Accounting for Taste: A Multi-Attribute Neurocomputational Model Explains the Neural Dynamics of Choices for Self and Others

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people towards prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity towards high and low merit recipients by influencing other-regard and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point towards stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Complex economic decisions from simple neurocognitive processes: the role of interactive attention

Neurocognitive theories of value-based choice propose that people additively accumulate choice attributes when making decisions. These theories cannot explain the emergence of complex multiplicative preferences such as those assumed by prospect theory and other economic models. We investigate an interactive attention mechanism, according to which attention to attributes (like payoffs) depends on other attributes (like probabilities) attended to previously. We formalize this mechanism using a Markov attention model combined with an accumulator decision process, and test our model on eye-tracking and mouse-tracking data in risky choice. Our tests show that interactive attention is necessary to make good choices, that most participants display interactive attention and that allowing for interactive attention in accumulation-based decision models improves their predictions. By equipping established decision models with sophisticated attentional dynamics, we extend these models to describe complex economic choice, and in the process, we unify two prominent theoretical approaches to studying value-based decision making.

Value certainty and choice confidence are multidimensional constructs that guide decision-making

The degree of certainty that decision-makers have about their evaluations of available choice alternatives and their confidence about selecting the subjectively best alternative are important factors that affect current and future value-based choices. Assessments of the alternatives in a given choice set are rarely unidimensional; their values are usually derived from a combination of multiple distinct attributes. For example, the taste, texture, quantity, and nutritional content of a snack food may all be considered when determining whether to consume it. We examined how certainty about the levels of individual attributes of an option relates to certainty about the overall value of that option as a whole and/or to confidence in having chosen the subjectively best available option. We found that certainty and confidence are derived from unequally weighted combinations of attribute certainties rather than simple, equal combinations of all sources of uncertainty. Attributes that matter more in determining choice outcomes also are weighted more in metacognitive evaluations of certainty or confidence. Moreover, we found that the process of deciding between two alternatives leads to refinements in both attribute estimations and the degree of certainty in those estimates. Attributes that are more important in determining choice outcomes are refined more during the decision process in terms of both estimates and certainty. Although certainty and confidence are typically treated as unidimensional, our results indicate that they, like value estimates, are subjective, multidimensional constructs.

A unified neural account of contextual and individual differences in altruism

Altruism is critical for cooperation and productivity in human societies but is known to vary strongly across contexts and individuals. The origin of these differences is largely unknown, but may in principle reflect variations in different neurocognitive processes that temporally unfold during altruistic decision making (ranging from initial perceptual processing via value computations to final integrative choice mechanisms). Here, we elucidate the neural origins of individual and contextual differences in altruism by examining altruistic choices in different inequality contexts with computational modeling and electroencephalography (EEG). Our results show that across all contexts and individuals, wealth distribution choices recruit a similar late decision process evident in model-predicted evidence accumulation signals over parietal regions. Contextual and individual differences in behavior related instead to initial processing of stimulus-locked inequality-related value information in centroparietal and centrofrontal sensors, as well as to gamma-band synchronization of these value-related signals with parietal response-locked evidence-accumulation signals. Our findings suggest separable biological bases for individual and contextual differences in altruism that relate to differences in the initial processing of choice-relevant information.

A Common Neural Account for Social and Nonsocial Decisions

To date, social and nonsocial decisions have been studied largely in isolation. Consequently, the extent to which social and nonsocial forms of decision uncertainty are integrated using shared neurocomputational resources remains elusive. Here, we address this question using simultaneous electroencephalography (EEG)-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in healthy human participants (young adults of both sexes) and a task in which decision evidence in social and nonsocial contexts varies along comparable scales. First, we identify time-resolved build-up of activity in the EEG, akin to a process of evidence accumulation (EA), across both contexts. We then use the endogenous trial-by-trial variability in the slopes of these accumulating signals to construct parametric fMRI predictors. We show that a region of the posterior-medial frontal cortex (pMFC) uniquely explains trial-wise variability in the process of evidence accumulation in both social and nonsocial contexts. We further demonstrate a task-dependent coupling between the pMFC and regions of the human valuation system in dorso-medial and ventro-medial prefrontal cortex across both contexts. Finally, we report domain-specific representations in regions known to encode the early decision evidence for each context. These results are suggestive of a domain-general decision-making architecture, whereupon domain-specific information is likely converted into a "common currency" in medial prefrontal cortex and accumulated for the decision in the pMFC.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Little work has directly compared social-versus-nonsocial decisions to investigate whether they share common neurocomputational origins. Here, using combined electroencephalography (EEG)-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and computational modeling, we offer a detailed spatiotemporal account of the neural underpinnings of social and nonsocial decisions. Specifically, we identify a comparable mechanism of temporal evidence integration driving both decisions and localize this integration process in posterior-medial frontal cortex (pMFC). We further demonstrate task-dependent coupling between the pMFC and regions of the human valuation system across both contexts. Finally, we report domain-specific representations in regions encoding the early, domain-specific, decision evidence. These results suggest a domain-general decision-making architecture, whereupon domain-specific information is converted into a common representation in the valuation system and integrated for the decision in the pMFC.

A computational account of how individuals resolve the dilemma of dirty money

Money can be tainted when it is associated with direct or indirect harm to others. Deciding whether to accept "dirty money" poses a dilemma because money can be used to help others, but accepting dirty money has moral costs. How people resolve the dilemma of dirty money remains unknown. One theory casts the dilemma as a valuation conflict that can be resolved by integrating the costs and benefits of accepting dirty money. Here, we use behavioral experiments and computational modeling to test the valuation conflict account and unveil the cognitive computations employed when deciding whether to accept or reject morally tainted cash. In Study 1, British participants decided whether to accept "dirty" money obtained by inflicting electric shocks on another person (versus "clean" money obtained by shocking oneself). Computational models showed that the source of the money (dirty versus clean) impacted decisions by shifting the relative valuation of the money's positive and negative attributes, rather than imposing a uniform bias on decision-making. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding and show that participants were more willing to accept dirty money when the money was directed towards a good cause, and observers judged such decisions to be more praiseworthy than accepting dirty money for one's own profit. Our findings suggest that dirty money can be psychologically "laundered" through charitable activities and have implications for understanding and preventing the social norms that can justify corrupt behavior.

Learning whom to cooperate with: neurocomputational mechanisms for choosing cooperative partners

Cooperation is fundamental for survival and a functioning society. With substantial individual variability in cooperativeness, we must learn whom to cooperate with, and often make these decisions on behalf of others. Understanding how people learn about the cooperativeness of others, and the neurocomputational mechanisms supporting this learning, is therefore essential. During functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning, participants completed a novel cooperation-partner-choice task where they learned to choose between cooperative and uncooperative partners through trial-and-error both for themselves and vicariously for another person. Interestingly, when choosing for themselves, participants made faster and more exploitative choices than when choosing for another person. Activity in the ventral striatum preferentially responded to prediction errors (PEs) during self-learning, whereas activity in the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) signaled both personal and vicarious PEs. Multivariate pattern analyses showed distinct coding of personal and vicarious choice-making and outcome processing in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), dorsal ACC, and striatum. Moreover, in right TPJ the activity pattern that differentiated self and other outcomes was associated with individual differences in exploitation tendency. We reveal neurocomputational mechanisms supporting cooperative learning and show that this learning is reflected in trial-by-trial univariate signals and multivariate patterns that can distinguish personal and vicarious choices.

Decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics: Recent progress and ongoing challenges

In the past decade, decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics have developed many new insights in the study of decision making. This review provides an overarching update on how the field has advanced in this time period. Although our initial review a decade ago outlined several theoretical, conceptual, methodological, empirical, and practical challenges, there has only been limited progress in resolving these challenges. We summarize significant trends in decision neuroscience through the lens of the challenges outlined for the field and review examples where the field has had significant, direct, and applicable impacts across economics and psychology. First, we review progress on topics including reward learning, explore-exploit decisions, risk and ambiguity, intertemporal choice, and valuation. Next, we assess the impacts of emotion, social rewards, and social context on decision making. Then, we follow up with how individual differences impact choices and new exciting developments in the prediction and neuroforecasting of future decisions. Finally, we consider how trends in decision-neuroscience research reflect progress toward resolving past challenges, discuss new and exciting applications of recent research, and identify new challenges for the field. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Emotion and Motivation.

Temporal dynamics of decision making: A synthesis of computational and neurophysiological approaches

As interest in the temporal dynamics of decision-making has grown, researchers have increasingly turned to computational approaches such as the drift diffusion model (DDM) to identify how cognitive processes unfold during choice. At the same time, technological advances in noninvasive neurophysiological methods such as electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography now allow researchers to map the neural time course of decision making with millisecond precision. Combining these approaches can potentially yield important new insights into how choices emerge over time. Here we review recent research on the computational and neurophysiological correlates of perceptual and value-based decision making, from DDM parameters to scalp potentials and oscillatory neural activity. Starting with motor response preparation, the most well-understood aspect of the decision process, we discuss evidence that urgency signals and shifts in baseline activation, rather than shifts in the physiological value of the choice-triggering response threshold, are responsible for adjusting response times under speeded choice scenarios. Research on the neural correlates of starting point bias suggests that prestimulus activity can predict biases in motor choice behavior. Finally, studies examining the time dynamics of evidence construction and evidence accumulation have identified signals at frontocentral and centroparietal electrodes associated respectively with these processes, emerging 300-500 ms after stimulus onset. These findings can inform psychological theories of decision-making, providing empirical support for attribute weighting in value-based choice while suggesting theoretical alternatives to dual-process accounts. Further research combining computational and neurophysiological approaches holds promise for providing greater insight into the moment-by-moment evolution of the decision process. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition Economics > Individual Decision-Making.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Advances in modeling learning and decision-making in neuroscience

An organism's survival depends on its ability to learn about its environment and to make adaptive decisions in the service of achieving the best possible outcomes in that environment. To study the neural circuits that support these functions, researchers have increasingly relied on models that formalize the computations required to carry them out. Here, we review the recent history of computational modeling of learning and decision-making, and how these models have been used to advance understanding of prefrontal cortex function. We discuss how such models have advanced from their origins in basic algorithms of updating and action selection to increasingly account for complexities in the cognitive processes required for learning and decision-making, and the representations over which they operate. We further discuss how a deeper understanding of the real-world complexities in these computations has shed light on the fundamental constraints on optimal behavior, and on the complex interactions between corticostriatal pathways to determine such behavior. The continuing and rapid development of these models holds great promise for understanding the mechanisms by which animals adapt to their environments, and what leads to maladaptive forms of learning and decision-making within clinical populations.

Enhancing models of social and strategic decision making with process tracing and neural data

Every decision we take is accompanied by a characteristic pattern of response delay, gaze position, pupil dilation, and neural activity. Nevertheless, many models of social decision making neglect the corresponding process tracing data and focus exclusively on the final choice outcome. Here, we argue that this is a mistake, as the use of process data can help to build better models of human behavior, create better experiments, and improve policy interventions. Specifically, such data allow us to unlock the "black box" of the decision process and evaluate the mechanisms underlying our social choices. Using these data, we can directly validate latent model variables, arbitrate between competing personal motives, and capture information processing strategies. These benefits are especially valuable in social science, where models must predict multi-faceted decisions that are taken in varying contexts and are based on many different types of information. This article is categorized under: Economics > Interactive Decision-Making Neuroscience > Cognition Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making.

Experimentally revealed stochastic preferences for multicomponent choice options

Realistic, everyday rewards contain multiple components. An apple has taste and size. However, we choose in single dimensions, simply preferring some apples to others. How can such single-dimensional preference relationships refer to multicomponent choice options? Here, we measured how stochastic choices revealed preferences for 2-component milkshakes. The preferences were intuitively graphed as indifference curves that represented the orderly integration of the 2 components as trade-off: parts of 1 component were given up for obtaining 1 additional unit of the other component without a change in preference. The well-ordered, nonoverlapping curves satisfied leave-one-out tests, followed predictions by machine learning decoders and correlated with single-dimensional Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction-like bids for the 2-component rewards. This accuracy suggests a decision process that integrates multiple reward components into single-dimensional estimates in a systematic fashion. In interspecies comparisons, human performance matched that of highly experienced laboratory monkeys, as measured by accuracy of the critical trade-off between bundle components. These data describe the nature of choices of multicomponent choice options and attest to the validity of the rigorous economic concepts and their convenient graphic schemes for explaining choices of human and nonhuman primates. The results encourage formal behavioral and neural investigations of normal, irrational, and pathological economic choices. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The orbitofrontal cortex spontaneously encodes food health and contains more distinct representations for foods highest in tastiness

The human orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has long been associated with food reward processing and is thought to represent modality-independent signals of value. Food tastiness and health are core attributes of many models of food choice and dietary self-control. Here we used functional neuroimaging to examine the neural representation of tastiness and health for a set of 28 food categories selected to be orthogonal with respect to both dimensions. Using representational similarity analysis, in conjunction with linear mixed-effects modeling, we demonstrate that the OFC spontaneously encodes food health, whereas tastiness was associated with greater neural dissimilarity. Subsequent analyses using model dissimilarity matrices that encode overall tastiness magnitude demonstrated that the neural representation of foods grows more distinct with increasing tastiness but not with increasing health. In a separate study, we use lexical analysis of natural language descriptions of food to show that food tastiness is associated with more elaborate descriptions of food. Together these data show not only that the OFC spontaneously encodes the dimensions of health and tastiness when viewing appetitive food cues, but also that the neural and cognitive representations of food categories that are the highest in tastiness are more refined than those lower in tastiness.

Goal congruency dominates reward value in accounting for behavioral and neural correlates of value-based decision-making

When choosing between options, whether menu items or career paths, we can evaluate how rewarding each one will be, or how congruent it is with our current choice goal (e.g., to point out the best option or the worst one.). Past decision-making research interpreted findings through the former lens, but in these experiments the most rewarding option was always most congruent with the task goal (choosing the best option). It is therefore unclear to what extent expected reward vs. goal congruency can account for choice value findings. To deconfound these two variables, we performed three behavioral studies and an fMRI study in which the task goal varied between identifying the best vs. the worst option. Contrary to prevailing accounts, we find that goal congruency dominates choice behavior and neural activity. We separately identify dissociable signals of expected reward. Our findings call for a reinterpretation of previous research on value-based choice.

Decision-making research has confounded the reward value of options with their goal-congruency, as the task goal was always to pick the most rewarding option. Here, authors separately asked participants to select the least rewarding of a set of options, revealing a dominant role for goal congruency.

Neuroeconomics, health psychology, and the interdisciplinary study of preventative health behavior

The goal of this article is to introduce readers to theories, tools, and evidence from the field of neuroeconomics and to describe how health psychology and neuroeconomics can be mutually informative in the study of preventative health behaviors. Preventative health behavior here refers to both individual actions that impact one's health (e.g., exercise) and broader behavioral patterns, such as those captured in personality constructs. Although neuroeconomic researchers have begun to incorporate health-relevant behaviors into their studies, the full potential of this research to inform preventative health models is as yet unrealized. What is needed to "translate up" is the unification of rich theoretical content from health psychology with investigations by neuroeconomic researchers of the decision-making process during health-relevant choices. We identify choice as a central, shared feature across models of preventative health behavior that can serve as an inroad for neuroeconomics to contribute to existing models and highlight commonalities that might not otherwise be apparent. A central premise of our argument is that, because health decisions are nearly always multiply determined, a more precise and mechanistic understanding of how choices are made is an important but understudied topic in health psychology. A partnership between health psychologists and neuroeconomic researchers can yield valuable insights into how preventative health choice is made and to identify targets and methods for intervention.

Comparing two neurocognitive models of self-control during dietary decisions

Self-control is the process of favoring abstract, distal goals over concrete, proximal goals during decision-making and is an important factor in health and well-being. We directly compare two prominent neurocognitive models of human self-control with the goal of identifying which, if either, best describes behavioral and neural data of dietary decisions in a large sample of overweight and obese adults motivated to eat more healthfully. We extracted trial-by-trial estimates of neural activity during incentive-compatible choice from three brain regions implicated in self-control, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex and assessed evidence for the dual-process and value-based choice models of self-control using multilevel modeling. Model comparison tests revealed that the value-based choice model outperformed the dual-process model and best fit the observed data. These results advance scientific knowledge of the neurobiological mechanisms underlying self-control-relevant decision-making and are consistent with a value-based choice model of self-control.

Vicarious Rewards Modulate the Drift Rate of Evidence Accumulation From the Drift Diffusion Model

Taking other people's interests into account is a fundamental ability allowing humans to maintain relationships. Yet, the mechanisms by which monetary incentives for close others influence perceptual decision-making processes remain elusive. Here, we compared perceptual decisions motivated by payoffs for oneself or a close relative. According to drift diffusion models (DDMs), perceptual decisions are made when sensory evidence accumulated over time - with a given drift rate - reaches one of the decision boundaries. We used these computational models to identify whether the drift rate of evidence accumulation or the decision boundary is affected by these two sources of motivation. Reaction times and sensitivity were modulated by three factors: the Difficulty (motion coherence of the moving dots), the Payoff associated with, and the Beneficiary of the decision. Reaction times (RTs) were faster for easy compared to difficult trials and faster for high payoffs as compared to low payoffs. More interestingly, RTs were also faster for self than for other-affecting decisions. Finally, using DDM, we found that these faster RTs were linked to a higher drift rate of the decision variable. This study offers a mechanistic understanding of how incentives for others and motion coherence influence decision-making processes.

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex computes task-invariant relative subjective value for self and other

Few studies have addressed the neural computations underlying decisions made for others despite the importance of this ubiquitous behavior. Using participant-specific behavioral modeling with univariate and multivariate fMRI approaches, we investigated the neural correlates of decision-making for self and other in two independent tasks, including intertemporal and risky choice. Modeling subjective valuation indicated that participants distinguished between themselves and others with dissimilar preferences. Activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was consistently modulated by relative subjective value. Multi-voxel pattern analysis indicated that activity in the dmPFC uniquely encoded relative subjective value and generalized across self and other and across both tasks. Furthermore, agent cross-decoding accuracy between self and other in the dmPFC was related to self-reported social attitudes. These findings indicate that the dmPFC emerges as a medial prefrontal node that utilizes a task-invariant mechanism for computing relative subjective value for self and other.

Affect and Decision Making: Insights and Predictions from Computational Models

In recent years interest in integrating the affective and decision sciences has skyrocketed. Immense progress has been made, but the complexities of each field, which can multiply when combined, present a significant obstacle. A carefully defined framework for integration is needed. The shift towards computational modeling in decision science provides a powerful basis and a path forward, but one whose synergistic potential will only be fully realized by drawing on the theoretical richness of the affective sciences. Reviewing research using a popular computational model of choice (the drift diffusion model), we discuss how mapping concepts to parameters reduces conceptual ambiguity and reveals novel hypotheses.

A Neuroeconomic Framework for Creative Cognition

Neuroeconomics is the study of the neurobiological bases of subjective preferences and choices. We present a novel framework that synthesizes findings from the literatures on neuroeconomics and creativity to provide a neurobiological description of creative cognition. We propose that value-based decision-making processes and activity in the locus ceruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) neuromodulatory system underlie creative cognition, as well as the large-scale brain network dynamics shown to be associated with creativity. This reconceptualization leads to several falsifiable hypotheses that can further understanding of creativity, decision making, and brain network dynamics.