Unconscious relational inference recruits the hippocampus

Brain mechanisms underlying the inhibitory control of thought

Controlling action and thought requires the capacity to stop mental processes. Over the past two decades, evidence has grown that a domain-general inhibitory control mechanism supported by the right lateral prefrontal cortex achieves these functions. However, current views of the neural mechanisms of inhibitory control derive largely from research into the stopping of action. Whereas action stopping is a convenient empirical model, it does not invoke thought inhibition and cannot be used to identify the unique features of this process. Here, we review research that addresses how organisms stop a key process that drives thoughts: memory retrieval. This work has shown that retrieval stopping shares right dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal mechanisms with action stopping, consistent with a domain-general inhibitory control mechanism, but also recruits a distinct fronto-temporal pathway that determines the success of mental control. As part of this pathway, GABAergic inhibition within the hippocampus influences the efficacy of prefrontal control over thought. These unique elements of mental control suggest that hippocampal disinhibition is a transdiagnostic factor underlying intrusive thinking, linking the fronto-temporal control pathway to preclinical models of psychiatric disorders and fear extinction. We suggest that retrieval-stopping deficits may underlie the intrusive thinking that is common across many psychiatric disorders.

Context familiarity is a third kind of episodic memory distinct from item familiarity and recollection

Episodic memory is accounted for with two processes: "familiarity" when generally recognizing an item and "recollection" when retrieving the full contextual details bound with the item. We tested a combination of item recognition confidence and source memory, focusing upon three conditions: "item-only hits with source unknown" ('item familiarity'), "low-confidence hits with correct source memory" ('context familiarity'), and "high-confidence hits with correct source memory" ('recollection'). Behaviorally, context familiarity was slower than the others during item recognition, but faster during source memory. Electrophysiologically, a triple dissociation was evident in event-related potentials (ERPs), which was independently replicated. Context familiarity exhibited a negative effect from 800 to 1200 ms, differentiated from positive ERPs for item-familiarity (400-600 ms) and recollection (600-900 ms). These three conditions thus reflect mutually exclusive, fundamentally different processes of episodic memory, and we offer a new, tri-component model of memory. Context familiarity is a third distinct process of episodic memory.

Distinct mechanisms and functions of episodic memory

The concept of episodic memory (EM) faces significant challenges by two claims: EM might not be a distinct memory system, and EM might be an epiphenomenon of a more general capacity for mental time travel (MTT). Nevertheless, the observations leading to these arguments do not preclude the existence of a mechanically and functionally distinct EM system. First, modular systems, like cognition, can have distinct subsystems that may not be distinguishable in the system's final output. EM could be such a subsystem, even though its effects may be difficult to distinguish from those of other subsystems. Second, EM could have a distinct and consistent low-level function, which is used in diverse high-level functions such as MTT. This article introduces the scenario construction framework, proposing that EM crucially rests on memory traces containing the gist of an episodic experience. During retrieval, EM traces trigger the reconstruction of semantic representations, which were active during the remembered episode, and are further enriched with semantic information, to generate a scenario of the past experience. This conceptualization of EM is consistent with studies on the neural basis of EM and resolves the two challenges while retaining the key properties associated with EM. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

A third kind of episodic memory: Context familiarity is distinct from item familiarity and recollection

Episodic memory is accounted for with two processes: 'familiarity' when generally recognizing an item and 'recollection' when retrieving the full contextual details bound with the item. Paradoxically, people sometimes report contextual information as familiar but without recollecting details, which is not easily accounted for by existing theories. We tested a combination of item recognition confidence and source memory, focusing upon 'item-only hits with source unknown' ('item familiarity'), 'low-confidence hits with correct source memory' ('context familiarity'), and 'high-confidence hits with correct source memory' ('recollection'). Results across multiple within-subjects (trial-wise) and between subjects (individual variability) levels indicated these were behaviorally and physiologically distinct. Behaviorally, a crossover interaction was evident in response times, with context familiarity being slower than each condition during item recognition, but faster during source memory. Electrophysiologically, a Condition x Time x Location triple dissociation was evident in event-related potentials (ERPs), which was then independently replicated. Context familiarity exhibited an independent negative central effect from 800-1200 ms, differentiated from positive ERPs for item-familiarity (400 to 600 ms) and recollection (600 to 900 ms). These three conditions thus reflect mutually exclusive, fundamentally different processes of episodic memory. Context familiarity is a third distinct process of episodic memory.

Summary

Memory for past events is widely believed to operate through two different processes: one called 'recollection' when retrieving confident, specific details of a memory, and another called 'familiarity' when only having an unsure but conscious awareness that an item was experienced before. When people successfully retrieve details such as the source or context of a prior event, it has been assumed to reflect recollection. We demonstrate that familiarity of context is functionally distinct from familiarity of items and recollection and offer a new, tri-component model of memory. The three memory responses were differentiated across multiple behavioral and brain wave measures. What has traditionally been thought to be two kinds of memory processes are actually three, becoming evident when using sensitive enough multi-measures. Results are independently replicated across studies from different labs. These data reveal that context familiarity is a third process of human episodic memory.

Hippocampal representations of alternative possibilities are flexibly generated to meet cognitive demands

The cognitive ability to go beyond the present to consider alternative possibilities, including potential futures and counterfactual pasts, can support adaptive decision making. Complex and changing real-world environments, however, have many possible alternatives. Whether and how the brain can select among them to represent alternatives that meet current cognitive needs remains unknown. We therefore examined neural representations of alternative spatial locations in the rat hippocampus during navigation in a complex patch foraging environment with changing reward probabilities. We found representations of multiple alternatives along paths ahead and behind the animal, including in distant alternative patches. Critically, these representations were modulated in distinct patterns across successive trials: alternative paths were represented proportionate to their evolving relative value and predicted subsequent decisions, whereas distant alternatives were prevalent during value updating. These results demonstrate that the brain modulates the generation of alternative possibilities in patterns that meet changing cognitive needs for adaptive behavior.

Episodic long-term memory formation during slow-wave sleep

We are unresponsive during slow-wave sleep but continue monitoring external events for survival. Our brain wakens us when danger is imminent. If events are non-threatening, our brain might store them for later consideration to improve decision-making. To test this hypothesis, we examined whether novel vocabulary consisting of simultaneously played pseudowords and translation words are encoded/stored during sleep, and which neural-electrical events facilitate encoding/storage. An algorithm for brain-state-dependent stimulation selectively targeted word pairs to slow-wave peaks or troughs. Retrieval tests were given 12 and 36 hr later. These tests required decisions regarding the semantic category of previously sleep-played pseudowords. The sleep-played vocabulary influenced awake decision-making 36 hr later, if targeted to troughs. The words' linguistic processing raised neural complexity. The words' semantic-associative encoding was supported by increased theta power during the ensuing peak. Fast-spindle power ramped up during a second peak likely aiding consolidation. Hence, new vocabulary played during slow-wave sleep was stored and influenced decision-making days later.

Unconscious processing effects manifest only if conscious processing is excluded

In their discussion paper Steinkrauss and Slotnick argue against a role for the hippocampus in unconscious memory formation and retrieval. Unfortunately, they omitted highly relevant evidence that supports a role for the hippocampus in unconscious memory. They criticize four articles, two from our laboratory, pointing out long-known confounds like residual consciousness. We uncover these reproaches as untrue allegations. In our own interest, we prevented conscious mnemonic processing because reliable unconscious memory effects manifest only if consciousness is completely excluded, and because we always knew that residual consciousness would be our Achilles heel for the proponents of the 'explicit memory dogma.'

Emergent neural dynamics and geometry for generalization in a transitive inference task

Relational cognition-the ability to infer relationships that generalize to novel combinations of objects-is fundamental to human and animal intelligence. Despite this importance, it remains unclear how relational cognition is implemented in the brain due in part to a lack of hypotheses and predictions at the levels of collective neural activity and behavior. Here we discovered, analyzed, and experimentally tested neural networks (NNs) that perform transitive inference (TI), a classic relational task (if A > B and B > C, then A > C). We found NNs that (i) generalized perfectly, despite lacking overt transitive structure prior to training, (ii) generalized when the task required working memory (WM), a capacity thought to be essential to inference in the brain, (iii) emergently expressed behaviors long observed in living subjects, in addition to a novel order-dependent behavior, and (iv) expressed different task solutions yielding alternative behavioral and neural predictions. Further, in a large-scale experiment, we found that human subjects performing WM-based TI showed behavior inconsistent with a class of NNs that characteristically expressed an intuitive task solution. These findings provide neural insights into a classical relational ability, with wider implications for how the brain realizes relational cognition.

The dead salmon strikes again: Reports of unconscious processing in the hippocampus may reflect Type-I error

Steinkrauss and Slotnick (2024) reviewed neuroimaging studies linking the hippocampus with implicit memory. They conclude that there is no convincing evidence that the hippocampus is associated with implicit memory because prior studies are confounded by explicit memory (among other factors). Here, we ask a different yet equally important question: do reports of unconscious hippocampal activity reflect a Type-I error (i.e. a false positive)? We find that 39% of studies linking the hippocampus with implicit memory (7 of 18) do not report correcting for multiple comparisons. These results indicate that many unconscious hippocampal effects may reflect a Type-I error.

Amnesia in healthy people via hippocampal inhibition: A new forgetting mechanism

Structural damage to the hippocampus gives rise to a severe memory deficit for personal experiences known as organic amnesia. Remarkably, such structural damage may not be the only way of creating amnesia; windows of amnesia can also arise when people deliberately disengage from memory via a process known as retrieval suppression. In this review, we discuss how retrieval suppression induces systemic inhibition of the hippocampus, creating "amnesic shadow" intervals in people's memory for their personal experiences. When new memories are encoded or older memories are reactivated during this amnesic shadow, these memories are disrupted, and such disruption even arises when older memories are subliminally cued. Evidence suggests that the systemic inhibition of the hippocampus during retrieval suppression that gives rise to the amnesic shadow may be mediated by engagement of hippocampal GABAergic inhibitory interneurons. Similar amnesic shadow effects are observed during working memory tasks like the n-back, which also induce notable hippocampal downregulation. We discuss our recent proposal that cognitive operations that require the disengagement of memory retrieval, such as retrieval suppression, are capable of mnemonic process inhibition (the inhibition of mnemonic processes such as encoding, consolidation, and retrieval and not simply individual memories). We suggest that people engage mnemonic process inhibition whenever they shift attention from internal processes to demanding perceptual-motor tasks that may otherwise be disrupted by distraction from our inner world. This hitherto unstudied model of inhibition is a missing step in understanding what happens when attentional shifts occur between internally and externally oriented processes to facilitate goal-directed behaviour. This process constitutes an important novel mechanism underlying the forgetting of life events.

Conscious awareness and memory systems in the brain

The term "memory" typically refers to conscious retrieval of events and experiences from our past, but experience can also change our behaviour without corresponding awareness of the learning process or the associated outcome. Based primarily on early neuropsychological work, theoretical perspectives have distinguished between conscious memory, said to depend critically on structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), and a collection of performance-based memories that do not. The most influential of these memory systems perspectives, the declarative memory theory, continues to be a mainstay of scientific work today despite mounting evidence suggesting that contributions of MTL structures go beyond the kinds or types of memory that can be explicitly reported. Consistent with these reports, more recent perspectives have focused increasingly on the processing operations supported by particular brain regions and the qualities or characteristics of resulting representations whether memory is expressed with or without awareness. These alternatives to the standard model generally converge on two key points. First, the hippocampus is critical for relational memory binding and representation even without awareness and, second, there may be little difference between some types of priming and explicit, familiarity-based recognition. Here, we examine the evolution of memory systems perspectives and critically evaluate scientific evidence that has challenged the status quo. Along the way, we highlight some of the challenges that researchers encounter in the context of this work, which can be contentious, and describe innovative methods that have been used to examine unconscious memory in the lab. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Theory and Methods Philosophy > Consciousness.

Further evidence and theoretical framework for a subliminal sensory buffer store (SSBS)

We recently provided evidence that strongly masked stimuli are not erased or overwritten but are briefly stored in a subliminal sensory buffer store (SSBS), where information can accumulate through repetition and become consciously accessible. SSBS supports a direct prediction made by the global workspace theory of consciousness (GWT) and has implications on discussions about conscious overflow and the problem of the criterion. Here we show that the presentation sequence and the time from the target presentation to evaluation does not significantly impact perception. We suggest that selected information from this subliminal sensory buffer store is transferred into a type of supraliminal short-term memory that keeps stable representations for longer durations with full conscious access. We argue that the level of conscious access of memory storage has a greater impact on subsequent reportability than initial phenomenology and needs to be included more prominently in discussions on perception and consciousness.

Inverse forgetting in unconscious episodic memory

Forming memories of experienced episodes calls upon the episodic memory system. Episodic encoding may proceed with and without awareness of episodes. While up to 60% of consciously encoded episodes are forgotten after 10 h, the fate of unconsciously encoded episodes is unknown. Here we track over 10 h, which are filled with sleep or daytime activities, the retention of unconsciously and consciously experienced episodes. The episodes were displayed in cartoon clips that were presented weakly and strongly masked for conscious and unconscious encoding, respectively. Clip retention was tested for distinct clips directly after encoding, 3 min and 10 h after encoding using a forced-choice test that demands deliberate responses in both consciousness conditions. When encoding was conscious, retrieval accuracy decreased by 25% from 3 min to 10 h, irrespective of sleep or wakefulness. When encoding was unconscious, retrieval accuracy increased from 3 min to 10 h and depended on sleep. Hence, opposite to the classic forgetting curve, unconsciously acquired episodic memories strengthen over time and hinge on sleep on the day of learning to gain influence over human behavior.

Neural correlates of transitive inference: An SDM meta-analysis on 32 fMRI studies

Transitive inference (TI) is a critical capacity involving the integration of relevant information into prior knowledge structure for drawing novel inferences on unobserved relationships. To date, the neural correlates of TI remain unclear due to the small sample size and heterogeneity of various experimental tasks from individual studies. Here, the meta-analysis on 32 fMRI studies was performed to detect brain activation patterns of TI and its three paradigms (spatial inference, hierarchical inference, and associative inference). We found the hippocampus, prefrontal cortex (PFC), putamen, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), retrosplenial cortex (RSC), supplementary motor area (SMA), precentral gyrus (PreCG), and median cingulate cortex (MCC) were engaged in TI. Specifically, the RSC was implicated in the associative inference, whereas PPC, SMA, PreCG, and MCC were implicated in the hierarchical inference. In addition, the hierarchical inference and associative inference both evoked activation in the hippocampus, medial PFC, and PCC. Although the meta-analysis on spatial inference did not generate a reliable result due to insufficient amount of investigations, the present work still offers a new insight for better understanding the neural basis underlying TI.

The Neural Correlates of Analogy Component Processes

Analogical reasoning is a core facet of higher cognition in humans. Creating analogies as we navigate the environment helps us learn. Analogies involve reframing novel encounters using knowledge of familiar, relationally similar contexts stored in memory. When an analogy links a novel encounter with a familiar context, it can aid in problem solving. Reasoning by analogy is a complex process that is mediated by multiple brain regions and mechanisms. Several advanced computational architectures have been developed to simulate how these brain processes give rise to analogical reasoning, like the "learning with inferences and schema abstraction" architecture and the Companion architecture. To obtain this power to simulate human reasoning, theses architectures assume that various computational "subprocesses" comprise analogical reasoning, such as analogical access, mapping, inference, and schema induction, consistent with the structure-mapping framework proposed decades ago. However, little is known about how these subprocesses relate to actual brain processes. While some work in neuroscience has linked analogical reasoning to regions of brain prefrontal cortex, more research is needed to investigate the wide array of specific neural hypotheses generated by the computational architectures. In the current article, we review the association between historically important computational architectures of analogy and empirical studies in neuroscience. In particular, we focus on evidence for a frontoparietal brain network underlying analogical reasoning and the degree to which brain mechanisms mirror the computational subprocesses. We also offer a general vantage on the current- and future-states of neuroscience research in this domain and provide some recommendations for future neuroimaging studies.

Concept neurons in the human medial temporal lobe flexibly represent abstract relations between concepts

Concept neurons in the medial temporal lobe respond to semantic features of presented stimuli. Analyzing 61 concept neurons recorded from twelve patients who underwent surgery to treat epilepsy, we show that firing patterns of concept neurons encode relations between concepts during a picture comparison task. Thirty-three of these responded to non-preferred stimuli with a delayed but well-defined onset whenever the task required a comparison to a response-eliciting concept, but not otherwise. Supporting recent theories of working memory, concept neurons increased firing whenever attention was directed towards this concept and could be reactivated after complete activity silence. Population cross-correlations of pairs of concept neurons exhibited order-dependent asymmetric peaks specifically when their response-eliciting concepts were to be compared. Our data are consistent with synaptic mechanisms that support reinstatement of concepts and their relations after activity silence, flexibly induced through task-specific sequential activation. This way arbitrary contents of experience could become interconnected in both working and long-term memory.

It is unclear how distinct concepts are processed in the brain. Here, the authors recorded from concept cells in human subjects with epilepsy and found that a subset of concept cells responded to non-preferred concepts if those non-preferred concepts required comparison to a preferred concept.

Larger capacity for unconscious versus conscious episodic memory

Episodic memory is the memory for experienced events. A peak competence of episodic memory is the mental combination of events to infer commonalities. Inferring commonalities may proceed with and without consciousness of events. Yet what distinguishes conscious from unconscious inference? This question inspired nine experiments that featured strongly and weakly masked cartoon clips presented for unconscious and conscious inference. Each clip featured a scene with a visually impenetrable hiding place. Five animals crossed the scene one-by-one consecutively. One animal trajectory represented one event. The animals moved through the hiding place, where they might linger or not. The participants' task was to observe the animals' entrances and exits to maintain a mental record of which animals hid simultaneously. We manipulated information load to explore capacity limits. Memory of inferences was tested immediately, 3.5 or 6 min following encoding. The participants retrieved inferences well when encoding was conscious. When encoding was unconscious, the participants needed to respond intuitively. Only habitually intuitive decision makers exhibited a significant delayed retrieval of inferences drawn unconsciously. Their unconscious retrieval performance did not drop significantly with increasing information load, while conscious retrieval performance dropped significantly. A working memory network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious inference and correlated with retrieval success. An episodic retrieval network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious retrieval of inferences and correlated with retrieval success. Only conscious encoding/retrieval recruited additional brain regions outside these networks. Hence, levels of consciousness influenced the memories' behavioral impact, memory capacity, and the neural representational code.

Contextual cueing is not flexible

Target detection is faster when search displays repeat, but properties of the memory representations that give rise to this contextual cueing effect remain uncertain. We adapted the contextual cueing task using an ABA design and recorded the eye movements of healthy young adults to determine whether the memory representations are flexible. Targets moved to a new location during the B phase and then returned to their original locations (second A phase). Contextual cueing effects in the first A phase were reinstated immediately in the second A phase, and response time costs eventually gave way to a repeated search advantage in the B phase, suggesting that two target-context associations were learned. However, this apparent flexibility disappeared when eye tracking data were used to subdivide repeated displays based on B-phase viewing of the original target quadrant. Therefore, memory representations acquired in the contextual cueing task resist change and are not flexible.

Strongly masked content retained in memory made accessible through repetition

A growing body of evidence indicates that information can be stored even in the absence of conscious awareness. Despite these findings, unconscious memory is still poorly understood with limited evidence for unconscious iconic memory storage. Here we show that strongly masked visual data can be stored and accumulate to elicit clear perception. We used a repetition method across a wide range of conditions (Experiment 1) and a more focused follow-up experiment with enhanced masking conditions (Experiment 2). Information was stored despite being masked, demonstrating that masking did not erase or overwrite memory traces but limited perception. We examined the temporal properties and found that stored information followed a gradual but rapid decay. Extraction of meaningful information was severely impaired after 300 ms, and most data was lost after 700 ms. Our findings are congruent with theories of consciousness that are based on an integration of subliminal information and support theoretical predictions based on the global workspace theory of consciousness, especially the existence of an implicit iconic memory buffer store.

Neural correlates of recursive thinking during interpersonal strategic interactions

To navigate the complex social world, individuals need to represent others' mental states to think strategically and predict their next move. Strategic mentalizing can be classified into different levels of theory of mind according to its order of mental state attribution of other people's beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth. For example, reasoning people's beliefs about simple world facts is the first-order attribution while going further to reason people's beliefs about the minds of others is the second-order attribution. The neural substrates that support such high-order recursive reasoning in strategic interpersonal interactions are still unclear. Here, using a sequential-move interactional game together with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we showed that recursive reasoning engaged the frontal-subcortical regions. At the stimulus stage, the ventral striatum was more activated in high-order reasoning as compared with low-order reasoning. At the decision stage, high-order reasoning activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and other mentalizing regions. Moreover, functional connectivity between the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the insula/hippocampus was positively correlated with individual differences in high-order social reasoning. This work delineates the neural correlates of high-order recursive thinking in strategic games and highlights the key role of the interplay between mPFC and subcortical regions in advanced social decision-making.

Mental imagery in animals: Learning, memory, and decision-making in the face of missing information

When we open our eyes, we see a world filled with objects and events. Yet, due to occlusion of some objects by others, we only have partial perceptual access to the events that transpire around us. I discuss the body of research on mental imagery in animals. I first cover prior studies of mental rotation in pigeons and imagery using working memory procedures first developed for human studies. Next, I discuss the seminal work on a type of learning called mediated conditioning in rats. I then provide more in-depth coverage of work from my lab suggesting that rats can use imagery to fill in missing details of the world that are expected but hidden from perception. We have found that rats make use of an active expectation (i.e., an image) of a hidden visual event. I describe the behavioral and neurobiological studies investigating the use of a mental image, its theoretical basis, and its connections to current human cognitive neuroscience research on episodic memory, imagination, and mental simulations. Collectively, the reviewed literature provides insight into the mechanisms that mediate the flexible use of an image during ambiguous situations. I position this work in the broader scientific and philosophical context surrounding the concept of mental imagery in human and nonhuman animals.

Experimental Investigation Examining the Effects of Acute Exercise on Implicit Memory Function

Emerging work suggests that acute exercise can enhance explicit memory function. Minimal research, however, has examined whether acute exercise is associated with implicit memory, which was the purpose of this study. Three separate experimental studies were computed (N = 120; Mean age = 21). In Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to either a moderate-intensity bout of acute exercise (15-minute) or engaged in a seated control task (15-minute), followed by the completion of a word-fragmentation implicit memory task. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, but instead employed a higher-intensity exercise protocol. For Experiment 3, participants were randomly assigned to either a moderate-intensity bout of acute exercise (15-minute) or engaged in a seated control task (15-minute), followed by the completion of a real world, 3-dimensional implicit memory task. For Experiment 1, the exercise and control groups, respectively, had an implicit memory score of 7.0 (0.5) and 7.5 (0.6) (t(38) = 0.67, p = .51). For Experiment 2, the exercise and control groups, respectively, had an implicit memory score of 6.9 (1.9) and 7.8 (2.4) (t(38) = 1.27, p = .21). These findings suggest that exercise, and the intensity of exercise, does not alter implicit memory from a word fragmentation task. For Experiment 3, the exercise and control groups, respectively, had a discrimination implicit memory index score of 0.48 (0.18) and 0.29 (0.32) (t(38) = 2.16, p = .03). In conclusion, acute exercise does not influence a commonly used laboratory-based assessment of implicit memory but may enhance real world-related implicit memory function.

Exploring the neurocognitive basis of episodic recollection in autism

Increasing evidence indicates that the subjective experience of recollection is diminished in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) compared to neurotypical individuals. The neurocognitive basis of this difference in how past events are re-experienced has been debated and various theoretical accounts have been proposed to date. Although each existing theory may capture particular features of memory in ASD, recent research questions whether any of these explanations are alone sufficient or indeed fully supported. This review first briefly considers the cognitive neuroscience of how episodic recollection operates in the neurotypical population, informing predictions about the encoding and retrieval mechanisms that might function atypically in ASD. We then review existing research on recollection in ASD, which has often not distinguished between different theoretical explanations. Recent evidence suggests a distinct difficulty engaging recollective retrieval processes, specifically the ability to consciously reconstruct and monitor a past experience, which is likely underpinned by altered functional interactions between neurocognitive systems rather than brain region-specific or process-specific dysfunction. This integrative approach serves to highlight how memory research in ASD may enhance our understanding of memory processes and networks in the typical brain. We make suggestions for future research that are important for further specifying the neurocognitive basis of episodic recollection in ASD and linking such difficulties to social developmental and educational outcomes.

An integrated model of acute exercise on memory function

Memory is a complex cognition that plays a critical role in daily functioning. This review discusses the dynamic effects of acute exercise on memory function, via a hypothesized exercise-memory interaction model, taking into consideration multiple memory systems and exercise parameters.

Implicit acoustic sequence learning recruits the hippocampus

The exclusive role of the medial temporal lobe in explicit memory has been questioned by several studies reporting medial temporal lobe involvement during implicit learning. Prior studies have demonstrated that hippocampal engagement is present during the implicit learning of perceptual associations, however, it is absent during learning response-related associations. Therefore, it was hypothesized that the function of the medial temporal lobe during implicit learning is related to the extraction of perceptual associations in general. While in most implicit learning tasks visual stimuli were used, the aim of the current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study was to detect whether activations within medial temporal lobe structures are also found during implicit learning of auditory associations. In a modified version of the classical serial reaction time task, participants reacted to the presentation of five different tones. Unbeknownst to the participants, the tones were presented with an underlying sequential regularity that could be learned. To avoid an influence of response learning on acoustic associative learning, response buttons were remapped in every trial. After learning, two different tests were used to measure participants' conscious knowledge about the underlying sequence in order to assess the amount of implicit memory and to exclude participants with explicit knowledge acquired during learning. fMRI results revealed hippocampal activations for implicit learning of the acoustic sequence. When detecting a relation between implicit learning of acoustic associations and hippocampal activations, this study indicated a relation between hippocampal activations and memory formation of perceptual-based relational representation regardless of explicit knowledge. Thus, present findings suggest a general functional role for the formation of sequenced perceptual associations independent of the involvement of awareness.

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

There is compelling evidence that the "what it feels like" subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

Subliminal encoding and flexible retrieval of objects in scenes

Our episodic memory stores what happened when and where in life. Episodic memory requires the rapid formation and flexible retrieval of where things are located in space. Consciousness of the encoding scene is considered crucial for episodic memory formation. Here, we question the necessity of consciousness and hypothesize that humans can form unconscious episodic memories. Participants were presented with subliminal scenes, that is, scenes invisible to the conscious mind. The scenes displayed objects at certain locations for participants to form unconscious object-in-space memories. Later, the same scenes were presented supraliminally, that is, visibly, for retrieval testing. Scenes were presented absent the objects and rotated by 90°-270° in perspective to assess the representational flexibility of unconsciously formed memories. During the test phase, participants performed a forced-choice task that required them to place an object in one of two highlighted scene locations and their eye movements were recorded. Evaluation of the eye tracking data revealed that participants remembered object locations unconsciously, irrespective of changes in viewing perspective. This effect of gaze was related to correct placements of objects in scenes, and an intuitive decision style was necessary for unconscious memories to influence intentional behavior to a significant degree. We conclude that conscious perception is not mandatory for spatial episodic memory formation.

Prevailing theories of consciousness are challenged by novel cross-modal associations acquired between subliminal stimuli

While theories of consciousness differ substantially, the 'conscious access hypothesis', which aligns consciousness with the global accessibility of information across cortical regions, is present in many of the prevailing frameworks. This account holds that consciousness is necessary to integrate information arising from independent functions such as the specialist processing required by different senses. We directly tested this account by evaluating the potential for associative learning between novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in different sensory modalities. First, pairs of subliminal stimuli were presented and then their association assessed by examining the ability of the first stimulus to prime classification of the second. In Experiments 1-4 the stimuli were word-pairs consisting of a male name preceding either a creative or uncreative profession. Participants were subliminally exposed to two name-profession pairs where one name was paired with a creative profession and the other an uncreative profession. A supraliminal task followed requiring the timed classification of one of those two professions. The target profession was preceded by either the name with which it had been subliminally paired (concordant) or the alternate name (discordant). Experiment 1 presented stimuli auditorily, Experiment 2 visually, and Experiment 3 presented names auditorily and professions visually. All three experiments revealed the same inverse priming effect with concordant test pairs associated with significantly slower classification judgements. Experiment 4 sought to establish if learning would be more efficient with supraliminal stimuli and found evidence that a different strategy is adopted when stimuli are consciously perceived. Finally, Experiment 5 replicated the unconscious cross-modal association achieved in Experiment 3 utilising non-linguistic stimuli. The results demonstrate the acquisition of novel cross-modal associations between stimuli which are not consciously perceived and thus challenge the global access hypothesis and those theories embracing it.

Subliminally and Supraliminally Acquired Long-Term Memories Jointly Bias Delayed Decisions

Common wisdom and scientific evidence suggest that good decisions require conscious deliberation. But growing evidence demonstrates that not only conscious but also unconscious thoughts influence decision-making. Here, we hypothesize that both consciously and unconsciously acquired memories guide decisions. Our experiment measured the influence of subliminally and supraliminally presented information on delayed (30-40 min) decision-making. Participants were presented with subliminal pairs of faces and written occupations for unconscious encoding. Following a delay of 20 min, participants consciously (re-)encoded the same faces now presented supraliminally along with either the same written occupations, occupations congruous to the subliminally presented occupations (same wage-category), or incongruous occupations (opposite wage-category). To measure decision-making, participants viewed the same faces again (with occupations absent) and decided on the putative income of each person: low, low-average, high-average, or high. Participants were encouraged to decide spontaneously and intuitively. Hence, the decision task was an implicit or indirect test of relational memory. If conscious thought alone guided decisions (= H₀), supraliminal information should determine decision outcomes independently of the encoded subliminal information. This was, however, not the case. Instead, both unconsciously and consciously encoded memories influenced decisions: identical unconscious and conscious memories exerted the strongest bias on income decisions, while both incongruous and congruous (i.e., non-identical) subliminally and supraliminally formed memories canceled each other out leaving no bias on decisions. Importantly, the increased decision bias following the formation of identical unconscious and conscious memories and the reduced decision bias following to the formation of non-identical memories were determined relative to a control condition, where conscious memory formation alone could influence decisions. In view of the much weaker representational strength of subliminally vs. supraliminally formed memories, their long-lasting impact on decision-making is noteworthy.

Aberrant Functional Connectivity of the Amygdala Complexes in PTSD during Conscious and Subconscious Processing of Trauma-Related Stimuli

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterized by altered functional connectivity of the amygdala complexes at rest. However, amygdala complex connectivity during conscious and subconscious threat processing remains to be elucidated. Here, we investigate specific connectivity of the centromedial amygdala (CMA) and basolateral amygdala (BLA) during conscious and subconscious processing of trauma-related words among individuals with PTSD (n = 26) as compared to non-trauma-exposed controls (n = 20). Psycho-physiological interaction analyses were performed using the right and left amygdala complexes as regions of interest during conscious and subconscious trauma word processing. These analyses revealed a differential, context-dependent responses by each amygdala seed during trauma processing in PTSD. Specifically, relative to controls, during subconscious processing, individuals with PTSD demonstrated increased connectivity of the CMA with the superior frontal gyrus, accompanied by a pattern of decreased connectivity between the BLA and the superior colliculus. During conscious processing, relative to controls, individuals with PTSD showed increased connectivity between the CMA and the pulvinar. These findings demonstrate alterations in amygdala subregion functional connectivity in PTSD and highlight the disruption of the innate alarm network during both conscious and subconscious trauma processing in this disorder.

Subliminal messages exert long-term effects on decision-making

Subliminal manipulation is often considered harmless because its effects typically decay within a second. So far, subliminal long-term effects on behavior were only observed in studies which repeatedly presented highly familiar information such as single words. These studies suggest that subliminal messages are only slowly stored and might not be stored at all if they provide novel, unfamiliar information. We speculated that subliminal messages might affect delayed decision-making especially if messages contain several pieces of novel information that must be relationally bound in long-term memory. Relational binding engages the hippocampal memory system, which can rapidly encode and durably store novel relations. Here, we hypothesized that subliminally presented stimulus pairs would be relationally processed influencing the direction of delayed conscious decisions. In experiment 1, subliminal face–occupation pairs affected conscious decisions about the income of these individuals almost half an hour later. In experiment 2, subliminal presentation of vocabulary of a foreign language enabled participants to later decide whether these foreign words are presented with correct or incorrect translations. Subliminal influence did not significantly decay if probed after 25 versus 15 min. This is unprecedented evidence of the longevity and impact of subliminal messages on conscious, rational decision-making.

Learning history and cholinergic modulation in the dorsal hippocampus are necessary for rats to infer the status of a hidden event

Identifying statistical patterns between environmental stimuli enables organisms to respond adaptively when cues are later observed. However, stimuli are often obscured from detection, necessitating behavior under conditions of ambiguity. Considerable evidence indicates decisions under ambiguity rely on inference processes that draw on past experiences to generate predictions under novel conditions. Despite the high demand for this process and the observation that it deteriorates disproportionately with age, the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We developed a rodent model of decision-making during ambiguity to examine features of experience that contribute to inference. Rats learned either a simple (positive patterning) or complex (negative patterning) instrumental discrimination between the illumination of one or two lights. During test, only one light was lit while the other relevant light was blocked from physical detection (covered by an opaque shield, rendering its status ambiguous). We found experience with the complex negative patterning discrimination was necessary for rats to behave sensitively to the ambiguous test situation. These rats behaved as if they inferred the presence of the hidden light, responding differently than when the light was explicitly absent (uncovered and unlit). Differential expression profiles of the immediate early gene cFos indicated hippocampal involvement in the inference process while localized microinfusions of the muscarinic antagonist, scopolamine, into the dorsal hippocampus caused rats to behave as if only one light was present. That is, blocking cholinergic modulation prevented the rat from inferring the presence of the hidden light. Collectively, these results suggest cholinergic modulation mediates recruitment of hippocampal processes related to past experiences and transfer of these processes to make decisions during ambiguous situations. Our results correspond with correlations observed between human brain function and inference abilities, suggesting our experiments may inform interventions to alleviate or prevent cognitive dysfunction. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The innate alarm circuit in post-traumatic stress disorder: Conscious and subconscious processing of fear- and trauma-related cues

Fast defensive responses to salient threatening stimuli are an important clinical feature of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). We investigated the neural correlates of subliminal and supraliminal processing of fearful faces and individualized trauma-related words in individuals with PTSD (n=26) compared with healthy controls (n=20) using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Increased activity in the right cerebellum and the posterior cingulum was observed in individuals with PTSD during subliminal processing of trauma-related words, whereas increased activity of the basal forebrain was found within the PTSD group when processing supraliminal trauma-related words. Moreover, significant positive correlations were found between re-experiencing symptoms and response within the amygdala, and between hyper-arousal symptoms and response within the periaqueductal gray matter, during subliminal processing of trauma-related words and during supraliminal processing of fearful faces, respectively. These findings further our understanding of rapid threat processing and defensive responses, highlighting the role of the cerebellum and periaqueductal gray matter as part of an 'innate alarm system' in PTSD.

Intrinsic Connectivity Networks in post-traumatic stress disorder during sub- and supraliminal processing of threat-related stimuli

OBJECTIVE

To investigate the functional connectivity of large-scale intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs) in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) during subliminal and supraliminal presentation of threat-related stimuli.

METHOD

Group independent component analysis was utilized to study functional connectivity within the ICNs most correlated with the Default-mode Network (DMN), Salience Network (SN), and Central Executive Network (CEN) in PTSD participants (n = 26) as compared to healthy controls (n = 20) during sub- and supraliminal processing of threat-related stimuli.

RESULTS

Comparing patients with PTSD with healthy participants, prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex involved in top-down regulation showed increased integration during subliminal threat processing within the CEN and SN and during supraliminal threat processing within the DMN. The right amygdala showed increased connectivity with the DMN during subliminal processing in PTSD as compared to controls. Brain regions associated with self-awareness and consciousness exhibited decreased connectivity during subliminal threat processing in PTSD as compared to controls: the claustrum within the SN and the precuneus within the DMN.

CONCLUSION

Key nodes of the ICNs showed altered functional connectivity in PTSD as compared to controls, and differential results characterized sub- and supraliminal processing of threat-related stimuli. These findings enhance our understanding of ICNs underlying PTSD at different levels of conscious threat perception.

Relational Memory Is Evident in Eye Movement Behavior despite the Use of Subliminal Testing Methods

While it is generally agreed that perception can occur without awareness, there continues to be debate about the type of representational content that is accessible when awareness is minimized or eliminated. Most investigations that have addressed this issue evaluate access to well-learned representations. Far fewer studies have evaluated whether or not associations encountered just once prior to testing might also be accessed and influence behavior. Here, eye movements were used to examine whether or not memory for studied relationships is evident following the presentation of subliminal cues. Participants assigned to experimental or control groups studied scene-face pairs and test trials evaluated implicit and explicit memory for these pairs. Each test trial began with a subliminal scene cue, followed by three visible studied faces. For experimental group participants, one face was the studied associate of the scene (implicit test); for controls none were a match. Subsequently, the display containing a match was presented to both groups, but now it was preceded by a visible scene cue (explicit test). Eye movements were recorded and recognition memory responses were made. Participants in the experimental group looked disproportionately at matching faces on implicit test trials and participants from both groups looked disproportionately at matching faces on explicit test trials, even when that face had not been successfully identified as the associate. Critically, implicit memory-based viewing effects seemed not to depend on residual awareness of subliminal scene cues, as subjective and objective measures indicated that scenes were successfully masked from view. The reported outcomes indicate that memory for studied relationships can be expressed in eye movement behavior without awareness.

The conjunction of non-consciously perceived object identity and spatial position can be retained during a visual short-term memory task

Although non-consciously perceived information has previously been assumed to be short-lived (< 500 ms), recent findings show that non-consciously perceived information can be maintained for at least 15 s. Such findings can be explained as working memory without a conscious experience of the information to be retained. However, whether or not working memory can operate on non-consciously perceived information remains controversial, and little is known about the nature of such non-conscious visual short-term memory (VSTM). Here we used continuous flash suppression to render stimuli non-conscious, to investigate the properties of non-consciously perceived representations in delayed match-to-sample (DMS) tasks. In Experiment I we used variable delays (5 or 15 s) and found that performance was significantly better than chance and was unaffected by delay duration, thereby replicating previous findings. In Experiment II the DMS task required participants to combine information of spatial position and object identity on a trial-by-trial basis to successfully solve the task. We found that the conjunction of spatial position and object identity was retained, thereby verifying that non-conscious, trial-specific information can be maintained for prospective use. We conclude that our results are consistent with a working memory interpretation, but that more research is needed to verify this interpretation.

Hippocampus is place of interaction between unconscious and conscious memories

Recent evidence suggests that humans can form and later retrieve new semantic relations unconsciously by way of hippocampus-the key structure also recruited for conscious relational (episodic) memory. If the hippocampus subserves both conscious and unconscious relational encoding/retrieval, one would expect the hippocampus to be place of unconscious-conscious interactions during memory retrieval. We tested this hypothesis in an fMRI experiment probing the interaction between the unconscious and conscious retrieval of face-associated information. For the establishment of unconscious relational memories, we presented subliminal (masked) combinations of unfamiliar faces and written occupations ("actor" or "politician"). At test, we presented the former subliminal faces, but now supraliminally, as cues for the reactivation of the unconsciously associated occupations. We hypothesized that unconscious reactivation of the associated occupation-actor or politician-would facilitate or inhibit the subsequent conscious retrieval of a celebrity's occupation, which was also actor or politician. Depending on whether the reactivated unconscious occupation was congruent or incongruent to the celebrity's occupation, we expected either quicker or delayed conscious retrieval process. Conscious retrieval was quicker in the congruent relative to a neutral baseline condition but not delayed in the incongruent condition. fMRI data collected during subliminal face-occupation encoding confirmed previous evidence that the hippocampus was interacting with neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge to support relational encoding. fMRI data collected at test revealed that the facilitated conscious retrieval was paralleled by deactivations in the hippocampus and neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge. We assume that the unconscious reactivation has pre-activated overlapping relational representations in the hippocampus reducing the neural effort for conscious retrieval. This finding supports the notion of synergistic interactions between conscious and unconscious relational memories in a common, cohesive hippocampal-neocortical memory space.

A critical role of the human hippocampus in an electrophysiological measure of implicit memory

The hippocampus has traditionally been thought to be critical for conscious explicit memory but not necessary for unconscious implicit memory processing. In a recent study of a group of mild amnesia patients with evidence of MTL damage limited to the hippocampus, subjects were tested on a direct test of item recognition confidence while electroencephalogram (EEG) was acquired, and revealed intact measures of explicit memory from 400 to 600 ms (mid-frontal old-new effect, FN400). The current investigation re-analyzed this data to study event-related potentials (ERPs) of implicit memory, using a recently developed procedure that eliminated declarative memory differences. Prior ERP findings from this technique were first replicated in two independent matched control groups, which exhibited reliable implicit memory effects in posterior scalp regions from 400 to 600 ms, which were topographically dissociated from the explicit memory effects of familiarity. However, patients were found to be dramatically impaired in implicit memory effects relative to control subjects, as quantified by a reliable condition × group interaction. Several control analyses were conducted to consider alternative factors that could account for the results, including outliers, sample size, age, or contamination by explicit memory, and each of these factors was systematically ruled out. Results suggest that the hippocampus plays a fundamental role in aspects of memory processing that are beyond conscious awareness. The current findings therefore indicate that both memory systems of implicit and explicit memory may rely upon the same neural structures - but function in different physiological ways.

Unconscious relational encoding depends on hippocampus

See Mayes (doi:10.1093/brain/awu284) for a scientific commentary on this article.

The hippocampus is thought to support only conscious memory, while neocortex supports both conscious and unconscious memory. Duss et al. show that amnesic patients with damage to the hippocampal–anterior thalamic axis exhibit a diminished form of unconscious encoding and retrieval, suggesting that certain forms of unconscious memory are hippocampus-dependent.

Textbooks divide between human memory systems based on consciousness. Hippocampus is thought to support only conscious encoding, while neocortex supports both conscious and unconscious encoding. We tested whether processing modes, not consciousness, divide between memory systems in three neuroimaging experiments with 11 amnesic patients (mean age = 45.55 years, standard deviation = 8.74, range = 23–60) and 11 matched healthy control subjects. Examined processing modes were single item versus relational encoding with only relational encoding hypothesized to depend on hippocampus. Participants encoded and later retrieved either single words or new relations between words. Consciousness of encoding was excluded by subliminal (invisible) word presentation. Amnesic patients and controls performed equally well on the single item task activating prefrontal cortex. But only the controls succeeded on the relational task activating the hippocampus, while amnesic patients failed as a group. Hence, unconscious relational encoding, but not unconscious single item encoding, depended on hippocampus. Yet, three patients performed normally on unconscious relational encoding in spite of amnesia capitalizing on spared hippocampal tissue and connections to language cortex. This pattern of results suggests that processing modes divide between memory systems, while consciousness divides between levels of function within a memory system.