 5 tasks did not differ between the gamified and nongamified versions (P>.05). Out of 5 tasks, 4 demonstrated adequate to excellent test-retest reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient 0.72-0.91, P<.001; except SDT). Gamified metrics were significantly associated with addictive behaviors on behavioral inventories, though largely independent of trait-based scales known to predict addiction risk.

CONCLUSIONS

A purpose-built battery of digitally gamified tasks is sufficiently valid for the scalable assessment of key neurocognitive processes underpinning addictive behaviors. This validation provides evidence that a novel approach, purported to enhance task engagement, in the assessment of addiction-related neurocognition is feasible and empirically defensible. These findings have significant implications for risk detection and the successful deployment of next-generation assessment tools for substance use or misuse and other mental disorders characterized by neurocognitive anomalies related to motivation and self-regulation. Future development and validation of the BrainPAC tool should consider further enhancing convergence with established measures as well as collecting population-representative data to use clinically as normative comparisons.

Measuring Cognitive Abilities in the Wild: Validating a Population-Scale Game-Based Cognitive Assessment

Rapid individual cognitive phenotyping holds the potential to revolutionize domains as wide-ranging as personalized learning, employment practices, and precision psychiatry. Going beyond limitations imposed by traditional lab-based experiments, new efforts have been underway toward greater ecological validity and participant diversity to capture the full range of individual differences in cognitive abilities and behaviors across the general population. Building on this, we developed Skill Lab, a novel game-based tool that simultaneously assesses a broad suite of cognitive abilities while providing an engaging narrative. Skill Lab consists of six mini-games as well as 14 established cognitive ability tasks. Using a popular citizen science platform (N = 10,725), we conducted a comprehensive validation in the wild of a game-based cognitive assessment suite. Based on the game and validation task data, we constructed reliable models to simultaneously predict eight cognitive abilities based on the users' in-game behavior. Follow-up validation tests revealed that the models can discriminate nuances contained within each separate cognitive ability as well as capture a shared main factor of generalized cognitive ability. Our game-based measures are five times faster to complete than the equivalent task-based measures and replicate previous findings on the decline of certain cognitive abilities with age in our large cross-sectional population sample (N = 6369). Taken together, our results demonstrate the feasibility of rapid in-the-wild systematic assessment of cognitive abilities as a promising first step toward population-scale benchmarking and individualized mental health diagnostics.

Emerging Principles of Attention and Information Demand

I review recent literature on information demand and its implications for attention control. I argue that this literature motivates a view of attention as a mechanism that reduces uncertainty by selectively sampling sensory stimuli on the basis of expected information gain (EIG). I discuss emerging evidence on how individuals estimate the two quantities that determine EIG, prior uncertainty and stimulus diagnosticity (predictive accuracy). I also discuss the neural mechanisms that compute EIG and integrate it with rewards in frontoparietal, executive, and neuromodulatory circuits. I end by considering the implications of this framework for a broader understanding of the factors that assign relevance to sensory stimuli and the role of attention in decision making and other cognitive functions.

Uncertainty modulates visual maps during noninstrumental information demand

Animals are intrinsically motivated to obtain information independently of instrumental incentives. This motivation depends on two factors: a desire to resolve uncertainty by gathering accurate information and a desire to obtain positively-valenced observations, which predict favorable rather than unfavorable outcomes. To understand the neural mechanisms, we recorded parietal cortical activity implicated in prioritizing stimuli for spatial attention and gaze, in a task in which monkeys were free (but not trained) to obtain information about probabilistic non-contingent rewards. We show that valence and uncertainty independently modulated parietal neuronal activity, and uncertainty but not reward-related enhancement consistently correlated with behavioral sensitivity. The findings suggest uncertainty-driven and valence-driven information demand depend on partially distinct pathways, with the former being consistently related to parietal responses and the latter depending on additional mechanisms implemented in downstream structures.

Curiosity is motivated by uncertainty and valence, but how uncertainty and valence are encoded in the brain remains poorly understood. Here, the authors show that parietal neurons are enhanced by both factors, but that they specifically predict visual information seeking based on uncertainty.

Are you confident enough to act? Individual differences in action control are associated with post-decisional metacognitive bias

The art of making good choices and being consistent in executing them is essential for having a successful and fulfilling life. Individual differences in action control are believed to have a crucial impact on how we make choices and whether we put them in action. Action-oriented people are more decisive, flexible and likely to implement their intentions in the face of adversity. In contrast, state-oriented people often struggle to commit to their choices and end up second-guessing themselves. Here, we employ a model-based computational approach to study the underlying cognitive differences between action and state-oriented people in simple binary-choice decision tasks. In Experiment 1 we show that there is little-to-no evidence that the two groups differ in terms of decision-related parameters and strong evidence for differences in metacognitive bias. Action-oriented people exhibit greater confidence in the correctness of their choices as well as slightly elevated judgement sensitivity, although no differences in performance are present. In Experiment 2 we replicate this effect and show that the confidence gap generalizes to value-based decisions, widens as a function of difficulty and is independent of deliberation interval. Furthermore, allowing more time for confidence deliberation indicated that state-oriented people focus more strongly on external features of choice. We propose that a positive confidence bias, coupled with appropriate metacognitive sensitivity, might be crucial for the successful realization of intentions in many real-life situations. More generally, our study provides an example of how modelling latent cognitive processes can bring meaningful insight into the study of individual differences.

Mindfulness and music interventions in the workplace: assessment of sustained attention and working memory using a crowdsourcing approach

Background

Occupational stress has huge financial as well as human costs. Application of crowdsourcing might be a way to strengthen the investigation of occupational mental health. Therefore, the aim of the study was to assess Danish employees’ stress and cognition by relying on a crowdsourcing approach, as well as investigating the effect of a 30-day mindfulness and music intervention.

Methods

We translated well-validated neuropsychological laboratory- and task-based paradigms into an app-based platform using cognitive games measuring sustained attention and working memory and measuring stress via. Cohen’s Perceived Stress Scale. A total of 623 healthy volunteers from Danish companies participated in the study and were randomized into three groups, which consisted of a 30-day intervention of either mindfulness or music, or a non-intervention control group.

Results

Participants in the mindfulness group showed a significant improvement in the coefficient of sustained attention, working memory capacity and perceived stress (p < .001). The music group showed a 38% decrease of self-perceived stress. The control group showed no difference from pre to post in the survey or cognitive outcome measures. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation between usage of the mindfulness and music app and elevated score on both the cognitive games and the perceived stress scale.

Conclusion

The study supports the nascent field of crowdsourcing by being able to replicate data collected in previous well-controlled laboratory studies from a range of experimental cognitive tasks, making it an effective alternative. It also supports mindfulness as an effective intervention in improving mental health in the workplace.

Humans actively sample evidence to support prior beliefs

No one likes to be wrong. Previous research has shown that participants may underweight information incompatible with previous choices, a phenomenon called confirmation bias. In this paper, we argue that a similar bias exists in the way information is actively sought. We investigate how choice influences information gathering using a perceptual choice task and find that participants sample more information from a previously chosen alternative. Furthermore, the higher the confidence in the initial choice, the more biased information sampling becomes. As a consequence, when faced with the possibility of revising an earlier decision, participants are more likely to stick with their original choice, even when incorrect. Critically, we show that agency controls this phenomenon. The effect disappears in a fixed sampling condition where presentation of evidence is controlled by the experimenter, suggesting that the way in which confirmatory evidence is acquired critically impacts the decision process. These results suggest active information acquisition plays a critical role in the propagation of strongly held beliefs over time.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Medial Frontal Cortex Activity Predicts Information Sampling in Economic Choice

Decision-making not only requires agents to decide what to choose but also how much information to sample before committing to a choice. Previously established frameworks for economic choice argue for a deliberative process of evidence accumulation across time. These tacitly acknowledge a role of information sampling in that decisions are only made once sufficient evidence is acquired, yet few experiments have explicitly placed information sampling under the participant's control. Here, we use fMRI to investigate the neural basis of information sampling in economic choice by allowing participants (n = 30, sex not recorded) to actively sample information in a multistep decision task. We show that medial frontal cortex (MFC) activity is predictive of further information sampling before choice. Choice difficulty (inverse value difference, keeping sensory difficulty constant) was also encoded in MFC, but this effect was explained away by the inclusion of information sampling as a coregressor in the general linear model. A distributed network of regions across the prefrontal cortex encoded key features of the sampled information at the time it was presented. We propose that MFC is an important controller of the extent to which information is gathered before committing to an economic choice. This role may explain why MFC activity has been associated with evidence accumulation in previous studies in which information sampling was an implicit rather than explicit feature of the decision.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The decisions we make are determined by the information we have sampled before committing to a choice. Accumulator frameworks of decision-making tacitly acknowledge the need to sample further information during the evidence accumulation process until a decision boundary is reached. However, relatively few studies explicitly place this decision to sample further information under the participant's control. In this fMRI study, we find that MFC activity is related to information sampling decisions in a multistep economic choice task. This suggests that an important role of evidence representations within MFC may be to guide adaptive sequential decisions to sample further information before committing to a final decision.

Dynamic Representation of the Subjective Value of Information

To improve future decisions, people should seek information based on the value of information (VOI), which depends on the current evidence and the reward structure of the upcoming decision. When additional evidence is supplied, people should update the VOI to adjust subsequent information seeking, but the neurocognitive mechanisms of this updating process remain unknown. We used a modified beads task to examine how the VOI is represented and updated in the human brain of both sexes. We theoretically derived, and empirically verified, a normative prediction that the VOI depends on decision evidence and is biased by reward asymmetry. Using fMRI, we found that the subjective VOI is represented in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Critically, this VOI representation was updated when additional evidence was supplied, showing that the DLPFC dynamically tracks the up-to-date VOI over time. These results provide new insights into how humans adaptively seek information in the service of decision-making.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT For adaptive decision-making, people should seek information based on what they currently know and the extent to which additional information could improve the decision outcome, formalized as the VOI. Doing so requires dynamic updating of VOI according to outcome values and newly arriving evidence. We formalize these principles using a normative model and show that information seeking in people adheres to them. Using fMRI, we show that the underlying subjective VOI is represented in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and, critically, that it is updated in real time according to newly arriving evidence. Our results reveal the computational and neural dynamics through which evidence and values are combined to inform constantly evolving information-seeking decisions.

Formalizing planning and information search in naturalistic decision-making

Decisions made by mammals and birds are often temporally extended. They require planning and sampling of decision-relevant information. Our understanding of such decision-making remains in its infancy compared with simpler, forced-choice paradigms. However, recent advances in algorithms supporting planning and information search provide a lens through which we can explain neural and behavioral data in these tasks. We review these advances to obtain a clearer understanding for why planning and curiosity originated in certain species but not others; how activity in the medial temporal lobe, prefrontal and cingulate cortices may support these behaviors; and how planning and information search may complement each other as means to improve future action selection.

Smartphones and the Neuroscience of Mental Health

Improvements in understanding the neurobiological basis of mental illness have unfortunately not translated into major advances in treatment. At this point, it is clear that psychiatric disorders are exceedingly complex and that, in order to account for and leverage this complexity, we need to collect longitudinal data sets from much larger and more diverse samples than is practical using traditional methods. We discuss how smartphone-based research methods have the potential to dramatically advance our understanding of the neuroscience of mental health. This, we expect, will take the form of complementing lab-based hard neuroscience research with dense sampling of cognitive tests, clinical questionnaires, passive data from smartphone sensors, and experience-sampling data as people go about their daily lives. Theory- and data-driven approaches can help make sense of these rich data sets, and the combination of computational tools and the big data that smartphones make possible has great potential value for researchers wishing to understand how aspects of brain function give rise to, or emerge from, states of mental health and illness.

Learning how to behave: cognitive learning processes account for asymmetries in adaptation to social norms

Changes to social settings caused by migration, cultural change or pandemics force us to adapt to new social norms. Social norms provide groups of individuals with behavioural prescriptions and therefore can be inferred by observing their behaviour. This work aims to examine how cognitive learning processes affect adaptation and learning of new social norms. Using a multiplayer game, I found that participants initially complied with various social norms exhibited by the behaviour of bot-players. After gaining experience with one norm, adaptation to a new norm was observed in all cases but one, where an active-harm norm was resistant to adaptation. Using computational learning models, I found that active behaviours were learned faster than omissions, and harmful behaviours were more readily attributed to all group members than beneficial behaviours. These results provide a cognitive foundation for learning and adaptation to descriptive norms and can inform future investigations of group-level learning and cross-cultural adaptation.

Frontal circuit specialisations for decision making

There is widespread consensus that distributed circuits across prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex (PFC/ACC) are critical for reward-based decision making. The circuit specialisations of these areas in primates were likely shaped by their foraging niche, in which decision making is typically sequential, attention-guided and temporally extended. Here, I argue that in humans and other primates, PFC/ACC circuits are functionally specialised in two ways. First, microcircuits found across PFC/ACC are highly recurrent in nature and have synaptic properties that support persistent activity across temporally extended cognitive tasks. These properties provide the basis of a computational account of time-varying neural activity within PFC/ACC as a decision is being made. Second, the macrocircuit connections (to other brain areas) differ between distinct PFC/ACC cytoarchitectonic subregions. This variation in macrocircuit connections explains why PFC/ACC subregions make unique contributions to reward-based decision tasks and how these contributions are shaped by attention. They predict dissociable neural representations to emerge in orbitofrontal, anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during sequential attention-guided choice, as recently confirmed in neurophysiological recordings.

Fixation patterns in simple choice reflect optimal information sampling

Simple choices (e.g., eating an apple vs. an orange) are made by integrating noisy evidence that is sampled over time and influenced by visual attention; as a result, fluctuations in visual attention can affect choices. But what determines what is fixated and when? To address this question, we model the decision process for simple choice as an information sampling problem, and approximate the optimal sampling policy. We find that it is optimal to sample from options whose value estimates are both high and uncertain. Furthermore, the optimal policy provides a reasonable account of fixations and choices in binary and trinary simple choice, as well as the differences between the two cases. Overall, the results show that the fixation process during simple choice is influenced dynamically by the value estimates computed during the decision process, in a manner consistent with optimal information sampling.

Neural circuitry of information seeking

Humans and animals navigate uncertain environments by seeking information about the future. Remarkably, we often seek information even when it has no instrumental value for aiding our decisions - as if the information is a source of value in its own right. In recent years, there has been a flourishing of research into these non-instrumental information preferences and their implementation in the brain. Individuals value information about uncertain future rewards, and do so for multiple reasons, including valuing resolution of uncertainty and overweighting desirable information. The brain motivates this information seeking by tapping into some of the same circuitry as primary rewards like food and water. However, it also employs cortex and basal ganglia circuitry that predicts and values information as distinct from primary reward. Uncovering how these circuits cooperate will be fundamental to understanding information seeking and motivated behavior as a whole, in our increasingly complex and information-rich world.

Reinforcement learning as an intermediate phenotype in psychosis? Deficits sensitive to illness stage but not associated with polygenic risk of schizophrenia in the general population

BACKGROUND

Schizophrenia is a complex disorder in which the causal relations between risk genes and observed clinical symptoms are not well understood and the explanatory gap is too wide to be clarified without considering an intermediary level. Thus, we aimed to test the hypothesis of a pathway from molecular polygenic influence to clinical presentation occurring via deficits in reinforcement learning.

METHODS

We administered a reinforcement learning task (Go/NoGo) that measures reinforcement learning and the effect of Pavlovian bias on decision making. We modelled the behavioural data with a hierarchical Bayesian approach (hBayesDM) to decompose task performance into its underlying learning mechanisms. Study 1 included controls (n = 29, F|M = 0.81), At Risk Mental State for psychosis (ARMS, n = 23, F|M = 0.35) and FEP (First-episode psychosis, n = 26, F|M = 0.18). Study 2 included healthy adolescents (n = 735, F|M = 1.06), 390 of whom had their polygenic risk scores for schizophrenia (PRSs) calculated.

RESULTS

Patients with FEP showed significant impairments in overriding Pavlovian conflict, a lower learning rate and a lower sensitivity to both reward and punishment. Less widespread deficits were observed in ARMS. PRSs did not significantly predict performance on the task in the general population, which only partially correlated with measures of psychopathology.

CONCLUSIONS

Reinforcement learning deficits are observed in first episode psychosis and, to some extent, in those at clinical risk for psychosis, and were not predicted by molecular genetic risk for schizophrenia in healthy individuals. The study does not support the role of reinforcement learning as an intermediate phenotype in psychosis.

Autistic traits influence the strategic diversity of information sampling: Insights from two-stage decision models

Information sampling can reduce uncertainty in future decisions but is often costly. To maximize reward, people need to balance sampling cost and information gain. Here we aimed to understand how autistic traits influence the optimality of information sampling and to identify the particularly affected cognitive processes. Healthy human adults with different levels of autistic traits performed a probabilistic inference task, where they could sequentially sample information to increase their likelihood of correct inference and may choose to stop at any moment. We manipulated the cost and evidence associated with each sample and compared participants’ performance to strategies that maximize expected gain. We found that participants were overall close to optimal but also showed autistic-trait-related differences. Participants with higher autistic traits had a higher efficiency of winning rewards when the sampling cost was zero but a lower efficiency when the cost was high and the evidence was more ambiguous. Computational modeling of participants’ sampling choices and decision times revealed a two-stage decision process, with the second stage being an optional second thought. Participants may consider cost in the first stage and evidence in the second stage, or in the reverse order. The probability of choosing to stop sampling at a specific stage increases with increasing cost or increasing evidence. Surprisingly, autistic traits did not influence the decision in either stage. However, participants with higher autistic traits inclined to consider cost first, while those with lower autistic traits considered cost or evidence first in a more balanced way. This would lead to the observed autistic-trait-related advantages or disadvantages in sampling optimality, depending on whether the optimal sampling strategy is determined only by cost or jointly by cost and evidence.

Children with autism can spend hours practicing lining up toys or learning all about cars or lighthouses. This kind of behaviors, we think, may reflect suboptimal information sampling strategies, that is, a failure to balance the gain of information with the cost (time, energy, or money) of information sampling. We hypothesized that suboptimal information sampling is a general characteristic of people with autism or high level of autistic traits. In our experiment, we tested how participants may adjust their sampling strategies with the change of sampling cost and information gain in the environment. Though all participants were healthy young adults who had similar IQs, higher autistic traits were associated with higher or lower efficiency of winning rewards under different conditions. Counterintuitively, participants with different levels of autistic traits did not differ in the general tendency of oversampling or undersampling, or in the decision they would reach when a specific set of sampling cost or information gain was considered. Instead, participants with higher autistic traits consistently considered sampling cost first and only weighed information gain during a second thought, while those with lower autistic traits had more diverse sampling strategies that consequently better balanced sampling cost and information gain.

Diverse motives for human curiosity

Curiosity-our desire to know-is a fundamental drive in human behaviour, but its mechanisms are poorly understood. A classical question concerns the curiosity motives. What drives individuals to become curious about some but not other sources of information?¹ Here we show that curiosity about probabilistic events depends on multiple aspects of the distribution of these events. Participants (n = 257) performed a task in which they could demand advance information about only one of two randomly selected monetary prizes that contributed to their income. Individuals differed markedly in the extent to which they requested information as a function of the ex ante uncertainty or ex ante value of an individual prize. This heterogeneity was not captured by theoretical models describing curiosity as a desire to learn about the total rewards of a situation^2,3. Instead, it could be explained by an extended model that allowed for attribute-specific anticipatory utility-the savouring of individual components of the eventual reward-and postulates that this utility increased nonlinearly with the certainty of receiving the reward. Parameter values fitting individual choices were consistent for information about gains or losses, suggesting that attribute-specific anticipatory utility captures fundamental heterogeneity in the determinants of curiosity.

A Mobile App Delivering a Gamified Battery of Cognitive Tests Designed for Repeated Play (OU Brainwave): App Design and Cohort Study

BACKGROUND

Mobile phone and tablet apps are an increasingly common platform for collecting data. A key challenge for researchers has been participant "buy-in" and attrition for designs requiring repeated testing.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study was to develop and assess the utility of 1-2 minute versions of both classic and novel cognitive tasks using a user-focused and user-driven mobile phone and tablet app designed to encourage repeated play.

METHODS

A large sample of app users (N=13,979 at first data collection) participated in multiple, self-paced sessions of classic working memory (N-back), spatial cognition (mental rotation), sustained attentional focus (persistent vigilance task), and split attention (multiple object tracking) tasks, along with the implementation of a comparatively novel action-learning task. The "OU Brainwave" app was designed to measure time-of-day variation in cognitive performance and did not offer any training program or promise any cognitive enhancement. To record participants' chronotype, a full Morningness-Eveningness questionnaire was also included, which measures whether a person's circadian rhythm produces peak alertness in the morning, in the evening, or in between. Data were collected during an 18-month period. While the app prompted re-engagement at set intervals, participants were free to complete each task as many times as they wished.

RESULTS

We found a significant relationship between morningness and age (r=.298, n=12,755, P<.001), with no effect of gender (t_13,539=-1.036, P=.30). We report good task adherence, with ~4000 participants repeatedly playing each game >4 times each-our minimum engagement level for analysis. Repeated plays of these games allowed us to replicate commonly reported gender effects in gamified spatial cognition (F_1,4216=154.861, P<.001, η²_ρ=.035), split attention (F_1,4185=11.047, P=.001, η²_ρ=.003), and sustained attentional focus (F_1,4238=15.993, P<.001, η²_ρ=.004) tasks. We also report evidence of a small gender effect in an action-learning task (F_1,3988=90.59, P<.001, η²_ρ=.022). Finally, we found a strong negative effect of self-reported age on performance, when controlling for number of plays, in sustained attentional focus (n=1596, F_6,1595=30.23, P<.001, η²=.102), working memory (n=1627, F_6,1626=19.78, P<.001, η²=.068), spatial cognition (n=1640, F_6,1639=23.74, P<.001, η²=.080), and split attention tasks (n=1616, F_6,1615=2.48, P=.02, η²=.009).

CONCLUSIONS

Using extremely short testing periods and permitting participants to decide their level of engagement-both in terms of which gamified task they played and how many sessions they completed-we were able to collect a substantial and valid dataset. We suggest that the success of OU Brainwave should inform future research oriented apps-particularly in issues of balancing participant engagement with data fidelity.

Triple dissociation of attention and decision computations across prefrontal cortex

Naturalistic decision-making typically involves sequential deployment of attention to choice alternatives to gather information before a decision is made. Attention filters how information enters decision circuits, thus implying that attentional control may shape how decision computations unfold. We recorded neuronal activity from three subregions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) while monkeys performed an attention-guided decision-making task. From the first saccade to decision-relevant information, a triple dissociation of decision- and attention-related computations emerged in parallel across PFC subregions. During subsequent saccades, orbitofrontal cortex activity reflected the value comparison between currently and previously attended information. In contrast, the anterior cingulate cortex carried several signals reflecting belief updating in light of newly attended information, the integration of evidence to a decision bound and an emerging plan for what action to choose. Our findings show how anatomically dissociable PFC representations evolve during attention-guided information search, supporting computations critical for value-guided choice.

Age-dependent Pavlovian biases influence motor decision-making

Motor decision-making is an essential component of everyday life which requires weighing potential rewards and punishments against the probability of successfully executing an action. To achieve this, humans rely on two key mechanisms; a flexible, instrumental, value-dependent process and a hardwired, Pavlovian, value-independent process. In economic decision-making, age-related decline in risk taking is explained by reduced Pavlovian biases that promote action toward reward. Although healthy ageing has also been associated with decreased risk-taking in motor decision-making, it is currently unknown whether this is a result of changes in Pavlovian biases, instrumental processes or a combination of both. Using a newly established approach-avoidance computational model together with a novel app-based motor decision-making task, we measured sensitivity to reward and punishment when participants (n = 26,532) made a ‘go/no-go’ motor gamble based on their perceived ability to execute a complex action. We show that motor decision-making can be better explained by a model with both instrumental and Pavlovian parameters, and reveal age-related changes across punishment- and reward-based instrumental and Pavlovian processes. However, the most striking effect of ageing was a decrease in Pavlovian attraction towards rewards, which was associated with a reduction in optimality of choice behaviour. In a subset of participants who also played an independent economic decision-making task (n = 17,220), we found similar decision-making tendencies for motor and economic domains across a majority of age groups. Pavlovian biases, therefore, play an important role in not only explaining motor decision-making behaviour but also the changes which occur through normal ageing. This provides a deeper understanding of the mechanisms which shape motor decision-making across the lifespan.

Decisions in everyday life often require weighing the probability of successfully executing an action (e.g., successfully crossing a street) against potential rewards and punishments. Although older individuals take fewer risks during such motor decision-making scenarios, the underlying mechanism remains unclear. Similar age-related changes in economic decision-making are explained by a decrease in Pavlovian attraction toward reward. However, despite the role of Pavlovian biases in linking action with reward and avoidance with punishment, their impact on motor decision-making is unclear. To address this, we developed a novel app-based motor decision-making task (n = 26,532). We found that motor decision-making was subject to Pavlovian influences. Although we found age-related changes for both punishment and reward-based decision-making processes, the most striking effect of ageing was a decrease in the facilitatory effect of Pavlovian attraction on action in pursuit of reward. Using data from an independent economic decision task in the same individuals (n = 17,220), we demonstrate similar decision-making tendencies for motor and economic domains across a majority of age groups. Hence, Pavlovian biases play an essential role in not only explaining motor decision-making behaviour but also the changes which occur through normal ageing.

Dopamine and Proximity in Motivation and Cognitive Control

Cognitive control - the ability to override a salient or prepotent action to execute a more deliberate one - is required for flexible, goal-directed behavior, and yet it is subjectively costly: decision-makers avoid allocating control resources, even when doing so affords more valuable outcomes. Dopamine likely offsets effort costs just as it does for physical effort. And yet, dopamine can also promote impulsive action, undermining control. We propose a novel hypothesis that reconciles opposing effects of dopamine on cognitive control: during action selection, striatal dopamine biases benefits relative to costs, but does so preferentially for "proximal" motor and cognitive actions. Considering the nature of instrumental affordances and their dynamics during action selection facilitates a parsimonious interpretation and conserved corticostriatal mechanisms across physical and cognitive domains.

Making better decisions in groups

We review the literature to identify common problems of decision-making in individuals and groups. We are guided by a Bayesian framework to explain the interplay between past experience and new evidence, and the problem of exploring the space of hypotheses about all the possible states that the world could be in and all the possible actions that one could take. There are strong biases, hidden from awareness, that enter into these psychological processes. While biases increase the efficiency of information processing, they often do not lead to the most appropriate action. We highlight the advantages of group decision-making in overcoming biases and searching the hypothesis space for good models of the world and good solutions to problems. Diversity of group members can facilitate these achievements, but diverse groups also face their own problems. We discuss means of managing these pitfalls and make some recommendations on how to make better group decisions.